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Background:	 Adverse	 events	 associated	 with	 surgical	 procedures	 can	 result	 in	
patient	 disability,	 death,	 or	 increased	 length	 of	 stay	 and	 reducing	 or	 eliminating	
adverse	events	is	a	top	priority	for	patient	safety.	A	major	part	of	the	perioperative	
nursing	 role	 is	 securing	 patient	 safety,	 yet	 adverse	 events	 continue	 to	 occur	 and	
patients	 continue	 to	 suffer	 harm.	 	 In	 the	 messy	 reality	 of	 the	 practice	 setting,	
perioperative	 nurses	 at	 times	 work	 in	 ways	 other	 than	 following	 the	 rules	 and	
standards	 that	 have	 been	 developed	 to	 support	 safe	 practice.	 This	 may	 have	
potential	 unintended	 consequences	 for	 patient	 safety.	 The	way	 that	 perioperative	
nurses	 work	 and	 respond	 and	 adapt	 to	 the	 challenges	 in	 the	 workplace	 and	 the	
competing	goals	to	‘get	the	job	done’,	is	the	focus	of	this	study.		
Purpose:	The	purpose	of	this	study	was	to	develop	a	substantive	theory	to	explain	
the	ways	 that	perioperative	nurses	work	 to	 get	 the	 job	done	and	 the	 factors	 that	
influence	their	decisions	to	deviate	from	standards	and	rules.	
Methods:	 Between	 2015	 and	 2016,	 a	 constructivist	 grounded	 theory	 study	 was	
conducted	 that	 included	 56	 hours	 of	 observation	 of	 practice	 and	 10	 hours	 of	 in-
depth	 semi-structured	 interviews.	 Five	 RNs	 and	 one	 EN	 working	 in	 operating	
theatres	at	a	public	and	private	hospital	in	Tasmania	participated	in	the	study.	
Findings:	Emerging	from	my	research	was	the	substantive	theory	that	perioperative	
nurses	 ‘reshape	their	practice	 in	response	to	being	pressured	and	feeling	pressured	
to	 get	 the	 job	 done’.	Whilst	 the	 participants	mostly	 complied	with	 standards	 and	
rules	 and	 expressed	 a	 genuine	 desire	 to	 follow	 them,	 there	 were	 circumstances	
where	 they	made	 a	 conscious	 decision	 to	work	 in	 other	ways.	 Factors	within	 the	
context	 in	 which	 perioperative	 nurse’s	 practice	 can	 both	 constrain	 and	 enable	
practicing	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 rules	 and	 these	 constraining	 factors	 can	 lead	 to	
5being	 pressured	 and	 feeling	 pressured	 which	 in	 turn	 constrains	 practicing	 in	
accordance	with	the	rules		
Discussion:	 Decision-making	 underpins	 practice	 and	 perioperative	 nurses	 employ	
experience	 and	 clinical	 judgment	 in	 making	 decisions	 about	 the	 way	 they	 work.	
Whilst	working	 in	ways	other	 than	 following	 the	 rules	 is	 intentional	 it	 is	 not	done	
with	 the	 intention	 to	 break	 the	 rules,	 rather	 it	 is	 for	 another	 purpose;	 that	 is	 to	
improve	patient	outcomes	and	team	and	organisational	performance.	The	emergent	
theory	 adds	 to	our	 understanding	of	 the	 role	 that	 organisational,	 team,	 individual	
characteristics	 and	 the	 ambiguity/clarity	 of	 rules,	 tasks	 and	 responsibilities	 play	 in	
generating	 pressure	 and	 creating	 an	 environment	 more	 vulnerable	 to	 working	 in	
ways	other	than	following	the	rules.		
Implications:	Despite	potential	benefits	 to	 the	patient,	 the	 team	and	organisation,	
decisions	to	deviate	from	standards	and	rules	may	result	in	unsafe	practice	and	the	
potential	for	patient	harm.	Lack	of	documentation	of	the	deviations	and	continuing	
absence	of	professional	conversations	around	this	issue	inhibits	our	capacity	to	learn	
from	work	as	done.	Opportunities	to	 improve	systems	and	processes	that	enhance	
patient	safety	and	to	amend	standards	and	rules	to	reflect	the	reality	of	practice	is	
lost	 and	 the	 potential	 benefits	 remain	 hidden.	 Further	 research	 on	 capturing	 and	
scrutinising	the	potential	benefits	of	deviating	from	rules	and	standards	with	the	aim	
of	 keeping	 patients	 safe,	 meeting	 organisational	 demands	 and	 progressing	
professional	practice	will	be	a	natural	progression	from	this	research	study.		
Conclusions:	 This	 theory	 advances	 the	 perioperative	 nurse’s	 perspective	 on	
responding	 to	 ‘being	 pressured’	 and	 ‘feeling	 pressured’	 in	 clinical	 practice.	 The	
theory	 is	 relevant	 to	 perioperative	 nurses,	 employing	 organisations,	 professional	
bodies,	 education	 providers	 and	 researchers	 who	 seek	 to	 better	 understand	 the	
messy	reality	of	practice;	develop	and	implement	strategies	to	address	factors	that	
constrain	 following	 standards	 and	 rules;	 close	 the	 gap	 between	work	 as	 imagined	
and	work	as	done	and	ultimately	make	health	care	safer.	
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Chapter	1:	Introduction	
Background	and	context	
Towards	the	end	of	an	operation,	the	first	surgical	count	was	completed	and	identified	
as	being	correct.	The	surgical	team	proceeded	to	close	the	wound.	A	standard	second	
count	 was	 undertaken	 which	 identified	 a	 missing	 surgical	 pack.	 A	 search	 of	 the	
immediate	area	was	undertaken	and	an	x-ray	was	requested	to	determine	if	the	pack	
had	been	left	in	the	abdominal	cavity.	A	surgical	pack	was	located	on	the	floor	and	the	
team	concluded	 this	 to	be	 the	 ‘missing	pack’.	 The	 surgeon	completed	 the	procedure	
and	 the	patient	was	 transferred	 to	 the	post-operative	 recovery	unit.	 In	 the	 recovery	
unit,	 an	 x-ray	 was	 undertaken	 which	 revealed	 the	 missing	 pack	 in-situ.	 The	 patient	
returned	to	theatre	for	removal	of	the	pack.		
What	were	the	major	contributing	factors?		
1. The	pack	was	counted	while	 it	was	still	within	 the	surgical	 cavity	and	announced	
correct	without	visualisation/validation	by	 the	 second	person	 responsible	 for	 the	
surgical	count.	This	is	contrary	to	the	standard	practice,	which	requires	two	staff	to	
observe/validate	the	surgical	count.		
2. The	procedure	was	concluded	on	the	assumption	that	the	count	was	correct	when	
a	 pack	was	 found	 on	 the	 floor.	 A	 standard	 re-count	was	 not	 completed	 prior	 to	
wound	 closure	 and	 transfer	 of	 the	 patient	 to	 the	 recovery	 unit	 (Victorian	
Government	2014).	
This	vignette	highlights	two	concerns	that	have	driven	this	research.	Firstly,	despite	
concerted	 efforts	 to	 make	 surgery	 safer	 patients	 continue	 to	 be	 harmed	 during	
surgery	 and	 secondly,	 notwithstanding	 the	 presence	 of	 rules	 and	 standards	 that	
support	safe	practice,	standard	practices	are	not	always	followed.		
	
More	than	234	million	operations	take	place	globally	each	year	with	complications	
of	surgery	common	and	often	preventable	(Haynes	et	al.	2009).	Adverse	events	can	
lead	 to	 patient	 disability,	 death,	 or	 increased	 length	of	 stay	 imposing	 a	 significant	
burden	 on	 the	 health	 care	 system,	 the	 patients	 and	 their	 families.	 In	 response	 to	
growing	concerns,	interest	has	grown	in	how	and	why	adverse	events	occur	during	
surgery	and	how	to	make	the	patient's	perioperative	journey	safer.		
 11 
There	 are	 several	 perioperative	 adverse	 events	 that	 are	 recognised	 as	 being	
amongst	 the	 top	 ten	 priorities	 for	 patient	 safety	 including,	 wrong	 patient/wrong	
procedure/wrong	site	 surgery;	unintended	 retained	 instruments	or	other	material;	
surgical	site	 infection;	 implanting	of	 incorrect	prostheses;	surgical	fires;	burns	from	
energy	 devices;	 pressure	 injuries	 and	 specimen	 management	 errors.	 The	
perioperative	nurse	has	a	significant	role	to	play	 in	detecting	and	preventing	these	
adverse	events	by	carrying	out	a	range	of	clinical	activities	to	ensure	the	provision	of	
a	safe	environment	for	patients,	thereby	minimizing	the	risk	of	harm.	A	major	focus	
of	 perioperative	nursing	 is	 on	patient	 safety;	 however	 adverse	 events	 continue	 to	
occur	and	patients	continue	to	suffer	harm	
	
My	 own	 personal	 knowledge	 and	 experience	 in	 the	 clinical	 setting	 coupled	 with	
literature	 on	 this	 topic	 supports	 the	 premise	 that	 whilst	 we	 know	 that	 there	 are	
standards	 and	 rules	 that	 inform	 and	 govern	 practice,	 nurses	 at	 times	 adopt	ways	
'other'	 than	 following	 the	 rules	 'to	 get	 the	 job	 done'.	 These	ways	 of	 working	 are	
variously	 identified	 as	 violations;	 deviations;	 rule	 breaking;	 rule	 bending;	 cutting	
corners;	shortcuts	and	workarounds.	What	is	evident	from	reviewing	the	literature	is	
a	 lack	 of	 clarity	 in	 definition	 and	 inconsistency	 in	 application	 of	 these	 terms	with	
some	 of	 these	 ways	 of	 working	 being	 considered	 acceptable	 and	 becoming	 the	
norm.	 The	 risk	 however	 is	 that	 these	 ways	 of	 working	 may	 have	 unintended	
consequences	for	the	patient.	That	is	deviating	from	rules	and	standards	may	lead	to	
an	adverse	outcome	for	the	patient.		
	
Perioperative	 nurses	 are	 continually	 balancing	 the	 imperative	 to	 deliver	 safe	 care	
with	other	demands	in	a	complex,	dynamic	and	rapidly	changing	environment.	The	
delivery	of	high	quality	nursing	care	to	attain	safe	patient	outcomes	requires	sound	
clinical	decision	making,	which	in	turn	is	based	on	making	an	accurate	judgment	on	
the	 most	 appropriate	 course	 of	 action	 to	 take	 in	 each	 situation.	 The	 question	 is	
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whether	in	responding	to	competing	goals	and	demands,	perioperative	nurses	work	
in	 ways	 that	 deviate	 from	 safe	 practices	 that	 can	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 lead	 to	
inadvertent	patient	harm.		
Statement	of	purpose	and	research	questions	
The	aim	of	this	research	was	to	explore	the	ways	that	perioperative	nurses	work	in	a	
complex	and	demanding	environment	where	there	are	competing	pressures	to	get	
the	 job	done	and	 to	develop	a	 substantive	 theory	 that	 interprets	and	explains	 the	
findings.		
	
This	study	explored	the	ways	that	perioperative	nurses	worked	from	the	perspective	
of	 the	 nurses	 themselves,	 using	 a	 constructivist	 grounded	 theory	 approach	 as	 the	
research	method	(Charmaz	2014).	The	primary	research	question	was	‘What	are	the	
ways	of	working	in	perioperative	nursing	and	the	implications	for	patient	safety	and	
nursing	practice?’	The	following	secondary	questions	support	the	primary	question:	
	
• What	are	the	different	ways	of	working	in	perioperative	nursing?	
• What	are	the	conditions	that	underlie	the	different	ways	of	working?	
• What	influences	the	nurse	engaging	in	different	ways	of	working?	
• Are	perioperative	nurses	mindful	of	working	in	different	ways?	
• What	are	the	implications	for	practice	and	patient?	
		
The	intentions	of	the	study	were	to:	
1. Describe	 the	 experiences,	 thoughts	 and	 feelings	 of	 perioperative	 nurses	 as	
they	go	about	their	daily	activities.	
2. Theorise	 about	 the	 phenomenon	 the	 research	 uncovered	 to	 enhance	 our	
understanding	of	the	way	that	perioperative	nurses	work	and	the	way	they	
respond	to	the	competing	demands	and	pressures	to	get	the	job	done.	
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Research	approach	
My	research	uses	qualitative	enquiry	from	a	constructivist	and	interpretive	paradigm	
to	better	understand	the	world	within	which	perioperative	nurses	work.	Grounded	
theory	seeks	to	discover	issues	that	are	important	to	specific	groups	of	people	and	
develop	 theory	 to	 give	meaning	 to	 those	 issues.	 The	 grounded	 theory	method	 is	
therefore	 eminently	 suited	 for	 this	 research	 study,	which	 aims	 to	 understand	 and	
give	 meaning	 to	 the	 issues	 faced	 by	 perioperative	 nurses	 as	 they	 go	 about	 their	
work.	 The	 constructivist	 grounded	 theory	 approach	 acknowledges	 the	 knowledge,	
values	and	views	that	the	researcher	brings	to	the	research	enabling	the	researcher	
to	be	an	active	participant.	
	
56	hours	of	observations,	10	hours	of	in	depth	interviews	and	memos	written	by	the	
researcher	 were	 the	 primary	 methods	 of	 data	 collection	 along	 with	 relevant	
information	 from	 the	 literature.	 Information	 from	 the	 literature	 was	 collected	
through	extensive	searches	of	library	databases	and	the	web;	reference	lists	of	key	
articles	 and	 from	 presentations	 attended	 and	 readings	 provided	 in	 units	 and	
workshops	attended	through	the	doctorate	program.	This	data	subsequently	formed	
the	basis	for	the	overall	findings	of	this	research.	
	
The	researcher	
I	 undertook	 my	 hospital-based	 training	 in	 the	 UK	 in	 the	 late	 1970’s,	 discovering	
perioperative	 nursing	 in	 the	 third	 year	 of	 training	 and	 subsequently	 developing	 a	
passion	 for	 this	 specialised	 area	 of	 nursing.	 Clinical	 practice,	 post-graduate	
education	 in	 the	 field	and	active	engagement	with	 state	and	national	professional	
bodies	 followed.	 Notwithstanding	 periods	 of	 employment	 in	 nursing	 education,	
management	and	hospital	administration,	this	passion	has	remained	throughout	my	
career.	
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My	 interest	 in	 risk	 management	 began	 following	 a	 presentation	 I	 attended	 in	
Singapore	in	2004,	of	the	findings	of	the	Quality	in	Australian	Health	Care	Study	by	
Wilson	and	Runciman	(1995).	At	the	time,	I	was	a	Perioperative	Services	Manager.	It	
struck	me	 then,	 that	everything	a	perioperative	nurse	did	 from	checking	a	patient	
into	 theatre	 to	 discharge	 from	 recovery	 was	 about	 managing	 risk.	 In	 fact,	
perioperative	 risk	 management	 begins	 with	 the	 booking	 of	 the	 patient	 onto	 a	
theatre	list.	The	consequences	for	the	patient,	staff	and	organisation,	when	risks	are	
not	effectively	managed	became	more	apparent	to	me	as	a	Director	of	Nursing	and	
then	Chief	Executive	Officer.	 I	have	maintained	a	keen	 interest	 in	patient	safety	 in	
the	operating	 theatre	and	the	contribution	the	perioperative	nurse	makes	 to	keep	
patients	 free	 from	 harm	 throughout	 their	 perioperative	 journey	 because	 of	 these	
experiences.	The	topic	for	a	thesis	was	therefore	not	hard	to	find.		
Rationale	and	significance	of	the	research	
The	rationale	for	this	study	stems	from	my	desire	to	understand	why	perioperative	
nurses	 engage	 in	 different	 ways	 of	 working;	 why	 they	 do	 not	 always	 practice	 in	
accordance	 in	 rules	 and	 standards;	 and	what	 the	 implication	 of	 this	might	 be	 for	
patient	 safety	 and	 professional	 practice.	 Practices	 that	 deviate	 from	 rules	 and	
standards	 may	 have	 potential	 unintended	 consequences	 for	 patient	 safety.	
Conversely,	they	may	offer	creative	and	innovative	solutions	to	practice	 issues	and	
better	and	more	efficient	ways	of	working.	Breaking	the	silence	about	rule	breaking	
in	the	practice	setting	and	describing	the	factors	at	play	when	perioperative	nurses	
make	 decisions	 about	 the	way	 they	 practice	will	 contribute	 to	 our	 understanding	
about	an	area	that	has	largely	remained	hidden	from	view.	A	better	understanding	
of	 the	 underlying	 mechanisms	 and	 processes	 that	 contribute	 to	 and/or	 underpin	
rule	breaking	and	deviations	from	practice	will	assist	in	informing	the	development	
of	strategies	to	redress	this	situation.	Further	work	on	capturing	and	scrutinising	the	
potential	 benefits	 of	 deviating	 from	 rules	 and	 standards	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 keeping	
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patients	safe,	meeting	organisational	demands	and	progressing	professional	practice	
will	be	a	natural	progression	from	this	research	study.		
	
Thesis	structure	
The	 thesis	 is	 presented	 in	 7	 chapters.	 This	 chapter	 introduces	 the	 research	 topic	
covering	 the	purpose	of	 the	 study	 and	 research	questions;	 the	 approach	 taken	 to	
conduct	 the	 research;	 the	 rationale	 and	 significance	 of	 the	 research;	 and	 situates	
myself	as	the	researcher	within	the	area	of	study.	
	
Chapter	2	delivers	an	overview	of	the	relevant	literature	and	positions	the	research	
question	in	the	context	of	the	literature	and	current	theoretical	understandings.	The	
chapter	 discusses	 the	 genesis	 of	 the	 patient	 safety	 movement;	 the	 nature	 of	
perioperative	 adverse	 events	 and	 how	 and	 why	 they	 occur;	 the	 role	 that	 human	
factors	and	systems	play	in	adverse	events;	and	the	ways	that	perioperative	nurses	
work	to	get	the	job	done.		
	
Chapter	 3	 expounds	 the	methodology	 and	 design	 of	 the	 research	 study	 and	 data	
collection	and	analysis	procedures	and	processes.	The	research	study	 is	positioned	
within	the	qualitative	paradigm	with	the	focus	on	the	constructivist	grounded	theory	
approach	 described	 by	 Charmaz	 (2014).	 Constructivist	 grounded	 theory	 research	
methods	 are	 explicated	 including	 the	 criteria	 against	 which	 the	 research	 is	
evaluated.	Data	collection	methods	and	data	analysis	procedures	are	described	and	
relevant	ethical	considerations	highlighted.		
	
Chapters	4	and	5	present	the	findings	from	the	research	under	the	headings	of	the	
context	within	which	 perioperative	 nurses	 practice	 and	 the	 factors	 that	 enable	 or	
constrain	 practicing	 in	 accordance	 with	 rules	 and	 standards;	 the	 phenomena	
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experienced	by	the	participants	as	they	strive	to	get	the	job	done;	and	the	process	in	
which	they	engage	in	response	to	the	phenomena	experienced.	
	
Chapter	 6	 provides	 the	 analysis	 and	 discussion	 of	 those	 findings	 under	 the	 same	
headings	 of	 context,	 phenomena	 and	 process	 and	 renders	 the	 substantive	 theory	
that	emerged	from	the	research.		
	
The	 final	 chapter	 highlights	 how	 the	 research	 question	 was	 answered	 and	 the	
broader	 implications	 of	 the	 study	 findings	 for	 patient	 safety	 and	 perioperative	
nursing	 practice.	 Several	 recommendations	 to	 address	 the	 findings	 are	 proposed	
along	with	opportunities	for	further	research	to	make	patient	care	safer.			
Summary	
My	 interest	 in	and	passion	 for	perioperative	nursing	has	been	present	 throughout	
my	 career.	 Knowing	 that	 patients	 continue	 to	 suffer	 adverse	 events	 during	 their	
surgical	experience	and	that	unsafe	practice	contributes	to	some	adverse	events	led	
me	 to	 consider	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 practice	 and	 patient	
outcomes.	Of	specific	interest	to	me	was	to	better	understand	through	the	eyes	of	
the	 perioperative	 nurse,	why	 standard	 practices	were	 not	 always	 adhered	 to	 and	
what	was	driving	or	influencing	their	decisions	to	follow	or	not	follow	the	rules.	This	
research	explores	the	ways	that	perioperative	nurses	work	in	what	is	a	challenging	
environment,	 laying	bare	 the	messy	 reality	of	 their	practice	world	and	bringing	 to	
life	the	landscapes	of	their	experiences.		
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Chapter	2:	Keeping	patients	safe		 	
	
The	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	to	provide	an	overview	of	the	relevant	literature	and	
position	 the	 research	 question	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 literature.	 This	 chapter	 will	
critically	evaluate	the	literature	locating	the	research	problem	in	the	wider	context	
of	patient	safety.	 It	will	provide	a	broad	perspective	on	 the	 issue	of	patient	safety	
and	how	and	why	adverse	events	occur,	narrowing	down	to	the	available	specialist	
literature	 pertaining	 to	 the	 specific	 issue	 of	 'ways	 of	 working'	 in	 perioperative	
nursing	and	the	implications	for	patient	care	and	perioperative	nursing	practice.	
	
This	chapter	will	discuss	the	role	that	rules,	standards	and	norms	play	in	supporting	
safe	practice	along	with	the	reasons	why	deviations	from	rules	and	standards	occur.	
To	better	understand	 the	work	of	perioperative	nurses	and	 to	provide	context	 for	
the	 reader,	 the	 chapter	will	 include	 a	 description	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	 perioperative	
nurse	 along	with	 the	 key	 activities	 perioperative	 nurses	 perform	 to	 keep	 patients	
safe.		
	
This	 review	 gathers	 literature	 from	academic	 and	 scholarly	 articles	 in	 professional	
journals	 obtained	 using	 key	 word	 searches	 in	 the	 University	 of	 Tasmania	 (UTAS)	
Library	databases	and	web	searches.	Reference	lists	from	key	articles	have	provided	
an	 additional	 source	 along	 with	 key	 author	 searches,	 textbooks,	 reports	 and	
presentations,	 selecting	 items	 from	a	cross	section	of	disciplines	 including	nursing,	
perioperative	 nursing,	 medicine,	 public	 health	 and	 quality	 and	 safety,	 based	 on	
relevance	to	the	research	problem	and	the	research	question.	Two	major	systematic	
reviews	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 workarounds	 from	 the	 United	 States	 (Halbesleben	 &	
Rathert	2008)	and	Australia	 (Debono	et	al	2013)	provided	access	 to	contemporary	
peer	 reviewed	 published	 articles	 and	 research	 studies	 pertaining	 to	 the	 research	
question.	The	literature	review	for	this	chapter	was	predominantly	conducted	over	a	
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period	 of	 9	 months	 from	 May	 2013	 to	 Feb	 2014.	 Engaging	 in	 the	 process	 of	
collecting	 and	 analysing	 data	 led	 to	 further	 searching	 of	 the	 literature	 to	 better	
understand	 what	 was	 happening	 and	 inform	 theorising.	 This	 latter	 literature	 has	
been	incorporated	throughout	Chapter	6:	The	substantive	theory.		
	
The	 review	 will	 firstly	 examine	 the	 genesis	 of	 the	 patient	 safety	 movement	 and	
appraise	the	studies	undertaken	to	determine	the	frequency	and	nature	of	adverse	
events	both	 internationally	and	nationally.	An	examination	of	the	 literature	on	the	
nature	 of	 perioperative	 adverse	 events	 and	 a	 critique	 of	 the	 literature	 on	 how	
adverse	 events	 and	 errors	 occur	with	 particular	 focus	 on	Human	 Factors	 research	
and	the	emerging	literature	on	the	role	of	safety	systems	in	health	care	will	follow.	
The	 role	 of	 non-technical	 skills	 encompassing	 teamwork,	 communication,	
leadership,	 situational	 awareness,	 anticipation,	 forethought,	 task	 management,	
decision-making	 and	 the	 ability	 to	 cope	 with	 pressure	 will	 be	 discussed.	 The	
literature	 review	 will	 also	 explore	 organisational	 influences	 on	 the	 ways	 that	
perioperative	 nurses	work.	 Finally,	 current	 literature	 and	 research	 on	 the	ways	 of	
working	 and	 their	 potential	 implications	 for	 patient	 safety	 and	 practice	 in	 the	
operating	 theatre	 are	 critiqued	 with	 specific	 emphasis	 on	 the	 gaps	 in	 current	
knowledge	that	this	thesis	aims	to	address.	
Patient	safety	
Haynes	 et	 al.	 (2009)	 estimate	 that	 hospitals	 perform	 234	million	 operations	 each	
year	 with	 complications	 of	 surgery	 common	 and	 often	 preventable.	 The	 rate	 of	
complications	 varies	 between	 studies	with	 reports	 of	 perioperative	 death	 rates	 of	
between	0.4	-	0.8%	and	complications	of	3	-	17%	(Anderson	et	al.	2013;	Haynes	et	al.	
2009;	Leape	et	al.	1991;	Wiegmann	et	al.	2007;	Wilson	&	Runciman	1995).	Given	the	
magnitude	of	surgical	procedures	performed	around	the	world	and	the	rate	of	death	
and	complications,	 interest	has	grown	 in	the	 last	 three	decades	as	to	why	adverse	
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events	 occur	 during	 the	 perioperative	 period	 and	 how	 to	 make	 the	 patient's	
perioperative	journey	safer.		
	
The	patient	safety	movement	first	began	in	the	US	in	the	early	1980s	driven	mainly	
by	 increasing	 malpractice	 claims	 (Leape	 et	 al.	 1991).	 The	 seminal	 1984	 Harvard	
Medical	Practice	Study	II	(Leape	et	al.	1991)	identified	3.7%	of	hospitalised	patients	
with	disabling	injuries	of	which	28%	were	due	to	negligent	care	and	that	48%	of	the	
adverse	events	were	associated	with	an	operation.	Of	 significance	was	 the	 finding	
that	errors	 in	management	accounted	for	58%	of	adverse	events	and	half	of	these	
events	were	preventable.	The	Utah	and	Colorado	Study	(UTCOS)	was	replicated	by	
Thomas	 et	 al.	 (2011)	who	 examined	 the	 incidence	 of	 adverse	 events	 in	 1992	 and	
found	similar	results	to	those	in	the	Harvard	study.		
	
In	 1992,	 the	 Quality	 in	 Australia	 Health	 Care	 Study	 (QAHCS)	 was	 initiated	 to	
determine	the	extent	of	unsafe	healthcare	in	Australia.	This	ground-breaking	study	
reviewed	 a	 random	 sample	 of	 14,179	 medical	 records	 and	 results	 showed	 an	
adverse	event	rate	of	16.6%	of	admissions	with	50.3%	being	associated	with	surgery	
(Wilson	 &	 Runciman	 1995).	 The	 adverse	 event	 for	 the	 QAHCS	 was	 significantly	
higher	than	the	2.7%	–	3.9%	reported	in	the	UTCOS.	
	
Runciman	 (2000)	 compared	 the	 results	 of	 the	 QAHCS	 with	 that	 of	 the	 UTCOS	
(Thomas,	EJ	et	al.	2000)	which	used	a	similar	methodology	to	better	understand	the	
disparity	of	 findings	between	the	studies.	He	 found	several	 factors	 that	 influenced	
this	 disparity	 including	 methodological	 considerations,	 admission	 and	 discharge	
thresholds	and	under-reporting	concluding	that	the	results	reflected	the	difference	
in	 aims	 of	 both	 studies.	 Notwithstanding	 this,	 Runciman	 (2000)	 contends	 that	
potentially	preventable	adverse	events	were	occurring	which	is	cause	for	concern.	
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In	a	critique	of	the	paper	written	by	Wilson	and	Runciman	(1995),	Hall	(2002,	p.	1)	
argues	that	the	study	drew	‘extraordinary	conclusions	concerning	the	frequency	and	
totality	of	hospital	 treatment	derived	 injuries	 and	 fatalities’.	He	 contends	 that	 the	
study	had	several	shortfalls	in	the	areas	of	definitions,	classifying	decisions,	sampling	
and	 mathematical	 foundations	 leading	 to	 his	 conclusion	 that	 the	 study	
overestimated	the	rate	the	adverse	events	and	could	not	be	used	to	extrapolate	the	
findings	at	a	national	level.		
	
Using	 the	 QAHCS,	 data	 Kable,	 Gibberd	 and	 Spigelman	 (2002)	 studied	 the	 adverse	
event	 rate	 for	 surgical	 patients,	 associated	disability,	 preventability	 and	 the	major	
risk	 factors.	 Consistent	 with	 the	 aforementioned	 studies	 they	 defined	 an	 adverse	
event	as	 ‘an	unintended	 injury	or	complication	which	results	 in	disability,	death	or	
prolongation	of	hospital	stay	and	is	caused	by	health	care	management	rather	than	
the	patients	disease’	and	preventability	as	‘an	error	in	management	due	to	failure	to	
follow	 accepted	 practice	 at	 an	 individual	 or	 system	 level’	 (Kable,	 Gibberd	 &	
Spigelman	2002,	p.	270).	
	
The	 study	 found	 that	 the	 rate	of	 adverse	events	 in	 surgical	 admissions	was	21.9%	
with	13%	resulting	in	permanent	disability	and	4%	in	death	and	that	48%	of	adverse	
events	 were	 preventable.	 The	 adverse	 event	 rate	 associated	 with	 surgical	
admissions	 was	 found	 to	 be	 higher	 than	 the	 rate	 for	medical	 admissions	 (13.3%)	
suggesting	 that	 surgery	 brings	 with	 it	 additional	 risk	 of	 harm,	 supported	 by	 their	
finding	 that	 75%	of	 surgical	 adverse	 events	were	 a	 result	 of	 the	operation	 (Kable,	
Gibberd	&	Spigelman	2002).	
	
A	significant	deficit	in	these	studies	lies	in	the	absence	of	detailed	information	about	
the	factors	that	contribute	to	adverse	events	during	surgery	and	the	types	of	error	
that	occur	within	the	perioperative	setting.	For	example	the	QAHCS	study	reported	
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that	53%	of	adverse	events	were	associated	with	absence	of	or	failure	to	use	policy,	
protocol	or	plan	(Wilson	&	Runciman	1995)	but	the	particular	policies	or	protocols	
were	 not	mentioned.	 25%	 of	 the	 reasons	 for	 failure	 to	 prevent	 an	 adverse	 event	
involved	failure	to	take	precautions	to	prevent	accidental	injury	(Wilson	&	Runciman	
1995)	but	the	types	of	accidental	 injury	 incurred	by	the	patient	were	not	detailed.	
The	 studies	 concentrated	 heavily	 on	 medical	 practitioners	 and	 overlooked	 other	
members	of	the	surgical	team.	The	types	of	performance	issues	that	contributed	to	
adverse	 events	 were	 not	 discussed	 in	 any	 detail.	 This	may	 be	 due	 to	 difficulty	 in	
extracting	 this	 information	 from	 the	 medical	 record	 and	 the	 reluctance	 of	 the	
reviewer	to	give	an	opinion	on	whether	another	practitioner	had	made	an	error.		
	
A	 systematic	 review	 of	 14	 retrospective	 records	 studies	 (including	 the	 Australian	
studies	mentioned	previously)	by	Anderson	et	 al.	 (2013)	 found	 that	non-operative		
errors	were	more	 frequent	 than	errors	 in	 surgical	 technique.	Non-operative	errors	
included	 incorrect	or	delayed	diagnosis	and	treatment	associated	with	monitoring,	
medication,	 anaesthesia	 and	 judgment.	 Errors	 in	 surgical	 technique	 also	 included	
errors	 in	 operative	 management.	 This	 review	 did	 not	 contribute	 any	 additional	
information	 in	 relation	 to	 performance	 or	 system	 errors	 or	 discuss	 the	 specific	
perioperative	 events	 that	 can	 lead	 to	 patient	 harm	 such	 as	 wrong	 site,	 wrong	
person,	wrong	procedure	 surgeries,	 foreign	bodies	 left	 in	 a	patient	during	 surgery	
and	other	perioperative	events.		
	
Whilst	 there	 is	 debate	 about	 the	 accuracy	 of	 the	 rate	 of	 adverse	 events	 there	 is	
consensus	that	adverse	events	do	frequently	occur	and	that	many	are	preventable.	
These	studies	have	been	successful	in	bringing	the	issue	into	the	public	domain	and	
in	raising	the	 level	of	awareness	and	debate	on	how	best	to	tackle	the	problem	of	
iatrogenic	injury.	Another	positive	contribution	has	been	in	the	identification	of	risk	
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factors	for	adverse	events	including	age	and	length	of	stay	and	the	types	of	clinical	
management	and	systems	errors	that	contribute	to	adverse	events.		
	
The	next	section	will	discuss	the	nature	and	significance	of	adverse	events	specific	to	
the	perioperative	setting.	
Perioperative	adverse	events	
Adverse	 events	 that	 are	 of	 particular	 relevance	 to	 perioperative	 nursing	 include	
wrong	 patient/wrong	 procedure/wrong	 site	 surgery;	 retained	 surgical	 items;	
breaches	 in	 asepsis;	 burns	 from	 energy	 devices;	 surgical	 fires;	 pressure	 injuries;	
specimen	management	errors	 and	 implanting	of	 incorrect	prostheses	 (Steelman	&	
Graling	2013a;	Steelman,	Graling	&	Perkhounkova	2013b).		
	
Known	 as	 'never	 events'	 in	 the	 UK,	 'sentinel	 events'	 in	 the	 US	 and	 Australia	 and	
'serious	 adverse	 events'	 in	 New	 Zealand,	 the	 common	 definition	 is	 an	 event	 that	
causes	serious	harm	and	is	generally	accepted	as	being	preventable	(AIHW	&	ASQHC	
2007;	Health	Quality	and	Safety	Commission	2013;	NHS	Department	of	Health	2012;	
The	 Joint	 Commission	 Sentinel	 Event	 Unit	 2013).	 A	 list	 of	 eight	 such	 events	 was	
introduced	 into	 the	UK	 in	2009	and	 the	 list	has	 subsequently	grown	 to	 include	25	
types	of	events	with	wrong	site	surgery	being	the	most	frequently	occurring	event	
(Health	Quality	and	Safety	Commission	2013).	The	Joint	Commission	Sentinel	Events	
Unit	(JCSEU)	lists	28	sentinel	events	including	wrong	patient,	wrong	site,	wrong	side	
surgery,	un-intended	retention	of	 foreign	object	and	anaesthesia	events	 (The	Joint	
Commission	Sentinel	 Event	Unit	 2013).	 In	Australia,	 there	 is	 a	national	 core	 set	of	
eight	sentinel	events	including	procedures	involving	the	wrong	patient	or	body	part	
and	unintended	retained	instruments	or	other	material	(AIHW	&	ASQHC	2007).		
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The	next	section	will	outline	the	nature	and	significance	of	these	adverse	events	to	
provide	the	context	for	future	discussion	on	the	role	of	the	perioperative	nurse	and	
the	implications	of	ways	of	working	for	practice	and	patient	safety.		
	
Wrong	patient/wrong	procedure/wrong	site	surgery	
	
Wrong	 patient/wrong	 procedure/wrong	 site	 surgery	 is	 the	 fourth	 commonest	
sentinel	event	after	patient	suicide,	operative	and	post-operative	complications	and	
medication	errors	(Hanchanale	et	al.	2014)	and	has	been	identified	as	being	the	top	
safety	priority	for	perioperative	nurses	(Steelman	&	Graling	2013a).			
	
In	 the	 UK	 in	 2011/2012,	 70	 cases	 of	 wrong	 patient/wrong	 site/wrong	 procedure	
surgery	 were	 reported	 (NHS	 England	 Patient	 Safety	 Domain	 2014);	 in	 the	 US		
between	2004	and	2011,	1037	incidents		(The	Joint	Commission	Sentinel	Event	Unit	
2013)	and	in	New	Zealand	in	2012-2013,	8	cases	were	reported	(Health	Quality	and	
Safety	Commission	2013).	
	
In	 2007	 the	 Australian	 Institute	 of	 Health	 and	Welfare	 (AIHW)	 and	 the	 Australian	
Commission	on	Safety	and	Quality	in	Health	Care	(ACSQHC)	published	the	first	joint	
report	 on	 sentinel	 events	 in	 public	 hospitals	 for	 the	 period	 2004/2005	 (AIHW	 &	
ASQHC	 2007).	 This	 report	 identified	 53	 incidents	 of	 wrong	 patient/wrong	
procedure/wrong	 site	 surgery	 representing	 41%	 of	 all	 sentinel	 events.	 As	 these	
figures	do	not	include	sentinel	events	from	private	hospitals	the	incidence	of	wrong	
surgery	in	Australia	is	likely	to	be	much	higher	than	that	reported.		
	
A	US	study	by	Clarke	et	al.	(2007)	reported	427	incidents	of	near	misses	or	surgical	
interventions	started	involving	wrong	patient,	wrong	procedure,	wrong	site	with	83	
patients	having	an	incorrect	procedure	performed	to	completion.	Interestingly	they	
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found	that	on	31	occasions,	a	formal	time	out	procedure	did	not	prevent	the	wrong	
surgery.	 A	 time	 out	 procedure	 is	 a	 component	 of	 the	World	 Health	 Organisation	
(WHO)	 initiative	 to	 promote	 safer	 surgery	 and	 reduce	 deaths	 and	 complications	
from	 surgery	 (Jones	 2013).	 The	 procedure	 requires	 the	 surgical	 team	 taking	 'time	
out'	 from	 their	 other	 tasks	 to	 go	 through	 the	 surgical	 safety	 checklist	 prior	 to	
commencing	 the	 operation	 (Haugen	 et	 al.	 2013).	 It	 involves	 the	 whole	 team	
confirming	 that	 the	 correct	patient	 is	having	 the	 correct	procedure	on	 the	 correct	
site	along	with	checking	other	critical	information	such	as	anaesthetic	concerns	and	
allergies	(Jones	2013).	
	
Unintended	Retained	items	
	
An	unintended	retained	item	is	an	instrument,	surgical	swab/sponge,	needle	or	any	
other	 item	 unintentionally	 left	 inside	 a	 patient	 on	 completion	 of	 the	 surgical	
procedure.	 Surgical	 sponges	 are	 the	 most	 common	 item	 left	 behind	 and	 the	
abdomen,	pelvis	and	thorax	the	most	frequent	sites	(Feldman	2011).	The	incidence	
of	 unintended	 retained	 items	 has	 been	 estimated	 to	 be	 between	 1	 in	 1000	
operations	to	1	in	18000	operations	(Feldman	2011;	Gawande	et	al.	2003;	Zahiri	et	
al.	2011).		
	
A	review	of	54	medical	records	that	were	associated	with	a	retained	item	filed	with	
a	 large	malpractice	 insurer	 in	 the	 state	of	Massachusetts	between	1985	and	2001	
found	 69%	 of	 the	 retained	 items	 were	 surgical	 sponges	 and	 31%	 instruments.	 In	
examining	 the	characteristics	of	 the	54	cases	he	 found	 that	54%	of	 retained	 items	
had	been	 left	 in	the	abdomen	or	pelvis,	22%	in	the	vagina,	7.4%	in	the	thorax	and	
17%	elsewhere	 including	 spinal	 canal,	 face,	 brain	 and	 extremities	 (Gawande	 et	 al.	
2003).		
	
 25 
161	 cases	 of	 retained	 foreign	 object	 post-surgery	 were	 reported	 to	 the	 UK	
Department	of	Health	in	2011/2012	(NHS	England	Patient	Safety	Domain	2014).	The	
Joint	 Commission	 Sentinel	 Event	 Unit	 reported	 875	 incidents	 of	 unintended	
retention	of	a	foreign	body	(The	Joint	Commission	Sentinel	Event	Unit	2013)	and	in	
New	Zealand	in	2012-2013	there	were	13	incidents	of	retained	items	(Health	Quality	
and	 Safety	 Commission	 2013).	 In	 Australia	 for	 the	 period	 2004/5	 there	 were	 27	
reports	of	retained	items	constituting	20%	of	all	reported	sentinel	events	(AIHW	&	
ASQHC	 2007).	 These	 figures	 do	 not	 include	 sentinel	 events	 from	private	 hospitals	
and	numbers	are	therefore	likely	to	be	higher.		
	
Surgical	Site	Infection	
	
A	surgical	site	infection	(SSI)	is	an	infection	arising	following	surgery	and	specifically	
related	to	the	surgical	site.	The	overall	incidence	of	SSI	is	5-15%	and	they	account	for	
between	10-30%	of	 all	 hospital	 acquired	 infections	 (Coleman	et	 al.	 2010).	 Surgical	
site	 infections	 result	 from	 contamination	 by	 the	 patient's	 own	 flora	 and	 or	 from	
organisms	on	staff	and/or	in	the	environment	(Spelman	2002).	To	minimise	the	risk	
of	 SSI,	 surgical	 procedures	 require	 strict	 adherence	 to	 sterile	 technique	 (Simko	
2012).	 Breaks	 in	 sterile	 technique	 have	 been	 shown	 to	 cause	 infection,	 pain	 and	
increased	 length	 of	 stay	 (Hopper	 &	Moss	 2010)	 and	 can	 be	 an	 economic	 burden	
(Coleman	et	al.	2010).		
	
Incorrect	implants	
	
Implanting	 an	 incorrect	 prosthesis	 or	 component	 can	 significantly	 affect	 the	
outcome	for	a	patient.	In	the	UK	this	is	known	as	‘component	size	mismatch’	and	is	a	
designated	Never	Event	 (Pata	2016).	Using	a	device	 that	 is	 the	wrong	size	or	does	
not	 properly	 match	 other	 components	 can	 lead	 to	 soft-tissue	 irritation,	
impingement,	 pain,	 decreased	 motion,	 poor	 function	 and	 ultimately,	 a	 second	
operation	 may	 be	 required	 (Lowry,	 McGrath	 &	 Mihalko	 2014).	 Statistics	 on	 the	
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incidence	 of	 implanting	 incorrect	 prostheses	 are	 not	 readily	 available	 in	 Australia.	
However	 41	 incidences	 of	 wrong	 implant/prosthesis	 were	 reported	 to	 the	 UK	
Department	of	Health	in	2011/2012	(NHS	England	Patient	Safety	Domain	2014)	and	
there	 is	no	reason	why	this	event	would	not	occur	with	similar	 frequency	 in	other	
countries	including	Australia.		
	
Burns	from	energy	devices		
	
The	use	of	 diathermy	has	 become	an	 integral	 part	 of	 surgical	 technique	 since	 the	
1920's.	Surgical	diathermy	or	electro	cautery	 is	the	application	of	a	high-frequency	
electric	current	to	biological	tissue	to	cut	or	coagulate	tissue	to	achieve	haemostasis	
(Saaiq,	 Zaib	 &	 Ahmad	 2012).	 It	 is	 estimated	 that	 diathermy	 is	 used	 in	 3	 million	
procedures	 in	 the	 UK	 annually	 (Medicines	 and	 Healthcare	 Products	 Regulatory	
Agency	 2000).	 Although	widely	 used,	 diathermy	 is	 not	without	 risk	 to	 the	 patient	
and	may	cause	burns,	electrocution,	surgical	fires	and	smoke	inhalation	(Saaiq,	Zaib	
&	Ahmad	2012).		
	
Data	on	the	incidence	of	burns	in	Australia	and	overseas	is	not	readily	available	but	
the	UK	 there	were	 512	 incidents	 involving	 electro	 surgery	 reported	 from	 1998	 to	
2001	 (Medicines	 and	 Healthcare	 Products	 Regulatory	 Agency	 2000),	 largely	 to	 do	
with	equipment	failure	(Beesley	&	Taylor	2006).	
	
Surgical	fires	
	
Surgical	 fires	occur	 rarely	but	can	have	catastrophic	consequences	 for	 the	patient.	
Fires	are	a	risk	due	to	the	presence	of	the	three	elements	of	the	fire	triangle.	First,	
an	ignition	source	such	as	electro	cautery	instruments,	fibre	optic	light	sources	and	
light	cables,	argon	beam	coagulators,	electrical	equipment	and	power	tools	that	can	
produce	sparks	(Watson	2006).	Second,	a	fuel	source	such	an	alcohol	based	surgical	
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prep	 solution	 (Rocos	&	Donaldson	 2012).	 The	 third	 element	 is	 oxygen,	which	 can	
sequester	 beneath	 the	 drapes.	 The	 most	 common	 ignition	 sources	 are	 electro	
surgery	devices,	lasers	and	fibre	optic	light	sources	(Beesley	&	Taylor	2006;	Knudson	
2013;	Saaiq,	Zaib	&	Ahmad	2012).	
	
The	rate	of	surgical	fires	around	the	world	is	difficult	to	determine	but	two	reports	
from	 the	 US	 indicate	 a	 range	 from	 50	 and	 200	 surgical	 fires	 every	 year	 with	 a	
mortality	rate	of	20%	(Zahiri	et	al.	2011)	and	up	to	650	surgical	fires	occur	each	year,	
with	 up	 to	 5%	 causing	 death	 or	 serious	 harm	 (Rocos	&	 Donaldson	 2012).	 A	 2012	
report	from	the	Pennsylvania	Patient	Safety	Authority	(PPSA)	analysed	70	reports	of	
surgical	fires	submitted	to	its	database	from	July	1,	2004	to	June	30,	2011.	The	data	
indicated	a	downward	trend	in	the	number	of	fires	from	2010	to	2011	which	could	
be	 attributed	 to	 greater	 awareness	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 strategies	 to	
minimise	this	risk	(Mathias	2013).		
Mishandling	of	Specimens	
	
There	 is	 scant	 literature	 on	 the	 rate	 of	 incidents	 involving	 mislabelled	 or	 lost	
specimens.	The	PPSA	received	30	reports	in	2005	involving	specimens	that	were	lost	
between	 retrieval	 and	 the	 laboratory	 (Anon	 2008;	 Pennslyvania	 Patient	 Safety	
Authority	 2005).	 A	 study	 on	 specimen	 identification	 errors	 at	 the	 John	 Hopkins	
Hospital	 in	 the	 US	 found	 an	 error	 rate	 of	 4.3	 per	 1000	 surgical	 specimens	 (Anon	
2008).	 Mislabelled	 or	 lost	 specimens	 may	 result	 in	 inappropriate	 or	 unnecessary	
treatment	and	may	delay	diagnosis.	
Positioning	injuries	
	
Patients	 can	 and	 do	 sustain	 injuries	 resulting	 from	 positioning	 for	 their	 surgical	
procedure,	 from	 organ	 damage	 to	 direct	 nerve	 damage.	 Whilst	 the	 actual	
prevalence	 is	 not	 known,	 closed	 claims	 for	 negligence	 offer	 an	 insight	 into	 the	
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nature	 and	 extent	 of	 the	 problem.	 Of	 more	 than	 1500	 claims	 reviewed	 against	
anaesthetists	in	the	US,	15%	were	for	nerve	injury	(Gerken	2014).	A	number	of	cases	
of	 negligence	 for	 nerve	 and	 tissue	 damage	 from	 positioning	 during	 surgery	 are	
discussed	by	Murphy	(2004)	who	reiterates	the	importance	of	perioperative	nurses	
following	standards	for	positioning	to	avoid	patient	harm	and	possible	litigation.	
	
The	preceding	 overview	of	 the	 common	 injuries	 sustained	by	 patients	 undergoing	
surgery	highlights	the	need	for	all	members	of	the	surgical	team	to	be	cognisant	of	
all	 the	 risks	associated	with	surgery,	not	 just	 those	 that	are	directly	 related	 to	 the	
surgical	 procedure	 itself.	 The	 term	 ‘adverse	 event’	 describes	 such	 injuries	 and	 is	
defined	as:	
	
An	unintended	 injury	or	 complication,	which	 results	 in	 death,	 disability	 or	
prolongation	 of	 hospital	 stays	 and	 is	 caused	 by	 healthcare	 management	
rather	than	the	patient’s	disease	(Kable,	Gibberd	&	Spigelman	2002,	p.	2).		
	
This	definition	makes	clear	the	role	that	healthcare	management	plays	in	causing	an	
unintended	injury.	Conversely,	healthcare	management	can	also	detect	and	prevent	
adverse	events	from	occurring.	The	detection	and	prevention	of	adverse	events	is	a	
key	role	of	the	perioperative	nurse.		
	
	 	
 29 
The	role	of	the	perioperative	nurse	in	keeping	patients	safe	
Clearly	 defining	 and	 articulating	 the	 role	 of	 the	 perioperative	 nurse	 has	 been	
problematic	 throughout	 history	 and	 there	 is	 scant	 literature	on	 this	 specific	 topic.	
The	different	ways	that	the	role	has	historically	developed	throughout	the	world	and	
the	 introduction	 of	 various	 support	 roles	 to	 complement/replace	 some	 traditional	
aspects	of	the	role	has	compounded	this	(van	Beuzekom	&	Boer	2006).	For	example	
in	the	US	and	the	Netherlands,	 there	are	surgical	 technicians	so	nurses	now	rarely	
scrub	 and	 in	 the	UK	 there	 are	 nursing	 and	 non-nursing	 pathways	 to	 becoming	 an	
operating	department	practitioner	(Jackson	et	al.	2015;	Thomas,	J	&	Warwick	2015;	
van	Beuzekom	&	Boer	2006).	In	Australia,	there	are	differences	in	the	perioperative	
nursing	roles	between	states	with	some	states	and/or	hospitals	restricting	the	role	
of	the	enrolled	nurse	(Davies	2005).	
	
The	costs	associated	with	providing	a	full	nursing	perioperative	workforce	has	been	
one	of	 the	drivers	 for	 the	 introduction	of	 support	 roles	 into	 the	operating	 theatre	
overseas	 along	 with	 shortages	 of	 medical	 personnel	 and	 lack	 of	 availability	 of	
medical	staff	to	assist	during	surgery	(McGarvey,	Chambers	&	Boore	2000).	Australia	
is	not	 immune	 to	 the	push	 to	 introduce	non-regulated	workers	 into	 the	operating	
theatre	and	it	is	therefore	an	imperative	that	Australian	perioperative	nurses	clearly	
define	their	role	to	retain	their	relevance	as	 integral	to	the	delivery	of	safe	patient	
care.		
	
When	 looking	 for	 a	 clear	 definition	 of	 perioperative	 nursing,	 it	 quickly	 becomes	
evident	 that	one	 is	hard	 to	 find.	This	points	 to	 ‘an	 inherent	complexity	 in	 the	 role	
that	has	made	 it	difficult	 to	define’	 (McGarvey,	Chambers	&	Boore	2000,	p.	1096).	
McGarvey,	Chambers	and	Boore	 (2000)	 found	 that	perioperative	nurses	 tended	 to	
describe	their	role	 in	terms	of	the	functions	they	performed	rather	than	through	a	
philosophy	 of	 care.	 This	 approach	 appears	 to	 be	 the	 one	 taken	 by	 the	 Australian	
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College	 of	 Operating	 Room	 Nurses	 (ACORN)	 who	 publish	 competencies	 for	 the	
perioperative	 nurse	 and	 statements	 outlining	 the	 key	 elements	 of	 anaesthetic,	
scrub,	circulating/scout	and	recovery	nursing	roles,	but	not	an	overall	definition	or	
underpinning	philosophy	of	perioperative	nursing	(ACORN	2016).	
	
McGarvey,	Chambers	and	Boore	(2000),	explored	the	historical	development	of	the	
role	 of	 the	 perioperative	 nurse	 and	 the	 influence	 of	 cultural,	 socio-political	 and	
economic	 contexts	 on	 perioperative	 nursing	 practice.	 The	 study	 by	 Sigurdsson	
(2001)	explored	what	it	meant	to	be	a	perioperative	nurse.	Of	specific	relevance	to	
this	discussion	on	the	role	of	the	perioperative	nurse	is	the	pattern	she	identified	as	
‘defending	this	place’.	Within	this	pattern,	Sigurdsson	(2001,	pp.	211-212)	identified	
the	 themes:	 ‘How	 do	 I	 describe	 it?’;	 ‘Is	 it	 nursing?’;	 ‘It	 is	 nursing’;	 ‘the	 art	 of	
perioperative	nursing’;	and	‘changing	times’;	as	representative	of	the	way	the	nurses	
viewed	 their	 work	 and	 their	 identity.	 This	 clearly	 indicates	 the	 difficulty	 that	
perioperative	nurses	have	in	clarifying	their	role	within	the	traditional	definition	of	
nursing.	 This	 leads	 to	 difficulties	 with	 defending	 their	 place	 as	 nurses	 within	 the	
perioperative	setting,	raising	fears	about	the	future	of	perioperative	nursing	practice	
and	 making	 it	 even	 more	 difficult	 to	 clearly	 define	 their	 role	 and	 protect	 their	
professional	space.		
	
The	 original	 role	 of	 the	 perioperative	 nurse	 in	 the	 1800’s	 was	 care	 of	
instrumentation,	 preparation	of	 the	 environment	 and	 assisting	 the	 surgeon	 at	 the	
table,	 all	 of	 which	 required	 ‘diligence	 and	 obedience’	 and	 was	 therefore	 ideally	
suited	 to	 nurses	 (McGarvey,	 Chambers	 &	 Boore	 2000,	 p.	 1093).	 This	 role	 has	
expanded	 to	 recognise	 the	 ‘centrality	 of	 the	 patient’	 to	 the	 perioperative	 nursing	
role	along	with	continuing	the	role	of	caring	for	and	managing	increasingly	complex	
surgical	instrumentation	and	equipment	(Bull	and	Fitzgerald	2006,	p.7).	The	focus	on	
instrumentation,	equipment	and	the	environment	as	an	adjunct	to	delivering	direct	
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care	 to	 the	patient	has	 led	 to	 some	criticism	of	 the	perioperative	 role	being	more	
technical	 than	 nursing.	 However	 Bull	 and	 Fitzgerald	 (2006)	 found	 in	 their	
ethnographic	 study	 that	 perioperative	 nurses	 blend	 traditional	 nursing	 care	 and	
technological	ability	in	their	practice	and	ask	why	a	technical	focus	is	criticised	when	
it	 ensures	 safe	 patient	 care?	 The	 activities	 that	 perioperative	 nurses	 perform	pre,	
intra	and	post	procedure	facilitate	the	provision	of	a	safe	environment	for	patients	
and	 helps	 prevent	 potential	 complications	 (Rauta	 et	 al.	 2013).	 Another	 key	
ingredient	 of	 quality	 care	 is	 coordination	 (Matlow	 et	 al.	 2006)	 and	 the	 successful	
completion	of	any	operating	 list	 requires	a	high	 level	of	skills	 in	organisation,	 time	
management	 and	 coordination.	 The	 circulating	 or	 scout	 nurses	 undertakes	 these	
activities	 in	 the	 theatres	where	 this	 research	was	 conducted.	 In	other	hospitals,	 it	
may	be	the	scrub	nurse.		
	
The	literature	is	consistent	in	identifying	that	perioperative	nurses	have	a	key	role	in	
securing	patient	safety	and	preventing	mistakes	(Alfredsdottir	&	Bjornsdottir	2008;	
Beyea	2008;	Chard	2010;	Farrell	&	Davies	2006;	Joy	2009;	Kleinbeck	1996;	Lamberg,	
Salantera	&	 Junttila	2013;	McNamara	1995;	Rauta	et	al.	2013;	Steelman	&	Graling	
2013a)	and	consider	 these	 to	be	both	 their	 responsibility	and	within	 their	 locus	of	
control	(Chard	2010).	The	top	patient	safety	issues	identified	by	perioperative	nurses	
include	 wrong	 site/procedure/patient	 surgery,	 retained	 surgical	 items,	 aseptic	
aspects	of	 care,	 positioning	 and	pressure	 injuries,	 specimen	management,	 surgical	
fires	and	burns	from	energy	devices	(Rauta	et	al.	2013;	Steelman	&	Graling	2013a).	
Management	 of	 implants	 has	 also	 been	 recognised	 as	 an	 emerging	 risk	 (Lowry,	
McGrath	 &	 Mihalko	 2014).	 The	 literature	 provides	 research	 and	 evidence	 based	
actions	to	minimise	the	risk	of	patient	harm	and	these	have	been	used	to	inform	the	
standards	developed	by	ACORN	(ACORN	2016).	These	standards	are	closely	aligned	
with	 similar	 standards	 in	 the	 UK,	 US	 and	 Canada	 and	 represent	 the	 accepted	
standard	of	professional	practice	for	perioperative	nurses	in	Australia.			
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The	key	activities	in	relation	to	each	of	the	safety	issues	identified	by	perioperative	
nurses	will	now	be	summarised	to	provide	the	reader	with	an	understanding	of	the	
actions	that	the	perioperative	nurse	undertakes	to	minimise	the	risk	of	harm	during	
a	 patient’s	 perioperative	 stay.	 The	 following	 sections	 will	 reference	 the	 relevant	
ACORN	 standard	 acknowledging	 that	 each	 standard	 has	 a	 set	 of	 references	
evidencing	the	sources	from	which	the	standard	was	developed.	
	
Patient	identification	
	
A	 key	 perioperative	 nursing	 activity	 aimed	 at	 reducing	 patient	 harm	 is	 to	 confirm	
that	the	correct	patient	is	receiving	the	correct	procedure	on	the	correct	site.	These	
checks	commence	on	arrival	of	the	patient	into	theatre	when	the	ward	nurse	hands	
over	 the	 patient	 to	 the	 perioperative	 nurse.	 It	 is	 therefore	 critical	 that	 the	
perioperative	nurse	remains	vigilant	throughout	this	process	and	the	Team	Time	Out	
(TTO).	 The	 introduction	 of	 the	 World	 Health	 Organisation	 (WHO)	 Surgical	 Safety	
Checklist	(World	Alliance	for	Patient	Safety	2008)	has	provided	the	framework	for	a	
process	 that	 involves	people	within	 the	operating	 theatre	 taking	a	 ‘time	out’	 from	
their	 other	 tasks	 to	 check	 among	other	 things,	 patient	 identity	 and	document	 the	
outcome	 from	 the	 check.	 Patient	 Identification	 is	 one	 of	 the	 10	 National	 Clinical	
Standards	developed	by	the	Australian	Commission	on	Safety	and	Quality	in	Health	
Care	 (ACQSHC	 2012)	 and	 is	 a	 standard	 against	 which	 hospital	 performance	 is	
measured	 for	 accreditation.	 The	 tool	 used	 may	 vary	 between	 hospitals	 in	 both	
format	 and	 content	 but	 the	 underlying	 principles	 are	 consistent;	 that	 the	 surgical	
team	confirms	that	the	correct	patient	 is	having	the	correct	surgery	on	the	correct	
site,	 before	 surgical	 incision	 and	 ideally	 before	 being	 anesthetised.	 The	 ACORN	
Position	Statement:	Surgical	Safety	(ACORN	2016)	endorses	the	WHO	Surgical	Safety	
Checklist.	 The	 team	 member	 responsible	 for	 initiation	 of	 the	 protocol	 varies	
between	 hospitals	 and	 teams.	 Despite	 these	 variations,	 it	 is	 the	 role	 of	 the	
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perioperative	 nurse	 to	 participate	 fully	 in	 the	 team	 time	 out	 and	 take	 a	 clinical	
leadership	role	to	ensure	adherence	to	the	protocol.			
The	surgical	count	
	
The	 major	 perioperative	 nursing	 activity	 for	 avoiding	 an	 unintended	 retained	
surgical	item	is	the	surgical	count	(ACORN	2016).	This	is	a	joint	responsibility	of	the	
scout/circulating	nurse	and	scrub	nurse,	 in	collaboration	with	the	rest	of	 the	team	
and	 again	 requires	 vigilance.	 The	 pertinent	 actions	 involve	 the	 scout/circulating	
nurse	and	the	scrub	nurse	counting	out	loud	together	the	items	listed	on	the	count	
sheet	and	the	instrument	tray	lists	prior	to	commencement	of	surgery,	on	closure	of	
a	 cavity	 and	 again	 at	 skin	 closure.	 Counting	 of	 items	 added	 during	 the	 procedure	
occurs	 in	 the	same	manner.	 It	 is	 the	specific	 role	of	 the	scrub	nurse	 to	 inform	the	
surgeon	 of	 the	 status	 of	 the	 count	 at	 each	 closure	 phase	 and	 the	 specific	
responsibility	of	the	scout	nurse	to	accurately	document	the	count.		
	
The	 tools	 for	 recording	 the	count	vary	between	hospitals	 from	paper	based	 forms	
which	may	 also	 incorporate	 the	 documentation	 of	 other	 aspects	 of	 perioperative	
care,	 to	 electronic	 forms	 which	 are	 often	 part	 of	 a	 broader	 electronic	 patient	
management	 system.	 ACORN	 Standard:	 Management	 of	 Accountable	 Items	 Used	
During	Surgery/Procedures	 in	the	Perioperative	Environment	provides	guidance	on	
the	procedure	to	be	followed	(ACORN	2016).	
Aseptic	aspects	of	care	
	
The	contamination	of	items	within	the	sterile	field	can	lead	to	surgical	site	infection.	
The	 role	of	 the	perioperative	nurse	 is	 to	 ‘apply	professional	 conscience	 to	protect	
the	patient	by	performing	all	working	steps	to	control	asepsis’	(ACORN	2016,	p.198).	
There	are	a	 significant	 range	of	activities	 that	 the	perioperative	nurse	performs	 to	
assure	 asepsis	 including	 the	 wearing	 of	 correct	 theatre	 attire,	 scrubbing	 gowning	
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and	 gloving,	 skin	 preparation,	 opening	 sterile	 supples	 and	 the	 creation	 and	
maintenance	 of	 the	 aseptic	 field.	 The	 application	 of	 wide	 range	 of	 knowledge	
underpins	 these	 practices.	 For	 example,	 the	 opening	 of	 a	 sterile	 item	 requires	
knowledge	of	sterilising	methods,	how	to	recognise	that	an	article	is	sterile,	how	to	
open	a	sterile	article	without	contaminating	the	item	or	the	aseptic	fields	and	what	
to	 do	 in	 the	 case	 of	 contamination.	 The	 ACORN	 standards	 that	 support	 the	
assurance	 of	 asepsis	 include:	 Asepsis;	 Perioperative	 Attire;	 Surgical	 Scrubbing,	
Gowning	 and	 Gloving;	 Skin	 Preparation	 of	 the	 Patient;	 Reprocessing	 of	 Reusable	
items:	 Cleaning,	 Packaging	 and	 Storage	 of	 Sterile	 Supplies	 and	 Single	 Use	 Items	
(ACORN	2016).	
	
Management	of	Implants	
	
Implants	required	for	surgery	are	prepared	before	the	procedure	and	opened	once	
the	surgeon	requests	the	specific	type	and	size	of	the	component.	The	scout	nurse	
checks	 implant	 details	 with	 the	 surgeon	 and	 shows	 the	 implant	 box	 to	 the	 scrub	
nurse	before	opening.	Whilst	there	 is	not	a	specific	ACORN	Standard	on	this	topic,	
hospital	policies	are	widely	in	place	to	reduce	the	risk	of	component	size	mismatch	
with	its	associated	patient	safety	and	financial	implications.			
	
Use	of	diathermy		
	
Correct	application	of	the	diathermy	plate	and	connection	to	the	diathermy	machine	
is	 the	 responsibility	 of	 the	 scout/circulating	 nurse.	 Knowledge	 of	 the	 principles	 of	
electrical	 flow	 and	 using	 diathermy	 and	 other	 energy	 devices	 in	 accordance	 with	
manufacturer’s	 instructions	 underpins	 this	 task.	 Surgeons	 preferences	 normally	
determine	 the	 setting	 and	 changes	 to	 settings	 during	 the	 procedure	 are	made	 in	
response	 to	 surgeon	 request.	 Use	 of	 diathermy	 is	 underpinned	 by	 Standard:	
Electrosurgical	Equipment	(ACORN	2016).		
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Prevention	of	surgical	fires	
 
Presence	of	flammable	gases,	materials	and	solutions	coupled	with	the	use	of	heat	
producing	 devises	 such	 as	 diathermy	 and	 lasers	 substantially	 increases	 the	 risk	 of	
fire	 in	 the	 operating	 suite.	 All	 perioperative	 nurses	 have	 a	 role	 to	 play	 in	 the	
prevention	of	surgical	fires	and	this	role	 is	underpinned	by	Standard:	Fire	Safety	 in	
the	Operating	Suite	(ACORN	2016).		
Specimen	management		
	
The	perioperative	 nurse	 is	 responsible	 for	 confirming	with	 the	 surgeon	whether	 a	
specimen	 is	 to	 go	 to	 pathology,	 checking	 the	 medium	 in	 which	 to	 place	 the	
specimen,	 correctly	 labelling	 the	 specimens	 and	 ensuring	 the	 specimen	 is	 sent	 to	
pathology.	 Prerequisites	 for	 applying	 the	 Standard:	 Specimen	 Identification,	
Collection	 and	 Handling	 (ACORN	 2016)	 are	 knowledge	 of	 care	 and	 handling	 of	
specimens,	including	container	sizes,	mediums	and	related	safety	issues.			
Positioning	for	surgery	
	
The	 ACORN	 Standards:	 Positioning	 the	 Patient	 for	 Surgery	 and	 Safe	 Patient	 and	
Manual	 Handling	 (ACORN	 2016)	 provide	 direction	 for	 perioperative	 nurses	 to	
minimise	the	risk	of	harm	to	the	patient	from	positioning	or	manual	handling.		Key	
actions	 taken	 by	 the	 perioperative	 nurse	 involve	 the	 assessment	 of	 patient	 risk	
factors	and	the	use	of	positioning	devices	to	provide	surgical	access	for	the	surgeon	
whilst	 maintaining	 optimal	 body	 alignment	 and	 protecting	 the	 patient	 from	
pressure.	These	activities	are	underpinned	by	an	in-depth	knowledge	of	the	surgical	
procedure	 and	 position,	 underlying	 pathophysiology	 which	 may	 impact	 on	 or	 be	
impacted	by	positioning	and	the	appropriate	positioning	equipment	and	devices	to	
use.	
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The	role	of	the	perioperative	nurse	is	a	socio-technological	one	with	an	emphasis	on	
tasks	and	activities	 that	keep	patients	 free	 from	harm	during	 surgery.	This	 section	
has	 identified	 the	 key	 role	 that	 perioperative	 nurses	 play	 in	 keeping	 patients	 free	
from	harm	during	 surgery	 through	 a	 range	 of	 tasks	 and	 activities	 underpinned	 by	
knowledge	and	practical	expertise	that	minimise	and	manage	potential	risk.		
	
Notwithstanding	the	actions	taken	by	the	perioperative	nurse	and	the	availability	of	
standards,	 policies,	 procedures	 and	 protocols	 that	 support	 practice,	 incorrect	
surgical	 counts	 incidents	 continue	 to	 occur	 (Rowlands	 &	 Steeves	 2010);	 patients	
sustain	 injuries	 from	 poor	 positioning	 (Murphy	 2004);	 the	 inappropriate	
management	 of	 diathermy	 results	 in	 burns	 (Russell	 &	 Gaetz	 2004;	 Saaiq,	 Zaib	 &	
Ahmad	2012;	Webb,	 Balaratnam	&	Park	 2003);	 surgical	 fires	whilst	 rare,	 do	 strike	
(Rocos	 &	 Donaldson	 2012;	 Watson	 2006;	 Zahiri	 et	 al.	 2011);	 specimens	 are	
mislabelled	or	go	missing	(Makary	et	al.	2007;	Slavin,	Best	&	Aron	2001);	 incorrect	
implants	 are	 selected	 and	 inserted	 (Lowry,	 McGrath	 &	 Mihalko	 2014);	 patients	
suffer	 surgical	 site	 infections	 (Hopper	 &	 Moss	 2010;	 Spelman	 2002)	 and	 wrong	
patient,	wrong	procedure,	wrong	site	surgery	remains	a	significant	issue	(Clarke,	JR,	
Johnston	&	Finley	2007;	Hanchanale	et	al.	2014).		
	
The	next	section	will	examine	the	role	of	human	factors	and	other	models	to	explain	
the	role	that	humans	play	in	adverse	events.	
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Models	to	explain	human	error	
From	 the	 1940's	 to	 the	 1980s	 the	 focus	 of	 understanding	 adverse	 events	 was	
centred	 on	 high	 risk	 industries	 like	 the	 aviation	 and	 nuclear	 power	 generation	
(Reason	1995).	Since	the	sentinel	Harvard	Medical	Practice	study	in	1984	(Leape	et	
al.	1991),	attention	has	shifted	to	understanding	errors	that	lead	to	adverse	events	
in	health	care	and	this	has	led	to	research	into	the	human	and	organisational	factors	
that	impact	on	the	provision	of	safe	healthcare.		
	
Because	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 Reason's	 work,	 particularly	 in	 understanding	 errors	
and	violations	and	their	potential	to	lead	to	adverse	events,	a	detailed	account	of	his	
definitions	is	provided	in	the	following	sections.	
Human	error	and	the	Swiss	cheese	model	of	accident	causation	
An	error	is	defined	as	the	failure	of	a	planned	action	to	achieve	its	desired	goal	with	
further	 differentiation	 between	 slips	 (observable	 action)	 and	 lapses	 (failure	 of	
memory)	 (Reason	1995).	When	the	action	goes	entirely	as	planned	but	 the	plan	 is	
inadequate	 to	 achieve	 its	 intended	 outcomes,	 this	 is	 a	 failure	 of	 intention	 and	 is	
termed	a	mistake.	Mistakes	can	be	rule	based	or	knowledge	based	(Reason	1995).	
	
Reason	 (1995)	 also	 differentiates	 between	 errors	 and	 violations	 with	 violations	
being	deviations	 from	safe	operating	practices,	procedures,	 standards	or	 rules.	He	
argues	that	violations	are	deliberate	 in	that	the	actions	were	 intended	but	not	the	
possible	bad	consequences.	He	goes	on	to	propose	that	errors	can	be	explained	by	
what	goes	on	in	the	mind	of	an	individual	but	violations	occur	in	a	social	context.		
	
In	 considering	 how	 people	 contribute	 to	 accidents,	 Reason	 (1995)	 makes	 a	 third	
distinction,	that	is	between	active	and	latent	failures.	Active	failures	are	unsafe	acts	
(errors	and	violations)	committed	by	the	people	at	the	sharp	end	whose	actions	can	
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and	 do	 have	 adverse	 consequences.	 Decisions	 taken	 at	 the	 higher	 levels	 of	 an	
organisation	 can	 create	 latent	 failures	 that	 may	 remain	 dormant	 only	 becoming	
evident	when	they	combine	with	local	triggering	factors.	
	
Human	 error	 is	 of	 course	 however	 not	 the	 sole	 contributor	 to	 adverse	 events.	
Reason	(2005a)	also	highlights	the	role	of	the	organisation	or	health	care	system	in	
creating	 the	 latent	 factors	 which	 may	 lie	 dormant	 for	 a	 long	 time	 and	 when	
combined	with	active	failures	can	lead	to	an	adverse	event	occurring.	He	developed	
a	model	(also	known	as	the	Swiss	cheese	model	of	accident	causation)	to	explain	the	
aetiology	 of	 an	 organisational	 accident	 beginning	 with	 organisational	 processes,	
corporate	decisions	often	shaped	by	economic,	political	and	operational	constraints	
which	create	the	latent	conditions	within	the	system	and	lead	to	weaknesses	in	the	
organisations	 defences.	 These	 constraints	 flow	down	 to	 the	workplace	 and	 create	
the	 local	 error	 producing	 conditions	 including	 high	 workload,	 inadequate	
knowledge,	 ability	 or	 experience,	 inadequate	 supervision	 or	 instruction,	 fatigue,	
poor	 communication,	 teamwork	deficiencies	 and	 low	morale	 that	 promote	unsafe	
acts.	When	unsafe	acts	are	committed,	they	can	breach	the	organisation’s	defences,	
resulting	in	an	adverse	event.				
	
The	 factors	 that	 promote	 violations	 are	 less	 well	 understood	 and	 include	 lack	 of	
safety	 culture,	 lack	 of	 concern,	 poor	 morale,	 norms	 condoning	 violations,	 can	 do	
attitudes	 and	 apparently	 meaningless	 or	 ambiguous	 rules	 (Reason	 2005).	 The	
distinction	between	errors	 and	 violations	 is	 of	 importance	 to	 this	 research	 in	 that	
violations	are	deliberate.	 In	other	words,	there	 is	 intention	behind	the	act,	but	the	
consequences	of	the	violation	may	not	be	known.	This	research	will	also	explore	the	
presence	 of	 any	 norms	 that	 condone	 violations	 and	 further	 discussion	 will	 ensue	
under	the	section	on	ways	of	working.	
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A	concern	with	the	term	'human	error'	is	that	it	focuses	on	the	human	component	of	
system	(Henriksen	et	al.	2008)	and	those	who	make	errors	are	often	viewed	as	being	
careless	and	culpable	(Carthey	2013).	Carthey	(2013)	argues	that	this	approach	does	
not	improve	patient	safety	and	the	expectation	of	error	free	behaviour	is	unrealistic.	
Kennedy	 (2004,	 p.	 116)	 questions	 whether	 frontline	 human	 error	 tells	 the	 whole	
story	 arguing	 that	 ‘creating	 a	 safer	 health	 system	 requires	 transitioning	 to	 a	 new	
paradigm	 of	 acceptance	 of	 human	 fallibility	 within	 organisations’.	 This	 approach	
takes	 the	 attention	 away	 from	 blaming	 the	 individual	 and	 shifts	 the	 emphasis	 to	
identifying	 the	 underlying	 latent	 conditions	 within	 the	 system.	 A	 question	 for	
consideration	in	this	research	is	whether	responsibility	for	human	fallibility	lies	just	
with	 the	 organisation	 or	 whether	 there	 is	 some	 personal	 responsibility	 and	
accountability	for	fallibility?	
Systems	models	-	‘beyond	Swiss	cheese’	(Carthey	2013)	
The	 characteristics	of	 the	 individual	 are	only	one	 component	of	 a	 tiered	model	of	
factors	 which	 contribute	 to	 adverse	 events	 (Henriksen	 et	 al.	 2008;	 Reason	 2005).	
The	role	that	the	health	system	plays	in	errors	and	error	prevention	was	highlighted	
in	the	seminal	report	'To	Err	is	Human:	Building	a	Safer	Health	System’	(Institute	of	
Medicine	2000)	with	the	key	message	conveyed	being	that	factors	that	give	rise	to	
adverse	events	are	systemic	rather	than	the	result	of	poorly	performing	individuals.	
Nurses	are	 the	 last	 line	of	defence	 in	a	health	 system	and	are	 therefore	 the	most	
vulnerable	as	they	can	inherit	the	sins	of	omission	and	commission	of	everyone	else	
in	the	system	(Henriksen	et	al.	2008).		
	
The	Swiss	cheese	model	developed	by	Reason	(2005a),	is	considered	by	some	as	the	
'old	view'	of	human	error	 that	 fails	 to	 recognise	 the	complexity	of	 the	health	care	
system	 and	 shifts	 blame	 upstream	 to	 senior	 managers	 and	 regulators	 (Carthey	
2013).	There	has	been	a	recent	paradigm	shift	to	the	'new	view'	where	safety	is	seen	
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as	 ‘an	 emergent	 property	 of	 a	 system	 in	 which	 there	 are	 numerous	 trade-offs	
between	 safety	 and	 other	 goals’	 (Carthey	 2013,	 p.	 147).	 This	 new	 approach	
acknowledges	organisational	deficiencies	and	latent	failures	but	also	the	abilities	of	
the	individuals	within	the	system	to	adapt	and	respond	to	system	changes	(Carthey	
2013).	 Her	model	 of	 Safety	 Evolution	 and	 Erosion	 Enhancement	more	 adequately	
describes	 how	 patient	 safety	 emerges	 in	 a	 complex	 system	 like	 healthcare.	 The	
model	 is	 based	 on	 lessons	 learned	 from	 other	 models.	 It	 concludes	 that	 a	
combination	 of	 systems	 and	 human	 factors	 can	 enhance	 or	 erode	 safety;	 that	
systems	are	dynamic	and	evolve	over	time;	that	safety	is	an	emergent	property;	that	
we	should	focus	and	learn	from	what	went	right	rather	than	being	preoccupied	with	
what	 went	 wrong	 and	 that	 humans	 migrate	 to	 and	 explore	 the	 systems	 safety	
boundaries.	
System	migration	model		
The	 system	migration	model	 is	 particularly	 relevant	 to	 this	 research	as	 it	 provides	
insight	into	how	deviations	from	rules	become	the	norm	and	thus,	the	system	drifts	
to	the	boundaries	of	safety.	
	
The	Herald	of	Free	Enterprise1	and	Tokai-Mura2	disasters	are	examples	of	accidents	
caused	 ‘not	 by	 unintended	 errors	 but	 by	 deliberate	 deviations	 from	 rules	 and	
standards’	 that	 had	 occurred	 over	 a	 long	 period	 of	 time	 (Amalberti	 et	 al.	 2006).	
Violations	had	become	the	norm	and	thus,	there	was	a	drift	to	the	margins	of	safety.	
Amalberti	 et	 al.	 (2006)	 argues	 that	 violations	 are	 unavoidable	 because	 they	 are	
                     
1	The	Herald	of	Free	Enterprise	 ferry	 took	on	water	and	sank	as	 it	 left	Zeebrugge	harbour	 in	1987	resulting	 in	
considerable	loss	of	life.	The	cause	of	this	accident	was	that	the	staff	did	not	fully	close	the	back	ramp	before	the	
ship	left	harbour	to	save	time.	
	
2	 The	 most	 severe	 nuclear	 accident	 since	 Chernobyl	 occurred	 in	 Tokai-Mura,	 Japan	 in	 1999	 when	 workers,	
anxious	to	finish	their	job	at	the	conversion	building,	decided	to	use	a	larger	tank	to	increase	their	performance	
when	 purifying	 and	 homogenizing	 uranium.	 This	 led	 to	 a	 critical	 concentration	 of	 product	 and	 the	 system	
exploded.	
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markers	of	adaptation	 to	 system	changes.	However,	whilst	unavoidable,	 violations	
can	 be	 managed.	 This	 model	 is	 important	 in	 the	 context	 of	 this	 research	 as	 it	
provides	 several	 perspectives	 on	 violations	 and	 a	 framework	 for	 understanding	
them.		
	
How	and	why	adverse	events	 in	the	perioperative	setting	occur	 is	complex.	Recent	
studies	have	built	on	the	work	of	the	pioneers	 in	patient	safety,	exploring	 in	more	
detail	 the	 role	of	 system	 failures,	performance	and	other	errors	 in	 contributing	 to	
perioperative	adverse	events.	The	following	section	will	examine	the	factors	present	
in	the	workplace	that	produce	the	conditions	conducive	to	adverse	events	occurring.	
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Error	producing	conditions	in	the	Operating	Theatre	
There	 is	 agreement	 in	 the	 literature	 that	 latent	 failures	 within	 the	 system	 create	
weaknesses	in	the	organisation's	defences	that	flow	down	to	the	workplace	and	give	
rise	 to	 the	 conditions	 that	 can	 lead	 to	error	 (Carthey	2013;	Henriksen	et	 al.	 2008;	
Reason	2005).	Literature	pertaining	to	these	factors	will	be	reviewed	and	critiqued	
and	research	from	other	areas	of	nursing	will	be	included	where	appropriate.	
Distractions	and	interruptions	
The	 role	 of	 distraction	 and	 the	 effects	 of	 interruptions	 on	 the	 cognitive	 work	 of	
nurses	have	 important	 implications	for	understanding	the	origins	of	medical	errors	
and	are	particularly	applicable	in	the	operating	theatre.			
	
Disruptions	 and	 interruptions,	 including	 people	 entering	 and	 leaving	 the	 theatre,	
telephones	 and	 beepers,	 equipment	 failures	 and	 other	 work	 environment	 issues	
have	 been	 shown	 to	 adversely	 impact	 on	 workflow	 with	 one	 study	 finding	
interruptions	occurring	on	average	9-10	times	per	hour	(Antoniadis	et	al.	2013).	The	
number	of	 interruptions	 increases	the	number	of	miscommunications	 (Gillespie,	B.	
M.,	Chaboyer	&	Fairweather	2012)	and	there	is	a	strong	link	between	the	number	of	
interruptions	and	surgical	errors	(Wiegmann	et	al.	2007).	A	study	of	distractions	and	
interruptions	by	Healey,	Sevdalis	and	Vincent	(2006)	found	they	interfered	with	the	
work	of	 the	 team	and	affected	 team	performance.	 Perioperative	nurses	 identified	
distraction	 as	 a	 cause	 of	 error	 in	 a	 study	 by	 Chard	 (2010).	 Interestingly	 a	 quality	
activity	by	Slavin	 (2001)	 found	 that	perioperative	nurses	were	not	distracted	 from	
following	through	on	surgical	specimen	handling	because	of	a	lack	of	focus,	rather,	
they	felt	that	they	had	to	choose	among	competing	demands	of	patient	care.	Cases	
of	negligence	in	the	US	have	cited	distractions	such	as	the	use	of	mobile	devices	and	
interaction	with	social	media	during	procedures	(Buckwalter-Poza	2014).	
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Culture,	communication	and	teamwork	
The	 influence	 of	 culture	 on	 patient	 safety	 has	 been	 studied	 extensively.	 It	 has	
recently	 come	 to	 the	 fore	 in	 the	UK	 following	 the	Bristol	 Royal	 Infirmary	 and	Mid	
Staffordshire	 Trust	 enquiries	 where	 it	 was	 found	 that	 poor	 organisational	 culture	
contributed	significantly	to	patient	harm	(Kaufman	&	McCaughan	2013).	The	Bristol	
Royal	 Infirmary	 report	 found	 that	 the	hierarchical	nature	of	workplaces	within	 the	
healthcare	 system	 is	 a	 significant	 cultural	 weakness	 that	 can	 mitigate	 against	
teamwork	(Kennedy,	I	2001).	Where	a	blame	culture	pervades	the	workplace,	error	
reporting	may	be	limited	reducing	opportunity	for	remediation	(Chard	2010).	Social	
structure	within	 the	operating	 room	has	been	 found	 to	 impact	on	performance	of	
the	 surgical	 team	 along	 with	 lack	 of	 mediating	 norms,	 conventions	 and	 social	
relations	to	support	and	encourage	communication,	all	of	which	have	the	potential	
to	introduce	latent	threats	into	the	system	(Rydenfalt	et	al.	2012).		
	
There	 is	a	 significant	emphasis	 in	 the	 literature	on	 the	 role	of	 communication	and	
teamwork	 within	 the	 perioperative	 environment.	 Ineffective	 communication	 is	 a	
significant	 factor	 in	 sentinel	 events	 with	 up	 to	 65%	 of	 events	 stemming	 from	
communication	 failures	 (Burnett,	 Norris	 &	 Flin	 2012;	 Catalano	 2008;	 Halverson	
2011).	 Miscommunication	 or	 poor	 communication	 has	 been	 identified	 by	
perioperative	 nurses	 as	 being	 a	 cause	 of	 error	 (Chard	 2010)	 and	 implicated	 in	
incorrect	surgical	counts	 (Rowlands	&	Steeves	2010),	 team	effectiveness	 (Gillespie,	
B.	M.,	Chaboyer	&	Fairweather	2012)	and	been	found	to	compromise	patient	safety	
(Braaf	et	al.	2013;	Braaf,	Manias	&	Riley	2011).		
	
Within	 the	 perioperative	 setting	 where	 communication	 is	 so	 vitally	 important	 for	
safe	 patient	 care;	 silence	 and	 power	 can	 be	 an	 underlying	 barrier	 to	 effective	
communication	 (Braaf	 et	 al.	 2013;	 Gardezi	 et	 al.	 2009).	 There	 are	 also	 structural	
barriers	 to	 communication	 such	 as	 workflows	 and	 processes,	 supply	 chains,	
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equipment	 and	 information	 systems	 that	 create	 an	 error-promoting	 environment	
(Fowler	 et	 al.	 2008).	 Effective	 communication	 is	 influenced	 by	 culture	 (Kennedy,	 I	
2001),	social	structures	(Rydenfalt	et	al.	2012)	and	teamwork	(McNamara	2010)	and	
can	 enhance	 team	 activities	 such	 as	 participating	 in	 the	 surgical	 safety	 checklists	
(Gillespie,	B.	M.	et	al.	2016).	
Personal	and	psychological	factors	
Personal	and	psychological	factors	may	also	promote	the	conditions	in	which	errors	
occur.	For	example,	Rathert	et	al.	 (2012)	 found	exhaustion	to	be	an	antecedent	to	
unsafe	 practice.	 Inexperience,	 lack	 of	 supervision,	 work	 overload	 and	 faulty	
judgement	have	also	been	 identified	as	 contributing	 factors	along	with	having	 too	
many	things	to	do	at	once	(Chard	2010).		
	
Personal	accountability	also	has	a	role	to	play	in	preventing	patient	harm.	Goldmann	
(2006)	 argues	 for	 a	 balance	 between	 blaming	 mistakes	 on	 systems	 and	 holding	
individual	 practitioners	 accountable	 for	 their	 actions,	 citing	 hand	 hygiene	 as	 an	
example	where	both	systemic	 improvements	and	 increased	personal	 responsibility	
are	required	in	order	to	reduce	infections.		
	
More	recently,	the	focus	of	research	has	shifted	to	the	specific	behaviours	of	nurses	
operating	within	these	highly	complex,	dynamic	and	rapidly	changing	healthcare	
systems	to	meet	goals	or	achieve	them	more	readily.	The	next	section	will	review	
the	literature	on	these	behaviours	or	'ways	of	working'	against	a	background	of	the	
role	that	norms,	standards	and	rules	play	in	the	delivery	of	safe	care.	
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The	role	of	norms,	standards	and	rules	in	the	delivery	of	safe	care	
Evidence	based	standards	and	protocols	are	safety	tools	developed	to	guide	practice	
and	deliver	safe	care.	Norms	on	the	other	hand	are	an	accepted	standard	or	a	way	
of	 behaving	 or	 doing	 things.	 Ways	 of	 working	 other	 than	 following	 rules	 and	
standards	can	create	a	 latent	risk	 factor	 for	the	organisation,	resulting	 in	a	drift	 to	
the	margins	of	safe	practice	(Amalberti	et	al.	2006).	A	rule	is	defined	as	‘one	of	a	set	
of	explicit	or	understood	 regulations	or	principles	governing	conduct	or	procedure	
within	a	particular	area	of	activity’	(Merriam-Webster	Online	Dictionary).	Standards	
such	 as	 those	 developed	 by	 the	 Australian	 College	 of	 Operating	 Room	 Nurses	
(ACORN)	 can	 be	 considered	 an	 explicit	 set	 of	 rules	 that	 guide	 practice	 within	
perioperative	nursing	and	can	be	used	as	a	measure	or	norm	against	which	practice	
is	evaluated.		
	
Reason	 (1997)	 argues	 that	 external	 and	 internal	 controls	 regulate	 the	 individual’s	
behaviour	 in	the	workplace.	Standards	and	rules	are	examples	of	external	controls	
that	prescribe	what	and	how	work	should	be	done.	There	are	also	internal	controls	
represented	 by	 the	 knowledge	 and	 skills	 of	 the	 individual	 based	 on	 training	 and	
experience.	Together	these	controls	limit	the	use	of	discretion	and	the	variability	of	
human	 behaviour	 thereby	 ensuring	 safer	 ways	 of	 working	 (Reason	 1997).	 The	
implication	 here	 is	 that	 non-adherence	 to	 norms,	 rules	 and	 standards	 may	
compromise	 patient	 safety.	 Conversely	 where	 rules,	 policies	 and	 procedures	 are	
unavailable	or	deemed	to	be	unworkable	for	the	situation	at	hand,	ways	of	working	
other	 than	 following	 the	 rules	 can	 be	 perceived	 as	 necessary	 to	 get	 the	 job	 done	
(Reason	1997).		
	
The	 literature	 identifies	 a	 range	 of	 factors	 that	 contribute	 to	 rule	 breaking	 in	 the	
perioperative	 setting	 including	 emergencies,	 high	 workloads,	 poor	 workflows,	
productivity	 pressures,	 resource	 availability,	 deficient	 communication,	 inability	 to	
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deliver	timely	care,	unfamiliarity	with	technology	and	 lack	of	awareness	of	policies	
or	poor	understanding	of	content	(Debono	et.	al	2013).	Several	studies	have	found	
deviations	 employed	 as	 ways	 of	 working	 around	 rules,	 policies	 and	 procedures	
(Debono	 et.	 al	 2013;	 Halbesleben	 et	 al.	 2008).	 The	 sheer	 volume	 of	 policies	 and	
guidelines;	 multiple	 rules	 on	 the	 same	 topic;	 naming,	 accessibility,	 length	 and	
complexity;	 poor	 version	 control	 and	 the	 trivial	 nature	of	 some	policies	may	have	
the	unintended	consequence	of	reducing	compliance	(Carthey	et	al.	2011).		
	
Nursing	is	complex	work	and	this	complexity	is	derived	from	the	changing	condition	
of	the	patient;	the	need	to	coordinate	multiple	activities	at	any	given	time;	avoidable	
factors	 unrelated	 to	 the	 patient	 such	 as	 interruptions,	 supply	 disruptions	 and	
technology	 (Tucker	 &	 Spear	 2006).	 The	 perioperative	 setting	 is	 a	 dynamic	 and	
unpredictable	environment	where	the	ability	to	adapt	to	rapidly	changing	situations	
is	 paramount.	 This	 combination	 of	 complexity	 and	 unpredictability	 creates	 an	
environment	vulnerable	 to	 rule	breaking	and	where	quick	 fixes	 to	get	 the	 job	done	
become	 tempting	 (Reid	2014)	and	evidence	 is	 growing	 that	nurses,	 for	a	 variety	of	
reasons,	adopt	ways	other	than	following	the	rules	to	get	the	job	done	(Debono	et	al.	
2013;	Halbesleben	et	al.	2008).	Given	 that	evidence	based	standards	and	protocols	
(rules)	are	safety	tools	to	guide	practice	and	deliver	safe	care,	ways	of	working	other	
than	 following	 the	 rules	 are	 examples	 of	 where	 a	 safety	 system	 can	 be	 breached,	
leading	to	the	potential	for	patient	harm	and	migration	of	practice	to	the	boundaries	
of	 safety	 (Amalberti	 et	 al.	 2006).	 The	 next	 section	 explores	 these	 other	 ways	 of	
working.		
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Ways	of	working	
Several	terms	have	been	identified	in	the	literature	to	describe	behaviours	that	may	
lead	 to	 an	 adverse	 outcome	 including	 errors,	 violations,	 deviations,	 rule	 breaking,	
rule	 bending	 and	 shortcuts	 and	 more	 recently	 the	 term	 ‘workaround’	 is	 gaining	
prominence.	 Errors,	 violations,	 deviations,	 rule	 breaking,	 cutting	 corners	 have	
connotations	 of	 'bad'	 behaviour	 whilst	 rule	 bending,	 shortcuts	 and	 workarounds	
appear	 to	denote	behaviour	 that	 is	more	 acceptable.	What	 they	have	 in	 common	
however	is	that	all	these	approaches	may	have	unintended	consequences	and	lead	
to	 patient	 harm.	 This	 research	 aims	 to	 explore	 these	 concepts	 further	 particularly	
from	the	perspective	of	the	perioperative	nurse.		
	
It	 is	 useful	 to	 commence	 discussion	 on	ways	 of	working	 other	 than	 following	 the	
rules	 with	 current	 definitions	 of	 these	 terms	 from	 the	 literature,	 followed	 by	
dialogue	on	how	 the	definition	 is	 applied	 in	 the	health	 care	 arena.	 The	discussion	
will	highlight	where	the	literature	uses	terms	interchangeably.	
Shortcuts	and	cutting	corners	
A	 short	 cut	 is	 defined	 as	 an	 alternative	 route	 that	 is	 shorter	 than	 the	 one	usually	
taken	 or	 an	 accelerated	 way	 of	 doing	 or	 achieving	 something	 (Merriam-Webster	
Online	Dictionary).	 Taking	 shortcuts	 or	 cutting	 corners	 is	 something	 that	 routinely	
occurs	 both	 at	 home	 and	 professionally	 (Chard	 2010;	 Reid	 2014).	 Amalberti	 et	 al.	
(2006)	refers	to	cutting	corners	as	violations	in	the	context	where	corners	are	cut	to	
increase	 performance	 within	 a	 process	 that	 is	 under	 pressure	 and	 barriers	 are	
bypassed.	Reason	(2005)	also	argues	that	cutting	corners	is	a	type	of	violation.		
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Rule	breaking	and	rule	bending	
The	Oxford	 English	 Dictionary	 (2016)	 defines	 a	 rule	 as	 ‘one	 of	 a	 set	 of	 explicit	 or	
understood	 regulations	 or	 principles	 governing	 conduct	 or	 procedure	 within	 a	
particular	area	of	activity’.	Within	nursing	practice,	rules	can	be	formal	or	informal,	
unwritten,	 unspoken	 or	 evolving	 (Milton	 2006).	Breaking	 the	 rules	 has	 a	 negative	
connotation	that	is	to	disobey	or	refuse	to	conform.	Synonyms	include:	contravene,	
defy,	 evade,	 flout,	 ignore,	 infringe,	 misbehave,	 overstep,	 transgress	 and	 violate.	
Non-compliance	is	considered	to	be	a	form	of	rule	breaking	(Carthey	et	al.	2011).	
	
On	the	other	hand,	the	expression	‘bending	the	rules’	is	generally	accepted	to	mean	
doing	 something	 that	 is	 not	 usually	 allowed	 and	 encompasses	 a	 general	 societal	
understanding	that	it	is	sometimes	acceptable	and	perhaps	even	tacitly	encouraged	
to	 bend	 rules	 to	 get	 the	 job	 done	 (Collins	 2012).	 This	 is	 constructive	 workplace	
deviance,	 purposeful	 employee	 behaviour	 enacted	 for	 reasons	 thought	 to	 be	
innovative	by	the	employee	arguing	that	rules	are	bent	intentionally	but	done	with	
good	motive	 (Collins	2012).	There	 is	 therefore	a	 link	here	between	 the	concept	of	
rule	bending	and	positive	deviance.	The	description	of	this	behaviour	is	also	similar	
to	 that	 of	 a	 workaround.	 Although	 there	 is	 anecdotal	 acknowledgement	 of	 rule	
bending	 behaviours	 in	 nursing	 there	 is	 little	 published	 research	 in	 perioperative	
nursing.	
Workarounds	
The	term	workaround	originally	gained	prominence	in	computing	and	technology	to	
describe	a	method	for	overcoming	a	problem	or	 limitation	 in	a	program	or	system	
(Koopman	&	Hoffman	2003).	It	has	subsequently	been	adopted	to	describe	actions	
taken	 by	 nurses	 to	 work	 around	 medication	 administration	 (DiConsiglio	 2008;	
Halbesleben	 et	 al.	 2010;	 Koppel	 et	 al.	 2008)	 and	 other	 electronic	 systems	
(Vogelsmeier,	 Halbesleben	 &	 Scott-Cawiezell	 2008).	 The	 term	 workaround	 is	
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described	 as	 a	 situation	 where	 a	 block	 in	 workflow	 is	 overcome	 by	 creating	 a	
solution	to	work	around	the	block	rather	than	following	the	intended	process	and	is	
a	 term	 found	 extensively	 in	 the	 healthcare	 literature	 (Halbesleben,	 Rathert	 &	
Bennett	 2013).	 It	 is	 a	 concept	 seen	 as	 having	 both	 positive	 and	 negative	
characteristics.	
	
The	 factors	 contributing	 to	 workarounds	 include	 organisational,	 for	 example	
workload	and	productivity	pressures	 (Debono	et.	 al	2013;	Espin	et	al.	 2006);	work	
processes	such	as	interruptions	and	the	mismatch	between	technology	and	current	
workflow	(Debono	et	al.	2013;	Fowler	et	al.	2008;	Halbesleben	et	al.	2010;	Koppel	et	
al.	 2008);	 patient	 related	 factors	 particularly	 timeliness	 (Halbesleben	 et	 al.	 2010;	
Koppel	 et	 al.	 2008);	 individual	 factors	 including	 exhaustion	 (Debono	 et	 al.	 2013;	
Rathert	 et	 al.	 2012);	 saving	 time	 (Reid	 2014);	 and	 social	 and	 professional	 factors	
such	as	poor	communication	(Fowler	et	al.	2008;	Tucker	&	Edmondson	2003).	
	
Debono	 (2013)	 argues	 that	 views	 on	 workarounds	 are	 polarised	 in	 the	 literature	
where	 some	 studies	 conceptualise	 workarounds	 negatively,	 aligning	 them	 with	
terms	such	as	short	cuts,	violations	and	deviance	whilst	other	authors	place	a	more	
positive	 spin	 arguing	 that	 workarounds	 are	 a	 creative	 process	 and	 a	 ‘positive	
goldmine	of	 information	 to	 improve	patient	safety’	 (Lalley	2013	p.36).	Overall,	 the	
literature	perceives	workarounds	in	a	negative	light	(Debono	et.	al.	2013).		
	
Whilst	 workarounds	 are	 a	 creative	 way	 of	 managing	 a	 difficult	 situation	 in	 most	
situations	 (Reid	2014),	 they	can	contribute	 to	medical	error	 (Spear	&	Schmidhofer	
2005).	 Reid	 (2014,	 p.	 1)	 defines	workarounds	 as	 violations	 ‘because	 they	occur	 as	
deliberate	 digressions	 from	 standard	 practice	 and	 in	 the	 case	 of	 our	 professional	
lives,	 deviations	 from	 established	 organisational	 procedures,	 processes	 and	
protocols’.	Finding	a	way	to	work	around	a	barrier	is	an	example	of	what	Tucker	and	
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Edmondson	(2003)	call	first	order	problem	solving.	They	argue	that	workarounds	are	
problem	 solving	 techniques	 that	 focus	 on	 the	 immediate	 issue	 but	 not	 the	
contributing	 factors,	 so	 whilst	 the	 workaround	 appears	 to	 have	 resolved	 the	
problem,	 it	 is	 only	 a	 temporary	 measure,	 as	 the	 underlying	 conditions	 have	 not	
changed,	 a	 situation	 that	 may	 contribute	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 error	 promoting	
conditions	discussed	earlier.		
	
Systematic	reviews	of	the	literature	on	workarounds	in	nursing	by	Halbesleben	et	al.	
(2008)	and	Debono	 (2013)	 found	 that	workarounds	 remain	 ill	 defined;	 the	 term	 is	
inconsistently	conceptualised	in	the	clinical	setting;	there	is	a	 lack	of	clarity	 in	how	
nurses	 perceive	 workarounds	 and	 how	 nurses	 differentiate	 them	 from	 other	
constructs	 and	 there	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 research	 on	 the	 potential	 consequences	 of	
workarounds.	This	research	question	will	seek	to	address	these	gaps	as	they	pertain	
to	the	perioperative	setting.		
Violations	
Violations	 are	 defined	 as	 'deviations	 from	 safe	 operating	 practices,	 procedures,	
standards	 or	 rules'	 (Reason	 2005,	 p.	 57)	 or	 'deliberate	 deviations	 from	 standard	
procedures	or	instructions’	(Amalberti	et	al.	2006	p.i66).	This	definition	is	similar	to	
rule	 breaking	 and	 in	 the	 literature	 rule	 violation	 and	 rule	 breaking	 are	 sometimes	
used	interchangeably.		
	
Reason	 (2005a)	argues	 that	 there	are	 three	kinds	of	violations;	 routine,	optimizing	
and	 necessary	 or	 situational	 violations.	 Routine	 violations	 entail	 cutting	 corners	
wherever	 such	opportunities	present	 themselves.	 This	definition	 interprets	 cutting	
corners	 as	 a	 type	 of	 violation.	 Optimising	 violations	 are	 actions	 taken	 to	 further	
personal	 rather	 than	 task	 related	 goals	 –	 for	 'kicks'.	 Necessary	 or	 situational	
violations	are	actions	 that	 seem	to	offer	 the	only	path	available	 to	getting	 the	 job	
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done	and	rules	or	procedures	are	inappropriate	for	the	present	situation.	This	latter	
definition	 aligns	 with	 that	 of	 workarounds.	 Violations	 are	 intended	 but	 not	
necessarily	the	consequences.	
	
Violations	are	most	 likely	to	occur	 in	challenging	workplaces	where	‘quick	fixes	are	
beguiling	 and	 more	 easily	 tolerated’	 (Reid	 2014,	 p.	 1).	 Clearly,	 the	 perioperative	
setting	is	a	challenging	work	environment	and	is	therefore	vulnerable	to	violations.	
The	irony	is	that	many	violations	support	service	efficiencies	and	productivity	in	the	
short	term	at	least	and	staff	can	be	praised	for	flexibility	and	getting	the	job	done.	
The	problem	is	that	individuals	may	be	blind	to	the	potential	consequences	and	risks	
inherent	in	such	behaviours	and	because	they	help	us	get	things	done,	they	become	
increasingly	appealing.	The	potential	is	that	violations	become	the	norm	and	a	lack	
of	 regard	 for	 the	 potential	 consequences	 of	 normalising	 deviant	 acts	 develops.	
When	this	happens	the	organisation	begins	to	drift	towards	the	boundaries	of	safety	
(Reid	2014).	
	
Perspectives	 on	 rule	 breaking	 are	 derived	 from	 the	 work	 of	 various	 disciplines	
including	 motivation	 and	 attitude	 of	 individuals;	 organisational	 and	 cultural	
approaches;	 adaptation	 and	 flexibility	 of	 professionals	 and	 system	 migration	
(Amalberti	et	al.	2006;	Carthey	et	al.	2011;	Martin	et	al.	2013).	Amalberti	et	al.	(2006	
p.	i68)	integrated	elements	of	these	perspectives	into	a	system	migration	framework	
to	 explain	 how	 violations	 are	 established	 and	 normalized,	 underpinned	 by	 the	
notion	 that	workers	operate	within	 ‘an	envelope	of	possible	actions	 influenced	all	
the	time	by	wider	organisational	and	social	 forces’.	The	framework includes	three	
phases;	 first	 is	 the	 initial	 safe	 space	 where	 work	 process	 is	 ideally	 designed	 to	
operate	according	 to	a	set	of	procedures	and	rules	and	constraints	are	 in	place	as	
defences	to	violations;	second	 is	creation	of	borderline	tolerated	conditions	of	use	
where	processes	 are	 in	 place	 but	 under	 pressure	 so	 barriers	 are	 quickly	 bypassed	
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and	 corners	 are	 cut	 to	 increase	 performance;	 third	 is	 normalisation	 of	 deviance	
where	the	violations	have	become	routine	and	common	and	are	 'invisible'	 to	both	
workers	 and	managers	 and	 at	 this	 stage	 any	 further	 deviance	may	easily	 result	 in	
harm	to	the	patient.	
	
There	 are	 few	 studies	 reported	 in	 the	 literature	 on	 the	 topic	 of	 violations	 in	
healthcare	 and	 in	 fact,	 the	 term	 itself	 is	 not	widely	 used	 in	 this	 field.	 The	QACHS	
study	reported	that	violations	were	the	underlying	cause	of	4.8%	of	adverse	events	
but	 did	 not	 provide	 detail	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 these	 violations	 (Wilson	 &	 Runciman	
1995).	Other	national	adverse	events	 studies	did	not	 refer	 to	violations	at	all.	 The	
lack	 of	 information	 about	 violations	 is	 due	 to	 the	 difficulties	 in	 identifying	 that	
violations	 have	 occurred	 and	 the	 reluctance	 of	 individuals	 to	 engage	 in	 discussing	
violations	due	to	the	risk	of	punitive	measures	against	them	(Amalberti	et	al.	2006).	
Deliberate	 violations	 are	 poorly	 appreciated	 and	 studied	 in	 healthcare	 and	 it	 is	
important	to	acquire	more	knowledge	about	the	causes	and	evolution.		
Non-compliance	
Non-compliance	is	also	a	type	of	violation	but	its	definition	is	more	difficult	because	
its	interpretation	depends	on	the	type	of	instruction,	the	nature	of	the	work	and	the	
social	 and	 organisational	 context	 (Amalberti	 et	 al.	 2006).	 In	 some	 cases,	 strict	
observance	of	 a	 policy	 is	 required,	 for	 example	 the	wearing	 of	 lead	 gowns	during	
procedures	 using	 radiological	 equipment,	 whereas	 some	 flexibility	 is	 tolerated	
regarding	other	standards	such	as	 the	wearing	of	 jewellery	and	theatre	attire.	Not	
following	 policies	 and	 guidelines	 is	 a	 type	 of	 non-compliance	 but	 there	 are	 new	
challenges	to	compliance	emerging	in	the	workplace.	A	recent	study	has	shown	that	
the	increasing	number	of	policies	and	guidelines	makes	it	difficult	to	distinguish	the	
essential	 from	 the	 irrelevant	and	 this	 impacts	on	 compliance	 (Carthey	et	al.	 2011)	
and	ultimately	may	contribute	to	error.	
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Non-compliance	 has	 been	 a	 focus	 of	 research	 particularly	 as	 it	 pertains	 to	 the	
implementation	 of	 evidence-based	 practice,	 policies,	 protocols	 and	 guidelines	
including	 the	WHO	 surgical	 checklist	 (Kieffer	 et	 al.	 2013;	 Papaconstantinou	 et	 al.	
2013;	 Saturno	 et	 al.	 2014).	 Research	 into	 the	 role	 that	 ambiguity	 plays	 in	 non-
compliance	 offers	 insight	 into	 the	 impact	 of	 lack	 of	 clarity	 of	 task,	 role	 and	
responsibility	on	compliance	(Gurses	et	al.	2008).		
	
The	issues	this	raises	for	this	research	lies	in	the	uncertainty	of	when	full	compliance	
is	expected.	The	decision-making	processes	or	'mindfulness'	of	perioperative	nurses	
in	determining	whether	to	comply	with	standards,	policies,	guidelines	and	protocols	
will	be	explored	in	this	research.	
Negative	deviance	and	positive	deviance	
The	verb	‘deviate’	is	derived	from	the	Latin	de	‘off’	and	via	‘way’	and	came	into	use	
in	the	17th	century	to	describe	the	act	of	turning	aside	from	a	route	or	course	whilst	
modern	language	characterises	deviation	as	a	departure	from	an	accepted	norm,	or	
standard	of	 behaviour	 (Merriam-Webster	Online	Dictionary).	 Rule	breaking,	 taking	
short	cuts,	workarounds	or	cutting	corners	can	all	be	considered	forms	of	deviance	
because	they	deviate	from	the	prescribed	course	of	action.		
	
This	 definition	 promotes	 deviance	 as	 a	 negative	 attribute,	 i.e.	 that	 the	 deviant	
behaviour	is	unacceptable.	Recent	management	literature	identifies	two	streams	of	
research	 on	 deviant	 employee	 behaviour;	 one	 that	 frames	 deviance	 negatively	
where	 rule	 breaking	 behaviour	 may	 lead	 to	 organisational	 harm	 and	 the	 other	
where	 deviance	 is	 seen	 in	 a	 more	 positive	 light	 providing	 benefits	 to	 the	
organisation	(Clancy	2010;	Gary	2013;	Lalley	2013;	Lalley	&	Malloch	2010;	Lindberg	
&	 Clancy	 2010;	 Warren	 2003).	 Deviance	 can	 therefore	 be	 associated	 with	 both	
negative	and	positive	behaviours.		
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Before	 exploring	 the	 concept	 of	 positive	 deviance	 in	 more	 detail,	 it	 is	 worth	
considering	a	 key	question	posed	by	Warren	 (2003),	 ‘Deviant	 compared	 to	what?’	
Current	thought	is	that	behaviour	is	deviant	if	it	departs	from	the	accepted	norms	of	
a	 social	 or	 reference	 group.	 Warren	 (2003)	 differentiates	 between	 formal	 and	
informal	group	norms,	with	formal	norms	being	rules,	procedures,	codes	of	conduct	
and	informal	norms	being	work	routines.	An	employee	may	belong	to	several	social	
or	reference	groups	i.e.	a	work	team;	a	department;	an	organisation;	a	professional	
group	and	the	accepted	norms	of	each	of	those	groups	may	differ.	Thus,	employees	
may	find	themselves	complying	with	the	informal	norms	of	their	work	team	but	be	
non-compliant	with	organisational	rules	and	policies	or	professional	standards.	This	
may	give	rise	to	conflict	between	the	norms	of	those	groups	leading	to	‘competing	
sets	of	social	influence	and	expectations’	(Warren	2003	p.624).		
	
Judging	behaviour	to	be	either	positive	or	negative	requires	that	is	compared	with	a	
measure	or	standard	and	simply	saying	that	behaviour	is	deviant,	because	it	departs	
from	a	norm	does	not	disclose	anything	about	the	 importance	or	consequences	of	
the	 behaviour	 (Warren	 2003).	 Warren	 (2003,	 p.	 622)	 unites	 the	 two	 streams	 of	
research	on	employee	deviant	behaviour,	asserting	that	both	negative	and	positive	
deviant	 behaviours	 are	 fundamentally	 the	 same	 in	 that	 ‘both	 require	 a	 departure	
from	 norms	 whereby	 employees	 must	 resist	 social	 pressure	 to	 conform’.	 She	
suggests	further	that	behaviours	should	be	measured	against	more	global	standards	
or	‘hyper	norms’	rather	than	local,	reference	group	norms	to	determine	whether	the	
deviant	 behaviours	 are	 negative	 or	 positive.	 These	 ‘hyper	 norms’	 encapsulate	
globally	held	values,	beliefs	and	ethical	principles	and	can	be	found	in	standards	set	
by	 global	 organisations	 such	 as	 the	 World	 Health	 Organisation	 (WHO).	 National	
bodies	 such	 as	 the	 Australian	 Commission	 for	 Quality	 and	 Safety	 in	 Health	 Care	
(ACSQHC)	 and	 professional	 and	 industry	 bodies	 such	 as	 ACORN	may	 derive	 their	
standards	 from	 global	 bodies.	 The	 Surgical	 Safety	 Checklist	 is	 an	 example	 of	 a	
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standard	 developed	 by	WHO	 (World	 Alliance	 for	 Patient	 safety	 2008)	 that	 is	 now	
embedded	in	national	standards.		
	
Constructive	 or	 positive	 deviance	 is	 also	 an	 approach	 used	 to	 effect	 change	 both	
organisationally	and	within	communities.	This	approach	has	been	used	successfully	
in	improving	the	nutritional	status	of	children	in	third	world	countries,	reducing	the	
incidence	of	MRSA	in	hospitals,	 improving	medication	reconciliation;	improving	the	
use	of	electronic	medical	records	(Clancy	2010;	Lindberg	&	Clancy	2010;	Lindberg	et	
al.	2009).			
Summary	
This	chapter	has	 located	the	research	problem	in	the	broader	 literature	on	patient	
safety	 and	has	 considered	 the	 role	of	human	 factors	 and	 systems	 in	enhancing	or	
eroding	patient	safety.	There	has	been	a	focus	on	the	role	of	rules	and	standards	in	
the	 delivery	 of	 safe	 care	 and	 the	 implications	 of	 working	 in	 ways	 that	 are	 not	 in	
accordance	with	rules	and	standards	have	been	explored.		
	
Several	ways	 of	working	have	been	 identified	 in	 the	 literature	with	 terms	 such	 as	
short	cuts,	cutting	corners,	rule	breaking,	rule	bending,	workarounds,	violations	and	
errors	often	being	used	interchangeably.	On	balance,	there	is	consensus	that	in	the	
context	 of	 nursing	 practice	 these	 ways	 of	 working	 are	 violations	 that	 constitute	
deviance	from	usual	or	accepted	standards.	Violations	can	be	perceived	as	being	a	
way	of	working	which	'gets	the	job	done'	but	its	potential	to	lead	to	patient	harm	is	
not	necessarily	 appreciated.	Whilst	 violations	 clearly	 have	 the	potential	 to	 lead	 to	
patient	 harm,	 recent	 research	 considers	 both	 the	 negative	 and	 positive	
consequences	of	such	behaviours	and	answering	this	research	question	will	explore	
these	consequences	further.	The	use	of	the	term	'ways	of	working'	in	addressing	this	
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research	question	does	not	limit	this	research	project	to	exploring	a	single	construct	
such	as	workaround,	rather	this	approach	leaves	the	way	open	to	explore	not	only	
the	existing	concepts	in	use	but	may	uncover	new	ones.			
	
There	 have	 been	 few	 studies	 that	 have	 empirically	 studied	 the	 ways	 that	
perioperative	nurses	work	and	fewer	that	have	explored	the	antecedents,	attributes	
and	consequences	of	the	different	ways	of	working	and	this	research	aims	to	fill	this	
gap.	The	way	that	perioperative	nurses	perceive,	describe,	 interpret	and	assimilate	
into	 practice	 the	 various	 ways	 of	 working	 and	 the	 factors	 that	 influence	 their	
decision-making	are	areas	this	research	will	explore.		
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Chapter	3:	Methodology		
	
This	 research	 uses	 qualitative	 enquiry	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 world	 in	 which	
perioperative	nurses	practice	with	specific	regard	to	the	way	they	work	to	maintain	
patient	 safety.	 The	 methodology	 chosen	 is	 constructivist	 grounded	 theory,	
developed	by	Kathy	Charmaz	in	the	1990s.	This	approach	builds	on	the	fundamental	
premise	 of	 traditional	 grounded	 theory	 discovered	 by	 Glaser	 and	 Strauss	 in	 the	
1960s,	 that	 ‘systematic	 qualitative	 analysis	 had	 its	 own	 logic	 and	 could	 generate	
theory’	(Charmaz	2014,	p.	7).	Constructivist	grounded	theory	is	widely	employed	in	
health	 research	 to	 discover	 issues	 that	 are	 important	 to	 specific	 groups	of	 people	
and	 is	 an	 approach	 that	 enables	 the	 researcher	 to	 be	 an	 active	 participant	 in	
generating	 theory	 from	 their	 own	 as	 well	 as	 participants	 perspectives	 and	
experiences.	The	developed	theory	is	a	co-construction	of	the	respective	realties	of	
the	participants	and	the	researcher	and	is	grounded	in	the	data.		
	
The	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	to:	
1. Situate	this	study	within	the	qualitative	research	paradigm		
2. Provide	an	overview	of	the	evolution	of	constructivist	grounded	theory	
3. Discuss	 the	 constructivist	 grounded	 theory	 approach	 and	 the			
appropriateness	of	this	methodology	to	the	research	question		
4. Explore	the	role	of	critical	reflexivity	in	the	research	process	
5. Review	 the	 issues	 of	 representation	 and	 legitimation	 in	 relation	 to	
qualitative	 inquiry	 and	 the	 importance	 of	 a	 rigorous	 and	 systematic	
approach	to	evaluation	of	the	research	
6. Describe	the	research	design		
7. Detail	the	methods	and	how	these	aligns	with	the	research	question	
8. Describe	the	data	collection	and	analysis	procedures	and	processes	
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Qualitative	research	
Research	is	about	discovery	and	learning	more	about	the	world	within	which	we	live.	
Numerous	 approaches	 facilitate	 the	 researcher	 making	 this	 journey	 of	 discovery.	
Research	 approaches	 are	 broadly	 categorized	 as	 being	 qualitative	 or	 quantitative.	
Qualitative	research	 is	concerned	with	 ‘how	social	experience	 is	created	and	given	
meaning’	 and	 is	 in	 contrast	 to	 quantitative	 research	 that	 aims	 to	 ‘measure	 and	
analyse	 causal	 relationships	 between	 variables’	 (Denzin	 &	 Lincoln	 2005,	 p.	 10).	
Qualitative	 research	 enables	 the	 exploration	 of	 a	 range	 of	 social	 dimensions	 and	
answer	questions	about	‘how	things	work	in	particular	contexts’	(Mason	2014,	p.	1).	
The	 importance	 of	 qualitative	 enquiry	 to	 study	 and	 understand	 human	 behaviour	
from	 a	 sociological	 perspective	was	 established	 through	 the	work	 of	 the	 ‘Chicago	
School’	in	the	1920s	and	1930s	(Denzin	&	Lincoln	2005,	p.	1).	A	range	of	disciplines	
including	nursing	then	adopted	qualitative	enquiry.		
	
Whilst	much	debate	has	centred	on	the	argument	that	quantitative	research	is	more	
rigorous	 and	 more	 scientific	 than	 qualitative	 research.	 Walsh	 (2013)	 argues	 that	
there	are	a	number	of	ways	of	approaching	research	with	no	one	way	being	more	
privileged	 than	 another.	 Debates	 that	 polarize	 the	 argument	 to	 an,	 ‘either	 or’	
approach	potentially	limit	the	researcher	and	the	research	outcomes.		
	
The	approaches	we	currently	possess	are	but	windows	that	frame	our	view	of	
this	world	but	also	limit	what	we	can	see.	We	should	not	think	that	our	window	
is	the	only	one,	or	indeed,	our	view	the	best	(Walsh,	2013,	p.	10).	
	
Rather	 than	 viewing	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 research	 as	 being	 mutually	
exclusive,	 current	 thought	 is	 that	 they	are	at	either	end	of	 a	 continuum	of	beliefs	
and	 the	 researcher	 adopts	 either	 a	 qualitative	 or	 quantitative	 approach	 or	 a	
combination	of	both,	based	on	the	research	question.	Therefore,	 it	 is	 the	research	
question	 that	 should	 determine	 the	 research	 methodology	 rather	 than	 the	
epistemological	or	ontological	stance	of	the	researcher.		
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The	 research	 question	 for	 this	 study	 asks,	 ‘What	 are	 the	 ways	 of	 working	 in	
perioperative	 nursing	 and	 their	 implications	 for	 practice	 and	 patient	 safety?’	 The	
study	 is	 asking	how	 things	work	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	perioperative	 setting	 and	 is	
seeking	to	understand	the	behaviour	of	perioperative	nurses	as	they	respond	to	the	
daily	 challenges	 of	 delivering	 safe	 patient	 care	 in	 a	 complex	 and	 demanding	
environment.	This	research	question	therefore	lends	itself	to	a	qualitative	approach.	
The	grounded	theory	method	
Grounded	theory	is	a	qualitative	research	methodology	that	aims	to	discover	theory	
from	data	using	inductive	methods.	Grounded	theory	was	‘discovered’	by	Glaser	and	
Strauss	 in	 the	 1960s	 and	 the	 method	 was	 published	 in	 their	 seminal	 work	 ‘The	
Discovery	of	Grounded	Theory:	Strategies	for	Qualitative	Research	(Glaser	&	Strauss	
1967).	This	discovery	came	at	a	time	of	tension	between	qualitative	and	quantitative	
research	 in	sociology	 in	the	United	States,	 in	particular	 in	relation	to	the	dearth	of	
writings	on	qualitative	methodological	approaches	and	analytical	strategies	 (Glaser	
&	Strauss	1967).	What	Glaser	and	Strauss	achieved	for	qualitative	research	was	the	
articulation	 of	 a	 methodology	 underpinned	 by	 a	 systematic	 approach	 to	 analysis	
that	could	be	applied	 in	several	settings	 for	a	variety	of	 topics.	This	countered	the	
prevailing	 positivist	 thinking	 that	 qualitative	 research	 was	 ‘impressionistic,	
anecdotal,	 unsystematic	 and	 biased’	 (Charmaz	 2014,	 p.	 6).	 In	 challenging	 the	
positivist	 methodological	 assumptions	 of	 the	 day,	 Glaser	 and	 Strauss	 moved	
qualitative	 inquiry	 beyond	 descriptive	 studies	 to	 develop	 theoretical	 explanations	
about	human	behaviour	(Charmaz	2014;	Hall,	Griffiths	&	McKenna	2013).	
	
Ghezelijeh	 et	 al.	 (2009)	 characterise	 traditional	 grounded	 theory	 as	 ontologically	
realist	and	epistemologically	positivist.	This	stance	holds	that	there	is	a	single	reality	
and	 objective	 truth	 can	 be	 measured	 through	 research	 (Brekenbridge	 2012).	
Grounded	 theory	 involves	 both	 an	 inductive	 and	 deductive	 approach	 to	 the	
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construction	of	theory	(Hall,	Griffiths	&	McKenna	2013)	which	is	discovered	through	
a	process	of	 data	 collection	 from	which	 the	 issues	of	 importance	emerge	 (Field	&	
Morse	 1985)	 and	 hypotheses	 are	 tested	 and	 retested	 as	 they	 arise	 from	 the	 data	
(Mills,	 Bonner	&	 Francis	 2006a).	 It	 is	 an	 approach	 now	used	widely	 in	 health	 and	
nursing	(Field	&	Morse	1985;	Mason	2014).		
The	remodelling	of	grounded	theory	
Following	 the	 publication	 of	 their	 seminal	 work,	 a	 philosophical	 divide	 became	
apparent	between	Glaser	 and	Strauss	and	 their	methodological	 approaches	began	
to	diverge	 along	different	paths.	 This	 developed	 into	 separate	 schools	of	 thought,	
now	referred	to	as	Glaserian	and	Straussian	grounded	theory	with	Strauss	working	
closely	 with	 Janet	 Corbin	 to	 co-develop	 the	 Straussian	 approach.	 Glaser	 has	
continued	to	focus	on	methods	and	his	work	continues	to	be	closely	aligned	with	the	
original	 approach	 (Glaser	&	Strauss	1967).	Meanwhile	 Strauss	and	Corbin	 rejected	
the	 positivist	 approach	 that	 theory	 is	 out	 there	 to	 be	 discovered,	 became	 more	
aligned	with	pragmatism	(Mills,	Bonner	&	Francis	2006a)	and	subsequently	adopted	
more	 	 realist	 stance	 (Higginbottom	 &	 Lauridsen	 2014).	 Furthermore,	 in	
acknowledging	 the	existence	of	multiple,	 socially	 constructed	 realities	 the	work	of	
Strauss	 and	 Corbin	 reflected	 a	 constructivist	 position	 (Hall,	 Griffiths	 &	 McKenna	
2013).	 The	 remodelling	 of	 grounded	 theory	 occurred	 during	 the	 period	 of	 the	
‘blurred	genres’,	where	researchers	had	at	their	disposal	a	range	of	paradigms	and	
methods	and	a	more	interpretative	approach	was	gaining	currency	(Higginbottom	&	
Lauridsen	2014,	p.	12).	
This	divergence	set	the	scene	for	the	evolution	of	other	postmodern	approaches	to	
qualitative	enquiry	including	dimensional	analysis	introduced	by	Leonard	Schatzman	
(Schatzman	1991),	 situational	 analysis	 espoused	by	Adele	Clarke	 (Clarke,	AE	2005)	
and	 constructivist	 grounded	 theory	 developed	 by	 Kathy	 Charmaz	 (Charmaz	 2014).	
These	 approaches	 share	 common	 elements	 with	 traditional	 grounded	 theory,	 in	
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particular	the	systematic	analysis	of	data.	The	main	differences	are	in	the	underlying	
epistemological	 assumptions	under	 challenge	at	 the	 time.	 This	 period	 is	 known	as	
the	 ‘crisis	of	representation’	where	writing	was	becoming	more	reflexive,	 issues	of	
validity,	reliability	and	objectivity	were	once	more	becoming	problematic	and	older	
models	of	truth	and	meaning	were	being	challenged	(Denzin	&	Lincoln	2005).				
The	constructivist	approach	to	grounded	theory		
In	 the	 development	 of	 constructivist	 grounded	 theory,	 Charmaz	 put	 forward	 the	
notion	 that	 relativity	and	subjectivity	had	a	place	 in	grounded	theory	which	 in	 the	
day	 ‘caused	 quite	 a	 stir’	 (2014,	 p.	 14).	 She	 chose	 the	 term	 ‘constructivist’	 to	
acknowledge	the	place	of	relativity	and	subjectivity	and	the	way	that	the	researcher	
and	participants	co-constructed	a	 shared	understanding	 from	the	data	and	also	 to	
differentiate	her	viewpoint	from	the	social	constructionist	approach	with	which	she	
had	grown	dissatisfied	(Charmaz	2014,	p.	14).	
	
The	 central	 tenets	 of	 constructivist	 grounded	 theory	 are	 to	 give	 voice	 to	
participants,	the	co-construction	of	understanding,	the	assumption	of	relativism	and	
the	subjective	epistemological	perspective	which	underpins	the	approach	(Charmaz	
2014).	In	contrast	to	traditional	grounded	theory,	constructivist	grounded	theory	is	
ontologically	 relativist	 and	 epistemologically	 subjective.	Ontologically	 it	 denies	 the	
existence	of	a	single	objective	reality	purporting	that	reality	is	a	social	construction;	
there	 are	 as	 many	 social	 constructions	 as	 there	 are	 individuals	 and	 some	
constructions	are	shared	within	groups	(Breckenridge	et	al.	2012).		Epistemologically	
it	is	subjective	because	of	the	nature	of	the	relationship	between	the	researcher	and	
the	 participants,	 which	 acknowledges	 the	 knowledge,	 values	 and	 views	 that	 the	
researcher	brings	to	the	research.	The	researcher	is	part	of	the	research	endeavour	
rather	 than	 being	 an	 objective	 observer	 and	 theory	 is	 developed	 from	 the	
researchers	rendering	of	participants	data	(Mills,	Bonner	&	Francis	2006a).		
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Another	 difference	 between	 the	 constructivist	 and	 traditional	 grounded	 theory	
approaches	lies	in	the	way	literature	is	viewed	on	and	around	the	area	under	study.		
Traditional	grounded	theory	does	not	advocate	a	review	of	the	literature	until	after	
the	analysis	is	completed	to	avoid	‘seeing	your	data	through	the	lens	of	earlier	ideas’	
(Charmaz	 2014,	 p.	 306).	 The	 constructivist	 approach	 however	 considers	 that	
reviewing	 the	 literature	 along	with	 any	 other	 available	 data	 informs	 the	 research	
process,	stimulating	further	discussion	with	participants	and	further	analysis	of	the	
data	(Charmaz	2014).		
	
The	view	that	theory	is	constructed	and	the	pivotal	role	that	interviews	play	in	the	
collection	 and	 construction	 of	 data	 is	 not	 shared	 by	 Glaser	 and	 he	 addressed	 his	
reasons	why	in	a	response	to	a	chapter	written	by	Charmaz	in	2000	called	Grounded	
Theory:	 Objectivist	 and	 Constructivist	 Methods	 (Glaser	 2012).	 Glaser	 argues	 that	
constructivist	grounded	theory	is	a	misnomer	because	grounded	theory	can	use	any	
data,	not	just	constructed	data	from	interviews.	Glaser	states:	
	
It	means	exactly	what	is	going	on	in	the	research	scene	is	the	data,	whatever	
the	 source,	 whether	 interview,	 observations,	 documents,	 in	 whatever	
combination.	 It	 is	 not	 only	 what	 is	 being	 told,	 how	 it	 is	 being	 told	 and	 the	
conditions	 of	 its	 being	 told,	 but	 also	 all	 the	 data	 surrounding	what	 is	 being	
told	(2012,	p.	28).		
	
	
Glaser	argues	 further	 that	 the	constructivist	view	of	 the	nature	of	 the	relationship	
between	 the	 researcher	 and	 the	 participant	 in	 co-constructing	 understanding	 is	
characteristic	of	the	interview	technique.	The	potential	biases	in	the	researcher	and	
participant	 relationship	 are	 just	 another	 variable	 to	 consider.	 He	 claims	 that	 the	
grounded	theory	constant	comparative	method	is	the	technique	which	brings	all	the	
data	together,	 from	whatever	source	(not	 just	 interviews)	and	discovers	the	 latent	
patterns	which	lead	to	theory	development	(Glaser	2012).		
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Despite	the	relativist	and	subjectivist	differences	of	opinion,	constructivist	grounded	
theory	is	true	to	the	four	main	tenets	of	grounded	theory,	these	being:	
	
1. The	requirement	for	conceptualisation	and	theory	development;		
2. That	theories	must	be	grounded	in	social	reality;		
3. That	the	researcher	approach	the	topic	with	an	open	mind;	and		
4. The	use	of	theoretical	sampling	(Glaser	2012).		
	
It	 is	 the	 third	 element	 concerning	 the	 role	 of	 the	 researcher	 that	 Charmaz	 has	
further	 developed	based	on	 the	 premise	 that	 the	 researcher	 cannot	 be	 a	 neutral	
and	value	free	observer.	Rather	the	researcher	is	someone	who	brings	his/her	own	
values,	 privileges	 and	 preconceptions	 to	 the	 research,	 which	 must	 not	 only	 be	
acknowledged	but	also	embraced	as	a	part	of	 the	 research	process	 (Hunter	et	al.	
2011).	 This	 stance	 is	 reflective	 of	 the	 postmodern	 period	 in	 the	 development	 of	
qualitative	research	where	it	was	argued	that	the	researcher	can	no	longer	remain	
aloof	from	the	research	(Charmaz	2014).	
	
Researchers	rationale	for	choosing	the	constructivist	grounded	theory	method	
Methodology	 is	 ‘how	 researchers	 ascertain	 what	 they	 think	 can	 be	 known;	 the	
analysis	of	how	research	should	or	does	proceed’	(Ghezeljeh	&	Emami	2009,	p.	2).	
The	ontological	and	epistemological	stance	of	the	researcher	influences	the	chosen	
methodology	 and	 it	 is	 therefore	 important	 to	 consider	 this	 stance	when	 selecting	
the	 approach	 for	 the	 research	 question.	 I	 considered	 three	 methodologies	 to	
determine	 their	 applicability	 in	 answering	 this	 research	 question.	 These	 were	
interpretive	 or	 hermeneutic	 phenomenology,	 ethnography	 and	 constructivist	
grounded	 theory.	 A	 review	 of	 several	 studies	 pertaining	 to	 perioperative	 nursing	
assessed	the	relevance	of	the	methodologies	to	this	research	question.	
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Interpretive	or	hermeneutic	phenomenology	was	considered	as	a	methodology	as	it	
enables	the	researcher	to	describe	and	understand	the	phenomenon	of	day	to	day	
activities	which	may	be	routine,	taken	for	granted	and	yet	complex	and	situational	in	
an	 attempt	 to	 understand	 them	 in	 a	 new	way	 (Denzin	&	 Lincoln	 2005).	 Rowlands	
and	Streeves	(2010)	used	this	approach	to	explore	the	experiences	of	perioperative	
nurses	 in	 relation	 to	 incorrect	 surgical	 counts	whilst	 Lindwall	 and	 von	 Post	 (2008)	
adopted	a	hermeneutic	approach	to	describe	habits	in	perioperative	nursing	culture.		
	
Ethnography	 is	 the	 study	 of	 a	 culture	 or	 a	 sub-culture	 where	 the	 researcher	
becomes	 immersed	 in	 the	 setting	 in	 order	 to	 better	 understand	 the	world	 of	 the	
participants	and	 is	an	approach	widely	used	 in	nursing	 (Lindwall	&	von	Post	2008;	
Rowlands	&	Steeves	2010).	Bingham	(1995)	used	ethnographic	approach	to	explore	
and	 engage	 in	 a	 dialogue	 with	 a	 group	 of	 students	 on	 what	 it	 meant	 to	 be	 a	
perioperative	nurse.	Ethnography	was	the	method	of	choice	for	McDonald	(2006)	to	
study	threats	to	patient	safety	in	an	operating	theatre	of	a	NHS	hospital	whilst	Bull	
and	FitzGerald	 (2006)	employed	an	ethnographic	approach	 to	address	 the	ways	 in	
which	OR	nurses	care	for	patients	within	a	technological	environment.	
	
As	 stated	 previously,	 traditional	 grounded	 theory	 is	 a	 qualitative	 research	
methodology	that	aims	to	discover	theory	from	data	using	inductive	methods.	It	is	a	
qualitative,	systematic	approach	to	discover	a	theory	that	explains	situated	actions	
and	interactions	within	a	research	setting	(Charmaz	2014).	Whilst	 it	 is	a	qualitative	
approach,	 the	 underlying	 ontology	 of	 traditional	 grounded	 theory	 is	 positivist	 and	
from	 an	 epistemological	 perspective,	 the	 researcher	 remains	 aloof	 from	 the	
research.	 In	 constructivist	grounded	 theory	on	 the	other	hand,	 the	 researcher	 is	a	
partner	 in	 the	 research	 and	 co-constructs	 understanding	 with	 the	 participants.	
Waehle	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 adopted	 this	 approach	 to	 develop	 an	 emergent	 theory	
regarding	the	use	of	surgical	checklists	to	reduce	adverse	events.		
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The	 previous	 discussion	 demonstrates	 that	 several	 qualitative	 research	
methodologies	 could	 address	 this	 research	 question.	 The	 reasons	 I	 selected	 the	
constructivist	grounded	theory	approach	for	this	research	are	threefold:	
	
1. The	approach	would	enable	collection	and	analysis	of	data	from	observation	
and	 interview	 to	 answer	 the	 research	 question	 ‘What	 are	 the	 ways	 of	
working	 in	 perioperative	 nursing	 and	 their	 implications	 for	 practice	 and	
patient	safety’	to	develop	a	theory	grounded	in	that	data;		
2. This	approach	resonated	with	my	epistemological	and	ontological	worldview.		
3. The	approach	acknowledged	the	subjectivity	and	the	emic	perspective	I	bring	
to	 the	 research.	 The	 constructivist	 approach	 has	 reshaped	 the	 relationship	
between	 the	 researcher	and	 the	participants	by	enabling	 the	 researcher	 to	
be	an	active	participant	 in	generating	 theory	 from	their	own	as	well	as	 the	
participant’s	 experiences.	 As	 I	 have	 a	 background	 in	 perioperative	 nursing	
the	 constructivist	 approach	 acknowledged	 that	 I	 have	 a	 perspective	 that	
would	 enable	 me	 to	 co-construct	 understanding	 and	 meanings	 with	 the	
participants.		
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Research	design	
A	major	 implication	 of	 choosing	 a	 constructivist	 grounded	 theory	 approach	 lies	 in	
the	 design	 of	 the	 research	 study.	 Contrary	 to	 the	 traditional	 grounded	 theory	
approach,	 where	 the	 researcher	 takes	 the	 stance	 of	 an	 objective	 observer,	 the	
constructivist	 approach	 requires	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 relationship	 between	 the	
researcher	and	the	participants	that	is	reciprocal	in	nature	(Waehle	et	al.	2012).	Key	
considerations	 this	 raised	 for	 the	 research	 design	 are	 the	 way	 the	 interviews	 are	
conducted,	 how	 the	 power	 imbalance	 between	 researcher	 and	 participant	 was	
addressed,	 the	 role	 that	 critical	 reflexivity	 and	 self-reflection	 played	 in	 the	 co-
construction	 of	meaning	 and	 the	 style	 adopted	 for	writing	 up	 the	 research	 (Mills,	
Bonner	&	Francis	2006a).		
The	relationship	between	the	researcher	and	the	participants	
The	relationship	between	the	researcher	and	the	participants	is	central	in	qualitative	
research.	Before	entering	 the	 field,	 consideration	of	 the	nature	of	 the	 relationship	
between	 the	 participants	 and	 myself	 as	 researcher	 brought	 forth	 two	 potential	
issues,	 these	 being	 power	 and	 the	 professional	 self.	 I	 reflected	 on	 this	 in	 the	
following	memo	before	going	into	the	field.	
	
Memo	 (Sept	 15	 2015):	 I	 have	 been	 reading	 an	 article	 by	 Robyn	 Dowling	 for	 the	 unit	
‘Qualitative	Methods’	called	‘Power,	subjectivity	and	ethics	in	qualitative	research’	(Dowling	
2010).	The	timing	of	this	unit	is	good	as	it	is	informing	my	thoughts	as	I	prepare	to	go	into	the	
field	to	commence	data	collection.	The	article	poses	several	questions	that	I	will	attempt	to	
answer	in	relation	to	my	own	research.	
	
What	is	the	nature	of	this	relationship	with	the	participants?	Is	it	reciprocal?		
No	as	we	are	not	in	comparable	social	positions	and	the	benefits	and	costs	of	participating	
are	not	equal.		
	
Is	it	asymmetrical	–	studying	up?		
No,	as	the	participants	are	not	in	a	position	of	influence	in	comparison	to	me.	
	
Is	it	asymmetrical	–	studying	down?		
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Yes,	as	I	am	in	a	position	of	greater	power	than	the	participants.	This	means	the	relationship	
is	potentially	exploitative.			
	
What	 are	 some	of	 the	 power	 dynamics	 of	 the	 general	 social	 situation	 I	 am	exploring	 and	
what	sort	of	power	dynamics	do	I	expect	between	the	informants	and	myself?	
	
It	may	be	perceived	that	I	could	convey	things	I	see/hear	about	what	goes	on	because	of	my	
contacts	 and	 relationships	 with	 senior	 staff	 in	 the	 department	 and	 in	 hospital	
administration.	With	some	participants,	in	the	past	I	have	been	their	teacher/manager	and	I	
may	therefore	still	be	perceived	as	being	in	an	authoritative	role.	I	could	potentially	portray	
them	 in	 a	 bad	 light.	What	 I	 say	 about	 them	 and	 their	 world	 may	 ‘have	 the	 potential	 to	
change	the	way	those	people	are	thought	about’.	
	
Dowling	 also	 asks	 the	 researcher	 to	 consider	 whether	 they	 are	 an	 insider	 or	 outsider	 in	
respect	 to	 the	 research	 project?	 I	 am	 an	 insider	 in	 that	 I	 have	 worked	 both	 as	 a	
perioperative	nurse	and	in	that	exact	environment	but	I	am	also	an	outsider	in	that	I	am	not	
one	of	the	team.	
	
The	 questions	 posed	 by	Dowling	 facilitate	 engagement	 in	 critical	 reflexivity,	 an	 important	
consideration	in	grounded	theory.	This	has	been	very	helpful	in	the	research	design	phase.		
	
Issue	of	power		
Qualitative	 research	necessitates	participation	 in	a	 social	process.	 The	 interactions	
between	 the	 researcher	 and	 the	 participants	 occur	 in	 a	 societal	 context	 where	
norms,	 expectations	 and	 structures	 of	 power	 play	 a	 role	 (Kong,	 Mahoney	 &	
Plummer	2001).	Power	impinges	on	the	research	in	a	variety	of	ways.	Firstly	in	the	
way	 that	 the	 researcher	 interprets	 the	 information	 gathered,	 secondly	 in	 that	 the	
knowledge	gained	can	be	used	to	influence	policy	making	decisions	and	thirdly	it	can	
change	the	way	people	think	about	the	participants	(Dowling	2010).	In	this	research	
the	power	relationship	is	asymmetrical	because	of	the	difference	between	the	social	
position	I	hold	and	that	of	the	participants.	Whilst	the	power	dimension	cannot	be	
eliminated,	 it	 can	 be	 managed	 through	 a	 process	 of	 critical	 reflexivity	 (Dowling	
2010).		
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Reflexivity	
Qualitative	research	acknowledges	reflexivity	as	a	powerful	methodological	 tool	 to	
raise	 self-awareness	 and	 recognise	 ones’	 place	 in	 the	 research	 and	 the	 research	
process.	Critical	reflexivity	is	defined	by	Charmaz	(2014,	p.	344)	as	‘the	researcher’s	
scrutiny	of	the	research	experience,	decisions	and	interpretations	in	ways	that	bring	
him	or	her	into	the	process’.	Asking	questions	of	oneself	and	of	the	research	process	
and	reflecting	on	the	answers	helps	to	make	the	researcher	accountable	for	his/her	
position	and	‘demonstrate	quality	and	rigour’	in	the	research	process	(Dowling	2010,	
p.	30).	Keeping	a	research	journal	and	writing	memos	were	the	techniques	used	to	
record	and	make	those	internal	conversations	and	deliberations	transparent.		
	
Evaluation	of	qualitative	research	
Crisis	of	legitimation	
The	evaluation	of	qualitative	 research	has	 long	been	 the	subject	of	discussion	and	
debate.	 The	 ‘triple	 crisis’	 described	 by	 Denzin	 and	 Lincoln	 (2005,	 p.	 19)	 asks	 how	
qualitative	 studies	 are	 to	 be	 evaluated	 ‘in	 the	 contemporary,	 post	 structural	
moment’.	 Questioning	 the	 relevance	 of	 traditional	 concepts	 of	 validity,	
generalisability	 and	 reliability	 raises	 issues	 of	 the	 legitimation	 of	 qualitative	
research.	More	recently	criteria	such	as	credibility,	transferability,	dependability	and	
confirmability	 have	 been	 offered	 as	 useful	 principles	 for	 evaluating	 qualitative	
research	(Mansvelt	&	Berg	2010,	p.	351).	The	current	view	 is	 that	 the	authority	 to	
claim	the	research	as	legitimate	is	based	on	it	being	an	accurate,	true	and	complete	
account	of	experience	and	meaning	(Schwandt	2007),	recognising	that	the	text	is	an	
interpretation	 or	 construction	 by	 the	 researcher.	Mason	 (2014,	 p.	 38)	 argues	 that	
the	 broad	 ideas	 behind	 the	 concepts	 of	 validity,	 generalisability	 and	 reliability	 are	
not	 ‘necessarily	 problematic’	 and	 can	 be	 usefully	 applied	 to	 the	 evaluation	 of	
qualitative	 research.	 Charmaz	 (2014)	 however	 uses	 the	 criteria	 of	 credibility,	
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originality,	 resonance	and	usefulness	to	evaluate	grounded	theory	studies	and	 it	 is	
these	criteria	that	were	used	to	evaluate	this	research.		
Credibility		
Credibility	speaks	to	the	researchers	familiarity	with	the	research	setting	and	topic;	
the	 sufficiency	of	 the	data;	 the	 systematic	 comparative	analysis	of	 categories;	and	
the	strength	of	the	links	between	the	data	and	the	findings	(Charmaz	2014).	
Originality	
Originality	 is	 present	 through	 the	 offering	 of	 new	 insights;	 a	 new	 conceptual	
rendering	 of	 the	 data;	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 research	 and	 how	 it	 extends	
knowledge	in	the	area	(Charmaz	2014).	
Resonance	
The	 research	 is	 portrayed	 in	 a	 meaningful	 way	 that	 is	 evocative	 of	 the	 lived	
experience	of	 the	participants	 and	offering	deeper	 insights	 about	 their	world	 that	
resonate	with	the	participants	and	perioperative	nurses	across	other	sites	(Charmaz	
2014).		
Usefulness	
Usefulness	 entails	 rendering	 the	 findings	 in	 a	meaningful,	 readable	 and	 accessible	
manner	 so	 readers	 can	 use	 them	 in	 the	 everyday	 world.	 The	 contribution	 of	 the	
findings	 to	 knowledge	 is	 evident	 along	 with	 opportunities	 for	 further	 research	
(Charmaz	2014).	
	
The	 previous	 discussion	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	 a	 rigorous	 and	 systematic	
approach	to	any	qualitative	research.	The	constructivist	grounded	theory	approach	
is	both	 rigorous	and	systematic.	Keeping	a	 research	 journal	and	writing	memos	 to	
record	assumptions,	interpretations	and	influences	assists	in	making	transparent	the	
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perspectives	 that	 underpin	 the	 writing,	 contributes	 to	 the	 data	 collection	 and	
facilitates	the	process	of	theorising.		
Crisis	of	Representation		
The	 crisis	 of	 representation	 relates	 to	 capturing	 the	 lived	 experience.	 Debate	 has	
raged	 about	 the	 epistemology,	 method	 and	 forms	 or	 representation	 within	
qualitative	 research	 (Schwandt	 2007).	 A	 central	 question	 is	 whether	 the	 research	
account	 can	 capture	 the	 lived	 experience	 of	 the	 participants	 and	 whether	 the	
researcher	is	representing	the	world	as	viewed	by	the	participants	or	creating	their	
experiences	through	the	writing	of	the	text	(Denzin	&	Lincoln	2005,	p.	19).	This	crisis	
emerged	 from	 the	 claim	 that	 interpretative	 accounts	 cannot	 completely	 capture	
lived	 experience	 (Schwandt	 2007).	 Resolution	 of	 this	 issue	 requires	 an	
acknowledgement	 that	 the	 research	 account	 is	 not	 the	 single	 truth	 but	 an	
interpretation	 of	 the	multiple	 truths	 as	 lived	 by	 each	 of	 the	 participants	 and	 the	
researcher,	which	the	researcher	renders	into	a	text.		
	
Issues	 of	 legitimation	 and	 representation	 should	 be	 considered	 at	 the	 research	
design	 stage	 (Denzin	 &	 Lincoln	 2005,	 p.	 25)	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 methodology	 is	
matched	 to	 the	 research	 question	 and	 the	 methods	 of	 data	 collection	 are	
appropriate	to	the	methodology.	
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Ethical	considerations	
The	major	ethical	considerations	in	this	research	were	obtaining	ethics	approval	to	
conduct	the	research;	gaining	approval	 to	access	the	sites	where	the	research	was	
carried	 out;	 obtaining	 the	 informed	 consent	 of	 the	 participants;	 issues	 of	 the	
professional	self;	and	being	 in	the	field	where	other	staff	would	be	present	during	
observation	of	participants.		
The	approval	process	
The	approval	process	was	multilayered	and	 included	ethics	approval,	 site	approval	
and	 approval	 to	 attend	 the	 specific	 clinical	 setting.	 An	 outline	 of	 these	 processes	
follows:	
Ethics	approval		
Because	 this	 study	 involved	 hospital	 employees,	 ethics	 approval	 was	 required	 to	
conduct	 the	 research	 and	 this	 focused	 predominantly	 on	 the	 provision	 of	
information	 about	 the	 study	 and	 the	 obtaining	 of	 an	 informed	 consent	 to	
participate.	Of	importance	was	conveying	to	participants	that	they	could	opt	out	of	
the	study	at	any	time.		
Ethics	approval	to	conduct	this	research	was	sought	and	obtained	from	the	Human	
Ethics	 Research	 Committee	 (Tasmania)	 Network	 (H0014736)	 with	 the	 research	
meeting	the	criteria	for	a	low	risk	application	(Appendix	1).		
Site	approval	Private	Hospital	
The	 private	 hospital	 firstly	 required	 evidence	 that	 the	 Human	 Ethics	 Research	
Committee,	(Tasmania)	Network	(HREC),	had	approved	the	study.	Submission	of	the	
research	proposal	to	the	hospital	Ethics	Committee	for	approval	followed.	A	meeting	
was	then	convened	with	the	Director	of	Clinical	Services	to	gain	approval	to	conduct	
the	study	and	consent	to	contact	the	Theatre	Manager.		
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Site	approval	Public	Hospital	
CEO	 approval	was	 required	 to	 come	 on	 site	 to	 conduct	 research	 and	 this	 process	
was	 facilitated	via	 the	medico-legal	office.	 The	written	approval	of	 the	Director	of	
Nursing	 was	 obtained	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 initial	 meeting	 along	 with	 consent	 to	
contact	the	Theatre	Manager.				
Clinical	area	approval	
The	Theatre	Manager	of	each	operating	 suite	was	 contacted	 to	brief	 them	on	 the	
project,	seek	their	permission	to	enter	the	operating	suite	and	to	gain	their	support	
to	recruit	staff	to	participate	in	the	research.		
Issue	of	the	professional	self	
A	significant	question	for	me	was	‘what	do	I	do	if	I	see	something	that	may	result	in	
harm	 to	 a	 patient	 while	 observing	 a	 participant?’	 This	 important	 ethical	 question	
had	 to	be	 resolved	before	entering	 the	 field	because	 it	 related	 to	doing	what	was	
‘right’.	Firstly,	I	entered	the	field	as	an	observer	who	was	also	a	registered	practicing	
nurse	 with	 obligations	 and	 responsibilities	 to	 prevent	 patient	 harm	 and	 report	
negligent	 practice.	 Secondly,	 I	 entered	 the	 field	 as	 an	 observer	 who	 as	 a	 human	
being	 had	 a	 sense	 of	 obligation	 and	 responsibility	 to	 speak	 up	 if	 I	 thought	 that	
another	human	being	was	a	risk	of	harm.	The	dilemma	is	that	this	professional	self,	
placed	me	 in	 a	 unique	position	 to	 recognise	 the	potential	 for	 patient	 harm	 in	 the	
research	 setting	 that	 other	 observers	without	 this	 experience	may	not	 foresee.	 In	
other	words,	I	was	more	‘attuned’	to	the	risks	inherent	in	the	setting.	The	resolution	
to	 this	 dilemma	 lay	 in	 remaining	 true	 to	 my	 personal	 and	 professional	 self	 and	
speaking	up	where	 it	becomes	evident	 that	 the	patient	may	experience	significant	
harm	if	I	failed	to	do	so.	
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I	was	 faced	with	 the	actual	 situation	on	 the	3rd	day	of	observing	and	again	a	 few	
days	later.	The	first	time	was	when	I	was	observing	a	research	participant	as	she	was	
opening	sterile	supplies.	She	had	 just	shown	a	student	how	to	do	this	 task	and	he	
was	 standing	 close	 by,	 also	 opening	 items.	 However,	 it	 was	 clear	 that	 he	 was	
completely	 unaware	 of	 the	 sterile	 gowns	 open	 on	 a	 table	 behind	 him	 and	 was	
moving	closer	and	closer.	The	research	participant	was	also	unaware	of	his	proximity	
so	I	got	up	and	whispered	in	her	ear	that	he	was	getting	too	close	and	she	addressed	
the	situation	with	him,	thanking	me	afterwards.		
	
The	 second	 time	 was	 when	 a	 patient	 was	 being	 anaesthetised.	 The	 anaesthetic	
nurse	had	placed	an	arm	board	on	one	side	to	keep	his	arm	supported	but	on	the	
other	side,	the	arm	was	unsupported.	As	the	patient	drifted	off	to	sleep,	I	could	see	
his	 arm	 slipping	 and	 that	 soon	 it	would	 fall	 off	 the	 table.	 I	 indicated	 to	 the	 scout	
nurse	what	was	happening	and	she	immediately	addressed	it,	nodding	in	thanks	as	
she	caught	his	arm.	Following	this	event,	I	wrote	the	following	memo:	
	
Memo	(18	Oct	2106):	I	cannot	un-know	what	I	know	about	the	maintenance	of	a	sterile	field	
and	 it	was	 clear	 to	me	 that	 both	 the	 student	 and	 participant	were	 unaware	 that	 he	was	
about	to	contaminate	the	sterile	field.		
	
I	 cannot	 un-see	 the	 arm	 of	 an	 unconscious	 patient	 slip	 of	 the	 table	 potentially	 causing	
damage	to	a	nerve,	skin,	or	soft	tissue	and	it	was	clear	to	me	that	no	one	else	had	noticed.			
	
However,	I	did	see	what	the	risks	were	and	therefore	I	spoke	up	as	my	professional	self.	It	
was	the	right	thing	to	do.	
 
Being	in	the	field	
As	participants	were	going	to	be	observed	as	they	went	about	their	daily	activities,	it	
was	inevitable	that	the	work	of	other	team	members	was	going	to	be	witnessed	as	
the	participants	interacted	with	them.	A	communication	strategy	was	developed	to	
address	 this	 should	 it	 be	 raised	 by	 other	 team	members	 and	 provide	 a	 clear	 and	
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consistent	message	that	only	observing	staff	who	had	consented	to	participate	were	
being	observed.	The	interaction	of	the	participant	with	other	members	of	the	team	
was	going	to	be	part	of	the	data	collected	and	additionally	participants	named	other	
team	 members	 during	 interview.	 It	 was	 therefore	 important	 that	 those	 persons	
remained	 completely	 anonymous	 and	 unidentifiable	 in	 the	 telling	 of	 the	
participant’s	stories.		
Obtaining	participant	consent	
Written	 consent	 was	 obtained	 from	 the	 participants	 for	 interviewing	 and	 being	
observed	 in	 practice	 (Appendix	 2).	 Each	 participant	 was	 given	 a	 Participant	
Information	 sheet,	 which	 outlined	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 study	 and	 their	 involvement	
(Appendix	 3).	 Both	 the	 participant	 information	 sheet	 and	 consent	 form	 were	
submitted	 to	 the	Human	Ethics	Research	Committee,	 (Tasmania)	Network	and	 the	
Private	 Hospital	 Ethics	 Committee	 and	 approved	 for	 use.	 Only	 participants	 who	
consented	to	participate	in	the	study	were	directly	observed.	
Research	setting		
The	main	 operating	 suites	 of	 a	 public	 and	 a	 private	 hospital	 in	 Tasmania	 are	 the	
setting	for	this	study.	The	initial	contact	was	through	the	Director	of	Nursing/Clinical	
Services	of	each	hospital	at	a	meeting	to	provide	an	outline	of	the	study	and	to	seek	
their	formal	approval	to	conduct	the	research	at	their	sites.	Both	were	provided	with	
a	 letter,	 formulated	 on	 the	 principles	 of	 the	 Building	 Effective	 Engagement	
Techniques	 (BEET)	 tool	 developed	 to	 implement	 practice	 change	 and	 assist	 in	
engaging	stakeholders	in	a	change	process	(Walsh	et	al.	2005).	This	tool	was	chosen	
to	assist	 in	presenting	a	 strong	and	coherent	argument	 to	 the	key	 stakeholders	at	
the	selected	hospitals	of	the	benefits	of	the	research	and	my	capacity	to	undertake	
it.	 The	 letter	 provided	 an	 outline	 of	my	 professional	 background,	 the	 goal	 of	 the	
research	 study,	 the	 outcomes	 envisaged	 from	 the	 study	 and	 the	 actions	 it	 was	
proposed	to	implement	in	conducting	the	research.	
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The	two	hospitals	performed	a	range	of	surgeries	from	day	surgery	and	 low	acuity	
elective	 surgery	 to	 trauma,	 emergencies	 and	 high	 acuity	 neurological	 and	 cardiac	
surgery,	thus	providing	a	broad	cross	section	of	specialities	and	acuity.	
	
Recruitment		
The	first	group	of	participants	were	recruited	followed	a	staff	meeting	in	the	theatre	
at	 the	 public	 hospital	 where	 a	 brief	 overview	 of	 the	 research	 was	 provided.	 4	
participants	 came	 forward	 after	 the	meeting	with	 3	 agreeing	 to	 be	 observed	 and	
interviewed	and	one	agreeing	to	be	interviewed.	All	were	RNs	who	had	many	years	
of	 experience.	 Subsequently	 an	 EN	with	minimal	 (less	 than	 3	months)	 experience	
who	 was	 participating	 in	 ‘an	 orientation	 to	 theatre	 course’,	 volunteered	 to	
participate	in	the	study.	
	
Another	 group	 of	 participants	 was	 recruited	 at	 the	 private	 hospital	 following	 the	
success	of	the	strategy	used	at	the	public	hospital.	Two	participants	came	forward	at	
the	 meeting	 and	 within	 2	 weeks	 of	 commencing	 observation,	 a	 novice	 RN	 and	
another	experienced	RN	also	 indicated	 interest	and	consented	to	participate	along	
with	a	RN	in	a	management/clinical	role. 
	
Inclusion	criteria	and	selection	of	participants	
Six	practicing	Registered	and	Enrolled	Nurses	 in	 scrub	and	 circulating	 roles	 from	a	
cross	section	of	age	and	length	of	experience	gave	consent	to	participate	(Table	1).	
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Identifier	 Public/Private	 RN/EN	 Years	of	experience	
	Susan	 Public	 RN	 20+	
Louise	 Public	 EN	 <1	
Claire	 Private	 RN	 10	+	
Joanne	 Private	 RN	 20	+	
Sarah	 Public	 RN	 20	+	
Jane	 Private	 RN	 15+	
	
Table	1:	Participating	perioperative	nurses		
	
The	 next	 section	 details	 the	 methods	 of	 data	 collection	 and	 analysis.	 The	 data	
collection	 techniques	 of	 coding,	 constant	 comparison,	 theoretical	 sampling,	
saturation	and	data	sufficiency	will	be	detailed	and	examples	of	application	of	these	
techniques	provided.		
	
	 	
 77 
Methods	
The	methods	adopted	for	this	research	were	interviewing,	observation	and	memos.	
As	 a	 strategy	 of	 inquiry,	 constructivist	 grounded	 theory	 relies	 on	 these	 data	
collection	methods	to	interpret	and	analyse	the	lived	experience	of	the	participants.		
Interviewing	
The	 interview	 technique	 was	 intensive	 rather	 than	 purely	 conversational.	 By	
adopting	 a	 purely	 conversational	 approach	 the	 researcher	 may	 find	 themselves	
listening	rather	than	questioning	and	seeking	clarification	and	letting	the	participant	
direct	the	flow	rather	than	allowing	the	researcher	to	stop	to	explore	points	raised	
in	more	detail	 (Charmaz	2014).	On	the	other	hand	an	 intensive	 interview	‘typically	
means	a	one	sided,	gently	guided	conversation	that	explores	a	person’s	substantial	
experience	with	the	research	topic’	(Charmaz	2014,	p.	56).		
Charmaz	 (2014)	 offers	 a	 number	 of	 strategies	 for	 conducting	 effective	 interviews	
including	 reading	 participants	 nonverbal	 cues;	 leaving	 the	 space	 open	 for	
participants	 to	 decline	 to	 answer;	 softening	 or	 reframing	 questions	 to	 reduce	
invasiveness;	and	improvising	to	maintain	the	flow	and	how	to	provide	feedback	to	
assist	the	participant	to	be	more	articulate.	Guidelines	for	interviewing	are	provided	
by	 Charmaz	 (2014,	 p.	 70)	 and	 these	 were	 adopted	 for	 the	 interviews	 with	
perioperative	nurses	(Appendix	4).		
Recording	and	transcribing	of	interviews	
The	constructivist	approach	to	 interviewing	permits	 interviews	to	be	recorded	and	
transcribed	 which	 is	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 Glaserian	 approach	 which	 promotes	 note	
taking	 alone	as	being	 sufficient	 to	 record	 the	essentials	 (Charmaz	2014).	However	
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Charmaz	 (2014,	 p.	 91)	 argues	 that	 note	 taking	 alone	 does	 not	 capture	 situational	
details	 such	 as	 participant	 tone	 and	 silences,	 which	 are	 important	 elements	 for	
constructivist	 grounded	 theorists.	 In	 this	 research,	 interviews	 were	 recorded	 and	
transcribed	before	coding.		
Participant	observation	
Participant	observation	 is	 a	 technique	commonly	used	 in	ethnography	 to	 facilitate	
immersion	in	the	culture	of	the	participants	being	studied	(Dobson	1986).	As	stated	
earlier,	in	this	approach	the	researcher	becomes	immersed	in	the	setting	in	order	to	
better	 understand	 the	 world	 of	 the	 participants	 (Lindwall	 &	 von	 Post	 2008;	
Rowlands	&	Steeves	2010).	 Charmaz	 (2014,	 p.	 23)	 argues	 that	 the	 combination	of	
ethnographic	 observations	 and	 interviews	 is	 a	 ‘powerful	 data	 collection	 strategy’	
that	provides	rich	data.	Participant	observation	employs	four	levels	of	involvement:	
participant,	participant	as	observer,	observer	as	participant	and	observer	(Hoare	et	
al.	 2012)	 or	 alternatively	 as	 participating,	 partially	 participating,	 minimally	
participating	or	non-participating	(Laitinen,	Kaunonen	&	Åstedt-Kurki	2014).		
	
In	 this	 study,	 the	 stance	 taken	 was	 that	 of	 a	 participant	 observer.	 Participant	
observation	‘allows	the	researcher	to	see	what	people	do	and	to	compare	what	they	
do	 with	 what	 they	 say	 they	 do’	 (Laitinen,	 Kaunonen	 &	 Åstedt-Kurki	 2014,	 p.	 11)	
within	the	social	context.	The	notes	made	during	observation	facilitate	deep	probing	
of	 what	 is	 happening	 in	 the	 setting.	 The	 notes	 record	 actions,	 anecdotes,	
observations,	 define	 issues	 of	 importance	 to	 the	 participants,	 pay	 attention	 to	
language,	 place	 the	 actions	 of	 the	 participants	 in	 context	 and	 highlight	 the	
significant	 processes	 occurring	 in	 the	 setting	 (Charmaz	 2014).	 By	 being	 present	 in	
the	 setting	 with	 the	 participants,	 the	 researcher	 experiences	 the	 world	 of	 the	
participants	with	them.	
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Charmaz	 (2014)	 poses	 a	 number	 of	 questions	 for	 the	 novice	 observer	 to	 consider	
when	 in	 the	 field,	 to	 assist	 in	more	 clearly	 viewing	 the	 events	 as	 they	 unfold	 and	
facilitate	 the	 gathering	 of	 rich	 data	 from	 observation	 of	 the	 participants.	 These	
questions	were	adapted	to	form	a	framework	for	observing	perioperative	nurses	as	
they	went	about	their	daily	activities	(Appendix	5). 
	
Memo	writing	
Memo	writing	 is	 a	 technique	used	by	 the	 researcher	 to	 take	 time	out	 to	 consider	
and	 analyse	 the	 information	 derived	 from	 coding	 or	 the	 emerging	 categories.	 It	
forms	 an	 important	 link	 between	 collecting	 the	 data	 and	writing	 drafts	 (Charmaz	
2014)	and	enhances	the	exploration	of	the	data	(Hoare,	Mills	&	Francis	2012).	Whilst	
in	 the	 field,	 	 the	 participant’s	 actions;	 the	 context;	 the	 conditions	 present	 at	 the	
time;	 interactions	 between	 the	participant	 and	others	 along	with	 the	 researcher’s	
thoughts	 and	 observations	 were	 recorded.	 These	 notes	 not	 only	 informed	 the	
questions	 to	 later	 to	ask	 the	participant,	 they	also	 formed	 the	basis	 for	memos	 in	
which	 the	 emerging	 issues	 and	 themes	 were	 further	 explored.	 Furthermore,	 as	
observation	 and	 data	 collection	 progressed,	 the	 assumptions	 held	 by	 the	
participants	and	myself	were	queried	and	challenged	and	different	ways	to	interpret	
the	 data	 were	 sought.	 The	 writing	 of	 memos	 not	 only	 assisted	 in	 analysing	 and	
theorising	but	also	informed	the	process	of	theoretical	sampling,	highlighting	gaps	in	
the	data	and	focussing	attention	on	emerging	categories	and	concepts.		
 	
 80 
Data	analysis	procedures	
Six	 participants	were	 observed	 for	 a	 total	 of	 56	 hours	 and	 10	 hours	 of	 interviews	
were	conducted	and	transcribed.	The	transcribed	interviews	were	entered	into	the	
software	program	NVivo	and	the	process	of	coding	commenced.	
	
Coding		
Data	was	analysed	using	coding,	 the	 fundamental	analytical	 tool	used	 in	grounded	
theory.	The	technique	of	coding	requires	 that	 the	data	 is	 taken	apart,	defined	and	
labelled	 so	 that	 ultimately,	 categories	 can	 be	 developed	 from	 codes	 that	
demonstrate	 analytical	 strength	 (Charmaz	 2014).	 Unlike	 quantitative	 analysis,	 the	
codes	are	not	preconceived	and	applied	 to	 the	data,	 rather	 they	emerge	 from	the	
data	(Charmaz	2014).	
	
Initial	 coding	 is	where	 the	 researcher	 begins	 to	 engage	with	 and	 define	 the	 data.	
Line	by	line	coding	is	a	form	of	initial	coding	where	the	researcher	analyses	each	line	
of	 data	 and	 what	 theoretical	 ideas	 it	 suggests	 (Charmaz	 2014).	 Initial	 coding	
consisted	of	reading	the	interviews	and	creating	codes	for	pieces	of	information	that	
had	relevance	to	the	research	question.	These	codes	were	revisited	sorting	similar	
codes	 into	 groups	 under	 a	 head	 code.	 For	 example,	 the	 descriptions	 given	 by	 the	
participants	about	how	they	managed	tasks,	were	coded,	sorted	and	grouped	under	
the	 head	 code	 'Task	 management’.	 Where	 gathered	 data	 was	 similar,	 or	 shared	
common	 features,	 it	was	pulled	 in	under	a	category.	For	example,	 the	head	codes	
task	 management,	 anticipation,	 situation	 awareness,	 forethought	 and	 ‘being	
prepared’	 were	 grouped	 under	 the	 category	 of	 non-technical	 skills.	 If	 the	 actual	
expression	 used	 by	 the	 participant	 is	 coded,	 this	 becomes	 an	 in-vivo	 code	 and	 is	
recognised	 throughout	 this	 research	 by	 enclosure	 in	 italics.	 For	 example,	 ‘being	
prepared’	is	an	in-vivo	code.	This	process	not	only	holds	‘like’	data	together,	it	also	
makes	the	data	more	manageable.		
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At	 this	 stage	 the	 information	 in	 each	 code	 was	 in	 chunks	 or	 exemplars	 from	 the	
interviews.	 The	 next	 stage	was	 coding	 these	 chunks	 line	 by	 line.	 This	 led	 to	more	
focussed	 coding	 and	 recoding.	 Revisiting	 the	 interview	 transcripts	 ensured	 the	
coding	or	 re-coding	of	all	 relevant	 information	contained	 in	 the	 interview.	As	new	
data	was	coded	and	new	understandings	and	patterns	emerged	the	original	codes	
and	 head	 codes	 were	 revisited	 and	 where	 applicable	 merged,	 separated	 or	 re-
named.		
	
Focussed	coding	follows	on	from	initial	coding	where	the	researcher	 looks	 in	more	
detail	 at	 the	most	 common	codes	arising	 from	 the	 initial	 codes	and	begins	 to	 test	
them	 against	 the	 larger	 batch	 of	 data	 (Charmaz	 2014).	 For	 example,	 line	 by	 line	
coding	of	interview	exemplars	from	different	participants	was	revealing	data	about	
not	having	enough	 time	 to	 complete	all	 the	 tasks	expected.	 The	 in	 vivo	 code	of	 ‘I	
wish	 there	 was	more	 time’	 drew	 together	 data	 on	 the	 topic	 of	 time.	 This	 led	 to	
reviewing	the	literature	in	more	depth	and	exploring	the	research	on	this	topic.	The	
literature	itself	both	constitutes	data	and	informs	the	data	and	is	coded	accordingly.	
	
Focussed	coding	revealed	several	common	themes	amongst	the	codes	and	gathering	
these	 into	tentative	categories	 facilitated	 further	exploration.	Memos	documented	
emerging	 and	 revealing	 thoughts	 along	with	 possible	 links	 to	 other	 codes.	Where	
relevant,	 the	memos	were	 then	 linked	 to	 the	 code.	 For	 example,	 a	 link	 emerged	
between	the	pressures	that	perceived	lack	of	time	created	to	get	the	job	done	and	
the	 impact	 it	 had	 on	 task	 management,	 leading	 to	 a	 realisation	 that	 there	 are	
differing	and	competing	temporal	structures	at	play.		
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Constant	comparison	
The	 researcher	 analyses	 the	 data	 collected	 through	 a	 technique	 of	 constant	
comparison	that	gives	meaning	to	the	stories	told	by	the	participants	(Ghezeljeh	&	
Emami	2009).	Data	 is	 compared	with	data,	data	with	codes,	 code	with	code,	code	
with	category,	category	with	category	and	category	with	concept	(Charmaz	2014)	to	
identify	similarities	and	differences	in	the	data	to	facilitate	coding,	development	of	
categories	and	finally	concepts	(Higginbottom	&	Lauridsen	2014;	Hunter	et	al.	2011).	
The	finding	of	similarities	in	the	data	and	drawing	data	on	time	together	under	the	
code	 ‘‘I	 wish	 there	was	more	 time’	 as	 outlined	 above,	 is	 an	 example	 of	 constant	
comparison	at	work.	So	 too	 is	 the	development	of	category	of	 ‘Wishing	 there	was	
more	 time’	 that	 was	 initially	 a	 code	 but	 was	 raised	 to	 a	 category	 because	 it	
represented	several	codes	on	the	theme	of	time	and	its	impact	or	influence	on	the	
ways	that	perioperative	nurses	work.	
	
Constant	comparison	of	the	data	assists	 in	clarifying	any	themes	and	patterns	that	
are	emerging.	This	in	turn	informs	where	there	are	gaps	and	the	questions	that	need	
asking	to	address	them	and	to	consolidate	thoughts	on	emerging	patterns.	
Theoretical	sampling,	saturation	and	data	sufficiency	
Using	 the	 techniques	 of	 theoretical	 sampling	 and	 saturation	 of	 categories,	 the	
researcher	 develops	 the	 properties	 of	 each	 emerging	 category,	 seeking	 people,	
events	or	 information	 that	define	 the	properties,	boundaries	and	 relevance	of	 the	
category	 or	 set	 of	 categories	 (Charmaz	 2014).	 For	 example,	 codes,	 such	 as	 ‘team	
time	 out	 practices	 varying	 between	 teams	 and	 specialties’;	 ‘practices	 being	
influenced	by	 the	presence	of	 certain	 staff	members’;	 ‘inconsistencies	 in	practices	
between	staff’;	‘not	everyone	does	it	exactly	the	same’;	the	following	of	rules	being	
‘hit	and	miss’;	were	gathered	under	the	category	of	ambiguity/clarity.		
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To	 ensure	 clarity	 for	 the	 researcher	 and	 reader	 when	 reading	 the	 findings	 in	
Chapters	4	and	5,	definitions	are	provided	for	many	of	the	categories.	For	example,	
in	the	category	of	ambiguity/clarity,	ambiguity	is	defined	as	‘uncertainty	of	meaning	
where	 more	 than	 one	 interpretation	 is	 plausible’	 and	 clarity	 is	 ‘clearness	 of	
understanding	and	freedom	from	ambiguity’.	Where	provided,	these	definitions	are	
in	boxes	at	the	beginning	of	the	section	directly	under	the	section	heading.		
	
A	review	of	 interview	transcripts,	field	notes,	memos	and	the	literature	sought	out	
the	 practices	 relevant	 to	 each	 category	 and	 helped	 set	 the	 boundaries	 for	 the	
category.	The	conduct	of	further	interviews	targeted	questions	to	gather	more	data	
to	 substantiate	 emerging	 themes.	 Annotations	 made	 during	 the	 coding	 process	
assisted	 in	 highlighting	 areas	 for	 further	 examination	 and	 exploration	 with	
interviewees.		
	
Saturation	occurs	at	 the	point	where	gathering	more	data	on	a	 category	does	not	
yield	any	additional	properties	or	insights	(Charmaz	2014)	so	when	it	became	clear	
the	 data	 was	 offering	 no	 new	 insights,	 data	 sufficiency	 was	 deemed	 to	 have	
occurred.	Charmaz	(2014)	argues	that	the	quality	of	the	research	and	its	credibility	
relies	on	 the	quality	of	 the	data,	 its	 relevance,	depth	and	sufficiency.	Suitable	and	
sufficient	 data	 is	 required	 ‘to	 fit	 your	 task	 and	 give	 a	 full	 picture	 of	 the	 topic’	
(Charmaz	2014,	p.	33).	Data	 sufficiency	 is	not	however	 just	about	quantity;	 it	 also	
relates	to	the	richness	of	the	data	that	tells	the	participants	stories	and	enables	the	
researcher	 to	 interpret	 and	 render	 the	 co-constructed	 understandings	 of	 the	
participants	 and	 researcher	 into	 a	 robust	 theory	 that	 explains	what	 is	 happening.	
The	 point	 at	 which	 sufficient	 data	 has	 been	 collected	 is	 the	 point	 at	 which	 the	
categories	become	 saturated,	 ‘in	other	words,	 your	 categories	 are	 robust	because	
you	 have	 found	 no	 new	 properties	 of	 these	 categories	 and	 your	 established	
properties	account	for	patterns	in	your	data’	(Charmaz,	2014	p.213).	
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Basic	Social	Processes	
Traditional	grounded	theory	describes	basic	social	processes	as	being	 fundamental	
to	 the	grounded	 theory	method	 (Charmaz	2014	p.34).	Glaser	 (2005)	argues	 that	a	
basic	 social	 process	 emerges	 from	 a	 core	 category,	 contending	 that	 while	 a	 core	
category	 is	 always	 present	 in	 a	 grounded	 theory	 research	 study,	 a	 basic	 social	
process	may	not	be.	Reflecting	on	and	asking	questions	of	what	 is	being	seen	and	
heard	 in	 the	 research	 setting	 will	 assist	 the	 researcher	 to	 study	 the	 processes	
occurring.	 Charmaz	 suggests	 the	 following	 actions	 to	 determine	 what	 social	
processes	are	at	play:	
	
• Attending	to	actions	and	processes	as	well	as	words	
• Delineating	the	context,	scenes	and	situations	of	action	carefully	
• Recording	who	did	what,	when	it	occurred,	why	it	happened	and	how	it	
occurred	
• Identifying	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	 specific	 actions,	 intentions	 and	
processes	emerge	or	are	muted	
• Looking	for	ways	to	interpret	the	data	
• Focussing	on	specific	words	and	phrases	 to	which	participants	 seem	to	
attribute	particular	meaning	
• Finding	 taken	 for	 granted	 and	 hidden	 assumptions	 of	 various	
participants;	 showing	how	they	are	 revealed	 through	and	affect	action	
(2014	p.35)	
	
Adopting	 the	 strategies	 outlined	 above	 during	 the	 process	 of	 data	 collection	
and	 analysis	 assisted	me	 in	 identifying	 the	 processes	 at	 play	 in	 the	 research	
setting	and	a	basic	social	process	emerged	from	my	research.	The	core	category	
(phenomena)	of	‘being	pressured’	and	‘feeling	pressured’	led	to	the	emergence	
of	the	social	process	of	reshaping	practice	in	response	to	pressure.	Discovery	of	
a	 basic	 social	 process	 enhances	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 practical	 realities	
faced	by	the	participants	and	helps	to	explain	the	variations	in	the	behaviour.		
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Summary	
This	chapter	situated	this	research	within	the	qualitative	paradigm	and	drawing	on	
the	work	of	Denzin	and	Lincoln	(2005)	has	placed	constructivist	grounded	theory	in	
the	 post-modern	 period	 where	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 aloof	 researcher	 was	 being	
challenged.	The	appropriateness	of	this	methodology	and	methods	to	the	research	
question	 have	 been	 established	 and	 the	 research	 design	 outlined	 with	 specific	
emphasis	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 researcher	 and	 the	 participants	 and	
concerns	relating	to	power	and	the	role	of	the	professional	self.	The	role	of	critical	
reflexivity	 as	 a	 means	 of	 raising	 self-awareness	 and	 recognising	 the	 researchers	
place	in	the	research	and	the	research	process	was	also	explored.		
	
A	 review	of	 the	 issues	of	 representation	and	 legitimation	 in	 relation	 to	qualitative	
inquiry	highlighted	the	importance	of	a	rigorous	and	systematic	approach	to	assure	
credibility,	 originality,	 resonances	 and	 usefulness	 of	 qualitative	 research	 findings.	
Ethical	 considerations	 emphasised	 informed	 participant	 consent,	 ensuring	 that	
participants	and	other	 team	members	 remained	unidentifiable	and	 the	 robustness	
of	the	ethics	approval	processes.	
	
This	 chapter	 also	 provided	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 methods	 and	 data	 collection	 and	
analysis	 procedures	 applied	 to	 the	 data	 within	 a	 constructivist	 grounded	 theory	
framework.	The	research	methods	outlined	are	appropriate	to	address	the	research	
questions	posed	in	this	study.	
The	 next	 two	 chapters	 present	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 research	 structured	 under	 the	
headings	of	context,	phenomenon	and	process.		
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Chapter	4:	Findings	
The	 context	 -	 ‘Enablers	 and	 constraints	 to	 practicing	 in	 accordance	
with	rules	and	standards’.	
	
The	 findings	 are	 presented	 in	 two	 chapters.	 The	 current	 chapter	 presents	 the	
context	 within	 which	 perioperative	 nurses	 practice	 that	 enables	 or	 constrains	
practicing	 in	 accordance	with	 standards	 and	 rules.	 These	 enablers	 and	 constraints	
may	 act	 to	 enhance	 performance	 and	 compliance	 or	 conversely	 create	 an	
environment	 or	 pressure	 that	 results	 in	 perioperative	 nurses	 making	 trade-offs	
between	 rule	 following	 or	 rule	 breaking	 to	 get	 the	 job	 done.	 Chapter	 5	 is	 in	 two	
parts	 with	 Part	 1	 exploring	 the	 phenomena	 of	 ‘being	 pressured’	 and	 ‘feeling	
pressured’	 to	 get	 the	 job	 done	 that	 emerged	 from	 the	 data.	 Part	 2	 discusses	 the	
process	of	‘reshaping	practice’	that	perioperative	nurses	engage	in	as	they	respond	
to	the	pressures	to	get	the	job	done.	The	context,	phenomena	and	process	together	
constitute	the	substantive	theory	that	perioperative	nurses	reshape	their	practice	
in	response	to	pressures	to	get	the	job	done.		
	
Introduction	
The	 data	 identified	 a	 range	 of	 factors	 that	 act	 to	 enable	 or	 constrain	 the	
perioperative	nurse	practicing	in	accordance	with	rules	and	standards.	These	factors	
constitute	 the	 context	 within	 which	 perioperative	 nurses	 practice	 and	 deliver	
patient	care.	Factors	that	enable	or	constrain	practicing	in	accordance	with	the	rules	
create	 pressure	 and/or	 an	 environment	 vulnerable	 to	working	 in	ways	 other	 than	
following	standards	and	rules.	Coding,	sifting	and	sorting	of	the	data	led	to	synthesis	
of	 several	 categories,	 which	 in	 turn	 gave	 rise	 to	 the	 five	 key	 concepts	 of	
‘organisational	 conditions’,	 ‘ambiguity’,	 ‘having	 a	 good	 day’,	 ‘knowing	 how’	 and	
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‘they’ve	just	got	it’.	Each	of	these	concepts	will	now	be	explored	with	reference	to	
the	categories	from	which	they	arose.		
Organisational	conditions		
In	this	study,	I	define	organisational	conditions	as	those	conditions	present	in	the	workplace	
that	 influence	 practicing	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 rules	 and	 are	 within	 the	 remit	 of	 the	
organisation	 to	 control	 or	manage	 through	 appropriate	 human,	material	 and	 IT	 resource	
management.		
	
The	codes	emerging	from	the	data	relating	to	organisational	conditions	included:	
Being	limited	by	time	
Being	busy	
Being	interrupted	
Being	distracted	
Taking	the	focus	away	from	the	patient	
Doing	paperwork	
Having	to	leave	the	theatre	to	get	equipment	and	supplies	
Managing	tasks	unrelated	to	the	patient	on	the	table;	and		
Being	responsible	for	junior	staff	
	
The	codes	were	sifted	and	sorted	into	the	categories	of	‘being	busy’;	‘needing	more	
time’;	 interruptions	and	distractions;	skill	mix	and	team	makeup	and	together	they	
constitute	the	concept	of	organisational	conditions	that	act	to	enable	or	constrain	
practicing	in	accordance	with	the	rules.	These	categories	form	the	sub	headings	for	
this	section.	
	‘Being	busy’	
The	perioperative	nurse	participants	describe	 their	daily	work	as	 ‘being	busy’.	 The	
busyness	may	be	 related	 to	 the	number	of	 patients	 on	 a	 list	 or	 the	nature	of	 the	
surgical	procedures,	such	as	short	cases	with	quick	turnovers:	
	
Joanne:	…	on	really	busy	days	like	when	you	have	a	busy	eye	day	for	example.	
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Claire:	…	and	if	you’ve	got	a	really	busy	day	with	lots	of	short	cases.	
	
They	also	describe	being	busy	as	doing	many	 tasks,	doing	more	 than	one	 thing	at	
once	(multitasking)	and	having	to	focus	on	tasks	unrelated	to	the	patient:		
	
Jane:	That	is	what	busy	means	to	me	really.	A	lot	of	jobs	to	do.	A	lot	of	extra	jobs	to	do.		
	
Susan:	I	find	that	it	gets	busy	pretty	easily	and	I	might	be	focusing	on	two	or	three	things.	
	
Claire:	…	and	you	haven’t	done	anything	on	the	computer	or	any	paperwork	because	you’ve	
been	busy	doing	all	that	other	stuff.	
	
Jane:	We	keep	very	busy	going	around	chasing	things	up	all	the	time.	
	
The	participants	 acknowledge	 that	 ‘being	busy’	 has	 implications	 for	 their	 practice,	
the	way	they	perform	their	tasks,	the	priorities	they	make	and	the	potential	risks	it	
poses	 for	patient	safety.	 In	particular,	 that	 ‘being	busy’	 takes	 the	 focus	away	 from	
the	patient	on	the	table:		
	
Susan:	I	was	so	busy	I	that	I	wasn't	focussing	on	patient	safety.	
	
Claire:	Sometimes	it	does	distract	me	from	focussing	on	the	patient,	if	it	all	gets	too	busy.			
	
Jane:	It	has	meant	feeling	like	I’ve	got	lots	of	balls	in	the	air	to	juggle	and	I’ve	got	to	try	and	
keep	on	top	you	know.		
	
‘Needing	more	time’	
During	interview,	the	participants	frequently	referred	to	the	amount	of	time	or	lack	
of	 time	 to	 perform	 tasks	 and	 activities.	 Examples	 of	 codes	 were:	 ‘time,	 we	 need	
more	time’;	being	limited	by	time;	‘it	comes	down	to	a	time	thing’;	non-clinical	time;	
time	consuming;	managing	time;	saving	time;	 ‘just	one	more	minute’	and	pressure	
of	time.		
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Some	 tasks	 performed	 by	 perioperative	 nurses	 are	 very	 time	 consuming	 such	 as	
checking	trays	against	the	tray	list	before	the	commencement	of	the	procedure.	The	
more	complex	the	surgery,	the	more	trays	there	are	and	therefore	there	are	more	
tray	lists	to	check.	This	task	is	performed	concurrently	with	several	other	tasks	such	
as	 setting	 up	 instruments	 trolleys,	 opening	 supplies	 and	 counting	 ‘accountable’	
items,	 so	 it	 makes	 for	 a	 busy	 period	 for	 the	 scrub	 and	 scout	 nurse.	 The	 time-
consuming	 nature	 of	 tray	 checking	 coupled	with	 limited	 time	 to	 complete	 all	 the	
other	necessary	tasks	can	be	a	constraint	to	practicing	in	accordance	with	the	rules.	
The	following	exemplar	demonstrates	this:			
	
Susan:	 If	 there	 are	 2	 experienced	 theatre	 nurses	 in	 the	 theatre	 you	 know	 it	 can	 be	 time	
consuming	 to	 do	 a	 tray	 list	 for	 something	 that	 you	 know	well	 and	 for	 a	minimal	 or	 quite	
remote	risk	of	losing	something	in	the	patient,	again	plastic	surgery,	so	it	does	come	down	
to	efficiency	sometimes	as	well.	
	
Having	to	chase	down	equipment	to	be	able	to	safely	position	the	patient	is	another	
time-consuming	task:	
	
Susan:	 I	wouldn't	 say	 it	necessarily	affects	patient	 safety	because	you	get	 the	 right	one	 in	
the	end.	But	it’s	time	consuming	in	the	interim	trying	to	chase	it	down.	
	
The	 peeling	 of	 stickers	 from	 the	 labels	 on	 supplies	 sterilised	 in	 CSD	 and	 applying	
them	to	a	tracking	form	at	point	of	use	is	another	time-consuming	task	identified	by	
Susan:		
	
Yes,	 it	 is	 time	consuming.	When	you're	opening	neurosurgical	 for	example	or	orthopaedic	
items,	where	they	have	multitudes	of	trays	that’s	where	I	see	people	getting	big	bundles	(of	
stickers)	and	for	me	that’s	where	it’s	more	efficient	to	have	your	form	right	there	and	stick	
them	straight	on.		
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Senior	 perioperative	nurses	often	have	portfolios	 that	 they	manage	 in	 addition	 to	
their	allocated	clinical	roles.	They	find	though	that	clinical	time	always	takes	priority,	
often	 leaving	 little	 or	 no	 non-clinical	 time	 to	 complete	 tasks	 associated	with	 their	
portfolios.	This	results	in	them	having	to	do	these	tasks	during	a	list,	taking	the	focus	
away	 from	 the	 patient	 on	 the	 table	 and	 adding	 to	 the	 number	 of	 tasks	 they	 are	
managing	 at	 a	 given	 time.	 This	 in	 turn	 adds	 to	 the	 pressure	 to	 get	 the	 job	 done.	
Limitations	 on	 time	 and	 other	 priorities	 means	 some	 tasks	 are	 not	 done	 such	 as	
updating	 surgeon’s	 preference	 cards.	 The	 following	 three	 exemplars	 convey	 the	
frustration	 felt	by	senior	perioperative	nurse	participants	at	not	having	 time	to	do	
non-clinical	tasks	and	make	improvements:		
	
Susan:	We	are	rostered	non-clinical	time	but	we	are	only	given	it	based	on	the	availability	on	
the	 day.	 You	 can't	 manage	 if	 you’re	 not	 given	 the	 time	 to	 manage	 and	 improve	 things.	
Nothing	 changes.	 Nothing	 improves.	 There's	 so	much	 room	 for	 improvement	 that	 would	
affect	safety,	efficiency,	everything,	but	not	being	given	time	to	do	that,	I	find	is	a	real	issue.	
	
Sarah:		On	my	wish	list	is	to	have	non-clinical	time	so	I	could	do	stuff	that	I’d	like	to	have	up	
to	date.	It’s	the	non-clinical	stuff	that	sometimes	I	think,	again,	I	had	on	my	list,	‘I	must	order	
this,	this	and	this.’	Now,	if	I	don’t	get	a	chance	to	do	it	for	a	couple	of	days	then	there’s	a	bit	
of	pressure	to	make	sure	that	I	do	get	that	equipment	here.		
	
Joanne:	They	(competencies)	are	actually	out	of	date,	which	 is	a	bit	of	a	worry	and	one	of	
these	days,	I	will	get	time	to	update	them.	
	
Another	time-consuming	task	identified	by	the	participants	was	paperwork.	Joanne	
finds	 herself	 having	 to	 get	 paperwork	 done	 in	 the	morning	 in	 preparation	 for	 the	
afternoon	list,	as	she	knows	she	will	not	have	time	to	do	it	all	when	the	time	comes	
due	 to	 the	speed	of	 the	surgeon.	She	 is	 conscious	 that	 this	 is	 taking	her	attention	
away	from	the	patient	currently	on	the	table	but	this	is	a	compromise	she	feels	she	
must	make	to	get	the	job	done.	I	asked	her	what	she	prepared	in	advance:	
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Joanne:	 Paperwork.	 I	 was	 putting	 data	 into	 the	 computer	 that	wasn't	 essential	 data	 that	
takes	a	 lot	of	time.	So,	 like	 I	was	signing	the	sticker	form,	 I	was	filling	the	chargeable	 item	
numbers	on	the	chargeable	form	and	I	was	putting	data	into	the	computer	that	always	stays	
the	 same.	 I've	 actually	 thought	 about	 whether	 that	 is	 a	 good	 thing	 to	 be	 doing	 during	
someone	 else’s	 list	 and	 I'm	 really	 aware.	 I	 always	 do	 it	 during	 the	 morning	 list,	 as	 that	
surgeon	 is	much	slower	so	 I	am	very	aware	that	 I	am	doing	something	that	 is	not	 for	that	
patient.	So,	I	am	always	listening	and	I	just	leave	it	and	go	away	from	it	if	the	surgeon	needs	
help.	So,	I	don't	think	it	is	of	any	detriment	to	the	patient.	Whereas,	if	I	left	it	until	the	actual	
list,	some	of	it	wouldn't	get	done	because	it’s	not	possible	to	keep	up	with	him.		
	
When	 incidents	 occur	 such	 as	 discovering	 that	 an	 alert	 is	 not	 on	 the	 system	 or	
equipment	 is	broken,	 finding	time	to	access	 the	computer	and	enter	 the	data	 into	
the	program	 to	 report	 the	problem	 is	problematic	and	as	a	 result,	many	 incidents	
are	just	not	reported.	This	has	implications	for	risk	management	and	patient	safety:		
	
Susan:	It	usually	comes	down	to	a	time	thing.	A	lot	of	things	happen	that	really	should	have	
an	 incident	report	filled	out	about	them	or	 just	to	highlight	or	to	put	something	 in	writing	
somewhere,	to	raise	somebody's	awareness	about	it	but	again	it’s	time	consuming.	A	lot	of	
time	it	just	doesn't	happen	because	you	simply	do	not	have	time	and	it’s	just	something	else	
to	 add	 to	 your	 list,	 you	 know	 it’s	 just	 taking	 your	 focus	 off	 the	 current	 patient	 and	what	
you're	doing	so	a	lot	of	it	goes	undocumented.		
	
Susan:	A	prime	example	is	that	the	bed	is	broken	but	A	hasn't	got	time	to	follow	up,	why	is	
the	bed	broken,	how	come	this	child	is	on	the	bed	if	it’s	broken,	what	can	we	do	about	this,	
who	is	to	fix	this	broken	bed?	We	don't	really	want	 it	back	to	put	the	child	back	on	at	the	
end	of	the	case.	Yes,	time,	we	need	more	time.	
	
	
There	are	several	constraints	on	perioperative	nurse’s	time	with	additional	portfolio	
responsibilities	and	 the	amount	of	paperwork	being	significant	 factors.	The	 lack	of	
time	can	lead	to	non-reporting	of	issues	and	incidents,	preference	cards	being	out	of	
date	 and	 juggling	 of	multiple	 asks	 with	 its	 concomitant	 pressure	 to	 not	 drop	 any	
balls	and	forget	things.		
	 	
 92 
Completing	 paperwork	 ahead	 of	 time	 is	 cutting	 corners	 to	 get	 the	 job	 done.	 A	
consistent	thread	is	the	need	to	balance	the	competing	demands	of	being	there	for	
the	patient	and	the	need	to	complete	administrative	tasks.	Perioperative	nurses	are	
also	 cognisant	 that	 administrative	 demands	 take	 their	 focus	 away	 from	 their	
patients.	My	 findings	 indicate	 that	 lack	 of	 time	 is	 the	 biggest	 inhibiting	 factor	 for	
making	improvements	and	the	non-reporting	of	things	that	go	wrong.	This	creates	a	
lost	opportunity	for	improving	the	systems	and	process	that	support	the	delivery	of	
safe	 patient	 care	 and	many	 resolvable	 issues	 remain	 within	 the	 system	 to	 create	
issues	and	pressure	for	others.			
	
Interruptions	and	distractions	
Interruptions	 and	 distractions	 take	 many	 forms	 and	 those	 identified	 by	 the	
participants	 included	 phone	 calls;	 people	 coming	 to	 theatre	 to	 ask	 questions;	
colleagues	talking	about	non-patient	related	matters;	presence	of	students	and	the	
need	 to	 attend	 to	 multiple	 tasks	 and	 other	 responsibilities.	 Interruptions	 and	
distractions	may	constrain	practicing	in	accordance	with	rules	and	standards.	In	the	
next	 exemplar,	 a	 colleague	who	was	 relaying	 information	 completely	unrelated	 to	
the	 patient	 on	 the	 table	 interrupts	 Claire	 during	 a	 count.	 I	 asked	 her	 if	 that	
happened	often	and	what	the	impact	was:		
	
Claire:	Most	people	are	pretty	good	when	you’re	counting,	unless	it’s	an	urgent	thing.	I	have	
found	 it	happening	more	 frequently	with	exactly	 the	 same	situation	as	 it	was	 today	and	 I	
have	actually	had	a	word	about	it	to	that	person	because	I	really	do	need	to	concentrate	on	
one	 thing	at	 a	 time	because	 there	are	already	other	distractions.	 So,	 yes,	 it	 does	have	an	
impact.	I	thought	about	restarting	the	count,	but	I	was	very	confident	that	I	hadn’t	touched	
anything	and	that	I	had	stopped	in	the	middle	of	the	packs,	but	technically	I	probably	should	
have	 started	 again	 really.	 But	 yes,	 it	 is	 a	 distraction,	 so	 it	 has	 the	 impact	 of	 possibly	 not	
counting	correctly.	
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Claire	 recognises	 that	 her	 concentration	 is	 broken	 by	 being	 interrupted	 and	 may	
create	a	 risk	of	counting	 incorrectly.	She	 is	also	 fully	aware	 that	 the	standard	says	
the	count	should	be	restarted	if	there	is	an	interruption.	However,	 in	the	here	and	
now	she	must	weigh	up	the	consequences	of	following	the	standard	or	not	and	she	
decides	to	continue	the	count.	The	impact	of	the	unnecessary	interruption	is	that	a	
rule	is	broken	to	get	the	job	done.		
	
On	one	occasion	when	Susan	was	team	leader	and	scout	for	a	 list,	 I	observed	that	
she	was	interrupted	3	times	during	one	operation.	One	person	came	to	the	door	and	
asked	 Susan	 for	 a	 telephone	 number	 and	 another	 came	 to	 theatre	with	 a	 pair	 of	
scissors	that	she	showed	Susan.	There	was	also	a	phone	call	that	Susan	stepped	out	
of	 the	 theatre	 to	 take.	 At	 the	 interview	 that	 followed,	 I	 asked	 Susan	 if	 she	 was	
interrupted	very	often:	
	
Susan:	 Yes.	 I’m	 only	 here	 on	 [certain	 days	 of	 the	 week]	 so	 I	 often	 get	 interrupted	 by	
someone	who	comes	to	the	door	asking	a	question	about	tomorrow	and	you’ll	often	see	me	
checking	the	predicted	lists,	like	you	saw	me	doing	today,	the	list	and	this	emails	and	things	
during	the	case.	But	obviously,	I	try	and	do	those	things	at	an	appropriate	time	like	once	the	
procedure	is	up	and	running,	if	I	have	time.	
	
As	 a	 senior	 nurse	 in	 the	 operating	 suite,	 Susan	 has	 a	 portfolio	 for	 overseeing	 a	
specialty.	With	 this	 portfolio	 come	 additional	 responsibilities	 that	 require	 Susan’s	
attention.	Phone	calls	and	queries	from	staff	about	 issues	concerning	her	portfolio	
interrupt	her	from	time	to	time,	during	an	operation.	She	acknowledges	that	these	
interruptions	take	her	 focus	away	from	the	patient	on	the	table	and	on	occasions,	
she	leaves	the	theatre	to	deal	with	them.	
	
Having	students	 in	the	theatre	places	additional	demands	on	the	team	and	can	be	
distracting.	Susan	acknowledges	that	teaching	can	be	a	distraction	adding	to	the	list	
of	tasks	to	do	and	potentially	taking	the	focus	from	the	patient:		
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Susan:	Whether	it	distracts	from	what	I’m	doing?	Sometimes	it	does,	not	always	but	I	guess	
the	potential	 is	 there.	 In	my	mind,	 I’m	 thinking	 I’ve	got	 to	go	out	and	chase	 that	up	but	 I	
want	to	help	this	person	with	the	paperwork	and	I	also	need	to	be	doing	what	I’m	doing.	So,	
I	 guess	 it	 is	 easy	 to	 potentially	 lose	 focus	 but	 I	 also	 think	 probably	 that	 because	 of	 the	
amount	of	years	I’ve	been	doing	this	I	do	a	lot	of	things	without	thinking.	So,	I	guess	that’s	
part	of	the	multi-tasking	and	throw	a	bit	of	teaching	in	there	as	well	I	guess	you	can	easily	
get	distracted	with	something.	
	
Jane	also	related	that	having	multiple	tasks	to	complete,	juggling	them	and	trying	to	
remember	everything	that	needed	action	was	distracting:	
	
Jane:	I	still	feel	like	I	give	really	good	patient	care	but	it	does	distract	me	at	times	from	fully	
focusing	on	the	patient,	which	I	like	to	do	and	that’s	what	I	get	satisfaction	from.	
	
Many	 the	 tasks	 that	 perioperative	nurses	need	 to	perform	 to	meet	organisational	
needs	 take	 the	 focus	 away	 from	 the	patient.	 Claire	 related	 to	me	 that	 sometimes	
she	 left	 the	prostheses	paperwork	until	 after	 the	end	of	 the	 list	 so	 that	 it	 did	not	
distract	her	 from	delivering	care	 to	 the	patient.	 I	 reflected	on	this	 in	 the	 following	
memo:		
	
Memo	 (28	Nov	2015):	Some	of	 the	standards	are	about	the	systems	and	processes	within	
which	 we	 work	 and	 others	 are	 about	 recommended	 practices	 and	 they	 are	 all	 there	 to	
create	 a	 safe	 environment	 for	 patients.	 So,	 when	 you	 always	 bring	 these	 things	 back	 to	
patient	safety,	then	it	makes	for	some	very	interesting	conversations.	One	of	the	things	that	
I’m	seeing	and	thinking	about,	which	is	what’s	interesting	for	me,	is	how	much	of	what	it	is	
that	perioperative	nurses	do	that	takes	their	focus	away	from	their	key	role	which	is	patient	
safety,	 towards	 meeting	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 organisation.	 So,	 what	 Claire	 talked	 about	 in	
relation	to	the	orthopaedic	prosthesis	for	example,	is	about	meeting	organisational	need,	so	
if	we	come	back	and	 say,	 ‘Well	 actually	 I’m	here	 for	patient	 safety	and	 if	 I’m	doing	 this,	 I	
can’t	 be	 doing	 that	 when	 that’s	 what	 actually	 I	 am	 here	 for	 in	 terms	 of	 patient	 safety’.	
Therefore,	 when	 Claire	 says	 she	 leaves	 it	 until	 the	 end	 (paperwork),	 then	 her	 focus	 of	
attention	is	on	the	patient	and	providing	a	safe	environment	for	the	patient.	Unfortunately,	
that	leaves	her	with	a	backlog	of	administrative	stuff	that	somehow	or	other	is	still	hers	to	
sort.	
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Interruptions	 and	 distractions	 can	 affect	 the	 cognitive	 work	 of	 nurses.	 This	 has	
important	 implications	 for	 understanding	 the	 origins	 of	 medical	 errors	 and	 is	
particularly	 applicable	 in	 the	 operating	 theatre.	 Disruptions	 and	 interruptions,	
including	 people	 entering	 and	 leaving	 the	 theatre,	 telephones	 and	 beepers,	
equipment	 failures	 and	 other	 work	 environment	 issues	 have	 been	 shown	 to	
adversely	 impact	 on	workflow	with	 interruptions	 occurring	 on	 average	 9-10	 times	
per	 hour	 (Antoniadis	 et	 al.	 2013).	 Interruptions	 can	 be	 a	 determinant	 in	 adverse	
events	(Koh,	Park	&	Wickens	2014)	and	there	is	a	strong	link	between	the	number	of	
interruptions	 and	 surgical	 errors	 (Wiegmann	 et	 al.	 2007).	 The	 number	 of	
interruptions	 has	 been	 shown	 to	 increase	 the	 number	 of	 miscommunications	
(Gillespie,	 Chaboyer	 and	 Fairweather	 2012).	 This	 highlights	 that	 interruptions	
occurring	while	completing	other	tasks	can	have	a	negative	impact	on	the	successful	
completion	 of	 the	 task	 at	 hand	 by	 impacting	 on	 flow	 and	 potentially	 resulting	 in	
losing	one’s	place	in	a	count	or	forgetting	a	task	altogether.		
	
‘Having	a	good	team’	
The	makeup	 of	 team	 emerged	 as	 an	 important	 factor	 for	 the	 perioperative	 nurse	
participants.	 Team	 make-up	 can	 enhance	 or	 detract	 from	 individual	 or	 team	
performance.	 The	 following	exemplars	provide	a	 rich	description	of	what	happens	
when	the	participants	perceive	the	team	as	being	‘right’:		
	
Claire:	I	think	it	makes	a	big	difference	when	you	get	to	know	each	other,	so	when	new	staff	
come	you	sort	of	hold	back	a	bit	because	you	are	getting	 to	know	their	experience,	what	
skills	they’ve	got	that	they	can	bring.	So,	I	think	knowing	each	other	well	and	I	don’t	mean	in	
a	 friendship	way,	but	 just	knowing	 the	skills	 that	 individuals	have	 is	 important	 in	having	a	
good	team.	Helping	each	other	and	not	just	wanting	to	stick	to	your	role	and	you	know,	be	
blinkered	to	everything	else	that’s	going	on.	
	
Susan:	Lists	will	seemingly	run	like	clockwork	if	you’ve	got	people	thinking	on	the	same	level	
and	the	(speciality	theatre	is	a	great	example	of	that.	It’s	a	core	team.	It’s	the	same	team	all	
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the	time.	So,	everything	runs	beautifully	in	there.	Everyone	knows	what	he	or	she	needs	to	
do;	everybody	knows	what	is	expected	of	him	or	her.		
	
Claire:	So,	the	skill	mix	is	really	important	because	it	makes	it	a	lot	less	stressful,	or	at	least	
for	the	scout	and	for	the	doctor	because	everyone	knows	what	they	are	doing.	
	
	
Having	a	good	team	takes	the	pressure	off	 individual	team	members	because	they	
can	rely	on	each	other	to	get	the	job	done.	Perceiving	the	skill	mix	and	team	make	
up	 is	 not	 good	 can	 create	 pressure	 on	 the	 perioperative	 nurse	 and	 affect	 team	
performance:		
	
Claire:	One	of	the	pressures	can	be	if	you	haven’t	got	the	right	skill	mix	in	the	theatre,	then	
that	can	delay	cases,	delay	the	day.	
	
Good	communication	plays	an	important	role	in	teamwork	and	patient	safety.	The	
following	exemplars	describe	situations	where	poor	communication	may	have	
resulted	in	wrong	site	surgery	or	inappropriate	diagnosis:		
	
Louise:	 For	 example,	 a	 simple	 scenario	 that	 could	 have	 gone	 really	 wrong	 last	 week:	 we	
were	all	set	up	for	a	particular	case,	had	the	first	patient’s	name	on	the	computer,	details	
entered	etc.	and	a	patient	comes	 in	and	gets	settled	on	the	bed.	Thankfully,	 they	weren’t	
asleep,	 but	 the	 anaesthetist	 has	 given	me	 the	paperwork	 and	 I’ve	 thought	 ‘oh	 that	name	
doesn’t	match	what	 I’ve	got	here,	 this	patient	 is	 second	on	the	 list’.	So,	 I’ve	actually	gone	
over	 quietly	 to	 the	 anaesthetist	 and	 checked	 and	 he	 said,	 ‘oh	 yes	 the	 first	 one	 has	 been	
cancelled’.	 We	 hadn’t	 as	 the	 nursing	 staff	 hadn’t	 been	 notified	 that	 the	 first	 one	 was	
cancelled,	so	we	were	planning	on	doing	the	first	case,	where	the	anaesthetist	was	all	set	up	
for	 the	 second	one.	Had	 that	patient	been	asleep,	 I	would	have	been	assuming	 that	 they	
were	having	something	totally	different	in	a	totally	different	area	to	what	they	were	actually	
having.	Had	we	all	been	on	the	same	page	as	me,	that	patient	could	have	been	in	a	whole	
lot	of	danger;	because	once	they’re	asleep	they	can’t	say	no	I’m	not	that	patient.		
	
Susan:	There	was	an	incident	here	at	the	hospital	in	the	last	year	or	so.	It	was	the	doughnuts	
of	 the	 bowel	 resection	 (from	 the	 stapling	 device)	 and	 there	was	 some	misunderstanding	
between	the	surgeon	and	the	scrub	nurse	about	wanting	to	send	them	off.	I	don't	do	a	lot	of	
bowel	 surgery	 but	 I'm	 pretty	 sure	 routinely	 they	 do	 go	 off,	 but	 maybe	 they	 don't	 go	
routinely	and	in	this	instance,	there	was	a	miscommunication	and	when	the	patient	came	to	
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see	 the	 surgeon,	 he	 looked	 at	 the	 computer	 and	 there	 were	 no	 results	 because	 the	
specimens	 hadn't	 been	 sent	 off.	 So	 obviously,	 there	 was	 an	 impact	 on	 the	 patient.	
Obviously,	all	the	specimens	are	important	but	I	guess	not	having	the	specimen	may	be	the	
difference	between	the	patient	having	to	come	back	for	another	procedure	or	not.		
	
	
In	 summary,	 organisational	 conditions	 such	 as	 workload,	 interruptions	 and	
distractions,	 skill	 mix	 and	 communication	 can	 enable	 or	 constrain	 practicing	 in	
accordance	with	rules	and	standards	and	create	pressure	to	get	 the	 job	done.	The	
next	 section	 explores	 the	 role	 that	 ambiguity/clarity	 of	 rules,	 standards	 and	 tasks	
can	 have	 in	 enabling	 or	 constraining	 practicing	 in	 accordance	 with	 rules	 and	
standards.	
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Ambiguity/clarity	of	rules,	standards	and	tasks	
In	 this	 study,	 I	 define	 ambiguity	 as	 uncertainty	 of	 meaning	 where	 more	 than	 one	
interpretation	 is	 plausible,	 and	 clarity	 as	 clearness	 of	 understanding	 and	 freedom	 from	
ambiguity.	
	
Ambiguity	 was	 not	 a	 term	 used	 by	 the	 participants.	 Rather	 it	 developed	 as	 a	
construct	 through	 analysis	 of	 the	 data.	 In	 observing	 the	 practices	 of	 the	
perioperative	nurse	participants	as	they	went	about	their	daily	work,	it	became	clear	
that	whilst	rules	and	standards	were	adhered	to	most	the	time,	there	were	several	
inconsistencies	in	terms	of	how	things	were	done	in	different	theatres,	 in	different	
types	of	surgeries,	in	different	situations	and	in	different	teams.	Coding	and	sorting	
of	my	observations	and	the	responses	given	in	interviews	gave	rise	to	five	areas	of	
practice	 where	 ambiguity	 was	 evident,	 these	 being	 the	 checking	 of	 tray	 lists;	 the	
count;	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 Team	 Time	 Out	 (TTO)	 procedure;	 and	
management	of	warmed	sterile	solutions.	These	areas	of	practice	form	the	headings	
for	this	section.	
	
Checking	of	tray	lists		
	
I	 observed	 that	 Claire	 counted	 the	 total	 number	 of	 instruments	 on	 a	 minor	 tray	
rather	than	counting	them	in	groups	of	like	instruments	e.g.	artery	forceps,	scissors,	
tissue	 holders.	 The	 ACORN	 Standard	 ‘Management	 of	 Accountable	 Items	 used	
during	Surgery/Procedures	in	the	Perioperative	Environment’	(ACORN	2016)	is	silent	
on	this	point	with	the	result	that	each	nurse	does	it	differently.	Claire	explained	that	
practices	differed	depending	on	whom	you	are	working	with:	
	
Claire:	Sometimes	we	do	count	them	individually,	the	minor	op	tray.	 It	sort	of	depends	on	
who	you	are	counting	with.	Some	people	say,	 ‘I’m	 just	going	to	count	the	whole	tray’	and	
others	 will	 start	 counting	 it,	 you	 know,	 the	 scrub	 nurse	 will	 start	 counting	 it	 in	 separate	
groups	so	it	sort	of	depends	on	who	you’re	counting	with.	
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The	surgical	count	
	
The	 next	 two	 exemplars	 highlight	 inconsistencies	 in	 recording	 items	 on	 the	 count	
sheet	and	the	technique	of	counting:	
	
Claire:	I	wonder	about	a	lot	of	things	with	the	count	because	we	actually	don’t	count	every	
single	thing	that	we	open	onto	a	table.	We	open	a	disposable	Y-suction	catheter	for	tonsils	
and	I’ve	started	to	put	that	on	the	count	sheet,	but	we	never	did	before.	It’s	funny	people’s	
perception	of	what	 should	be	 in	 the	count	and	what	shouldn’t,	 like	we	open	a	disposable	
pen	and	ruler	and	the	ruler’s	just	a	bit	of	paper,	but	some	pens	don’t	have	a	ruler	in	it	and	
some	do	and	it’s	just	some	people	put	down	the	ruler	as	well	as	the	pen	and	other	people	
don’t.	And	there	are	things	that	we	put	on	the	table	that	we	haven’t	been	told	to	count	or	
haven’t	in	the	past	been	habitually	counted	and	they	don’t	get	put	on	there	and	I	think	well,	
if	we	count	that,	then	why	don’t	we	count	that?		
	
Claire:	 Some	 people	 will	 open	 it	 (the	 pack),	 put	 it	 over	 here	 and	 fold	 it	 and	 that’s	 fine	
because	I	can	see	it.	But	some	people	have	a	different	technique	that	I	find	hard	to	follow	
and	 I	 really	have	to	 look	to	make	sure	 I	can	see	that	 it’s	a	single	pack	that	they’re	putting	
down.	A	couple	of	years	ago,	we	had	a	few	lots	of	packs	of	raytec	that	had	six	in	them.	So,	
I’m	making	 sure	 that	 I	 can	 see	 and	 the	 scout	 can	 see,	 that	 that	 is	 a	 single	 item	 that	 I’m	
counting	off.	
	
Whether	certain	consumable	items	are	included	as	part	of	the	count,	how	the	item	
is	recorded	and	the	way	that	items	are	separated	and	displayed	during	a	count	are	
examples	of	where	there	is	ambiguity	rather	than	clarity.	The	checking	of	tray	lists	is	
covered	 in	 the	 Standard	 ‘Management	 of	 Accountable	 Items	 Used	 during	
Surgery/Procedures	 in	 the	 Perioperative	 Environment	 (ACORN	 2016).	 Standard	
Statement	 1	 recommends	 that	 Health	 Care	 Facilities	 (HCF)	 develop	 a	 policy	 that	
defines	 those	 types	 of	 surgery	 requiring	 the	 management	 of	 accountable	 items;	
what	 items	 should	 be	 included	 in	 mandatory	 counts	 and	 any	 variations	 to	 the	
management	of	accountable	items.	The	absence	of	such	a	policy	leads	to	ambiguity	
and	 inconsistencies	 in	 practice	 and	 may	 have	 implications	 for	 patient	 safety.	
Standard	 Statement:	 Criteria	 3.3	 and	 3.5	 prescribe	 that	 ‘both	 nurses	 count	 each	
individual	item	out	loud	simultaneously	while	visualising	all	 items’	and	‘ensure	that	
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each	accountable	item	is	separated	during	the	counting	procedure’.	That	there	is	a	
difference	 in	 the	way	 individuals	 can	 apply	 the	 technique	 of	 counting	 highlights	 a	
degree	of	ambiguity	in	the	standard.		
	
Implementation	of	the	Team	Time	Out	(TTO)	
	
I	observed	many	inconsistencies	during	the	TTO,	where	team	members	pause	before	
commencing	the	procedure	to	verify	the	correct	patient	is	having	the	correct	surgery	
on	the	correct	site:		
	
Susan:	Some	of	the	anaesthetists	are	very	good	at	driving	it.	There’s	one	in	particular	I	can	
think	of	who	 always	 says,	 right	 before	he	 gives	 any	drugs	 and	before	 the	patient	 goes	 to	
sleep,	let’s	do	a	time	out.	But	of	course,	sometimes	they	might	have	had	some	midazolam	in	
the	anaesthetic	bay	while	they’ve	been	waiting	so	in	that	instance	I	guess	once	they’ve	had	
some	drugs	on	board	that	changes	that	a	little	bit.	So,	where	possible	I	would	usually	try	to	
instigate	 it	before	 the	patient	goes	 to	 sleep.	But	 I	 think	 the	actual	 standard	or	protocol	 is	
that	it	can	be	done	once	the	patient	is	asleep	before	the	initial	incision	is	done.	One	surgeon	
I’m	thinking	of	in	particular	always	does	the	time	out	when	the	patient	is	prepped,	draped	
and	ready	and	before	he	makes	his	incision,	he’ll	do	his	time	out	then.	So,	there	are	a	lot	of	
variances.		
	
This	 exemplar	 highlights	 ambiguity	 as	 to	who	 should	 instigate	 the	 TTO,	when	 the	
TTO	is	performed	and	a	lack	of	certainty	of	what	the	protocol	actually	says	should	be	
done.	 I	 also	 observed	 differences	 in	 the	 level	 of	 engagement	 of	 various	 team	
members.	 Susan	 rationalises	 that	 it	 is	better	 to	do	a	TTO	with	 fully	engaged	 team	
members	than	push	the	doctors	to	participate:		
	
Susan:	The	TTO	 is	obviously	an	 important,	probably	one	of	 the	most	 important	checks	we	
do,	so	I	will	always	make	sure	that	we	have	done	one.	But	I	guess	that	what	I	let	slip	some	of	
the	time	is	the	amount	of	engagement	I	guess	that’s	in	there.		
	
	
As	 Team	 Leader	 Susan,	must	make	 a	 call	 as	 to	whether	 she	 is	 going	 to	 push	 the	
doctors	to	 fully	comply	with	the	TTO	protocol	or	not.	She	rationalises	that	doing	a	
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TTO	 with	 the	 people	 present	 and	 who	 do	 participate	 is	 more	 important	 than	
ensuring	full	compliance	with	the	protocol.	This	leaves	the	perioperative	nurse	in	a	
position	of	having	to	compromise	and	complete	the	activity	often	without	full	team	
participation.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 ambiguity	 and	 lack	 of	 consistency	 constrains	
practicing	in	accordance	with	the	rules.		
	
Management	of	warmed	sterile	solutions		
	
The	 following	 memo	 highlights	 inconsistencies	 in	 the	 practice	 of	 storing	 sterile	
solutions	in	warming	cabinets:	
	
Memo	 (13	Oct	 2015):	 	 I	 observed	 that	 the	 practices	 around	 the	 storage	 of	 solutions	 in	 a	
warming	cabinet	were	inconsistent.	Solutions	are	placed	in	the	warming	cabinet	to	assist	in	
preventing	hypothermia	so	warming	them	is	a	risk	minimisation	strategy.	In	the	absence	of	
a	 hospital	 policy	 or	 professional	 standard,	 I	 referred	 to	 the	 manufacturer’s	 instructions	
obtained	through	a	web	search.	The	manufacturer’s	 rules	around	storage	state	 that	 these	
solutions	 should	 only	 be	 warmed	 at	 certain	 temperatures	 for	 certain	 periods	 of	 time	 to	
maintain	 their	 chemical	 composition	 and	 therefore	 their	 efficacy.	 The	 manufacturer’s	
instructions	provide	two	options	for	storage	with	the	variation	based	on	temperature	of	the	
cabinet	 and	 time	 stored.	 They	 also	 provide	 instructions	 on	 managing	 unused	 solutions	
under	each	storage	option	and	promote	labelling	as	a	mechanism	for	monitoring	the	length	
of	storage.	To	follow	these	instructions	the	temperature	of	the	cabinet	needs	to	be	known	
and	solutions	then	dated	according	to	either	option	one	or	two	above.	On	one	occasion,	 I	
observed	Susan	taking	a	bottle	of	saline	out	of	the	warming	cabinet,	checking	the	label	with	
the	scrub	nurse	and	pouring	it	into	a	sterile	container	on	the	set	up.	I	resolved	to	follow	this	
up	with	Susan	at	interview.	
	
At	 interview,	 I	 asked	 Susan	 about	 the	 rationale	 for	 warming	 solutions,	 how	 she	 knew	
which	ones	to	warm	and	how	she	knew	how	long	bottles	of	saline	had	been	in	the	warming	
cabinet	before	she	took	it	out	for	use	
	
Susan	responded:		
Susan:	 They	 say	 saline	 bottles	 can	 be	 kept	 in	 the	 heater	 for	 14	 days.	 They	 don't	 become	
unsterile.	My	understanding	is	that	potentially	some	of	the	concentration	of	the	fluids	might	
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have	 changed	 in	 there.	 They	 say	 it	 can	 go	 back	 to	 room	 temperature	 but	 shouldn't	 be	
reheated	again.	If	you	take	it	out	of	the	hot	box	and	put	it	back	on	the	shelf,	it’s	still	sterile,	
that’s	my	understanding	of	it.		
	
Researcher:	So	how	do	you	know	whether	it’s	been	in	there	for	14	days?	
	
Susan:	 They	are	 supposed	 to	be	dated	but	 it’s	hit	 and	miss.	 There	 is	no	 set	policy.	 It’s	 an	
individual	thing	whether	you	chose	to	do	that	or	not.	A	lot	of	the	saline	gets	rotated	around	
regularly	anyway,	so	a	lot	of	people	just	think	it	gets	rotated.	But	there's	no	set	policy,	which	
is	something	I	did	want	to	look	into.		
	
This	exemplar	highlights	a	 lack	of	 clarity	around	 the	practice	of	warming	 solutions	
compounded	 by	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 hospital	 policy	 to	 support	 the	 manufacturer’s	
instructions	 leaving	 the	 way	 open	 for	 misinterpretation	 and	 inconsistency	 in	
practice.	This	has	potential	implications	for	patient	safety	in	that	extended	warming	
at	incorrect	temperatures	may	alter	the	composition	of	solutions.	In	looking	at	this	
in	light	of	work	by	Gurses	(2007)	there	is	ambiguity	around	the	required	settings	of	
the	 cabinet;	 the	 length	 of	 time	 the	 solution	 can	 be	 stored	 and;	 responsibility	 for	
dating	the	bottles	and	rotating	older	ones	forward.	The	absence	of	an	organisational	
policy	 to	 support	 the	 implementation	 of	 manufacturer’s	 instructions	 leads	 to	
inconsistency	in	compliance	with	the	rules,	which	in	this	case	are	the	manufacturer’s	
instructions.	The	actual	practice	of	keeping	solutions	in	the	warming	cabinet	for	14	
days	 is	 not	 consistent	with	 either	 option	 in	 the	manufacturer’s	 instruction.	 Susan	
was	 aware	 that	 the	 practice	 for	 warming	 of	 solutions	 was	 underpinned	 by	
manufacturers	 guidelines	 but	 acknowledged	 that	 her	 understanding	 was	
incomplete,	 prompting	 her	 to	 revisit	 them	 (demonstrating	 the	 reflexive	 nature	 of	
the	interview).	
	
In	 summary	ambiguity	 in	policies,	 standards	and	practices	 can	enable	or	 constrain	
practicing	 in	 accordance	 with	 those	 rules	 and	 standards.	 Whilst	 the	 concept	 of	
ambiguity	may	not	create	pressure	for	the	perioperative	nurse,	it	contributes	to	the	
 103 
vulnerability	 of	 the	 workplace	 by	 creating	 opportunities	 for	 miscommunication,	
misunderstandings	and	misinterpretation.	Where	rules	and	standards	are	clear	and	
unambiguous	 there	 is	 little	 room	 for	 misinterpretation	 and	 the	 variability	 in	
performance	is	limited.	The	next	section	explores	the	role	that	teamwork	and	team	
dynamics	 play	 in	 enabling	 or	 constraining	 practicing	 in	 accordance	with	 rules	 and	
standards.														
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Team	characteristics:	‘Having	a	good	day’		
I	define	team	characteristics	in	this	study	as	those	features	that	identify	a	specific	group	of	
people	who	share	a	common	goal.	
	
	
The	 following	 codes	 evidence	 team	 characteristics	 that	 act	 to	 enable	 or	 constrain	
practicing	in	accordance	with	the	rules	and/or	increase	or	decrease	the	pressure	felt	
by	team	members.		
	
Being	confident	in	colleague’s	techniques	
Feeling	confident	in	other	equally	experienced	staff	
Influence	of	certain	members	of	a	team	
Working	with	different	team	members	
Learning	correct	practices	from	what	others	do	
This	is	what	we	do	here	
Practices	depend	on	who	you	are	working	with	
Letting	that	go	
	
The	two	categories	of	teamwork	and	dynamics	and	shared	goals	arose	from	sorting	
these	codes.	Together	they	form	the	concept	‘having	a	good	day’.	These	categories	
form	the	headings	of	this	section.	 
Teamwork	and	dynamics	
The	perioperative	nurse	participants	view	the	experience	of	the	team	as	integral	to	
the	provision	of	 safe	patient	care	and	 the	ability	of	 the	 team	to	get	 the	 job	done.	
Claire	reflects	on	the	importance	of	having	an	experienced	team	during	a	paediatric	
list:	
	
Claire:	It’s	safer.	It’s	less	stressful	for	everybody	involved	to	have	a	skill	mix	that’s	right.	
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Having	less	experienced	team	members	can	adversely	affect	the	performance	of	the	
team.	 As	 Claire	 identifies,	 in	 a	 small	 team	 having	 one	 member	 who	 is	 less	
experienced	or	who	works	at	a	slower	pace	can	impact	on	team	dynamics	and	lead	
to	an	‘unpleasant	day’.	
	
Claire:	The	other	is	when	you	have	a	list	where	the	surgeon	and/or	the	anaesthetist	want	it	
to	move	quickly.	They	want	a	very	quick	change	over	time	between	cases	and	if	you’ve	got	
staff	members,	they	don’t	even	have	to	be	new,	but	that	just	take	more	time	in	what	they	
do.	That	can	make	the	list	stressful	because	things	are	being	slowed	down,	the	list’s	being	
slowed	down,	the	surgeon	or	the	anaesthetist	are	getting	crabby	because	the	list’s	slower.	It	
makes	 for	 a	 stressful	 day	 when	 you	 know	 you’ve	 got	 a	 long	 day	 ahead	 of	 you	 and	 the	
surgeon	 gets	 crabby	 at	 9:30	 and	 you	 think	 ‘Oh	 it’s	 going	 to	 be	 a	 long	day’	 and	 then,	 you	
know,	 it	 can	be	an	unpleasant	day.	That	doesn’t	have	 to	be	an	 inexperienced	person	 that	
can	make	a	difference;	it	can	be	the	way	that	different	people	work	together.	
	
Several	factors	influence	‘having	a	good	day’.	An	important	one	is	that	everyone	in	
the	 team	 does	 the	 role	 he/she	 is	 there	 to	 do.	 Again,	 this	 comes	 back	 to	 team	
membership	and	familiarity	and	each	team	member	having	trust	and	confidence	in	
each	other.	When	Sarah	works	 in	another	 team	 in	another	 theatre,	having	a	good	
day	 is	 not	 a	 given.	 Familiarity	 and	 trust	 can	 therefore	 have	 either	 a	 positive	 or	 a	
negative	impact	on	how	the	day	goes.			
	
Researcher:	And	what	influences	that	(the	team)	positively?	
	
Sarah:	Making	sure	everyone	does	the	role	that	they	do	for	the	day	and	 its	gone	well.	 It’s	
funny;	because	in	here	[usual	theatre]	you	don’t	ask	that	question,	you	just	do	it.		Whereas	
if	you’re	 in	 the	other	 theatres,	you	can	still	have	good	days	but	again,	 it	depends	on	your	
team	 and	 the	 people	 that	 you’re	 working	 with.	 	 So,	 if	 you’re	 working	 with	 another	
experienced	 nurse	 and	 a	 junior	 one,	 a	 good	 day	 to	me	 is	 teaching	 that	 new	 person	 and	
hoping	that	they’ve	had	a	good	day	and	they’ve	learnt	something,	that	sort	of	thing.	And	the	
other	senior	person	has	had	a	good	day	and	perhaps	the	pressure	has	been	taken	off	her	or	
him	because	we’ve	worked	well	together	and	they	don’t	think	that	they	have	to	think	about	
every	single	thing.			
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Productive	 relationships,	 trusts	 and	 good	 communication	within	 the	 team	are	 key	
factors	 in	team	performance	and	achieving	shared	goals.	Good	team	dynamics	can	
also	 enhance	 job	 satisfaction	 and	 provide	 a	 pleasant	 and	 relaxed	 working	
environment	 for	 the	 staff.	 The	 structure	 of	 the	 work	 context	 plays	 a	 role	 in	
enhancing	or	constraining	team	cooperation	and	where	trust	is	lacking	coupled	with	
a	lack	of	support	from	social	and	organisational	structures,	there	may	be	poor	team	
functionality	and	communication	failures	(Rydenfalt	et	al.	2012).		
Shared	goals	
Shared	 team	goals	 that	are	clearly	articulated	can	have	a	positive	 impact	on	 team	
performance.	Differences	between	 team	members	 as	 to	what	 the	 shared	 goals	 of	
the	team	are	(perceptions	of	activities)	may	lead	to	tension	(Rydenfalt	et	al.	2012).	
These	goals	can	be	implicit	or	explicit.	I	asked	Sarah	what	the	main	goal	was	for	her	
team	at	the	start	of	the	day:		
	
Sarah:	To	have	a	good	day.	
	
Researcher:	What	constitutes	a	good	day?	
	
Sarah:	 Everything	 goes	 smoothly,	 everything	 runs	 efficiently,	 we	 work	 well	 together,	
everyone	is	happy	and	we’ve	done	a	good	job.	I	think	the	efficiency	and	its	gone	smoothly.	
There	haven’t	been	hiccoughs	as	well.	I	think	that’s	a	good	day.	
	
I	asked	Sarah	if	the	team	itself	set	the	goal	of	having	a	good	day	and	she	responded	
that	 it	was	a	tacit	thing	but	the	whole	team	felt	the	same	way.	Being	efficient	and	
being	seen	to	be	efficient	 is	also	a	goal	for	Sarah	and	her	team.	They	take	pride	in	
the	fact	that	the	surgeons	do	not	have	to	ask	for	anything,	that	everything	is	ready	
and	 available.	 Sarah	 expressed	 that	 in	 addition	 to	 ‘having	 a	 good	 day’,	 keeping	
patients	safe	is	a	tacit	goal,	‘it’s	a	given,	it’s	what	we	are	here	for’.	A	cohesive,	well-
functioning	team	looks	out	for	each	other	and	plugs	any	gaps.	As	Sarah	says	in	the	
following	exemplar,	changing	the	sucker	was	the	anaesthetic	nurse’s	responsibility.	
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The	 anaesthetic	 nurse	missed	 it,	 Sarah	 noticed	 it	 and	 fixed	 it	 because	 having	 the	
sucker	there	and	ready	it	is	a	patient	safety	issue:	
Sarah:	 I	 came	 in	 and	 noticed	 that	 there	 wasn’t	 any	 suction	 on	 the	 anaesthetic	 machine.	
Technically	that’s	not	my	task	to	complete,	but	I	noticed	it	and	I	fixed	it	and	that’s	a	safety	
thing.	Again,	you	need	suction.	Obviously,	the	patient	is	not	likely	to	need	suctioning,	but	if	
it	wasn’t	 there	 -	 you	know.	 It’s	 that	 focus	all	 around	you,	 looking	all	 around	you	 to	make	
sure	everything’s	right,	observing	that	the	patient’s	okay.	It	all	comes	back	to	the	patient.	
	
In	 summary,	 team	 members	 orient	 themselves	 to	 the	 common	 task,	 which	 is	
keeping	 patients	 safe	 and	 completing	 the	 list	 within	 the	 specified	 time	 schedule.	
How	 they	 do	 this	 is	 influenced	 by	 the	 social	 and	 organisational	 context.	 Lack	 of	
cohesion	 of	 surgical	 teams	 has	 be	 found	 to	 adversely	 impact	 on	 communication	
which	 in	 turn	 can	 have	 implications	 for	 patient	 safety	 (Gillespie,	 Brigid	 M.	 et	 al.	
2013).	 Cohesiveness	 also	 affects	 the	wellbeing	 of	 the	 team	 -	 'having	 a	 good	day's	
and	job	satisfaction	-	'knowing	I’ve	done	a	good	job'.		
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Individual	characteristics	
Several	 codes	 emerged	 from	 the	 data	 relating	 to	 the	 characteristics	 of	 the	
participants	and	other	team	members.		
	
These	codes	were	sifted	and	sorted	into	the	categories	of	making	decisions;	having	
experience	-	‘knowing	how/not	knowing	how’;	having	non-technical	skills	–	‘they’ve	
just	got	 it’	 and	making	a	personal	 choice.	Together	 they	constitute	 the	concept	of	
individual	 characteristics	 that	 act	 to	 enable	 or	 constrain	 practicing	 in	 accordance	
with	the	rules.	These	categories	form	the	sub	headings	for	this	section	and	examples	
of	codes	will	be	included	under	each	sub	section. 
Decision	making	
Interestingly	the	participants	did	not	themselves	use	the	terms	decision	or	decision	
making,	rather	they	used	the	terms	‘using	common	sense’;	 ‘it	makes	sense’;	 ‘using	
experience’;	 and	 ‘using	 clinical	 judgment’	 in	 response	 to	my	questions	 concerning	
the	decision-making	process	that	was	occurring	when	they	worked	in	a	certain	way.	
However,	 these	 terms	 do	 all	 point	 to	 a	 cognitive	 process	 occurring	 that	 results	 in	
making	 a	 decision.	 In	 the	 first	 exemplar	 Susan	 reflects	 on	 why	 she	 makes	 the	
decision	to	not	check	trays	for	smaller	procedures:	
	
Susan:	I	think	you	have	to	use	your	experience	and	your	judgment	and	sometimes	common	
sense	has	 to	prevail.	 If	 it’s	 a	 small	 finger	 for	 example,	 you	are	not	 going	 to	 lose	 a	pair	 of	
scissors	 in	 there.	 You	 may	 lose	 them	 in	 the	 linen	 but	 I	 don’t	 feel	 that	 jeopardizes	 the	
patient’s	 safety	 whereas	 if	 I	 didn’t	 do	 the	 tray	 list	 on	 a	 thoracic	 case	 for	 example	 or	 a	
laparotomy,	well	that	wouldn’t	sit	comfortably	with	me.	
	
Susan	uses	a	combination	of	judgement,	experience	and	common	sense	to	underpin	
the	 ultimate	 decision	 not	 to	 check	 the	 trays	 in	 certain	 situations.	 Participants	
frequently	referred	to	 ‘using	their	experience’	 to	 inform	their	decision	making	 in	a	
range	of	practice	 situations	 including	whether	 to	break	 the	 rules	or	not	 in	a	given	
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situation.	In	the	following	exemplar	Sarah	describes	the	role	that	experience	plays	in	
her	 decision	 to	 not	 use	 the	 tray	 lists,	 even	 though	 the	 surgery	 is	 in	 the	 thoracic	
cavity:		
	
Researcher:	So,	for	example,	you’ve	made	a	conscious	decision	not	to	do	the	tray	lists	based	
on	 your	 experience.	 So,	 are	 there	 other	 things,	 besides	 experience,	 that	 influence	 you	 to	
deviate	from	the	standard?	
	
Sarah:	Probably	not.	 I	 think	 it	 is	because	we’re	experienced	nurses	and	 that	we	know	the	
trays	so	well	that	we	can	recognise	 if	something’s	missing	or	not	right,	pretty	well	straight	
away	and	because	we’ve	got	the	set	trays	all	the	time.	There	are	things	that	we	count	in	our	
mind,	not	openly,	but	you	go	through	the	tray	when	you’re	getting	your	instruments	out	in	
your	own	mind	knowing	 that	 all	 the	equipment	 -	 it’s	not	 that	we	don’t	 consciously	 count	
them	but	unconsciously	we	are	counting	the	trays	ourselves	all	the	time.	
	
In	 the	next	exemplar,	 I	asked	Claire	how	she	felt	about	doctors	 taking	a	drink	 into	
theatre	whilst	 the	 nurses	were	 not	 allowed.	 For	 Claire,	 this	 particular	 rule	 ‘makes	
sense’	and	hence	she	is	willing	to	comply	even	when	the	doctors	do	not:	
Claire:	I’m	not	saying	it’s	right	that	it’s	one	rule	for	one	and	one	rule	for	another.	I	think	as	
long	as	we	are	all	trying	to	do	the	right	thing,	if	the	doctors	choose	not	to	when	they	know	
the	rules,	there	 isn’t	a	 lot	more	we	can	do	about	 it.	 I	don’t	feel	cross	that	we	have	to	and	
they	don’t,	because	I	agree	with	the	concept	of	it	and	why	we	do	it	because	I	think	it	makes	
sense.	
	
The	next	exemplar	describes	the	close	relationship	between	knowledge,	experience	
and	clinical	 judgement	where	Susan	made	the	decision	 to	open	a	sterile	 item	that	
had	been	dropped	on	the	floor:	
	
Researcher:	Going	back	to	something	that	you	have	said	quite	consistently,	that	is	over	and	
above	 understanding	 what	 the	 standard	 or	 rules	 say	 you	 are	 applying	 a	 level	 of	 clinical	
judgement	in	tandem	with	that	rule.	So	not	accepting	the	rule	as	black	and	white.	
	
Susan:	Yes,	that’s	right	so	here	is	a	certain	amount	of	clinical	judgement	there	and	a	certain	
amount	 of	 knowledge	 of	 your	 supplies	 and	 equipment.	 Someone	 more	 junior	 might	 not	
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realise	 that	 is	 the	 only	 double	 ended	 ‘whatever’	 that	 we’ve	 got	 so	 that	 it	 is	 making	 a	
judgement	call	and	using	your	prior	knowledge	so	there	are	a	few	factors	there,	I	guess.	
	
What	these	exemplars	highlight	 is	 that	even	when	the	participants	know	what	the	
rules	and	standards	say,	the	rule	or	standard	is	only	one	factor	they	consider	when	
making	 a	 decision.	 Other	 factors	 such	 as	 availability	 of	 replacement	 items,	
knowledge	and	experience	all	play	a	part	 in	decision-making.	The	next	section	will	
discuss	in	detail	the	relationship	between	experience	and	knowledge	that	emerged	
from	the	research.	
	
Having	experience	-	‘Knowing	how/not	knowing	how’		
This	 section	 seeks	 to	 understand	what	 experience	means	 through	 the	 eyes	 of	 the	
participants	 and	 how	 it	 influences	 decision-making.	 The	 concept	 of	 knowing	
how/not	knowing	how	emerged	from	the	categories	of	‘experience	is	knowing’;	gaps	
in	 knowledge	 and	 personal	 choice.	 These	 categories	 form	 the	 headings	 for	 this	
section.		
	
Experience	is	‘knowing	how’	
	
A	 team	 member’s	 experience	 can	 moderate/influence	 behaviour.	 I	 asked	 Susan	
what	the	term	‘experience’	meant	for	her:	
	
Susan:	It	makes	a	lot	of	things	easier;	it	makes	you	feel	comfortable	in	what	you	are	doing.	It	
allows	you	to	know	what	you	need	to	do.	It	allows	you	to	teach	other	people	what	you	are	
doing	and	what	to	do.	In	terms	of	patient	safety,	it’s	got	to	be	a	benefit	to	the	patient,	again	
you	 know	what	 to	 do,	 what’s	 safe	 practice.	 If	 you're	 scrubbing,	 you	 are	maintaining	 the	
sterile	 field,	 you've	 got	 the	 right	 equipment,	 understanding	 the	 surgery	 so	 you	 can	
anticipate	what	the	surgeon	needs,	planning	what	you	are	going	to	do.	
	
Her	description	conveys	a	sense	of	being	comfortable	 in	her	own	professional	and	
personal	 skin,	of	 knowing	what	 to	do	and	of	understanding	what	 is	going	on.	This	
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‘knowing’	underpins	her	ability	to	anticipate	and	plan.	She	recognises	the	benefit	of	
this	 ‘knowing’	 for	 the	delivery	of	 safe	patient	care	and	 for	 teaching.	Experience	as	
described	by	Susan	is	an	enabler	and	contributes	positively	to	her	own	performance,	
the	performance	of	the	team	and	her	ability	to	deliver	safe	patient	care.		
	
Sarah	also	 reflects	on	how	 ‘knowing’	 is	 a	 key	 factor	 in	enabling	her	 to	manage	an	
emergency	case	in	her	speciality	and	that	the	knowing	is	borne	from	experience:		
	
Sarah:	Again,	 experience	 I	 think.	Because	we	are	 so	 routine,	having	 that	 fairly	 set	 routine	
that	things	go	in	certain	order	and	you	know	that	that’s	the	way	you	want	to	flow	and	you	
know	subconsciously	 that	you	can	do	 it	all	 the	time.	Even	directing	your	people	or	people	
from	the	outside	that,	‘I	need	this,	this	and	this.	I	know	where	it	is;	get	it.’	Knowing	that	sort	
of	routine	down	pretty	well	after	all	these	years.	So,	it’s	experience.	
	
Participants	 identified	that	 ‘experience’	was	not	related	to	how	long	someone	had	
been	a	perioperative	nurse:		
	
Susan:	 Just	 because	 you've	worked	 in	 theatre	 for	 a	 long	 time	 doesn’t	mean	 you	 are	 any	
good	at	it.		
	
In	Claire’s	eyes	the	 longevity	of	practice	 is	of	 less	 importance	than	the	quality	and	
specific	type	of	experience	the	nurse	has:	
	
Claire:	So,	 it’s	not	experience	 in	years,	 it’s	how	much	a	person	has	worked	 in	 that	area	of	
surgery,	or	with	that	surgeon	even.		
	
The	 notion	 that	 the	 experience	 the	 participants	 speak	 of	 is	 not	 related	 to	 the	
passage	of	time	or	to	longevity	 is	expressed	by	Benner	(Benner	1984).	Rather	than	
length	of	 time,	 it	 is	 the	amount	and	quality	of	practice	 that	are	key	 factors	 in	 the	
level	of	expertise	people	achieve,	 indicating	that	 it	 is	not	 just	passage	of	 time	that	
builds	experience,	it	 is	also	the	quality	of	the	experiences	on	the	journey	(Ericsson,	
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Prietula	&	Cokely	2007).	Expertise	is	gained	over	the	course	of	time	and	is	shaped	by	
experience	(Scholes,	Albarran	&	Williams	2006).		
	
Participants	 indicated	 that	 the	 experience	 of	 other	 team	 members	 is	 a	 positive	
influence	on	 their	own	performance	and	 the	performance	of	 the	 team.	There	 is	 a	
solid	 link	 between	 experience	 of	 the	 team	 and	 ensuring	 a	 safe	 outcome	 for	 the	
patient.	 With	 experience	 comes	 confidence	 and	 lack	 of	 confidence	 of	 team	
members	can	pervade	the	atmosphere,	making	the	whole	team	edgy.	The	following	
exemplar	encapsulates	the	influence	experience	has	on	the	team	working	cohesively	
to	deliver	safe	patient	care	and	difficulties	that	can	arise	when	team	members	are	
not	experienced:		
	
Claire:	 Probably	 the	 best	 example	 of	 when	 it’s	 really	 important	 [having	 an	 experienced	
team]	is	when	we’ve	got	paediatric	patients.	We	usually	have	four	staff	in	a	theatre.	It’s	the	
only	time	we	have	four	staff	in	a	theatre,	when	we’ve	got	paediatric	patients.	There	are	two	
people	 allocated	 to	 anaesthetics	 to	 help	 get	 the	 child	 off	 to	 sleep	 and	 to	 look	 after	 the	
parent	who’s	usually	there,	take	the	parent	out	and	then	continue	looking	after	the	patient	
while	they’re	 intubated	or	the	mask’s	put	 in.	 If	 the	fourth	person	-	 if	 the	whole	team	isn’t	
experienced	in	paediatrics…	it’s	the	anaesthetic	side	of	it	which	can	go	wrong	very	quickly	-	
it	can	be	very	stressful	and	dangerous,	so	that’s	one	situation	where	it’s	really	important	to	
have	the	skill	mix	right.		
	
A	link	between	experience	and	practicing	without	thinking	emerged	from	the	data.	
The	 term	 ‘sub	 conscious’	was	 frequently	 used	 by	 Susan	 and	 I	 asked	 her	what	 the	
term	meant	to	her	and	how	it	was	she	could	do	things	without	consciously	thinking	
about	them:	
	
Susan:	Definitely	experience.	I	think	just	a	lot	of	it	comes	down	to	experience.	Like	when	you	
are	undoing	sterile	drapes	or	draping,	I	don’t	think,	‘oh	now	I	need	to	put	the	plastic	down	
to	make	it	waterproof	and	now	I	need	2	layers’.	It’s	a	matter	of	experience	and	routine	and	I	
think	routine	comes	from	experience	as	well.	
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Susan’s	experience	allows	her	to	filter	out	the	routine	and	the	mundane	and	this	is	
an	 attribute	 of	 an	 expert	 practitioner.	 Lyneham	 et	 al.	 (2008)	 call	 this	 attribute	
cognitive	 intuition,	 which	 they	 link	 to	 the	 ability	 to	 process	 information	 on	 both	
conscious	and	unconscious	levels	and	the	ability	to	rationalize	the	decision	after	the	
event.	 This	 notion	 is	 of	 interest	 because	 the	 participants	 identified	 a	 range	 of	
activities	 they	performed	and	decisions	 they	made	without	 conscious	 thought	but	
they	were	able	to	rationalize	or	explain	in	hindsight	why	they	did	what	they	did.	In	
the	following	exemplar	Susan	describes	the	frequently	performed	task	of	opening	a	
sterile	item	and	she	recognises	that	this	is	done	without	conscious	thought:		
	
Researcher:	What	is	it	that	you	are	looking	for	then	when	you	say,	‘for	sterility’?		
	
Susan:	 I’m	 looking	 to	 see	 that	 the	 package	 is	 intact,	 that	 the	 indicator	 has	 changed.	We	
don’t	 get	 every	 packet	 and	 spend	 30	 seconds	 thoroughly	 checking	 it.	 I	 guess	 there	 is	 a	
certain	 element	 of	 subconsciousness	when	 you're	 looking,	when	 you're	 undoing	 it.	 Has	 it	
been	 sealed	 across?	 I	 guess	 you	 are	 subconsciously	 thinking	 that	 about	 that	 and	 when	
you're	 opening	 it,	 yes,	 it’s	 sealed,	 yes	 it	 looks	 ok	 and	 it	 feels	 ok.	 And	 there	 is	 a	 certain	
amount	of	subconscious	there	that	if	you	opened	it	and	it	opens	very	quickly	you'd	think	'oh	
that’s	not	right,	it’s	not	sealed'.	
	
Susan	also	recognises	that	whilst	the	task	is	perfomed	subconsciously,	anything	out	
of	 the	ordinary	 is	 raised	 into	 the	consciousness.	Dreyfus	and	Dreyfus	 (1980)	argue	
that	‘most	expert	performance	is	ongoing	and	non-reflective	unless	confronted	with	
an	unusual	or	critical	situation’.		
	
When	 observing	 Sarah,	 I	 noted	 that	 during	 positioning,	 she	 held	 up	 the	 patient’s	
hand	 to	 show	 the	 anaesthetist	 and	 afterwards	 I	 asked	 her	 why	 she	 did	 this.	 She	
responded	 that	 she	noticed	 the	patient	was	wearing	her	wedding	 ring,	which	was	
unusual	as	the	norm	was	for	the	patient	to	come	without	their	rings.	So,	it	was	the	
‘out	 of	 the	 ordinary’	 Sarah	 became	 aware	 of.	 She	 was	 not	 consciously	 checking	
whether	the	patient	was	wearing	a	ring	but	became	aware	of	it	because	it	was	out	
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of	the	ordinary.	Similarly,	in	a	previous	exemplar	Sarah	had	noted	the	absence	of	a	
complete	suction	unit.	Again,	this	is	the	process	of	filtering	information	that	expert	
nurses	use,	the	scanning	of	the	environment	that	picks	up	the	unusual,	rather	than	
the	usual.	
	
The	 subconscious	 level	at	which	 the	participants	work	 is	 indicative	of	operating	at	
the	level	of	an	expert.	This	enables	them	to	make	decisions	quickly	by	filtering	out	
unnecessary	detail	and	homing	 in	on	any	 issues	that	appear	out	of	the	ordinary	or	
unusual.	 The	 experience	 of	 which	 the	 participants	 speak	 is	 in	 fact	 expertise,	 the	
special	 skills	 and	 knowledge	 developed	 because	 of	 experience.	 It	 is	 the	 expertise	
that	is	highly	valued	as	with	it	comes	a	level	of	knowledge	and	skill	that	enhance	the	
work	of	the	team,	instils	confidence	and	trust	in	the	whole	team,	reduces	pressure	
and	facilitates	the	delivery	of	safe	patient	care.		
 
Gaps	in	knowledge	
	
There	were	several	examples	in	the	data	where	knowledge	about	an	area	of	practice	
was	 absent	 or	 incomplete	 and	 this	 was	 a	 factor	 in	 decision-making.	 Where	 a	
participant	did	not	know	that	a	rule	existed	or	what	a	standard	said	in	relation	to	a	
practice	 then	 it	 was	 problematic	 to	 follow	 the	 rule	 or	 standard.	When	 it	 became	
apparent	 to	 the	 participant	 that	 they	 lacked	 knowledge	 about	 a	 specific	 topic	 or	
practice,	 they	 readily	 acknowledged	 this	 and	 in	 so	 doing	 engaged	 in	 critical	
reflexivity.	The	following	exemplars	demonstrate	gaps	in	knowledge	related	to	four	
ACORN	standards:	
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1.	 Management	 of	 Accountable	 Items	 Used	 During	 Surgery/Procedures	 in	 the	
Perioperative	 Environment	 Standard:	 Standard	 Statement	 3:	 Criteria	 3.3	 (ACORN	
2016)	
	
Researcher:	…that	practice	actually	would	have	been	the	standard	practice	as	articulated	in	
the	ACORN	count	standard,	that	you	visualised	the	pack?		
	
Joanne:	I	don't	know	if	it	actually	says	‘visualises’,	I	don't	actually	know	that	it	says	that.	
	
2.	Perioperative	Attire:	Standard	Statement	2	Criteria	2.6	(ACORN	2016)	
	
Claire:	 I	 would	 have	 to	 have	 a	 look	 and	 see	 what	 it	 actually	 says.	 I	 know	 they	 don’t	
encourage	us	bringing	our	own	uniforms	 in,	even	 if	 they’ve	been	appropriately	 laundered	
because	we	can’t,	you	know,	we	don’t	have	the	controls	that	an	industrial	laundry	does	for	
our	uniforms.	Just	thinking	logically,	the	same	would	really	go	for	a	hat.	I	guess	it	would	sit	
in	the	same	boat,	but	I	don’t	know	what	the	standards	say	about	the	hats.	
	
	
3.	Instrument	Tracking	Guideline	(ACORN	2016)		
	
Researcher:	Is	there	a	rule	or	a	standard	that	governs	that	particular	aspect	for	the	handling	
of	the	stickers?		
	
Susan:	I	don't	know	if	there	is	a	hospital	policy	on	that,	not	that	I'm	aware	of.	
	
4.	Staffing	Requirements	Standard:	Standard	Statement	3	Criteria	4.2	(ACORN	2016)	
	
Researcher:	 So,	where	 you	 talk	 about	 the	 staffing	 and	 the	 three	 people	 in	 every	 theatre,	
especially	 times	when	 the	anaesthetic	nurse	 then	has	 to	 scrub	and	assist	how	do	you	see	
that	sitting	against	the	standards	around	staffing?		
	
Claire:	I’m	not	sure	because	I’m	not	sure	what	it	says.	 
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Making	a	personal	choice	
Personal	choice	plays	a	significant	part	 in	compliance	with	rules	and	standards	and	
can	override	 ‘knowing’	what	a	standard	or	 rule	says.	 I	observed	that	 the	nurses	 in	
the	theatre	were	all	wearing	neck	chains	and	due	to	the	V-neck	design	of	the	theatre	
tops,	 the	 neck	 chains	 were	 not	 contained	 within	 the	 uniform.	 I	 asked	 Claire	 her	
decision	making	around	that	practice.		
	
Claire:	 I	 guess	 I	 generally	 don’t	 ever	 wear	my	 rings	 or	my	 earrings	 because	 I	 know	 hand	
hygiene’s	 impeded	with	 rings	and	 I’m	always	nervous	 that	 an	earring	might	 fall	 out,	but	 I	
guess	 I’ve	convinced	myself	that	a	necklace	 isn’t	going	to	fall	off	or	contaminate	anything,	
but	that’s	not	necessarily	true.	I	am	wearing	my	necklace	because	it’s	sentimental	to	me.	
	
Claire	makes	the	intentional	decision	to	deviate	from	the	standard	on	theatre	attire	
because	 her	 necklace	 holds	 sentimental	 significance	 to	 her.	 ACORN	 Standard:	
Perioperative	 Attire,	 Standard	 Statement	 8,	 Criteria	 8.2	 states	 ‘personnel	 shall	
remove	 necklaces,	 except	 where	 they	 are	 able	 to	 be	 fully	 enclosed	 within	 the	
perioperative	attire’	(ACORN	2016).	Wearing	a	neck	chain	that	cannot	be	contained	
within	the	uniform	departs	from	the	established	norm	and	Claire	breaks	this	rule	out	
of	personal	choice.		
	
In	summary,	participants	see	experience	as	the	development	of	knowledge	and	skills	
across	 the	 passage	 of	 time	 that	 is	 not	 solely	 dependent	 on	 longevity.	 Participants	
recognise	experience	as	a	key	attribute	for	their	own	individual	performance	and	the	
overall	 performance	 of	 the	 team.	 The	 way	 that	 the	 participants	 work	 is	 the	
embodiment	of	their	knowledge,	skills	and	experience.	‘Knowing	how’	is	embodied	
in	 practicing	 without	 conscious	 thought	 and	 is	 eloquently	 summed	 up	 by	 Benner	
(1984)	who	 states	 ‘performance	without	 conscious	 awareness	 is	 knowledge	 being	
used’.	 On	 an	 individual	 basis	 experience	 informs	 a	 decision	whether	 to	 break	 the	
rules	in	a	given	situation.	
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Five	 of	 the	 participants	 were	 experienced	 perioperative	 nurses,	 whilst	 the	 sixth	
(Louise)	 was	 very	 inexperienced	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 longevity	 in	 the	 perioperative	
setting	and	in	nursing	generally.	However,	despite	the	lack	of	‘time’	in	the	role,	her	
colleagues	viewed	her	as	having	high	level	of	non-technical	skills	and	this	made	her	a	
valuable	 asset	 by	 enhancing	 team	 performance	 and	 taking	 the	 pressure	 off	 other	
team	members	to	have	to	think	for	her.	Individuals	having	non-technical	skills	are	a	
significant	positive	influence	on	team	performance.	
	
Having	non-technical	skills	-	‘They’ve	just	got	it’		
The	definition	of	non-technical	skills	used	in	this	study	is	the	'cognitive	and	social	skills	that	
complement	the	technical	skills	for	safe	and	effective	practice'	(Mitchell	et	al.	2013).	
	
	
The	 data	 highlights	 a	 range	 of	 attributes	 that	 perioperative	 nurses	 view	 as	 being	
valuable	to	the	team	in	achieving	the	goal	of	getting	the	job	done.	‘They’ve	just	got	
it’,	 encapsulates	 the	 value	 that	 the	 participants	 place	 on	 themselves	 and	 their	
colleagues	 having	 good	 non-technical	 skills.	 The	 following	 two	 exemplars	 richly	
describe	this	concept:	
	
Sarah:	I	think	it’s	something	innate.	I	think	they’ve	just	got	it.	They	are	very	intuitive.	And	I	
am	sure	you	have	too,	worked	with	some	people	that	know	it,	they	understand…	I	think	it’s	
an	intuitive	thing	a	lot	of	it	and	then	it	builds	up	to	experience	as	well	and	just	clicking	in.		
	
Claire:	We’ve	got	some	new	girls	who	are	 just	 fantastic	 in	different	roles	that	they	do	and	
they	haven’t	been	nursing	for	a	long	time,	but	they	are	just	brilliant.	The	way	that	they	do	
things	and	their	 forethought	about	 things,	 the	ability	 to	anticipate	things	and	be	aware	of	
everything	that’s	going	on,	not	just	necessarily	what	they’re	doing.		
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Codes	relating	to	non-technical	skills	included:		
	
‘It	gets	put	in	their	hand’	
Anticipating	
Understanding	surgeon’s	needs	
Keeping	an	eye	on	things	
Choosing	an	appropriate	time	
Being	aware	
Being	organised	
Prioritising	
Being	in	control	
Multi-tasking	
They’ve	just	got	it’	
	
These	codes	were	sorted	into	the	categories	of	situational	awareness;	anticipation;	
forethought	and	task	management.	Together	they	form	the	concept	‘they’ve	just	got	
it’.	These	categories	form	the	headings	of	this	section.		
	
Situational	awareness	
	
Situational	awareness	is	a	valued	non-technical	skill	and	participants	recognise	that	
not	all	perioperative	nurses	have	this	skill.	With	situational	awareness,	the	nurse	 is	
aware	 of	 other	 things	 that	 are	 happening	 around	 her	 besides	 the	 task	 at	 hand.	
Situational	 awareness	 is	 an	 individual’s	 cognitive	 ability	 to	maintain	 attention	 and	
respond	to	changes	within	their	immediate	environment	(McClelland	2012)	and	is	a	
similar	 concept	 to	 being	 vigilant.	 Being	 vigilant	 is	 recognised	 by	 Susan	 as	 an	
attribute:	
	
Susan:	People	are	pretty	vigilant	in	actually	doing	it	[applying	stickers	to	the	form],	so	in	that	
respect	everybody	tries	to	toe	the	line.	It's	not	something	that	people	are	haphazard	about;	
people	do	genuinely	try	to	follow	the	procedure.	
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The	 following	 memo	 provides	 examples	 of	 where	 an	 experienced	 nurse	
demonstrated	 situational	 awareness	 and	 a	 student	demonstrated	 that	 he	had	not	
yet	developed	this	skill,	highlighting	the	difference	between	an	expert	and	a	novice:		
	
Memo	 (8	 Oct	 2015):	 Susan	was	 very	 busy	 this	morning	 being	 the	 only	 scout	 so	 she	 was	
completing	paperwork,	entering	information	on	the	computer,	opening	the	bundles	for	the	
scrub	 who	 was	 ready	 to	 gown	 and	 set	 up	 and	 discussing	 with	 the	 surgeons	 what	 their	
requirements	were.	The	surgeon	said	he	wanted	to	use	mono-polar	diathermy	and	this	took	
her	 out	 of	 the	 room	briefly	 to	 get	 the	 item	 from	 the	 supplies	 trolley.	 On	 her	 return,	 she	
began	opening	sterile	supplies	for	the	scrub	and	I	could	see	her	looking	across	at	the	patient	
from	time	to	time.	The	patient	was	asleep	and	the	surgeons	were	beginning	to	position	the	
patient.	 I	wondered	 if	 Susan	had	 remembered	 that	 the	patient	now	required	a	diathermy	
plate.	A	nurse	came	 in	 to	assist	and	 immediately	on	seeing	her	Susan	said,	 ‘can	you	put	a	
plate	on?’	Amongst	all	the	other	things	she	was	doing,	Susan	had	remembered	she	needed	
to	this.	This	is	an	example	of	situational	awareness.	
	
Also	in	the	theatre	was	a	student	who	was	observing.	Susan	was	showing	him	how	to	open	a	
sterile	 packet	 and	 present	 it	 to	 the	 scrub	 nurse.	 The	 waste	 container	 was	 between	 but	
behind	Susan	and	the	student	and	as	each	packet	was	opened	the	student	turned	to	put	the	
paper	in	the	bin.	In	doing	so	though	he	took	a	few	steps	back	each	time	toward	the	sterile	
gown	 trolley.	 He	 was	 completely	 unaware	 of	 his	 proximity	 to	 the	 trolley	 despite	 Susan	
telling	him	about	the	sterile	field.	Such	was	his	concentration	on	the	task	at	hand	he	had	no	
situational	awareness.	
	
Susan	was	fully	aware	of	everything	that	was	going	on	around	her	whilst	the	student	
was	so	focused	on	the	task	of	opening	an	item	he	was	totally	unaware	of	anything	
else.	 This	 illustrates	 the	 importance	 of	 situational	 awareness	 as	 an	 individual	
characteristic	but	also	the	benefits	it	brings	to	the	team.		
Louise	had	entered	nursing	as	a	mature	aged	student	and	had	less	than	9	months	of	
EN	experience	and	less	than	3	months	of	perioperative	experience	when	I	observed	
her	 in	 practice.	 The	 next	 exemplar	 highlights	 her	 awareness	 of	 what	 is	 going	 on	
around	 her	 and	 her	 good	 listening	 skills	 learned	 in	 her	 20	 years	 in	 a	 previous	
occupation:		
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Louise:	 I	 seem	 to	 put	 the	 surgeon’s	 voice	 first.	 If	 I	 segregate	 his	 hearing,	 it’s	 always	 the	
surgeons	voice	first,	because	they’re	the	ones	that	know	what	they	want.	I	guess	I	just	pick	
up	on	their	body	language	and	for	example,	the	look	on	their	foreheads,	or	if	they’re	talking	
and	 they’re	 happy-go-lucky	 and	 then	 all	 of	 a	 sudden	 it	 goes	 quiet,	 it’s	 like	 oh	 what	 just	
happened.	So,	I	just	become	more	centred	on	that.	General	chitchat	I	don’t	worry	about	so	
much.			
	
Whilst	 Louise	does	not	have	perioperative	nursing	experience	 in	 terms	of	years	of	
practice,	she	has	life	experience	that	she	brings	to	the	role.	Her	listening	skills	are	so	
well	 developed	 from	 her	 previous	 job	 that	 even	 when	 focused	 on	 a	 task,	 she	
remains	attuned	to	tones	and	tensions	in	background	conversation	and	atmosphere	
and	can	bring	herself	back	to	the	moment.	Her	colleagues	recognise	her	awareness	
as	 a	 skill	 that	 is	 beneficial	 to	 the	 team	 despite	 her	 inexperience	 in	 the	 technical	
aspects	of	the	role.	Louise	is	highly	cognisant	of	the	concept	of	awareness	and	sees	
herself	becoming	less	focused	on	the	task	at	hand,	as	her	experience	builds:		
	
Louise:	And	I	think	with	hernias	now,	I've	scrubbed	for	a	few	hernias,	so	now	I	can	focus	on	
the	here	and	now,	without	getting	tunnel	vision,	because	I	can	sort	of	still	see	the	split	way.	
	
Louise	aptly	describes	the	focus	on	the	task	at	hand	as	having	‘tunnel	vision’.	Being	
able	 to	 complete	 tasks	 as	well	 as	 focusing	 on	 the	 here	 and	 now,	 she	 describes	 as	
seeing	 things	 the	 ‘split’	way’.	 This	 indicates	 Louise	 is	 still	 at	 the	novice	 –	 beginner	
stage	of	practices	where	she	moves	from	the	focus	on	the	task	to	being	aware	of	her	
environment.	Whilst	 the	 two	 things	 are	 not	 happening	 concurrently	 yet,	 Louise	 is	
cognisant	 that	 as	 she	 becomes	 less	 focused	 on	 the	 technical	 skills,	 she	 becomes	
more	aware	of	what	else	is	happening	around	her,	indicating	the	development	of	the	
non-technical	skill	of	awareness.	Louise	attributes	this	to	the	experience	she	brings	
to	the	role	from	her	previous	occupation.	What	she	has	had	to	do	is	to	retrain	herself	
into	knowing	what	and	whom	is	important	to	tune	into	in	her	new	environment.		
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Anticipation	
	
Anticipation	is	the	second	non-technical	skill	identified	by	the	participants	as	being	a	
valuable	 attribute	 for	 personal	 and	 team	 performance.	 The	 following	 memo	
describes	my	observation	of	anticipation	in	action:		
	
Memo	(25	Nov	2016):	It	was	obvious	to	me	that	Claire	was	anticipating	the	surgeon’s	needs	
as	she	was	getting	things	ready	that	he	needed	next.	For	example,	she	anticipated	the	scales	
would	 be	 required	 soon	 and	 asked	 the	 scout	 to	 prepare	 them.	 She	 anticipated	 he	would	
need	a	wet	pack	to	lie	across	the	first	breast	when	he	was	ready	to	start	on	the	other	breast	
so	had	one	prepared	and	ready	to	hand	up.	She	anticipated	when	he	needed	the	Morrisons	
to	 hold	 the	 breast	 tissue	 after	 the	 incision	 and	 had	 it	 in	 her	 hand	 ready	 to	 pass.	 She	
prepared	the	drains	ahead	of	time	so	they	were	ready	to	hand	over	when	requested.	
	
Like	 situational	 awareness,	 anticipation	 is	 also	 a	 skill	 that	 some	 new	 nurses	 also	
exhibit.	In	a	conversation	with	Louise	about	what	her	priorities	were	when	she	was	
setting	up	for	case	she	stated:	
	
Louise:	It’s	basically	what	they’re	going	to	need.	There	is	no	point	having	all	your	packs	and	
everything	nice	and	neatly	sorted	over	here,	but	not	have	your	instruments	ready	for	them.	
They	need	a	knife	to	be	able	to	make	incisions	and	they	need	their	ports	and	stuff	like	that,	
so	knowing	what	they	need	first	and	having	that	ready.	
	
Knowing	what	the	surgeon	needs	and	having	that	ready	 is	demonstrating	the	non-
technical	 skill	 of	 anticipation.	 The	 closely	 linked	 skills	 of	 anticipation,	 task	
management	and	situational	awareness	 facilitate	being	organized	and	preparing	 in	
advance	 for	 situations	 yet	 to	 arise.	 For	 Sarah	 anticipation	 is	 part	 of	 being	 an	
advanced	practitioner:	
	
Sarah:	I	think	that’s	someone	who	knows	their	stuff	and	can	anticipate,	knows	what’s	going	
on,	can	know	when	something’s	deviated	from	the	norm	and	picking	all	that	sort	of	stuff	up	
as	well.	
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Forethought		
	
Forethought	 is	 the	third	of	the	non-technical	skills	 identified	by	the	participants	as	
being	 a	 valuable	 attribute	 in	 a	 team	 member.	 Forethought	 is	 the	 ability	 to	 look	
forward	and	plan	for	future	events.	Forward	planning	is	also	a	way	of	working	that	
participants	identified	as	helping	get	the	job	done.	Forethought	is	closely	linked	with	
task	 management	 and	 being	 organized.	 Forward	 planning	 is	 important	 to	 the	
participants	for	several	reasons.	They	can	be	properly	prepared	for	the	next	case	or	
list;	things	go	more	smoothly	and	they	know	that	the	doctors	will	get	upset	if	things	
are	not	there	that	they	need	so	they	work	to	avoid	that.	What	they	do	now	makes	it	
better	for	the	next	patient,	even	though	it	means	that	they	are	not	present	with	the	
patient	they	have	on	the	table.		
	
Jane:	…and	planning	for	future	lists	for	patients,	which	is	almost	as	important	as	the	patient	
you’ve	got	there	because	they’re	future	patients.	
	
Making	decisions	to	deal	with	 future	events	 is	 important	 for	 forward	planning	and	
being	prepared.	For	 things	 to	go	smoothly	 for	a	 list	 the	next	day	or	even	 the	next	
week	pre-planning	is	required	and	this	is	a	significant	part	of	a	senior	perioperative	
nurse’s	role.	So	much	of	what	is	due	to	occur	in	the	future	is	dependent	on	what	the	
perioperative	 nurse	 does	 (or	 does	 not)	 do	 today	 and	 participants	 are	 highly	
cognisant	of	that.	So,	as	well	as	fulfilling	a	direct	patient	care	role	and	managing	the	
list	in	the	here	and	now,	participants	also	had	to	be	thinking	ahead	to	the	next	case,	
the	next	list	or	even	the	next	week’s	lists.	This	not	only	takes	them	away	from	their	
core	 role	 of	 scouting	 for	 the	 cases	 on	 the	 list,	 but	 also	 creates	 pressure	 to	 get	
everything	done:	
	
Susan:	 Well	 it’s	 all	 about	 forward	 planning.	 What’s	 the	 next	 operation,	 what’s	 the	 next	
surgery,	have	I	got	all	my	stuff	ready	for	that?	But	that’s	making	sure	you	are	ready	for	the	
next	case.	You	know	 if	you	haven’t	got	something,	 it’s	an	opportunity	 to	get	all	your	stuff	
together	beforehand.	
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Susan:	 Yes,	 I	 feel	 there	 a	 constant	 pressure	 to	 get	 all	 these	 things	 done	 but	 I	 realise	 it’s	
taking	me	away	from	my	core	job.		
	
Susan	sees	the	lack	of	forethought	as	a	negative	in	her	colleagues	and	believes	it	to	
be	a	skill	that	many	nurses	have	not	been	taught	or	learnt.	She	links	forethought	to	
experience	and	actively	tries	to	teach	this	skill	to	junior	staff.	She	also	acknowledges	
that	 some	 perioperative	 nurses,	 who	 have	 experience	 in	 terms	 of	 years,	 do	 not	
necessarily	 have	 forethought.	 This	 again	 highlights	 the	 common	 theme	 that	 the	
‘experience’	that	is	valued	by	the	participants	is	more	than	just	years	on	the	job;	it	is	
other	skills	and	qualities:		
	
Susan:	Like	for	example	I	went	into	a	theatre	one	day	to	relieve	the	scout	for	a	drink.	It	was	
a	long	case	and	he	was	just	sitting	there,	just	chit	chatting.	When	he	went,	I	didn’t	sit	down	
for	 20	 minutes	 finishing	 all	 the	 things	 that	 to	 me	 needed	 doing.	 Part	 of	 that	 is	 this	
personality	but	part	of	it	is	efficiency.	I	corrected	things	in	the	computer	that	were	wrong,	I	
did	the	paperwork	that	he	hadn’t	done	and	I	restocked	the	blankets,	the	hot	box.	 I	did	his	
shopping	list	and	I	remember	thinking	to	myself	well	you’ve	been	sitting	here	probably	for	
last	half	hour	and	I	come	in	here	and	don’t	stop	for	20	mins	doing	all	the	things	that	I	could	
see	needed	doing	so	 I	 think	 that’s	a	skill	not	a	 lot	of	people	have.	 I	also	 think	comes	with	
experience	to	a	degree. 
	
	
Task	management	and	prioritising	
	
Successfully	balancing	all	the	activities	that	constitute	the	work	of	a	circulating	nurse	
and	team	leader	is	key	to	getting	the	job	done.	Senior	perioperative	nurses	are	not	
only	 responsible	 for	 their	 own	 direct/indirect	 patient	 care	 tasks	 as	 either	 a	 scrub	
nurse	 or	 a	 scout	 nurse,	 they	 are	 often	 also	 the	 team	 leader	 in	 the	 theatre	
responsible	for	managing	the	list	and	for	the	oversight	and	teaching	of	junior	staff.	
Managing	multiple	tasks	is	therefore	a	key	characteristic	of	a	senior	nurse’s	role	as	I	
reflected	on	in	the	following	memo:	
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Memo	(18	Oct	2015):	When	I	was	observing	Susan,	I	became	aware	that	two	of	the	things	
she	was	doing	regularly	was	receiving	and	responding	to	information.	On	one	occasion,	the	
surgeon	 was	 giving	 Susan	 information	 about	 the	 next	 patient.	 This	 was	 important	
information	that	would	require	Susan	taking	some	action	but	not	immediately.	
	
When	 I	 asked	Susan	about	 this	 she	 said	 she	 filed	 this	 information	with	 the	aim	of	
returning	 to	 it	 at	 an	 appropriate	 time	 and	 acting	 in	 response	 to	 it.	 There	 were	
several	 occasions	 where	 participants	 referred	 to	 the	 need	 to	 complete	 multiple	
tasks,	some	immediately	and	others	over	a	period	of	time.	This	got	me	to	thinking	
about	 how	 perioperative	 nurses	 manage	 multiple	 tasks,	 how	 they	 hold	 the	
information	and	remember	it	later	and	I	asked	this	of	Susan:		
	
Susan:	That’s	a	good	question.	 I	don't	know,	 I	haven't	 thought	about	how	I	do	 it.	 I	know	I	
keep	 saying	 that	 a	 lot	 of	 it	 comes	 down	 to	 experience,	 being	 able	 to	 multitask.	 That	
probably	 helps	 a	 lot	 more	 than	 what	 I	 think.	 In	 terms	 of	 prioritising	 tasks,	 I	 guess	 you	
prioritise	 setting	up	 for	 that	case	 initially.	You	always	have	 to	be	 thinking	ahead,	planning	
the	next	case,	planning	when	to	send	for	it,	checking	the	next	set	up.	You've	got	that	in	your	
mind	but	I	guess	you	just	get	that	case	going	first	and	then	when	you	are	set	up	and	ready,	
you've	got	time	to	check	if	the	next	set	up	is	out,	or	ring	the	sterile	stock	room	girls	to	get	it	
out	or	check	with	surgeon	what	is	happening	next.	
	
For	Sarah	time	management	skills	enable	her	to	decide	what	task	needs	to	be	done	
when.	She	works	back	from	when	the	patient	 is	required	 in	theatre	to	ensure	that	
ward	staff	has	sufficient	time	to	prepare	the	patient	before	she	sends	for	them.	Her	
experience	in	the	role	also	means	she	knows	how	the	ward	works	so	this	knowledge	
feeds	into	the	management	of	the	tasks	and	the	timing:		
	
Sarah:	It’s	just	a	time	management	thing	in	that	there	is	no	point	sending	for	the	patient	if	
they’re	not	showered	and	shaved.	It	depends	on	who	is	on	the	ward	whether	these	things	
have	been	done	and	whether	the	message	from	the	reception	has	got	to	the	nurse.	So,	you	
give	 them	a	certain	period	of	 time,	you	 ring	and	check	before	you	 ring	waiting	bay.	Yes,	 I	
think	that’s	just	a	time	management	thing	just	knowing	when	to	check.	
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Prioritising	tasks	is	key	to	keeping	the	list	running	smoothly	and	being	prepared	for	
the	next	patient	or	list:		
	
Susan:	 In	 terms	 of	 prioritising,	 I	 guess	 you	 prioritise	 setting	 up	 for	 that	 case	 initially.	 You	
always	 have	 to	 be	 thinking	 ahead,	 planning	 the	 next	 case,	 planning	 when	 to	 send	 for	 it,	
checking	the	next	set	up.		
	
Claire	 finds	 she	 cannot	 rely	 on	her	memory	 especially	 if	 interrupted	 and	 she	uses	
different	strategies	for	remembering	things	when	faced	with	multiple	tasks	including	
writing	things	down	and	sharing	information	with	the	scout.	She	is	assisted	in	being	
able	to	anticipate	what	 is	coming	next	and	determining	what	tasks	are	required	to	
be	 completed	 next	 by	 familiarity	 with	 the	 operation.	 This	 demonstrates	 the	 link	
mentioned	earlier	between	anticipation	and	task	management:		
	
Claire:	If	it	is	an	operation	that	I	am	familiar	with,	I	know	what’s	coming	next	and	what	we	
might	need.	With	a	similar	operation,	but	a	different	surgeon	that	perhaps	I	don’t	know	very	
well,	then	I	find	it	more	difficult	to	remember	things	like	that.	Sometimes	I	write	things	on	
the	table	with	a	pen	–	quite	often	actually.		
	
	
Summary		
This	chapter	has	explored	the	factors	that	enable	or	constrain	working	in	accordance	
with	 the	 rules	 that	 have	 emerged	 from	 the	 data.	 Whilst	 observation	 of	 practice	
showed	that	 the	participants	 frequently	complied	with	rules,	 I	also	observed	them	
on	 occasion,	 deviating	 from	 rules	 and	 standards.	 The	 data	 indicates	 that	 the	
participants	made	decisions	 to	 not	 follow	 standards	 or	 rules	 by	 the	 application	of	
clinical	judgement	to	the	situation	at	hand.	I	also	found	that	personal	choice;	gaps	in	
knowledge	and	making	a	mistake	(error)	may	also	give	rise	to	non-compliance	with	
rules	 and	 standards.	 Importantly	 many	 factors	 present	 in	 the	 perioperative	
environment	 that	 enable	 or	 constrain	 practicing	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 rules	 also	
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create	 pressure	 for	 the	 perioperative	 nurse.	 The	 next	 chapter	 explores	 the	
phenomena	of	‘feeling	pressured’	and	‘being	pressured’	to	get	the	job	done	and	the	
process	of	 ‘shaping	and	reshaping	practice’	 that	perioperative	nurses	engage	 in	as	
they	respond	to	the	pressures	to	get	the	job	done.	
	 	
 127 
Chapter	5:	Findings	continued	
Chapter	5	is	divided	into	two	parts	and	continues	the	presentation	of	findings.	Part	1	
will	 explore	 the	phenomena	 that	emerged	 from	 the	data	of	 ‘being	pressured’	and	
‘feeling	 pressured’	 and	 to	 get	 the	 job	 done.	 Part	 2	 will	 describe	 the	 way	 that	
perioperative	nurses	 reshape	 their	practice	 in	 response	 to	pressure	 to	 get	 the	 job	
done.		
	
Part	1:	The	phenomena	of	‘being	pressured’	and	‘feeling	pressured’		
In	this	study,	pressure	is	defined	as	a	constraining	or	compelling	force	or	influence	on	the	
decision-making	and/or	actions	of	the	perioperative	nurse.		
	
Introduction	
‘Pressure’	 was	 a	 consistent	 term	 present	 in	 the	 data	 and	 analysis	 yielded	 rich	
descriptions	 of	 how	 pressure	 the	 perioperative	 nurse	 participants	 experienced	
pressure.	The	following	is	a	sample	of	the	codes	that	describe	pressure:	
		
Constant	pressure	to	get	everything	done	
Pressure	to	achieve	
Under	a	lot	of	pressure	
Pressure	to	make	the	list	run	smoothly	
Team	make	up	creating	pressure	
That	impetus	to	keep	it	moving	
Do	it	quickly	
They	hurry	things	and	push	things	
Pressure	of	not	being	able	to	complete	tasks	
Running	
That	speedy	impetus.		
There’s	this	speediness	
It	just	puts	another	pressure	on	us	to	be	speedy.		
Being	quick	on	changeover	
Hurrying	up	is	just	another	pressure		
How	many	things	you	have	to	do	in	a	short	time	
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Encouragement	to	work	with	haste		
Push,	push,	push	
Pressure	of	not	having	stock	available	
Most	of	the	time	the	pressure’s	on	
	
In	analysing	these	codes,	it	emerged	that	the	perioperative	nurse	participants	were	
describing	two	different	types	of	pressure.	One	kind	of	pressure	came	from	within	
the	 participants,	 the	 pressure	 they	 were	 feeling	 from	 practicing	 in	 a	 busy	
environment	 with	 competing	 demands	 on	 their	 time;	 meeting	 their	 own	
expectations	 of	 doing	 a	 good	 job	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 delivering	 safe	 care;	 the	
expectations	of	the	organisation	to	get	the	job	done	and	dealing	with	organisational	
conditions.	 The	 other	 pressure	 was	 coming	 from	 sources	 external	 to	 the	
participants,	these	being	the	doctors,	other	team	members	and	team	make	up	and	
issues	with	equipment	and	supplies.	This	external	pressure	created	or	added	to	the	
pressure	felt	from	within.	Sifting	and	sorting	these	codes	led	to	the	development	of	
the	 phenomena	 (concepts)	 of	 ‘being	 pressured’	 to	 get	 the	 job	 done	 and	 ‘feeling	
pressured’	 to	 get	 the	 job	 done.	 These	 phenomena	 form	 the	 headings	 for	 this	
chapter.	
	
‘Being	pressured’	to	get	the	job	done	
The	 categories	 of	 ‘working	 with	 haste’	 and	 ‘push,	 push,	 push’	 capture	 the	 codes	
pertaining	to	‘being	pressured’	and	these	categories	form	the	sub	headings	for	this	
section.	
	
‘Working	with	haste’	
The	perioperative	nurse	participants	often	found	themselves	having	to	hurry	up	and	
work	 quickly	 in	 response	 to	 ‘being	 pressured’	 to	 get	 the	 job	 done.	 I	 asked	 the	
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participants	 where	 the	 pressure	 to	 hurry	 up	 and	 work	 quickly	 came	 from.	 Their	
responses	highlight	the	sources	as	being	doctors,	colleagues	and	the	organisation:	
Claire:	The	surgeons	mostly	and	if	it’s	coming	from	the	anaesthetist,	it’s	often	because	they	
know	that	the	surgeon	wants	to	get	on	with	it.	Sometimes	a	couple	of	the	anaesthetists,	you	
know	 that	 they’re	 really	 quick	 and	 they	want	 to	 get	 on	with	 it	 and	will	 grumble	 if	 you’re	
fiddling	around	and	not	being	quick	enough.	
	
Jane:	Well,	 surgeons	and	anaesthetists	don’t	 like	 to	be	kept	waiting	or	 feeling	 like	 they’re	
waiting	for	longer	than	they	feel	is	reasonable.		
	
Claire:	But	we’re	 also	 very	 encouraged	 to	have	a	quick	 changeover	between	patients	 and	
get	on	with	the	list	so	that	people	can	go	and	there’s	not	overtime	and	surgeons	aren’t	kept	
waiting	and	all	that	sort	of	thing.		
	
	
I	asked	Claire	if	she	felt	that	pressure	made	a	difference	in	terms	of	the	way	she	did	
things:	
	
Claire:	 I	guess	sometimes	yes	because	you	might	be	hurrying	up	to	do	that	and	you	might	
not	have	got	some	things	ready	that	you	should	have.	It	might	be	something	simple	like	the	
anaesthetist	might	say	‘Come	on	let’s	just	get	the	patient	in,	hurry	up’	and	you’ll	realise	you	
haven’t	put	the	drip	up,	or	you	haven’t	put	the	ECG	dots	on	the	anaesthetic	machine.	Just	
little	things,	but	once	you	get	to	the	point	where	you	need	the	drip	or	you’re	about	to	put	
the	ECG	dots	on	and	then	you	realise	that	you	haven’t	got	any	on	the	top	of	the	machine	
and	things	like	that.	So,	that	encouragement	to	work	with	haste.		
		
This	exemplar	demonstrates	that	the	pressure	of	having	to	work	quickly	sometimes	
led	to	things	not	being	ready	for	the	next	patient.	Pressure	to	work	with	haste	also	
leads	to	reprioritising	of	tasks	as	described	in	the	next	exemplar,	with	the	result	that	
documentation	standards	are	not	adhered	to:	
	
Claire:	 I	 think	 probably	what	 gets,	 not	missed,	 but	 put	 to	 the	 back	 because	 it	 can,	 is	 the	
paperwork.	That	might	be	left	almost	to	the	end	of	some	short	cases	and	you	haven’t	done	
anything	on	the	computer	or	any	paperwork	because	you’ve	been	busy	doing	all	that	other	
stuff	 and	 there’s	 this	 speediness	 and	 you	 have	 not	 had	 time	 to	 do	 it.	 So,	 then	 I	 will	
sometimes	find	at	the	end	of	the	case	and	think,	especially	 if	you’re	doing	the	same	cases	
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for	the	whole	list,	like	we	might	do	eight	carpal	tunnels	in	a	morning,	I	wonder	how	accurate	
sometimes	it	might	be	to	get	to	the	end	of	the	case	and	if	you	haven’t	been	scribing	where	
the	diathermy	is	the	diathermy	pads	on	and	how	much	local’s	been	given	and	all	that	and	
even	the	count.	 I	do	think	that	because	of	 the	speed,	 the	count	doesn’t	get	written	down	
straight	away	because	you’ve	opened	everything,	the	surgeon	is	already	scrubbed,	standing	
there	waiting	for	the	prep	and	you’re	doing	your	count.		
	
The	outcome	of	having	 to	work	with	haste	 is	 that	 tasks	must	be	 reprioritised	and	
trade-offs	 made	 with	 the	 result	 in	 this	 instance	 resulting	 in	 non-	 adherence	 to	
documentation	 standards.	 Pressure	 leads	 to	 working	 in	 a	 way	 that	 is	 not	 in	
accordance	with	the	rules.		
	
‘Push,	push,	push’	
The	 perceived	 mismatch	 of	 available	 time	 with	 the	 speed	 of	 the	 surgeon,	 the	
number	of	procedures	and	 the	 type	of	operations	on	 the	 list	may	create	pressure	
before	 the	 list	 even	 starts	 by.	 If	 cases	 do	not	 go	 to	 plan,	 if	 complications	 arise	 or	
procedures	 take	 longer	 than	 expected,	 this	 builds	 more	 pressure	 on	 the	
perioperative	 nurse	 to	work	 quickly	 to	 achieve	 the	 goal	 of	 completing	 the	 list	 on	
time.	A	constant,	often	subtle,	but	ever	present	pressure	 is	 the	surgeon	waiting	 in	
the	background.	Perioperative	nurses	feel	pressure	to	not	keep	the	surgeon	waiting	
to	avoid	conflict	or	maintain	a	productive,	collegial	atmosphere	for	the	team.	They	
know	the	consequences	of	having	an	unhappy	surgeon	and	work	hard	to	avoid	this.	
The	next	exemplar	provides	a	rich	description	of	a	situation	where	Claire	works	to	
keep	the	surgeon	and	the	team	happy	resulting	in	a	trade	off	against	documenting	
the	count	at	the	appropriate	time:		
	
Claire:	So,	the	surgeon	is	standing	there	waiting	for	their	prep	and	you’ve	only	just	opened	
up	all	the	tools	and	just	about	to	do	your	count.	Then	they’re	prepping	and	they’re	draping	
and	then	you	have	to	do	all	that	stuff,	you	can’t	just	say,	‘just	a	minute	I’m	just	going	to	go	
over	here	to	the	computer	and	write	down	everything	so	that	I’m	up	to	date	with	that	and	
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write	down	this	count	and	everything.	 I’ll	be	five	minutes	before	I	can	put	the	(diathermy)	
pedal	down.’	It	just	doesn’t	happen	and	I	know	we	could	say	it,	but	it	will	make	everybody	
really	unhappy	and	most	of	the	time,	they’re	not	huge	cases.	As	I	said,	the	acuity’s	not	that	
big	so	a	lot	of	our	cases	aren’t	massive	joints	with	40	or	50	different	things	to	write	on	the	
count	 sheet.	 They	 are	 your	 basics	 like	 a	 prep	 swab,	 5	 raytec,	 2	 blades	 and	 an	 atraumatic	
(suture).	So,	most	of	 the	 time,	you	can	remember	 that	stuff,	even	 if	you	write	 it	down	10	
minutes	after	you’ve	counted	it.	But	I	do	sometimes	when	I	come	to	write	it	down	just	ask	
the	scrub	nurse	again,	‘was	that	two	blades	we	had	or	did	I	only	give	you	one?’	But	yes,	that	
rush	does	make	you	think	‘I’d	just	like	a	few	more	minutes’	to	make	sure	I’ve	got	all	the	T’s	
crossed	and	the	I’s	dotted.’		
	
	
Keeping	 the	 surgeon	 and	 therefore	 the	 team	 happy,	 constrains	 the	 ability	 of	 the	
nurse	to	adhere	to	standards	of	documentation	i.e.	record	the	count	at	the	time	the	
item	 is	 opened.	 Claire	 justifies	 her	 decision	 to	 leave	 the	 paperwork	 using	 the	 low	
acuity	of	the	cases	as	the	rationalisation	for	breaking	rules.		
	
Being	pushed	to	work	quickly	may	result	in	safety	defences	being	breached	and	the	
potential	 for	 an	 adverse	 event	 to	 occur.	 Joanne	 recognises	 this	 as	 a	 barrier	 to	
keeping	patients	safe:		
	
Joanne:	I	think	hurrying	and	rushing	is	a	barrier	to	safety.	It	sometimes	causes	issues.	I	can	
think	of	a	list	where	the	surgeon	was	'push,	push,	push'	and	that’s	when	there	has	been	an	
instance	 of	 wrong	 site	 surgery	 and	why	we	 now	 push	 back	 and	 not	 let	 that	 happen,	 we	
hope.	
	
	
I	asked	Jane	what	pressure	looked	like	for	her:	
	
Jane:	 Expectations	 for	 keeping	 the	 list	 moving	 fairly	 fast	 but	 still	 providing	 really	 good	
patient	 care.	….	 So,	 there’s	 the	 pressure	 from	making	 sure	 the	 list	will	 run	 smoothly	 and	
planning	for	future	lists	for	patients	and	all	this	sort	of	stuff,	which	is	almost	as	important	as	
the	patient	you’ve	got	there	because	they’re	future	patients.	
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The	 following	 exemplar	 is	 a	 powerful	 description	 of	 what	 pressure	 feels	 like	 for	
Claire:	
Claire:	And	 so,	 the	 surgeon	had	 scrubbed	and	 I’m	 standing	 there	with	absolutely	nothing,	
not	even	a	prep	ball	and	solution	for	him	to	preps	and	it	was	another	5-10	minutes	before	I	
really	had	everything	even	open	to	start	getting	organised	and	 I	was	 just	on	the	back	foot	
for	 a	 good	 20	minutes	 because	 he	was	 then	 into	 it,	 he’d	 started	 the	 incision	 and	 he	was	
using	diathermy.		Yes,	it	makes	it	really	hard.	I	had	a	full	sweat	up	and	I	was	stressed.	I	was	
thinking,	‘I’m	not	organised	and	I	hate	this	feeling	of	not	being	organised’.	I	really	don’t	like	
it.	And	I	didn’t	feel	like	I	was	on	top	of	everything	for	the	whole	case.	Even	though	I	did	get	
there,	you’re	just	worked	up.	
	
The	 speed	 of	 the	 surgeon	 can	 also	 create	 pressure	 for	 the	 perioperative	 nurse.	
Joanne	describes	a	situation	where	she	has	to	get	paperwork	ready	in	the	morning	
because	the	afternoon	surgeon	is	so	quick,	the	staff	can’t	keep	up	with	him:		
	
Joanne:	Whereas	if	I	left	it	until	the	actual	list,	some	of	it	wouldn't	get	done	because	it’s	not	
possible	to	keep	up	with	him….	But	you’ve	got	to	do	what	is	right	for	everyone	and	it’s	not	
just	about	speed.	So,	he	is	probably	the	most	difficult	to	deal	with	when	it	comes	to	speed.	
	
Here	 Joanne	 is	 cognisant	 that	on	 the	one	hand	 the	only	way	 to	 keep	up	with	 the	
surgeon	during	the	list	is	to	cut	corners	and	do	the	paperwork	ahead	of	the	list	but	
on	the	other	hand	this	is	not	necessarily	right	for	everyone.	Again,	there	is	evidence	
of	making	trade-offs	between	doing	what	is	right	according	to	the	rules	and	meeting	
the	needs	of	 the	surgeon	and	 the	organisation	 to	get	 the	 job	done.	 Joanne	 is	also	
aware	of	the	pressure	that	getting	away	on	time	exerts:	
	
Joanne:	Well	I	think	with	some	of	the	surgeons	and	anaesthetists,	there	is	a	pressure.	I	think	
they've	got	something	to	do	afterwards	and	sometimes	it's	the	nurses	have	got	something	
to	 do	 afterwards.	 They	want	 to	 get	 away	on	 time;	 they	 know	 there's	 no	one	 going	 to	 be	
there	to	relieve	them.	Therefore,	they	hurry	things	and	push	things.	Especially	when	there's	
a	big	list	and	you	roll	your	eyes	and	you	think	well	I'm	not	going	to	get	off	on	time	again.			
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‘Feeling	pressured	to	get	the	job	done’	
The	 second	 phenomenon	 (concept)	 that	 evolved	 from	 the	 data	 was	 the	 pressure	
that	came	from	within	the	participants	from	practicing	in	a	busy	environment	with	
competing	 demands	 on	 their	 time.	 These	 feelings	 of	 pressure	 come	 from	 the	
expectation	 that	 the	 participants	 feel	 to	 do	 the	 job	 effectively	 and	 efficiently	 and	
also	 from	having	 to	 deal	with	 the	organisational	 conditions	 they	 face	 such	 as	 skill	
mix	 and	 team	 make	 up;	 availability	 of	 equipment	 and	 supplies;	 supervision	 of	
students	and	the	perceived	lack	of	time	to	complete	tasks.	Codes	were	sorted	into	
the	categories	of	‘weight	of	expectation’	and	‘oh	can	we	just	slow	down’.	Together	
they	form	the	concept	‘feeling	pressured’	to	get	the	job	done.	 
 
Weight	of	expectation	
The	picture	that	Susan	paints	 in	the	following	statement	is	redolent	of	the	feelings	
expressed	by	all	the	perioperative	nurse	participants.		
	
You	know	you’re	swimming	like	this	underneath	[rapidly	moving	legs	to	stay	afloat]	but	on	
the	top,	you	look	like	you’re	going	ok.	
	
In	 the	 following	 exemplar	 Jane	 describes	 what	 pressure	 is	 for	 her	 and	 how	 it	 is	
driven	by	the	expectations	of	others	in	her	performance:		
	
Researcher:	So,	what	sort	of	pressure	are	the	surgeons	or	the	doctors	in	the	team	putting	on	
you?	What	does	that	look	like	for	you?		
	
Jane:	 Expectations	 for	 keeping	 the	 list	 moving	 fairly	 fast	 but	 still	 providing	 really	 good	
patient	care.	Pressure	to	achieve.	And	some	of	that	pressure,	I	know,	we	put	on	ourselves.	
I’m	very	aware	of	that.	And	some	is	from	surgeons.	Some	is	from	staff	expectations.	
	
Researcher:	So,	when	you	say	that	you	put	pressure	on	yourself,	what	does	that	look	like?		
	
Jane:	That’s	when	I	actually	need	to	stop	and	I	do	stop	and	I	go	okay,	what	is	the	time	frame	
I	am	expecting	for	this?	Am	I	being	reasonable	and	working	through	it	logically	rather	than	
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your	emotions	getting	worked	ups	and	that’s	what	it’s	about	and	then	I	can	stop	and	that’s	
when	the	pressure	comes	off	a	bit.	
	
Jane	acknowledges	 that	 she	 is	 responsible	 for	 some	of	 the	pressure	 she	 feels	 and	
that	this	may	be	managed	by	pausing	to	reflect	on	what	is	causing	the	pressure	and	
whether	 it	 is	 reasonable	and	 logical	 to	 feel	 that	way.	However,	 in	 the	busyness	of	
the	day,	time	for	reflection	is	scarce	and	the	participants	desire	to	make	the	list	run	
smoothly	can	override	taking	time	out	to	reflect.		
	
Sarah	takes	pride	in	her	operating	lists	running	smoothly	and	considers	it	to	be	a	key	
part	of	her	role	that	surgeons	have	everything	they	need	and	don’t	have	to	ask	for	
anything.	 This	 is	 an	 expectation	 she	 has	 of	 her	 own	 performance	 and	 like	 other	
participants	when	supplies	and	equipment	are	not	available	this	creates	pressure	for	
her:	
	
Sarah:	I	had	on	my	list,	‘I	must	order	this,	this	and	this.’	Now,	if	I	don’t	get	a	chance	to	do	it	
for	a	couple	of	days	then	there’s	a	bit	of	pressure	to	make	sure	that	I	do	get	that	equipment	
here,	even	though	I	don’t	let	the	last	thing	run	down	to	nothing,	but	I	want	it	here	so	I	know	
that	if	the	surgeon	has	asked	for	something	-	we’ve	never	run	out	of	stock	or	anything.	And,	
I	guess,	if	there’s	going	to	be	any	pressure,	that’s	on	me	knowing	that	I’ve	done	a	good	job	
and	they	don’t	have	to	worry	about	that	sort	of	stuff.	That’s	a	big	old-fashioned	but	 -	you	
know?	But,	I	guess,	that’s	my	own	personal	standards	that	I	will	always	want	to	make	sure	
that	this	theatre	will	run	well	for	the	surgeons	and	they’ve	got	no	cause	to	worry	about	it.	
	
Perioperative	 nurses	 want	 to	 do	 a	 good	 job	 but	 the	 weight	 of	 expectation	 when	
faced	with	problems	that	are	often	outside	of	their	control	and	being	involved	in	an	
adverse	event	or	near	miss	can	create	significant	pressure	for	them.		
	
After	 transcribing	 and	 coding	 a	 series	 of	 interviews	 I	 noticed	 that	 when	 the	
interviewees	were	talking	about	events	during	which	something	went	wrong	or	had	
the	potential	to	result	in	patient	harm	they	expressed	strong	feelings.	These	feelings	
were	coded	as:	
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I	blame	myself	
I	felt	horrified	
It’s	awful	when	you	miss	things	
I	felt	terrible	
	
In	reflecting	on	this	I	made	the	following	brief	memo:	
	
Memo	(18	Jan	2016):	 I	have	been	taken	aback	by	the	strength	of	feeling	expressed	by	the	
interviewees	 when	 they	 have	 realised	 they	 have	 missed	 something	 or	 done	 something	
wrong.	 I	 can	 see	 that	 the	 feelings	 they	 experience	 add	 to	 the	 pressure	 from	within.	 The	
participants	also	perceive	a	culture	a	blame	to	exist	and	this	creates	additional	pressure.	
	
The	following	exemplars	provide	the	context	for	the	codes	listed	above:	
	
Joanne:	I	blame	myself.	When	I	filled	in	the	Riskman	(incident	report),	I	probably	didn't	even	
say	 anything	 about	 the	 student,	 because	 I	 felt	 so	 horrified	 that	 it	 had	 been	 part	 of	 that	
whole	 thing.	The	 fact	 that	he	 (the	anaesthetist)	had	been	 talking	 to	 someone	else	and	 I'd	
been	 trying	 to	 support	 him	 from	behind.	 So,	 I	 felt	 that	 I	was	 to	 blame	 yes.	 So,	 I	 think	 as	
nurses,	even	though	we	talk	about	a	no	blame	culture,	we	blame	ourselves	and	we	feel	that	
to	a	large	degree	other	people	blame	you,	even	though	it's	supposed	to	be	no	blame.	
	
Claire:	Some	doctors	are	notorious	for	not	signing	(consent	forms)	so	you	are	kind	of	aware	
with	them,	but	if	it’s	someone	that	always	does	sign	and	then	you	can	get	into	theatre	and	
the	scout	nurse	will	say	‘the	doctor	hasn’t	signed	it’	and	you	think	‘oh	how	did	I	miss	that?’	
It’s	awful	when	you	miss	things	like	that,	but	it	makes	you	realise	how	easy	it	is	to	do	and	
why	all	the	checks	are	so	important.	And	still	you	know,	the	anaesthetist	was	saying	‘I	think	
we’d	know	by	the	time	we	get	in	here,’	but	it	does	happen.	
	
Susan:	 I	 can	 think	 of	 case	 recently	 where	 we	 didn’t	 do	 a	 time	 out	 and	 I	 felt	 terrible	
afterwards	when	we	realised.	I	can’t	remember	why	we	didn’t	get	it	done.	It	all	happened	in	
a	flurry	and	I	can’t	remember	now,	but	when	it	came	time	to	do	the	paperwork,	I	thought	
‘hang	on	did	we	do	a	 time	out?	No.	 I	 think	 something	happened,	we	got	 side	 tracked	 for	
whatever	 reason,	 I	 can’t	 remember	why	now	and	 it	wasn’t	until	 the	 case	 started	 that	we	
realised	we	hadn’t	done	one.	
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Participants	 identified	 that	 they	 are	 reliant	 on	 the	 performance	 of	 other	 team	
members,	 staff	 from	 other	 areas	 of	 the	 department	 (e.g.	 Central	 Sterilising	
Department)	 and	 their	 managers	 to	 ensure	 that	 lists	 run	 smoothly.	 Correct	
equipment	and	supplies	are	required	along	with	an	appropriate	skill	mix	within	the	
team	 and	 getting	 these	 aspects	 right	 is	 frequently	 outside	 the	 control	 of	 the	
participants.	 When	 that	 performance	 is	 lacking	 it	 adversely	 impacts	 on	 the	
performance	of	the	participant	and	creates	feelings	of	pressure	to	maintain	control	
and	get	the	job	done.	
	
Availability	 of	 correct	 supplies	 equipment	 is	 a	 consistent	 pressure	 point	 for	 the	
participants	along	with	having	to	find	the	items	needed	for	the	patient	or	list:		
	
Sarah:	The	other	 thing	 is	 the	 stock,	 ‘has	 it	 arrived,	where	 is	 it?	We	need	 this’.	Chasing	up	
that	 sort	of	 stuff.	As	 I	 said	earlier,	CSD	not	coming	 to	 the	party	with	getting	 trays	back	or	
instruments	back	or	losing	them	and	that	sort	of	thing.		
	
Susan:	 Yes,	 it	 does	 (create	 pressure),	 because	 you	 can	 see	 it	 (obtaining	 positioning	
equipment)	takes	time	and	at	the	moment	we	have	a	real	shortage	of	orderlies	as	well.	So,	if	
it	takes	10	minutes	for	the	orderly	to	get	there	and	then	you	have	to	go	off	10	minutes	to	
find	the	pieces	so	that’s	a	fair	amount	of	time	wasted	and	can	cause	delays	in	your	day	for	
sure.	
	
Jane:	But	also,	having	all	the	equipment	there.	Things	get	moved	on	us.	
	
	
The	pressure	that	skill	mix	and	team	make	up	has	on	the	participants	is	described	in	
the	following	exemplar:	
	
Jane:	 It’s	 also	 trying	 to	 get	 to	 keep	 things	 moving	 because	 some	 people	 will	 talk.	 And	
managing	your	staff,	what	they’re	like	and	their	capabilities	and	things.	And	some	days	we	
know	 you	 look	 at	 the	 list	 and	 you	 go,	 ‘I’ve	 got	 such	 and	 such.	 Okay.	 I’d	 better	 try	 and	
manage	 to	 curb	 their	 extra	 talking’.	 You	 know,	 things	 like	 that	 all	 create	 a	 little	 bit	 of	
pressure	for	me.		
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Sarah	does	not	often	feel	pressure	related	to	her	speciality	and	she	puts	this	down	
to	 her	 experience.	 Nonetheless	 when	 faced	 with	 an	 emergency	 situation	 and	
unfamiliar	team	members	she	does	feel	pressure:		
	
Sarah:	Not	very	often	in	this	theatre,	I	don’t.	Of	course,	with	my	experience	I	think	I	know	it	
pretty	well.	Pressure	in	an	emergency	say,	probably	more	so.	If	the	other	person	who’s	been	
called	 in	 isn’t	 in	yet,	the	patient	has	arrived	and	you’re	relying	on	outside	staff	to	help	set	
you	up	and	making	sure	that	you’ve	got	everything	ready	to	go.	I	think	they’re	probably	the	
main	pressures.	
	
Being	 expected	 to	 look	 after	 and	 supervise	 students	 is	 an	 additional	 pressure	
experienced	 by	 the	 participants.	 The	 following	 exemplar	 clearly	 expresses	 the	
pressure	 felt	 by	 Claire	 as	 she	 juggles	 her	 normal	 workload	 with	 supervision	 of	
students.		
	
Claire:	Another	big	pressure	is	when	we	have	students	and	we	don’t	 just	have	second	and	
third	year	nursing	students,	we	also	have	medical	students	that	come	for	certain	surgeons	
and	if	you’ve	got	a	really	busy	day	with	lots	of	short	cases	and	you	have	a	nursing	student	
and	a	medical	 student	 that	 you	have	 to	 look	after	 for	 the	day	and	you’ve	got	 short	 cases	
that	might	 take	 anywhere	 between	 eight	 and	 20	minutes	 per	 case	 and	 you’ve	 got	 12	 of	
them;	 and	 you’re	 trying	 to	 look	 after	 and	watch	 that	 the	 student	 nurse	 and	 the	 student	
doctor	 are	 doing	 the	 right	 thing	 and	 that	 everything’s	 running	 smoothly	 with	 them,	 that	
they’re	not	 contaminating	 things	or	whatever	which	 sometimes	 is	 fair	 enough,	 they	don’t	
know	the	area.	Plus,	you’ve	got	all	your	paperwork	and	all	 the	computer	data	entry	to	do	
and	there	are	only	three	of	you	in	there	doing	it	all.	So,	the	student	factor	is	quite	big	with	
time	pressure	sometimes.	
	
	
Perioperative	nurses	are	expected	to	not	only	comply	with	policies	and	standards	
themselves	but	to	ensure	the	whole	team	complies.	This	leads	to	mismatch	between	
the	goal	of	the	surgeon	to	get	started	and	other	team	members	who	attempt	to	
comply	with	the	standard	on	Team	Time	Out:	
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Joanne:	Yes,	 like	the	Team	Time	Out,	 the	scrub	 is	 trying	to	set	up	and	they	 [the	surgeons]	
sometimes	don't	listen.	And	sometimes	with	the	surgeons	push,	push,	push,	they	don't	want	
to	fight	with	them	and	say	no,	could	we	just	do	that.	
	
Once	again,	the	perioperative	nurse	makes	a	trade-off	between	meeting	the	needs	
of	 the	 surgeon	 and	 those	 of	 the	 organisation.	 The	 result	 is	 often	 that	 the	
perioperative	nurse	makes	the	choice	to	work	in	a	way	that	is	not	in	accordance	with	
the	standard.	 In	other	words,	rules	are	broken	to	manage	the	pressure	exerted	by	
the	surgeon	to	get	the	operation	started.	As	Joanne	observes:	
	
Joanne:	I	think	if	they	are	pushed	hard	enough	they	are	tempted	to	take	short	cuts	in	their	
practice.	
	
‘Oh	can	we	just	slow	down.’	
As	discussed	 in	the	previous	chapter	the	participants	perceived	the	 lack	of	 time	to	
complete	 all	 the	 tasks	 they	 are	 expected	 to	 perform	 to	 be	 a	 significant	 source	 of	
pressure.	The	wish	to	slow	the	pace	down	to	enable	completion	of	tasks	to	ensure	
safe	care	is	delivered	is	expressed	by	the	participants	in	the	following	exemplars.	
	
Claire:	 You	 just	 have	 to	 be	 super	 organised	 I	 suppose	 and	 some	 days	 you’re	 just	 not.	 If	
you’re	having	a	bad	day	you’re	not	in	that	mindset	and	you	just	think	‘oh	can	we	just	slow	
down.’	
	
Louise:	Maybe	getting	anaesthetics	to	just	slow	down	a	little	bit	and	saying	right	patient	is	
on	the	table,	let’s	do	team	timeout.	
	
Claire:	That	rush	does	make	you	think	‘I’d	just	like	a	few	more	minutes’	to	make	sure	I’ve	got	
all	the	T’s	crossed	and	the	I’s	dotted.’	
	
Susan:	 I	 do	 find	 that	 an	 issue	 in	 that	 we	 don’t	 get	 allocated	 regular	 non-clinical	 time	 so	
you’re	always	chasing	your	tail.	
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Pressure	 to	 work	 with	 haste	 and	 manage	 the	 expectations	 of	 doctors,	 team	
members	 and	 the	 organisation	 has	 potential	 implications	 for	 patient	 safety	 and	
practice.	 The	 following	 exemplar	 provides	 an	 instance	 of	where	 the	 perioperative	
nurse	is	being	hurried	to	check	in	a	patient	so	that	the	patient	can	be	put	to	sleep	
and	the	operation	commenced:	
	
Researcher:	So	ordinarily	is	there	any	pressure	to	check	in	in	the	patient	quickly?		
	
Claire:	Yes,	most	of	the	time	the	pressure	is	on.	There’s	a	few	anaesthetists	who	are,	I’ll	say	
‘slow’,	you	know,	they’re	not	champing	at	the	bit,	but	most	of	them	want	to	hurry	up	and	
get	on	with	it,	so	yes,	there	is	an	impetus	and	the	surgeons	are	then	onto	the	anaesthetist	
to	hurry	up	and	put	the	patient	to	sleep.	So,	most	of	the	time	there	is	that	impetus	to	keep	
it	moving	and	do	it	quickly	so	they	can	get	them	to	sleep.	
	
Louise	describes	her	experience	of	not	having	adequate	time	to	complete	the	check	
in:	
	
Researcher:	Do	you	find	that	in	the	time	that	you	have	been	here	that	there	are	barriers	to	
being	able	to	do	the	check	in	procedure	as	well	as	you	are	currently	describing?	
	
Louise:	Sometimes	the	anaesthetists	seem	to	go	‘wham	bam’	we’re	putting	this	patient	to	
sleep,	or	they	come	in	and	they	start	putting	the	patient	to	sleep	and	once	they	make	that	
decision	 to	 put	 the	mask	 on	 somebody	 and	 they	 usually	 do	 that,	 they	 usually	 go	 straight	
from	 the	 bed,	 lay	 down,	 you’re	 comfortable,	 bang	 it’s	 on,	 ten	 deep	 breaths	 for	 me	 you	
know.	
	
The	check	in	of	a	patient	at	the	theatre	door	and	the	TTO	are	key	steps	in	ensuring	
the	 right	 patient	 is	 having	 the	 right	 surgery	 on	 the	 right	 site	 as	 well	 as	
communicating	 important	 information	 about	 allergies	 and	 medical	 conditions.	
Rushing	this	procedure	may	 lead	to	wrong	patient/side/site	surgery	and	 important	
things	 being	missed.	 Being	 pushed	 to	work	with	 haste	 creates	 vulnerability	 in	 the	
patient	safety	system	and	may	lead	to	rule	breaking	to	get	the	job	done.		
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Summary	
Perioperative	nurses	face	daily	challenges	to	get	the	job	done	to	meet	the	demands	
of	 the	doctors,	 the	 team	and	 the	organisation.	Meeting	 the	demands	of	others	as	
well	as	meeting	personal	standards	in	terms	of	being	and	being	seen	to	be	effective	
and	 efficient	 can	 create	 pressure.	 A	 dilemma	 the	 perioperative	 nurse	 participants	
often	face	is	on	the	one	hand,	not	wanting	to	upset	the	surgeon	by	slowing	him/her	
down	and	on	 the	other	hand	having	 time	to	accurately	complete	 their	 tasks.	They	
adapt	their	behaviour	and	work	in	a	way	that	meets	the	needs	of	the	surgeon	and	
team	 rather	 than	 adhering	 strictly	 to	 the	 standards.	 Part	 2	 of	 this	 chapter	 will	
explore	the	ways	that	perioperative	nurses	adapt	or	reshape	their	work	practices	in	
response	to	pressure	to	get	the	job	done.	
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Part	2:	The	process	of	reshaping	practice	
Introduction	
Part	2	of	this	chapter	will	describe	the	process	of	reshaping	practice	that	emerged	
from	 the	 observation	 of	 participant’s	 practices	 and	 interviews.	 This	 research	 has	
explored	 what	 perioperative	 nurses	 actually	 do	 when	 they	 encounter	 barriers	 or	
pressures	that	compromise	or	limits	their	ability	to	get	the	job	done.	Analysis	of	the	
data	indicates	that	perioperative	nurses	respond	to	pressure	to	get	the	job	done	by	
working	 in	 a	 number	of	 different	ways.	Whilst	 on	most	 occasions	 they	practice	 in	
accordance	with	 rules	 and	 standards,	 there	 are	 also	 several	 instances	where	 they	
practice	in	ways	other	than	following	the	rules.		
	
Ways	of	working	
‘Ways	of	working’	is	a	collective	term	that	includes	actions	such	as	taking	shortcuts,	cutting	
corners,	bending	rules,	breaking	rules,	violations,	deviance,	workarounds,	making	errors	and	
rule	compliance.		
	
The	following	are	a	sample	of	codes	that	described	the	data	on	ways	of	working:	
Breaking	the	rules	
Cheating	
Not	following	recommended	practice	
Cutting	corners	
Doing	thing	by	hit	and	miss	
Using	clinical	judgement	
Using	common	sense	
Toeing	the	line	
Compliance	
Taking	shortcuts	
Genuinely	trying	to	follow	the	rules	
That	was	an	omission	
Variations	from	standards	
It	was	an	oversight	
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These	codes	are	sorted	into	four	categories;	rule	compliance,	making	errors,	toeing	
the	line	and	rule	breaking.	Throughout	observation	it	was	clear	that	complying	with	
the	rules	was	the	dominant	practice	paradigm	even	when	working	under	pressure.	
However,	it	was	also	observed	on	occasions	that	errors	were	sometimes	made,	that	
strong	 group	 norms	 influenced	 conformance	 and	 that	 the	 same	 rules	were	 being	
broken	time	and	time	again.		
	
To	set	the	scene	for	the	reader	Part	2	begins	with	a	memo	I	wrote	whilst	writing	an	
article	 for	a	unit	of	 study	based	on	the	 literature	review	conducted	 for	 this	 thesis.	
This	memo	 highlights	 not	 only	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 subject	 of	 rule	 breaking	 but	
more	importantly	how	my	pre-conceived	ideas	about	rule	breaking	were	challenged,	
informed	and	changed	in	response	to	analysing	and	synthesising	the	literature.	This	
process	is	in	line	with	Charmaz’s	view	that	the	literature	is	itself	data	and	forms	part	
of	 the	 total	 picture	 that	 shapes	 the	 research	 and	 informs	 the	 findings	 (Charmaz	
2014).	 This	 particular	 memo	 was	 the	 key	 to	 opening	 my	 eyes	 and	 mind	 to	 the	
influences	 and	 drivers	 of	 rule	 following	 and	 rule	 breaking	 in	 the	 perioperative	
working	environment:		
	
Memo	 (1	 July	 2015):	 When	 I	 first	 started	 thinking	 about	 my	 research	 questions,	 I	 was	
focusing	on	workarounds	as	this	was	frequently	mentioned	 in	the	 literature	 I	was	reading.	
Following	 discussion	 with	 my	 supervisors,	 I	 decided	 to	 broaden	 it	 to	 ‘ways	 of	 working’,	
which	 did	 not	 then	 limit	 my	 research	 to	 just	 ‘one’	 way	 of	 working.	 My	 readings	 found	
reference	 to	 short	 cuts,	 cutting	 corners,	 rule	 breaking,	 rule	 bending,	 non-compliance,	
deviations,	violations	and	errors.	These	are	all	ways	of	working	that	don’t	follow	rules.		
	
I	 had	 in	my	mind	 that	 working	 in	 a	 way	 other	 than	 following	 the	 rules	 was	 a	 deliberate	
choice	 that	 nurses	 made.	 Perioperative	 nurses	 were	 committing	 violations	 because	 they	
chose	 to,	 because	 it	 was	 easier	 and	 it	 was	 a	 conscious	 decision	 to	 disregard	 the	 rules	
because	it	suited	them	not	to	follow	them,	they	didn’t	agree	with	them	so	they	did	it	their	
way.	Whist	this	sounds	harsh,	I	did	not	have	any	other	frame	of	reference	against	which	to	
challenge	this	perception.	
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As	I	commenced	writing	an	article	on	rules	and	rule	breaking	for	a	unit	of	study	as	part	of	
my	course,	I	decided	to	write	about	the	ways	of	working	other	than	following	the	rules	and	
to	inform	perioperative	nurses	that	by	choosing	this	path,	they	were	committing	deliberate	
violations	 and	 this	 had	 implications	 for	 patient	 safety.	 I	 wanted	 to	 tell	 them	 that	 the	
consequences	 of	 their	 actions	 may	 be	 unintended	 but	 the	 actions	 themselves	 were	
intentional.	
	
Writing	 the	 article	was	 a	 ‘light	 bulb	moment’.	 As	 I	 grappled	with	 the	multiple	 terms	 that	
described	rule	breaking	and	sought	and	compared	these	definitions	with	the	work	of	James	
Reason,	my	views	started	to	change.	The	concept	of	 intention	 itself	was	the	starting	point	
for	 my	 change	 of	 view.	 I	 had	 a	 very	 narrow	 and	 naive	 understanding	 of	 this	 concept.	 I	
thought	that	if	you	did	something	with	intention,	it	was	deliberate	and	therefore	you	were	
making	 a	 choice.	 Not	 so	 simple!!	 A	 better	 understanding	 of	 this	 concept	 has	 shifted	 my	
thinking	on	this	 issue.	The	other	area	where	my	view	was	reasonably	 fixed	was	related	to	
the	 concept	 of	 violations	 (another	 term	 for	 rule	 breaking).	 The	 work	 of	 James	 Reason	
showed	me	that	violations	may	in	fact	be	necessary	to	get	the	job	done	because	the	rules	
get	in	the	way,	may	be	absent,	unclear,	incomplete	or	unworkable	for	the	situation	at	hand.	
So,	when	one	 considers	 the	 issue	of	 ‘choice’	when	breaking	 the	 rules,	 this	 understanding	
makes	things	look	very	different.		
	
Reading	about	rules	and	how	and	why	they	are	made	was	also	of	 interest.	 It’s	paradoxical	
that	the	very	things	put	in	place	to	deliver	safe	care	in	a	timely	manner,	may	actually	hinder	
achieving	the	goal.	 It	 is	 in	fact	no	wonder	that	nurses	find	other	ways	to	get	the	job	done.	
This	has	opened	my	mind	to	other	ways	of	thinking	about	my	topic.	I	have	recognised	that	I	
had	 a	 number	 of	 preconceived	 ideas	 about	 the	 topic	 that	 I	 wasn’t	 really	 aware	 of.	 So,	
reading	 the	 literature	 on	 these	 issues	 has	 been	 a	 learning	 that	 will	 impact	 the	 way	 I	
approach	my	research.	
	
Rule	compliance	
As	 mentioned	 in	 the	 introduction	 it	 was	 clear	 throughout	 observation	 that	
complying	 with	 standards	 and	 rules	 was	 the	 dominant	 practice	 paradigm,	 even	
when	working	under	pressure.	The	following	codes	arose	from	the	data	 in	relation	
to	rule	compliance:	
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Doing	the	right	thing	
It’s	a	rule	of	thumb	
Being	vigilant	
Following	policy	and	procedure	
Genuinely	trying	to	follow	the	procedure	
Following	the	standards	
	
	
Data	from	interviews	supports	my	observations	that	the	participants	not	only	follow	
rules	 on	 most	 occasions	 but	 also	 have	 the	 appropriate	 knowledge	 that	 supports	
their	practice.	The	following	4	exemplars	 from	 interviews	provide	examples	of	 this	
and	 serve	 to	 highlight	 the	 depth	 of	 understanding	 and	 knowledge	 that	 underpins	
perioperative	practice	and	assures	the	delivery	of	safe	patient	care:	
1.	Specimen	handling		
	
Susan:	We	 need	 to	 clarify	with	 the	 surgeon	what	 the	 name	 of	 the	 specimen	 is	 and	what	
medium	they	want	it	put	in,	or	whether	they	want	fresh	or	frozen	so	we	don't	damage	the	
specimen.	 If	 it’s	 in	 formalin	 the	 policy	 states	 that	 the	 quantity	 of	 formalin	 should	 be	 10	
times	the	size	of	the	specimen,	which	is	why	I	went	for	the	bigger	pot	with	the	foam.	When	
writing	out	the	labels	we	need	to	make	sure	we	have	got	the	right	patient	sticker	and	write	
the	name	of	the	specimen,	the	surgeon	and	the	date	and	confirm	that	with	the	scout	nurse	
before	 sticking	 it	 on	 the	 jar.	 Then	 documenting	 that	 in	 the	 patient’s	 notes.	We've	 got	 a	
register,	where	we	put	the	same	patient	label	and	what	specimens	we	had.	When	they	are	
collected	by	the	pathology	staff	they	sign	off	as	well	to	say	they	have	collected	them.	Fresh	
specimens	go	straight	 to	pathology,	not	 to	be	 left	 in	 the	 tub.	 I	 think	 the	guys	come	down	
twice	a	day	 to	pick	up	 the	 specimens	 routinely.	 So	yes,	 very	 important	obviously	 to	make	
sure	you	have	got	the	correct	information	and	to	confirm	with	the	surgeon	if	there	are	any	
offcuts	of	tissue,	whether	they	want	that	to	go	as	a	specimen	or	not.	
	
The	 information	 related	 in	 the	 exemplar	 above	 is	 in	 accordance	 with	 ACORN	
Standard:	Specimen	Identification,	Collection	and	Handling,	Standard	Statements	2,	
3	and	4	(ACORN	2016). 	
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2.	Opening	sterile	supplies		
	
Researcher:	 How	 do	 you	 know	whether	 an	 item	 from	 CSD	 has	 been	 through	 a	 sterilising	
cycle?	
	
Louise:	Some	of	them,	particularly	the	leads	and	things	have	got	a	little	strip	and	it’ll	show	
you	a	control	colour	and	 it’ll	 show	you	the	colour	that	 it	should	be	when	 it’s	sterilised.	So	
always	check	that.	Always	check	that	it’s	clean	and	it’s	dry	and	its	cold	not	warm,	don’t	use	
them	 if	 they	are	warm,	or	wet.	And	 the	 stickers	 that	we	 take	off	 and	put	on	our	 tracking	
sheet,	they	change	colour	as	well,	so	they	go	in	one	colour	and	come	out	another	one.		So	
just	making	sure	that	that’s	done.	Like	I	said	like	everything	is	clean	and	dry	and	not	warm.	
	
The	 information	 related	 in	 the	 exemplar	 above	 is	 in	 accordance	 with	 ACORN	
Standard:	Asepsis,	Standard	Statement	3	(ACORN	2016).	
3.	Labelling	of	IV’s		
	
Claire:	The	IV	line	should	be	labelled	for	every	single	patient	because	IV	lines	have	a	72-hour	
life	and	the	cannula	should	be	changed	every	72	hours.	We	label	them	all	and	we	certainly	
questioned	why	we	do	that	for	day	cases	because	they’re	not	going	to	be	in	the	72	hours.	
It’s	actually	a	recommendation,	it	came	from	our	external	infection	control	audits	and	they	
said	 even	 though	we	 have	 so	many	 day	 cases	 here,	 if	we	 label	 every	 single	 line	 then	we	
won’t	forget	to	label	the	ones	that	are	staying.		
	
The	 information	 in	 the	 exemplar	 above	 is	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 guidelines	
published	by	the	Centre	for	Disease	Control	(Grady	et	al.	2011).	
	
	4.	Team	Time	Out		
	
Researcher:	what	does	the	team	time	out	try	to	achieve?	
	
Louise:	So,	it	achieves	that	they’re	having	the	correct	procedure,	it	is	the	correct	patient,	it’s	
the	correct	location,	that	they’re	having	their	right	leg	amputated,	not	their	left.	And	things	
like	that.	So,	it’s	just	to	make	sure	that	we’re	all	on	the	same	playing	field	and	that	we’re	all	
looking	out	for	the	patients	and	that	we’re	all	aware	of	this	patient.	
	
The	information	related	in	the	exemplar	above	is	in	accordance	with	ACORN	Position	
Statement:	Surgical	Safety	(ACORN	2016).	
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Knowledge	of	standards	
There	 is	 recognition	 by	 all	 participants	 concerning	 the	 role	 that	 ACORN	 standards	
and	 hospital	 policies	 and	 procedures	 play	 in	 guiding	 and	 supporting	 practice	 and	
these	policies	were	often	referred	to	in	interview.	Again,	this	serves	to	highlight	that	
participants	 are	 aware	 of	 the	 rules	 that	 govern	 practice	 and	 know	 from	where	 to	
access	them:	
	
Joanne:	 It's	 always	 there	 in	 policies	 and	 procedures	 (correct	 information	 pertaining	 to	
practices).	
	
Susan:	You	follow	the	standards	most	times.	
	
Claire:	We’ve	got	all	our	national	standards	now	that	are	really	clear	about	all	of	those	sorts	
of	things,	which	is	good.		
	
Sarah:	So,	from	that	point	of	view	I	find	I	try	and	read	what	our	standards	say.	
	
Susan:	Yes,	there	is	both	an	ACORN	standard	and	hospital	policy	for	specimens.	
	
Joanne:	We	 look	at	 the	ACORN	standards	and	whenever	 the	new	ones	come	out	 I	always	
read	it	and	compare	it	with	what	our	practice	is	and	then	tell	everybody	that	that's	changed,	
or	this	is	changed.	
	
Susan:	Obviously	understanding	the	standards	that	you	base	your	practice	on	forms	part	of	
your	knowledge.	
	
Joanne:	 The	 ACORN	 standards	 talks	 about	making	 sure	 you	 have	 a	 procedure	 in	 place	 in	
your	individual	facility	and	we've	taken	that	literally.	
	
	
The	 genuine	 desire	 of	 the	 perioperative	 nurses	 to	 do	 the	 right	 thing	was	 evident	
from	 the	 data	 but	 there	was	 also	 recognition	 that	 this	 desire	 is	 not	 present	 in	 all	
staff:	
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Joanne:	And	I	think	sometimes	people	don't	understand	the	value	of	following	procedures	
exactly.	I	think	unfortunately	there	are	some	nurses	who	cut	corners.		
	
In	 this	 exemplar	 Joanne	 links	 not	 understanding	 the	 value	 of	 following	 procedure	
with	 taking	 short	 cuts.	 The	 barrier	 here	may	 be	 a	 gap	 in	 knowledge	 or	 equally	 it	
could	 be	 that	 the	 nurse	 does	 know	 the	 value	 of	 following	 procedures	 exactly	 but	
choses	to	take	a	short	cut	in	response	to	pressure	to	get	the	job	done.	As	previous	
exemplars,	 have	 shown,	 Joanne	 herself	 admits	 to	 taking	 short	 cuts	 with	 doing	
paperwork	 for	 the	 afternoon	 list	 during	 the	 morning	 list	 in	 response	 to	 feeling	
pressure.	Feeling	pressured	and	being	pressured	creates	an	environment	vulnerable	
to	working	in	ways	other	than	following	the	rules.	
	
Toeing	the	line	
Susan	made	the	following	statement	about	rule	following	in	a	specific	theatre	when	
we	were	discussing	whether	rules	were	consistently	applied	in	all	theatres.		
	
In	 the	 (speciality	 theatre),	we	all	 toe	 the	 line	 if	 you	 like	but	 in	other	 cases	we	 tend	 to	be	
more	lenient,	I	guess.	
	
	
The	code	‘toeing	the	line’	was	initially	placed	under	the	category	of	rule	compliance	
because	it	appeared	to	be	related	to	following	rules	i.e.	in	the	speciality	theatre	we	
follow	the	rules	but	elsewhere	we	don’t	necessarily.	What	I	came	to	see	was	that	in	
this	context	 ‘toeing	the	line’	was	a	capitulation	to	strong	group	norms.	 ‘Toeing	the	
line’	was	as	much	about	complying	with	‘the	way	we	do	things	in	here’	as	it	was	to	
following	 rules.	 So,	 whilst	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 in	 the	 speciality	 theatre	 there	 were	
stricter	 rules	around	wearing	of	masks	and	an	expectation	 that	anyone	working	 in	
that	 theatre	wore	 a	mask,	 on	 the	other	hand	 staff	were	expected	 to	 comply	with	
group	norms	to	remove	items	for	resterilising	before	the	final	count	was	performed	
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which	is	a	breach	of	standard.	Group	norms	can	therefore	create	pressure	to	work	in	
ways	other	than	following	the	rules.	This	category	‘toeing	the	line’,	highlights	firstly	
the	power	of	group	norms	to	influence	whether	to	practice	in	accordance	with	rules	
or	 not	 and	 secondly	 that	 the	 participants	 reshape	 their	 practice	 according	 to	 the	
theatre	and	team	within	which	they	are	working.		
	
Making	errors	
In	this	study	‘making	errors’	is	defined	as	making	mistakes	or	omissions	or	an	oversight	that	
led	to	a	rule	not	being	followed.	
	
During	observation	of	practice	I	noted	three	occasions	where	errors	were	made	and	
these	are	described	in	the	following	exemplars:	
	
1.	The	surgical	count		
	
Researcher:	 	 I	noted	that	 in	the	first	case	the	bag	of	rubbish	 from	opening	sterile	supplies	
was	taken	out	of	the	theatre	before	the	first	count	but	in	the	second	procedure	it	was	taken	
out	 after	 the	 first	 count.	 Are	 you	 able	 to	 tell	 me	 a	 bit	more	 about	 this	 practice	 and	 the	
rationale?		
	
Sarah:	The	bag	of	rubbish	should	be	taken	out	before	the	first	count	is	done,	so	that	was	an	
oversight	on	the	scout’s	part.	
	
Removal	of	items	after	the	first	count	and	prior	to	the	final	count	is	contrary	to	the	
ACORN	 Standard:	 Management	 of	 Accountable	 Items	 Used	 During	
Surgery/Procedures	in	the	Perioperative	Environment	Standard,	Standard	Statement	
4:	 Criteria	 4.6.	 This	 standard	 states	 ‘the	 instrument	 and	 circulating	 nurse	 shall	
ensure	that	all	 items	remain	 in	the	room	until	 the	surgery/procedure	 is	completed	
and	all	counts	have	been	performed	and	deemed	correct’	(ACORN	2016	p.111).			
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2.	Labelling	of	IVs	
	
Researcher:	 I	 noticed	 that	 in	 the	orthopaedic	 list	when	 I	was	here	 a	week	or	 so	 ago,	 you	
labelled	 the	 IV	 line	each	 time,	whereas	 the	 list	yesterday	 for	 the	 few	occasions	 that	an	 IV	
line	was	put	up,	you	didn’t	put	a	label	put	on.		
	
Claire:	Yes,	that’s	an	omission	on	my	part.	
	
In	each	of	the	exemplars	above	an	error	was	made	that	was	readily	acknowledged	as	
such	 by	 the	 participants.	 In	 neither	 case	 were	 they	 aware	 that	 they	 had	made	 a	
mistake	until	I	raised	it	with	them.	This	demonstrates	the	‘human	factor’	element	of	
day	 to	day	work	where	despite	 rules	and	standards	and	safety	mechanisms	put	 in	
place	 to	 reduce	 the	 risk	 of	 human	 error,	 mistakes	 do	 just	 happen.	 In	 the	 next	
exemplar	feeling	pressure	led	to	an	error.		
	
3.	Infection	risk		
	
Joanne:	Another	thing	that	happened	here	was	there	was	a	drip	left	in	the	theatre.	So,	the	
patient	was	disconnected	from	the	drip	and	the	drip	was	left	in	theatre	and	not	removed	at	
the	 end	 of	 the	 case.	 And	 then	 that	 drip	 was	 reconnected	 to	 the	 next	 patient	 instead	 of	
having	a	fresh	one.	So,	we	talked	about	what	we	do	here	now,	is	that	we	don't	set	any	drips	
up	now,	until	 everything	 is	 cleared	 from	 the	 room.	Also,	we're	 supposed	 to	 take	 the	drip	
with	us	out	to	recovery,	even	if	it’s	disconnected,	so	it's	not	in	the	theatre.	Having	said	that,	
from	time	to	time	there	is	still	one	in	theatre.	And	one	of	those	instances,	I	can	say,	because	
it	was	me,	that	the	anaesthetist	had	a	student	with	him	and	was	talking	to	the	student	all	
the	time.	And	so,	he	wasn't	paying	as	much	attention	as	he	would	normally	do.	The	fact	was	
that	I	should	have	removed	it.	But	because	he	was	talking	and	teaching	I	was	doing	a	lot	of	
the	other	stuff	around	the	places	and	that's	what	happened.	Before	I	realised	what	he	was	
going	to	do,	he'd	done	it	(inserted	the	previously	used	IV	into	the	next	patient).	
	
Infection	prevention	principles	as	outlined	in	ACORN	Standards:	Infection	Prevention	
and	Asepsis	(ACORN	2016)	assist	in	minimising	the	risk	of	transmission	of	infection,	
hence	the	importance	of	removing	any	items	used	on	a	previous	patient	before	the	
next	patient	enters	the	theatre.		
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Errors	can	and	do	happen.	Sometimes	it	is	an	oversight	or	an	omission	where	there	
appears	to	be	no	underlying	reason	for	the	error	other	than	the	fact	that	we	are	all	
human	and	humans	make	mistakes.	At	other	 times,	organisational	conditions	such	
as	having	a	student	present	and	routines	being	upset	as	a	consequence,	can	create	
pressure	and	an	environment	that	is	vulnerable	to	mistakes	occurring.		
	
The	 following	section	explores	rule-breaking	behaviours	noted	during	observations	
of	the	participants	as	they	went	about	their	daily	practice.	
	
Rule	breaking	
In	this	study,	rule	breaking	is	defined	as	actions	such	as	taking	shortcuts,	cutting	corners,	
bending	rules,	breaking	rules,	violations,	deviance,	workarounds	where	practices	deviate	
from	established	norms	and	standards.	
	
When	it	came	time	to	observe	the	participants	I	had	discarded	my	pre-conceptions	
about	 rule	 breaking	 behaviours	 and	 was	 open	 to	 seeing	 the	 way	 they	 practiced,	
through	 their	 eyes.	 I	was	 attuned	 to	 those	 practices	 that	were	 not	 in	 accordance	
with	the	standards	and	rules	and	where	I	observed	such	practices,	I	noted	these	and	
I	raised	them	during	interview.		
	
Five	 exemplars	will	 now	 be	 presented	 that	 describe	 an	 example	 of	 rule	 breaking,	
each	 made	 up	 of	 the	 observed	 practice,	 the	 exemplar	 from	 the	 interview	 that	
followed	 and	 my	 interpretation	 of	 the	 event.	 This	 will	 be	 followed	 by	 a	 memo	 I	
wrote	outlining	 an	observed	workaround	 and	 the	 implications	 this	 has	 for	 patient	
safety.	
1.	Checking	trays		
	
Susan	is	scrubbed	for	a	procedure	and	as	she	opens	her	tray	she	hands	off	the	tray	
list	to	the	scout	nurse,	an	experienced	colleague	with	whom	she	frequently	works.	
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She	does	not	check	the	trays	against	the	list	with	the	scout.	This	 is	contrary	to	the	
ACORN	 Standard:	 Management	 of	 Accountable	 Items	 used	 during	
Surgery/Procedures	 in	 the	 Perioperative	 Environment,	 Standard	 Statement	 6:	
Criteria	 6.2	 that	 states	 that	 ‘the	 contents	 of	 each	 instrument	 tray	 are	 counted	 by	
two	nurses,	one	of	whom	is	an	RN…’	(ACORN	2016	p.113).		
	
Susan:	The	protocol	 is	 that	we	should	check	 the	 tray	 lists	as	part	of	 the	count	before	and	
after	 the	procedures.	As	 I	 say	 I	 think	you	have	 to	use	your	experience	and	your	 judgment	
and	sometimes	common	sense	has	got	to	prevail	you	know.	As	I	say	if	it’s	a	small	finger	for	
example,	you	are	not	going	to	lose	a	pair	of	scissors	in	there,	you	may	lose	them	in	the	linen	
but	 I	 don’t	 feel	 that	 jeopardizes	 patient	 safety	 whereas	 if	 I	 didn’t	 do	 the	 tray	 list	 on	 a	
thoracic	case	for	example	or	a	laparotomy,	well	that	wouldn’t	sit	comfortably	with	me.	And	
again,	depending	on	who	you	are	working	with	and	 the	 level	of	experience	 in	 the	 theatre	
because	sometimes	it	comes	down	to	efficiency	as	well	of	running	the	theatre	list.	If	there	
are	2	experienced	theatre	nurses	in	the	theatre	you	know	it	can	be	time	consuming	to	do	a	
tray	list	for	something	that	you	know	well	and	for	a	minimal	or	quite	remote	risk	of	 losing	
something	 in	 the	 patient,	 again	 plastic	 surgery,	 so	 it	 does	 come	 down	 to	 efficiency	
sometimes	as	well.	Two	experienced	people	are	you	happy	with	the	tray,	yes	great.	You’ve	
done	your	count	so	there	are	certain	items	on	your	tray	that	get	counted.	
	
Susan	 recognises	 that	by	not	checking	 the	 tray	 list	with	 the	scout	she	 is	practicing	
contrary	to	standards.		She	does	not	however	consider	this	to	be	breaking	the	rules	
because	she	is	applying	what	she	calls	her	‘clinical	judgement’	to	a	certain	situation.	
In	this	situation,	she	rationalises	that	in	a	small	plastics	case	instruments	are	just	not	
going	to	be	 left	 in	the	patient	and	consequently	 it	makes	no	sense	to	her	to	check	
them	with	the	scout.	She	justifies	her	actions	by	applying	logic	to	the	given	situation	
but	notes	however	that	this	logic	would	not	apply	in	larger	cases.	Susan	makes	the	
decision	not	to	check	the	trays	when	there	is	another	experienced	person	scouting	
because	 it	 is	 more	 efficient	 and	 saves	 time.	 She	 makes	 the	 point	 that	 if	 she	 is	
unfamiliar	 with	 the	 tray	 or	 if	 the	 scout	 is	 junior,	 she	 does	 check	 the	 trays.	 Her	
behaviour	 is	 therefore	adapted	to	 the	situation	based	on	 familiarity	with	 the	trays	
and/or	experience	of	other	team	members	and	the	desire	to	be	efficient.		
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2.	Opening	sterile	supplies		
	
Claire	 is	 about	 to	 scrub	 for	 a	 procedure.	 There	 are	 only	 3	 nurses	 allocated	 to	 the	
theatre,	herself	as	scrub,	the	scout	nurse	and	the	anaesthetic	nurse.	The	scout	nurse	
is	at	the	patient’s	side	reassuring	the	patient	while	the	anaesthetic	nurse	is	assisting	
the	 anaesthetist.	 Claire	 opens	 her	 bundles,	 opens	 her	 gloves	 onto	 the	 gown	 and	
glove	 trolley	 and	 proceeds	 to	 open	 her	 sterile	 supplies	 into	 a	 sterile	 bowl.	 This	 is	
contrary	 to	 ACORN	 Standard:	 Asepsis,	 Standard	 Statement	 3,	 Criteria	 3.12	 that	
states	 that	 ‘perioperative	 nurses	 have	 a	 duty	 to	 not	 flip	 sterilised	 items	 onto	 the	
aseptic	 field	 or	 into	 a	 receptacle	 to	 allow	 the	 instrument	 nurse	 to	 adequately	
monitor	the	introduction	of	items	onto	the	aseptic	field’	and	criteria	3.13	states	that	
all	 other	 items	 (other	 than	 large	 items	 and	 rigid	 containers)	 are	 to	 be	 dispensed	
directly	to	the	instrument	nurse	(ACORN	2016	p.202).		
	
Claire:	Then	you’re	in	this	dilemma.	I’ll	open	everything	I	can	that’s	safe	to	open	and	open	it	
onto	 the	 table	 and	place	 it	 into	 a	bowl	 and	 try	 and	do	 it	 away	 from	 the	 instruments	 and	
away	from	your	main	table	and	you	don’t	want	to	be	opening	too	many	things	into	the	bowl	
because	 then	 once	 you’ve	 got	 quite	 a	 few	 things	 in	 there,	 you	 think	 if	 I	 did	 contaminate	
something	as	it	went	out,	then	I’m	wasting	all	that	other	stuff	that’s	already	in	the	bowl	that	
I’ve	opened.	So	sometimes	it’s	hard.	It	allows	you	to	have	everything	organised	in	a	timely	
manner	so	that	it	all	flows,	you	know,	so	the	patient	is	not	lying	on	the	table	for	another	15	
minutes	asleep	and	nothing	is	happening	–	all	that	sort	of	thing.	
	
Claire	makes	the	decision	to	open	the	sterile	supplies	into	a	bowl	because	she	knows	
that	the	scout	nurse	is	attending	the	patient	and	therefore	will	not	be	able	to	open	
her	supplies.	This	will	mean	that	once	scrubbed,	she	has	stand	there	and	wait	for	the	
scout	 to	 finish	 with	 the	 patient	 before	 she	 can	 set	 up.	 This	 will	 delay	
commencement	 of	 the	 procedure	 as	 she	 will	 not	 be	 ready	 when	 the	 surgeon	 is	
scrubbed	and	wanting	the	prep.	So,	to	save	time,	lessen	the	amount	of	pressure	she	
feels,	 reduce	 the	 amount	 of	 time	 the	 patient	 is	 waiting	 and	 to	 be	 ready	 for	 the	
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surgeon,	 she	 opens	 her	 supplies	 into	 the	 sterile	 bowl.	 Claire	 recognises	 that	 this	
practice	is	contrary	to	ACORN	standards.		
	
3.	The	surgical	count	
	
I	 observed	 that	 on	 completion	 of	 the	 first	 stage	 of	 the	 procedure	 that	 the	 scrub	
nurse	handed	off	some	instruments	to	the	second	scout	nurse	who	in	turn	checked	
the	 items	with	 Sarah	 (1st	 scout	 and	 team	 leader)	 before	 removing	 them	 from	 the	
theatre	and	placing	them	on	a	trolley	to	go	to	CSD.	This	practice	 is	contrary	to	the	
ACORN	 Standard:	 Management	 of	 Accountable	 Items	 Used	 During	
Surgery/Procedures	in	the	Perioperative	Environment	Standard,	Standard	Statement	
4:	Criteria	4.6	that	states	‘the	instrument	and	circulating	nurse	shall	ensure	that	all	
items	 remain	 in	 the	 room	until	 the	surgery/procedure	 is	 completed	and	all	 counts	
have	 been	 performed	 and	 deemed	 correct’	 (ACORN	 2016	 p.111).	 	 At	 interview,	 I	
asked	Sarah	about	this	practice:	
	
Sarah:	 The	 instruments	 are	 taken	out	 of	 the	 theatre	when	 finished	with,	 for	 the	practical	
purpose	of	 getting	 them	washed	and	 re-sterilised.	CSD	are	 very	 slow	on	 their	 turnaround	
and	we	wouldn’t	have	 those	 instruments	back	 for	 the	next	day	or	 if	 there	was	a	break	 in	
sterility	in	the	afternoon	case.	
	
Sarah	makes	the	decision	to	deviate	from	the	count	standard	because	these	specific	
items	 are	 a	 limited	 resource	 and	 she	 needs	 to	 ensure	 those	 instruments	 are	
available	 as	 a	 backup	 for	 the	 afternoon	 case	 should	 a	 break	 in	 sterile	 technique	
occur	 and/or	 be	 available	 for	 the	 next	 day’s	 case.	 Sarah	 justifies	 this	 practice	
because	 the	next	operation	 cannot	 commence	without	 these	 instruments	and	 the	
adapting	of	this	practice	ensures	they	are	available	as	a	backup	or	to	prevent	delays	
or	cancellation	of	future	cases.		
	
4.	Instrument	tracking		
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The	next	exemplar	describes	a	situation	where	Susan	was	observed	to	place	stickers	
from	sterile	items	on	to	her	uniform	rather	than	directly	on	to	the	form.	The	practice	
of	instrument	tracking	is	guided	by	the	ACORN	Instrument	Tracking	Guideline	
(ACORN	2016).		
	
Researcher:	I	noticed	when	you	were	opening	packets	that	you	stuck	some	of	the	labels	on	
your	hand	and	on	your	uniform.	Is	that	a	routine	thing?		
	
Susan:	It	can	be,	ordinarily	in	the	ideal	situation	I	like	to	have	the	tracking	form	there	and	I	
just	stick	them	straight	on	from	a	safety	aspect	because	then	you	don’t	forget	to	put	them	
on.	Today	I	did	notice	that	I	was	doing	that.	
	
	
	
Illustration	1	–	attaching	tracking	stickers	to	uniform	rather	than	directly	onto	form.		
	
The	 final	 exemplar	 is	 based	 on	 a	 discussion	with	 Joanne	 rather	 than	 an	 observed	
practice.	 However,	 both	 the	 practices	 raised	 by	 Joanne	were	 observed	 by	me	 on	
several	occasions	and	are	examples	of	practices	where	the	standards	and	rules	are	
routinely	breached.	
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5.	Team	Time	Out	and	the	count		
	
During	 an	 interview	with	 Joanne,	 she	 raised	 that	 sometimes,	 perioperative	nurses	
took	 short	 cuts	 or	 cut	 corners	 when	 they	 were	 hurried.	 I	 asked	 her	 if	 she	 could	
provide	an	example	and	she	responded:	
	
Joanne:	Well	you	could	theoretically	say,	when	you	are	doing	the	TTO	and	the	anaesthetic	
nurse	isn't	in	the	theatre	but	the	surgeon	wants	to	start	and	he's	started	to	prep,	you	might	
have	to	do	the	TTO	before	everyone	is	present.		
	
I	think	with	things	like	the	count,	they	might	not	go	back	to	the	beginning.	You	know	it	says	
in	the	standard,	if	you	get	interrupted	you	are	supposed	to	start	again.	If	they	are	under	a	
lot	of	pressure,	 they	may	say	 ‘where	were	we,	6	ok	seven,	eight,	nine’.	That	sort	of	 thing,	
rather	than	saying	no	I’m	going	to	go	back.		
	
The	 TTO	 is	 regularly	 performed	 when	 some	 members	 of	 the	 team	 are	 absent	
highlighting	 not	 only	 a	 frequent	 breach	 of	 standard	 but	 also	 inconsistencies	 in	
practice	 and	 ambiguity	 around	 the	 rules	 that	 underpin	 this	 practice.	 ACORN	
Standard:	 Management	 of	 Accountable	 Items	 Used	 During	 Surgery/Procedures	 in	
the	 Perioperative	 Environment,	 Standard	 Statement	 3:	 Criteria	 3.4	 (ACORN	 2016)	
requires	 that	 the	 count	be	 recommenced	 if	 there	 is	 an	 interruption	 to	 reduce	 the	
risk	of	inaccuracy.	In	both	these	scenarios,	the	pressure	of	meeting	the	needs	of	the	
surgeon	 around	 timely	 commencement	 and	 completion	 of	 the	 surgical	 procedure	
leads	to	working	in	ways	other	than	following	the	rules.		
	
The	exemplars	above	provide	instances	of	practices	that	are	not	in	accordance	with	
the	rules	and	establish	links	between	the	rule	breaking	and	the	phenomena	of	‘being	
pressured’	and	‘feeling	pressured’	to	get	the	job	done.		
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The	 following	 memo	 describes	 a	 situation	 I	 observed	 where	 participants	
implemented	a	practice	essentially	to	work	around	a	barrier	of	time	limitation	and	
accessibility	 to	 paperwork.	 What	 this	 highlights	 is	 the	 potential	 implications	 for	
patient	safety	of	a	workaround:		
	
Memo	(17	Nov	2015):	The	process	is	that	the	stickers	from	the	sterile	packages	are	applied	
to	 the	 tracking	 form	 so	 that	 items	 used	 on	 the	 patient	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 an	 exact	
sterilisation	cycle	should	a	recall	be	made.	However,	the	multitude	of	packages	needing	to	
be	opened,	the	number	of	people	opening	them	and	the	accessibility	of	the	form	have	led	
to	perioperative	nurses	working	around	the	barrier	of	inaccessibility	of	the	form,	by	placing	
the	stickers	on	the	backs	of	their	hands,	on	their	arms	or	on	their	uniforms	while	they	are	
opening	 the	 packages	 and	 then	 sticking	 them	 on	 the	 form	 later	 thus	 saving	 time.	 This	
practice	is	however	not	without	risk	as	the	stickers	may	be	lost	between	opening	the	packet	
and	applying	them	to	the	form.	(On	one	occasion	I	saw	one	on	the	uniform	of	a	nurse	in	the	
tearoom).	So,	whilst	this	can	be	seen	as	a	creative	workaround	to	overcome	the	barrier	of	
limited	time	and	easy	access	to	the	form,	it	may	have	implications	for	patient	safety	in	the	
longer	 run	because	 if	 there	 is	 a	 recall,	 the	 link	between	 the	 sterile	 item	and	 therefore	 its	
sterilising	cycles	and	the	patient	is	lost.		
	
	
The	 next	 section	 will	 explore	 the	 thought	 processes	 and	 decision-making	 of	 the	
participants	as	they	reshape	their	practices	 in	response	to	the	demands	to	get	the	
job	done.	
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Reshaping	practice	
In	this	study	‘reshaping	practice’	is	defined	as	performing	an	existing	practice	differently	to	
the	established	norm,	standard	or	rule.	
	
Discussions	with	the	participants	about	ways	of	working	that	are	not	in	accordance	
with	following	the	rules	revealed	the	following	codes:	
	
Using	experience	as	justification	for	not	following	the	rules	
Justifying	practices		
Using	experience	
Making	a	judgment	call	
It’s	because	we	are	experienced	
Using	discretion	
Using	rationale	on	which	to	base	a	decision	
Using	clinical	judgment	
Using	common	sense	
I	don’t	think	it’s	detrimental	to	the	patient		
Making	a	conscious	decision	to	break	rules	
I	had	that	rationale	in	my	mind	
	
These	codes	present	 two	sides	of	 the	same	coin.	On	one	side	 the	participants	use	
their	experience/judgment/common	sense/discretion	to	inform	a	decision	to	break	
a	rule	and	on	the	other	side	they	use	their	experience	to	justify	and	rationalize	that	
decision.	The	interview	provided	the	participants	with	time	to	pause	and	reflect	on	
the	decision-making	process	in	which	they	engaged	and	this	yielded	rich	description	
of	 how	and	why	 they	made	 the	decision	 to	 break	 rules	 or	 vary	 from	 standards	 in	
given	situations.	The	following	exemplars	describe	reshaping	practice	and	highlight	
the	 phenomena	 of	 feeling	 pressured	 and	 being	 pressured	 that	 underlie	 the	
reshaping	of	practice.		
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1.	Counting	packs	for	a	burns	case	
	
In	this	first	exemplar	Susan	describes	how	the	practice	of	counting	packs	for	a	burns	
case	is	reshaped.		
	
Susan:	A	 good	example	of	where	 there	 is	 contentious	 grey	 area	 is	 burns	 surgery	dressing	
changes	where	you	are	using	multiple	packs	to	cleanse	the	patient.	The	standard	and	policy	
says	we	need	to	count	those	packs,	but	the	time	taken	to	do	that,	especially	if	you	only	have	
one	scout	to	count	out	30	odd	packs	that	have	been	thrown	into	the	bottom	of	a	bucket.	It’s	
generally	 accepted	 we	 don’t	 count	 packs	 for	 burns	 surgery.	 It	 didn’t	 sit	 well	 with	 my	
understanding	of	the	standard	and	policy	that	we	should	count	all	packs	and	raytec.	There	is	
no	 dissection	 or	 anything	 involved	 (in	 a	 burn	 dressing	 case)	 so	 we	 are	 not	 going	 to	 lose	
anything,	there	is	no	wound	to	lose	a	pack.	Common	sense	tells	me	you	are	never	going	to	
lose	a	pack	and	if	one	happened	to	get	wrapped	in	the	dressings	it	is	not	a	safety	issue	for	
the	patient	with	that.		
	
So,	people	are	just	happy	to	say	‘are	you	happy	not	to	count	the	packs’.	And	the	surgeons	
will	always	say	oh	we	don't	have	to	count	the	packs;	they	are	quite	adamant	that	we	are	not	
wasting	time	counting	the	packs	when	they	want	us	to	help	them.	
	
	
ACORN	 Standard:	 Management	 of	 Accountable	 Items	 Used	 During	
Surgery/Procedures	in	the	Perioperative	Environment	(ACORN	2016)	states	that	the	
purpose	of	 the	count	 is	 to	minimise	the	risk	of	unintentional	 retention	of	an	 item.	
The	 standard	 defines	 and	 accountable	 item	 (an	 item	 that	 shall	 be	 counted)	 as	
‘instruments	and	other	 items	which	by	their	nature	are	at	risk	of	being	retained	 in	
the	patient’	(p.109).	The	standard	also	promotes	the	facility	developing	its	own	local	
policy	where	variations	to	the	standard	are	implemented.	The	hospital	policy	refers	
to	the	ACORN	standard	and	does	not	provide	for	a	variation	to	this	practice.		
	
There	are	several	issues	at	play	here,	a	misinterpretation	of	the	standard;	applying	a	
standard	that	may	not	be	applicable	in	this	situation;	 lack	of	support	from	hospital	
policy	 to	 vary	 the	 standard;	 conflict	 from	 perceiving	 rules	 are	 being	 broken	 and	
pressure	caused	by	trying	to	apply	 the	standard.	 In	burns	cases,	as	pointed	out	by	
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Susan,	 there	 is	 no	 risk	 of	 a	 pack	 being	 retained.	 Susan	 does	 not	 count	 the	 packs	
because	 her	 common	 sense	 tells	 her	 it	 is	 unnecessary	 but	 she	 believes	 she	 is	
breaking	the	rules	in	doing	so.	Underlying	this	scenario	is	the	pressure	that	both	the	
scout	and	scrub	nurse	are	under	if	they	count	the	packs	to	comply	with	the	standard	
rather	 than	help	 the	 surgeon.	As	Susan	 indicates	 the	 surgeon	wants	 the	nurses	 to	
help	 with	 the	 cleaning	 and	 dressing	 of	 the	 burns	 and	 complying	 with	 the	 count	
standard	 takes	 the	 nurses	 attention	 away	 from	 this,	 creating	 tension	 within	 the	
team	and	conflict	in	regard	to	the	goals	of	different	members	of	the	team.	To	meet	
the	needs	of	the	surgeon,	the	perceived	rules	are	broken.		
	
Susan	cites	common	sense	as	being	the	driver	for	deviating	from	the	perceived	rule.	
Common	sense	in	this	context	though	is	something	more.	It	is	based	on	knowledge	
gained	over	a	period	of	time	by	exposure	to	similar	situations	that	packs	just	cannot	
be	lost	 in	this	particular	scenario	and	even	if	one	was	 lost,	 it	does	not	constitute	a	
retained	item	and	will	not	cause	the	patient	any	harm.	So	more	than	common	sense	
is	at	play,	it	is	also	‘skilled	know	how’.	
	
	
2.	Restarting	the	count	following	interruption	
	
In	 this	 next	 exemplar	 Claire	 responds	 to	my	observation	 that	 she	was	 interrupted	
during	a	count	and	that	she	reshaped	her	practice	because	of	that	interruption:		
	
Claire:	 Most	 people	 are	 pretty	 good	 when	 you’re	 counting,	 unless	 it’s	 an	 urgent	 thing.	 I	
know	 when	 you’re	 counting	 you	 have	 to	 concentrate	 anyway,	 but	 even	 when	 I’m	 doing	
other	 jobs,	 I	 really	 need	 to	 concentrate	 on	 one	 task	 at	 a	 time	 because	 there	 are	 already	
other	distractions.	So,	yes,	it	does	have	an	impact	and	I	think	I	thought	about	restarting	the	
count,	but	 I	was	very	confident	that	 I	hadn’t	touched	anything	and	that	 I’d	stopped	 in	the	
middle	of	the	packs,	but	technically	I	probably	should	have	started	again	really.	But	yes,	it	is	
a	distraction	and	then	you’re	watching	the	operating	table	as	well	to	see	what’s	going	on	up	
there.	But	while	you’re	counting,	always	usually	while	you’re	counting,	they	want	a	suture	
cut	or	something	like	that.	So,	it	has	the	impact	of	possibly	causing	not	counting	correctly.	
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Claire	 knows	 that	 the	 rules	 that	apply	 to	being	 interrupted	during	 the	 count	 state	
that	 you	 should	 start	 again	 as	 per	 ACORN	 Standard:	Management	 of	 Accountable	
Items	Used	During	Surgery/Procedures	 in	the	Perioperative	Environment,	Standard	
Statement	 3:	 Criteria	 3.4	 (ACORN	 2016).	 Faced	 with	 possible	 time	 delays	 that	
restarting	 the	 count	would	 cause	and	 the	 feelings	of	pressure	 that	build	 from	not	
being	ready	to	help	cut	sutures	or	provide	drains	and	dressings	in	a	timely	manner,	
Claire	makes	the	decision	to	continue	the	count	from	the	point	of	interruption.	She	
reshapes	her	practice	in	response	to	feelings	of	pressure,	a	desire	to	meet	the	needs	
of	the	surgeon	and	avoid	delaying	the	completion	of	the	case.		
	
3.	Checking	tray	lists		
	
In	 this	 exemplar,	 Sarah	 explains	 her	 decision	 to	 vary	 from	 the	 rules	 regarding	 the	
checking	of	the	instrument	trays	against	the	tray	list.		
	
Researcher:	We	talked	a	little	bit	about	a	term	that	you	use,	‘variations	from	standards’	and	
that	 sometimes	 you	make	 decisions	 to	 vary	 from	 standards	 based	 on	 experience.	 So,	 for	
example,	 you	 have	 made	 a	 conscious	 decision	 not	 to	 do	 the	 tray	 lists	 based	 on	 your	
experience.	How	does	experience	influence	you	to	deviate	from	the	standard?	
	
Sarah:	I	think	it	is	because	we’re	experienced	nurses	and	that	we	know	the	trays	so	well	that	
we	can	recognise	if	something’s	missing	or	not	right,	pretty	well	straight	away.	And	because	
we	don’t	have	a	million	 trays	 to	open,	we’ve	got	 the	set	 trays	all	 the	 time.	And	 there	are	
things	 that	 we	 count	 in	 our	mind,	 not	 openly,	 but	 you	 go	 through	 the	 tray	 when	 you’re	
getting	your	instruments	out	in	your	own	mind	knowing	that	all	the	equipment	-	it’s	not	that	
we	don’t	consciously	count	them	but	unconsciously	we	are	counting	the	trays	ourselves	all	
the	time.	
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Sarah	makes	a	conscious	decision	to	break	the	rules	regarding	the	checking	of	trays	
against	 the	 tray	 lists	 based	 on	 her	 experience	 and	 the	 experience	 of	 the	 team	
members.	There	is	an	element	of	trust	within	her	team	that	all	members	know	what	
their	role	 is	and	perform	their	allocated	tasks	where	possible	without	reference	to	
other	 team	members.	 The	 team	 dynamic	 evident	 throughout	 observation	 was	 to	
anticipate	and	meet	the	needs	of	the	surgeons.		
		
Sarah:	You	probably	observed	that	they	(the	surgeons)	don’t	ask	for	too	much;	it	gets	put	in	
their	hands.			
	
This	 desire	 to	 please	 and	 the	 pride	 felt	 in	 ensuring	 the	 surgeons	 always	 have	
everything	 they	 need	 without	 having	 to	 ask	 creates	 an	 underlying	 tension	 or	
pressure	that	in	turns	creates	an	environment	vulnerable	to	breaking	the	rules.		
	
4.	Documentation	
	
In	 an	 exemplar	 described	 in	 a	 previous	 section	 (page	 88),	 Joanne	 prepares	
documentation	in	advance	for	patients	on	an	afternoon.	Through	experience	Joanne	
knows	that	the	afternoon	surgeon	is	very	fast	and	if	some	of	the	paperwork	 is	not	
completed	ahead	of	time	then	keeping	up	would	not	be	possible.	She	reshapes	her	
practice	 to	 manage	 the	 pressure	 she	 would	 otherwise	 be	 under	 during	 the	
afternoon	 list.	 Completion	 of	 documentation	 for	 a	 future	 patient	 whilst	 another	
patient	is	on	the	table	is	fraught	with	risk	and	is	contrary	to	best	practice.	Joanne	is	
also	aware	 it	 takes	her	focus	away	from	the	surgeon	and	the	patient	on	the	table,	
however	the	desire	to	‘keep	up’	with	the	afternoon	surgeon	overrides	this	and	she	
reshapes	her	practice	to	meet	the	needs	of	the	surgeon	doing	the	afternoon	list.		
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5.	Dropped	sterile	item	
	
In	the	next	exemplar	Susan	adapts	an	aspect	of	aseptic	technique	when	an	 item	is	
dropped	on	the	floor.		
	
Researcher:	So	how	do	you	mentally	process	the	potential	conflict	between	what	you	know	
the	standard	says	and	making	a	judgment	call	(to	use	an	item	that	has	been	dropped).	
	
Susan:	 It	 depends	 on	 two	 things.	 The	 staples	 yesterday,	 they	 came	 in	 quite	 sturdy	
packaging.	If	the	paper	side	got	wet,	I'd	still	be	doubtful	it	had	been	damaged	as	it’s	water	
resistant	but	if	the	plastic	side	got	wet	I'd	probably	just	wipe	that	off.	The	paper	packaging	is	
more	of	an	issue	as	it’s	not	as	sturdy.	It	also	might	come	down	to	the	availability	of	the	item.	
Weck	clips	 for	example,	we've	got	 lots	of	 those	so	 it	wouldn’t	be	a	drama	 if	we	discarded	
that	 and	 had	 to	 get	 another	 one.	 But	 if	 it	 was	 an	 instrument	 we	 only	 had	 one	 of,	 well	
obviously,	 if	 it’s	damaged	 it’s	damaged	and	 there'd	be	no	doubt	about	 that.	But	 I	guess	 if	
you	only	had	one	of	those	for	the	operation	and	the	packaging	was	still	intact	and	you	were	
happy	with	that,	you	would	be	tending	to	think,	well	I’m	going	to	run	with	that	because	the	
packaging	is	still	intact	and	we	only	have	only	got	one	of	those	and	if	I	was	going	to	send	it	
up	to	re-sterilise	it	there	would	be	a	3	hour	wait	and	if	we	are	going	to	need	it	for	this	case,	
I’m	 happy	 to	 use	 that	 because	 the	 integrity	 is	 still	 ok.	 Researcher:	 So,	 it’s	 going	 back	 to	
something	 that	 you	 have	 said	 before	 quite	 consistently	 and	 that	 is	 that	 over	 and	 above	
understanding	what	the	standard	or	rules	say	you	are	applying	a	level	of	clinical	judgment	in	
tandem	with	that	rule.	So	not	accepting	the	rule	as	black	and	white.	
	
Susan:	Yes,	that’s	right	so	there	is	a	certain	amount	of	clinical	judgment	there	and	a	certain	
amount	of	knowledge	of	your	supplies	and	equipment	I	guess.	Someone	more	junior	might	
not	 realise	 that	 is	 the	 only	 double	 ended	whatever	 that	we’ve	 got	 so	 that	 it	 is	making	 a	
judgment	call	and	using	your	prior	knowledge	so	there	are	a	few	factors	there	I	guess.	
	
This	exemplar	highlights	the	decision-making	process	in	which	Susan	engages	when	
considering	 a	 situation	 she	 faces.	 ACORN	 Standard:	 Asepsis	 Standard	 Statement	 3	
Criteria	3.3	specifies	that	‘items	are	considered	sterile	only	for	as	long	as	packaging	
is	not	compromised’	(ACORN	2016	p.	201).	The	dropping	of	a	sterile	item	on	to	the	
floor	 potentially	 damages	 the	 integrity	 of	 the	 packaging	 and	 should	 therefore	 be	
discarded.	 Susan	 uses	 her	 clinical	 judgment	 to	 determine	 the	 risk	 associated	with	
reusing	the	dropped	item	and	reshapes	her	practice	accordingly.	
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The	 exemplars	 above	 are	 representative	 of	 the	 many	 examples	 in	 the	 data	 of	
participants	 reshaping	 their	 practice.	 From	 these	 and	 other	 exemplars	 several	
categories	 emerged	 that	 began	 to	 link	 and	 connect	 the	 context	 of	 the	 operating	
room	environment	with	the	phenomenon	of	feeling	pressured	and	being	pressured	
and	the	process	of	reshaping	practice	to	meet	the	demands	of	getting	the	job	done.	
In	other	words,	the	pieces	of	the	jigsaw	puzzle	were	beginning	to	fall	into	place	and	
form	the	picture	that	is	the	substantive	theory.	
	
Summary	
This	 research	 has	 explored	 what	 perioperative	 nurses	 actually	 do	 when	 they	
encounter	barriers	or	pressures	that	compromise	or	limits	their	ability	to	get	the	job	
done.	Analysis	of	the	data	indicates	that	perioperative	nurses	respond	to	pressure	to	
get	the	job	done	by	working	in	several	different	ways.	Whilst	on	most	occasions	they	
practice	 in	 accordance	 with	 rules	 and	 standards,	 there	 are	 also	 a	 number	 of	
instances	where	they	practice	 in	ways	other	than	following	the	rules.	Applying	the	
grounded	theory,	data	analysis	techniques	of	coding,	sifting,	sorting	and	theoretical	
sampling	has	 led	 to	 theorising	on	what	 is	 happening	here.	 The	 substantive	 theory	
that	has	emerged	from	this	process	will	be	presented	in	the	next	chapter.	
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Chapter	6:	The	Substantive	Theory		
Introduction	
This	chapter	interprets	and	synthesises	the	findings	put	forward	in	the	previous	two	
chapters	and	presents	 the	nascent	 theory	 that	makes	 sense	of	 and	explains	 those	
findings.	The	aim	of	my	research	was	to	explore	the	ways	that	perioperative	nurses	
work	 to	get	 the	 job	done	and	the	 implications	 for	patient	safety	and	practice.	The	
nascent	 theory	 addresses	 this	 goal	 and	 increases	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	
experiences	of	perioperative	nurses	as	they	strive	to	deliver	safe	care	in	a	complex	
environment	 with	 competing	 demands	 on	 their	 time.	 The	 ensuing	 discussion	 is	 a	
synthesis	 of	 the	 findings,	 the	 relevant	 literature	 and	my	 own	 interpretations	 that	
‘culminates	 in	 a	 grounded	 theory’	 or	 an	 abstract	 theoretical	 understanding	 of	 the	
studied	experience’	(Charmaz	2104	p.4).		
	
The	 theoretical	 understandings	 emerging	 from	 my	 research	 will	 be	 positioned	 in	
relation	to	 the	 literature,	dialogues	and	theories	 relevant	 to	 the	area	of	study	and	
demonstrate	 where	 knowledge	 and	 understanding	 have	 been	 extended.	 The	
approach	 I	 have	 taken	 is	 to	 include	 literature	 explored	 throughout	 the	 process	 of	
analysis	 and	 theorising.	 This	 literature	 may	 not	 therefore,	 have	 necessarily	 been	
included	in	the	literature	review	(Chapter	2:	Keeping	Patients	Safe)	where	the	focus	
was	 on	 providing	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 relevant	 literature,	 positioning	 the	 research	
question	in	the	context	of	the	literature	and	evaluating	the	research	problem	in	the	
broader	 context	 of	 patient	 safety.	 This	 approach	 is	 true	 to	 the	 constructivist	
grounded	 theory	 method	 in	 that	 ‘engaging	 the	 literature	 goes	 beyond	 a	 short	
section	of	a	paper	or	chapter	of	a	thesis’	 (Charmaz	2014	p.	309).	The	result	 is	that	
the	 relevant	 literature	 is	 woven	 throughout	 the	 process	 of	 theorising	 and	
development	of	the	substantive	theory	and	the	literature	tailored	‘to	fit	the	specific	
purpose	 and	 argument’	 (Charmaz	 2014	 p.	 307)	 of	my	 research.	 For	 example,	 the	
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concept	 of	 intentionality	 was	 not	 explored	 in	 the	 literature	 review,	 as	 it	 did	 not	
emerge	 as	 relevant	 until	 I	 was	 theorising	 about	 the	 way	 the	 participants	 were	
justifying	their	decisions	to	work	in	ways	other	than	following	the	rules.	The	concept	
of	intentionality	then	became	data	that	helped	inform	the	process	of	theorising.	
	
The	methodological	framework	for	this	study	is	constructivist	grounded	theory.	This	
approach	enabled	an	exploration	of	the	experience	of	the	perioperative	nurse	from	
their	 perspective.	 The	 previous	 2	 chapters	 presented	 the	 context	 within	 which	
perioperative	nurses	practice	and	the	factors	that	enable	and	constrain	practicing	in	
accordance	 with	 standards	 and	 rules;	 the	 phenomena	 of	 ‘feeling	 pressured’	 and	
‘being	pressured’	to	get	the	job	done	that	emerged	from	the	data;	and	the	process	
of	 ‘reshaping	practice’	 that	perioperative	nurses	engage	 in	as	 they	 respond	 to	 the	
pressures	 to	 get	 the	 job	 done.	 The	 context,	 phenomena	 and	 process	 together	
constitute	the	substantive	theory	that	perioperative	nurses	reshape	their	practice	in	
response	to	pressures	to	get	the	job	done.		
	
As	a	first	step,	this	chapter	will	review	the	journey	from	coding	to	the	development	
of	 concepts	 and	 theorising.	 This	 sets	 the	 scene	 for	 the	 presentation	 and	
interpretation	of	the	key	findings	that	emerged	from	the	research	discussed	later	in	
this	chapter.		
From	codes	to	concepts		
The	 process	 of	 analysing	 data	 helps	 to	 find	 meaning	 and	 develop	 concepts	 to	 build	
theory	to	explain	the	data	(Charmaz	2014);	that	is	to	find	answers	to	the	question,	what	
is	happening	here?	The	data	analysis	process	commenced	with	the	techniques	of	coding	
and	 focussed	 coding,	whereby	 the	data	 collected	had	 labels	 or	 codes	 allocated.	Codes	
were	 then	 compared	 with	 similar	 ones	 grouped	 together	 under	 main	 headings	 or	
categories.	Further	analysis	took	place	by	constantly	comparing	codes	with	codes,	codes	
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with	categories	and	categories	with	categories.	This	process	resulted	in	some	categories	
being	 elevated	 to	 concepts.	 The	 next	 step,	which	 took	 place	 throughout	 the	 phase	 of	
data	analysis,	coding	and	constant	comparison,	was	theorising.	
Theorising	
Charmaz	(2014	p.244)	describes	theorising	as	 ‘stopping,	pondering	and	thinking	afresh’	
about	 the	data.	 Throughout	 the	data	 collection	period,	 there	were	 frequent	pauses	 to	
reflect	on	the	data	gathered;	engaging	in	constant	comparison	of	the	codes;	ascertaining	
connections	and	linkages;	and	asking	questions	of	the	data.	I	wrote	up	these	reflections	
in	the	form	of	memos,	a	grounded	theory	technique	that	assists	in	analysis	of	data	and	
codes	 by	 ‘defining	 ideas	 that	 best	 fit	 and	 interpret	 the	 data	 as	 tentative	 analytic	
categories’	 (Charmaz	 2014	 p.4).	 It	was	 through	 this	 process	 that	 significant	 codes	 and	
categories	 stood	 out	 and	 developed	 into	 theoretical	 constructs.	 The	 following	 memo	
illustrates	the	first	tentative	steps	to	developing	analytical	categories	to	explain	the	data	
and	make	sense	of	the	observations:		
		
Memo	 (7	Dec	 2015):	 I	 am	 starting	 to	 think	on	 the	 lines	 that	 nurses	adapt	 (reshape)	 their	
behaviour	 in	 response	 to	 circumstances	 or	 influences.	 There	 are	 links	 emerging	 here	
between	 the	 context	 in	 which	 perioperative	 nursing	 takes	 place,	 the	 ways	 of	 working,	
experience,	decision-making	and	clinical	judgment.	
	
During	interview,	the	participants	acknowledge	they	are	not	following	the	rules	and	make	a	
choice/decision	 not	 to	 follow	 them.	 Is	 there	 a	 form	 of	 internal	 risk	 assessment	 going	 on	
based	on	experience?	Is	this	just	about	clinical	judgment?	Is	there	another	explanation?	
	
Often	the	intention	behind	the	rule	breaking	appears	to	be	honourable	i.e.	to	save	time,	to	
keep	 things	moving,	 to	 be	 efficient.	 This	 aligns	with	my	 recent	 reading	 of	 the	 concept	 of	
positive	deviance.	Does	this	explain	the	decision-making?			
	
	
This	memo	was	not	only	the	first	step	to	theorising	by	drawing	on	the	data	collected	
from	observations,	 interviews,	memos	and	the	 literature,	 it	also	helped	to	develop	
questions	to	take	back	into	the	field.	This	process	is	known	as	theoretical	sampling	
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and	 helps	 to	 focus	 data	 collection	 on	 ‘pertinent	 data	 to	 elaborate	 and	 refine	
categories’	 in	 the	 emerging	 theory	 (Charmaz	 2014	 p.	 192).	 This	 process	 of	
refinement	 enabled	 further	 sampling	 until	 no	 new	 properties	 emerged	 from	 the	
data.	 Categories	 and	 concepts	 became	 more	 concrete	 and	 developed	 into	 an	
emerging	picture	that	made	sense	of	the	data	and	brought	to	life	the	landscapes	of	
the	participant’s	experiences.		
Conceptual	framework	
The	following	diagram	illustrates	the	synthesis	of	the	findings,	the	extant	literature	
and	 my	 own	 interpretations	 as	 presented	 in	 the	 previous	 two	 chapters.	 The	
conceptual	 framework	 of	 context,	 phenomenon	 and	 process	 highlights	 the	 key	
categories	and	concepts	that	emerged	from	the	data.		
	
	
	
Diagram	2.		Key	concepts	and	categories		
 	
Context		
Concept:		
Enablers	and	constraints	
to	practicing	in	
accordance	with	the	
rules	
	
Categories:	Organisational	conditions	Ambiguity	of	rules,	tasks,	responsibilities	Team	characteristics	Individual	characteristics	
Process		
Concepts:		
Reshaping	practice	in	
response	to	pressure	to	
get	the	job	done			
Categories:	Rule	compliance	‘Toeing	the	line’	Making	errors	Rule	breaking	Using	clinical judgment	and	experience 
 	
 
Phenomenon		
Concepts:		
Being	pressured	and	
Feeling	pressured		
	
Categories:	‘Working	with	haste’	‘Push,	push,	push’	Weight	of	expectation	‘Oh,	can	we	just	slow	down’	
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Context	
Context	 is	 important	 on	 two	 levels.	 Firstly,	 it	 represents	 the	 world	 within	 which	
perioperative	nurses	practice.	Secondly,	the	emerging	theory	is	context	specific	as	it	
is	 concerned	 with	 the	 process	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 perioperative	 nurses	
participating	 in	 my	 research	 and	 the	 researcher.	 The	 emerging	 theory	 is	 a	 co-
construction	 of	 the	 respective	 understandings,	 realities	 and	 experiences	 of	 the	
researcher	 and	 the	 participants.	 The	 aim	 of	 my	 research	 was	 to	 explore	 and	
understand	the	experiences	of	 the	perioperative	nurse	and	this	 is	only	possible	by	
understanding	 the	 context	within	which	 the	 experience	 is	 situated.	 Carthey	 (2013	
p.144)	writes	that	‘human	performance	is	shaped	by	the	context	in	which	it	occurs…’	
and	 therefore	understanding	 the	 social	 context	 and	 the	 factors	 that	 affect	 human	
performance	 is	 imperative.	 The	 findings	 indicate	 that	 there	 are	 factors	within	 this	
context	that	can	both	enable	and	constrain	practicing	in	accordance	with	standards	
and	rules.		
Phenomena	
The	aim	of	grounded	theory	is	to	explain	complex	phenomenon	by	converting	them	
into	abstract	 constructs	and	hypothesizing	 their	 relationships	 (Charmaz	2003).	The	
phenomena	emerging	from	the	data	are	‘feeling	pressured’	and	‘being	pressured’	to	
get	 the	 job	 done.	 These	 emergent	 concepts	 represent	 the	 experience	 of	 the	
perioperative	 nurse	 participants,	 as	 described	 by	 them.	 In	 other	 words,	 these	
phenomena	are	grounded	in	the	data.	The	data	has	revealed	phenomena	that	have	
qualitatively	 new	 properties	 that	 are	 described	 in	 my	 research	 as	 ‘Working	 with	
haste’;	‘Push,	push,	push’;	Weight	of	expectation	and;	‘Oh	can	we	just	slow	down’.		
	
Process	
Process	 in	 the	 context	 of	 grounded	 theory	 refers	 to	 the	 basic	 social	 processes	
evident	in	the	data	and	data	analysis.	Charmaz	(2014	p.	34)	poses	several	questions	
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to	assist	the	researcher	understand	and	describe	the	basic	social	processes	at	play	in	
the	setting,	for	example:	How	do	the	observed	social	processes	emerge?	How	do	the	
actions	of	the	participants	construct	them?	Under	what	conditions	do	they	emerge?	
Answering	these	questions	assisted	me	to	uncover	the	finding	that	the	basic	social	
process	at	play	is	‘reshaping	practice’	as	the	participants	respond	to	the	pressures	to	
get	the	 job	done.	This	process	 influences	the	actions	of	the	participants	within	the	
practice	setting.		
	
This	research	reveals	connections	between	and	within	the	context	of	enablers	and	
constraints	 to	 practicing	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 rules,	 the	 phenomena	 of	 ‘being	
pressured’	 and	 ‘feeling	 pressured’	 and	 the	 process	 of	 reshaping	 practice.	 It	 is	
through	 the	 course	 of	 theorising	 that	 the	 links	 and	 connections	 between	 the	
categories	 and	 concepts	 described	 in	 the	 illustration	 above	 can	 be	 explicated,	
leading	to	the	construction	of	the	substantive	theory.		
	
The	 next	 section	 discusses	 the	 substantive	 theory	 in	 more	 detail,	 followed	 by	 an	
examination	of	the	findings	through	a	Human	Factors	 lens.	The	 implications	of	the	
findings	 for	 patient	 safety	 and	 nursing	 practice	will	 be	 examined	 using	 the	 Seven	
Levels	of	Safety	framework	developed	by	Vincent	(2012)	and	the	Systems	Thinking	
for	 Safety	 framework	 set	 forth	 by	 Shorrock	 et	 al.	 (2014).	 The	 theoretical	
understandings	 emerging	 from	 my	 research	 are	 positioned	 in	 relation	 to	 extant	
literature,	dialogues	and	theories,	highlighting	where	knowledge	and	understanding	
has	been	extended.		
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The	substantive	theory		
Emerging	 from	 my	 research	 is	 the	 substantive	 theory	 that	 perioperative	 nurses	
‘reshape	 their	practice	 in	 response	 to	being	pressured	and	 feeling	pressured	 to	get	
the	 job	done’.	Whilst	 the	participants	mostly	comply	with	 standards	and	 rules	and	
express	a	genuine	desire	to	follow	them,	there	are	circumstances	where	they	make	
a	 conscious	 decision	 to	 work	 in	 other	 ways.	 Factors	 within	 the	 context	 in	 which	
perioperative	 nurse’s	 practice	 can	 both	 constrain	 and	 enable	 practicing	 in	
accordance	 with	 the	 rules.	 Furthermore,	 constraining	 factors	 can	 lead	 to	 ‘being	
pressured’	and	‘feeling	pressured’,	which	in	turn	constrains	practicing	in	accordance	
with	the	rules.	Decision-making	underpins	practice	and	perioperative	nurses	employ	
experience	 and	 clinical	 judgment	 in	 making	 decisions	 about	 the	 way	 they	 work.	
Whilst	working	 in	ways	other	 than	 following	 the	 rules	 is	 intentional	 it	 is	 not	done	
with	 the	 intention	 to	 break	 the	 rules,	 rather	 it	 is	 for	 another	 purpose;	 that	 is	 to	
improve	patient	outcomes	and	team	and	organisational	performance.		
	
The	negative	case	
The	substantive	theory	postulates	that	there	are	constraining	factors	that	can	 lead	
to	 the	 phenomena	 of	 ‘being	 pressured’	 and	 ‘feeling	 pressured’,	 which	 in	 turn	
constrains	 practicing	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 rules.	 There	 is	 also	 a	 finding	 that	 at	
times	the	participants	made	a	personal	choice	to	break	the	rules	for	example	Claire	
choosing	to	wear	a	necklace	for	sentimental	reasons	as	described	in	Chapter	5	(page	
112).		
Making	a	personal	choice	to	wear	the	necklace	and	in	so	doing	deliberately	breach	
the	 standard,	 was	 not	 however	 related	 to	 ‘feeling	 pressure’	 or	 ‘being	 pressured’.	
Whilst	unrelated	 to	 the	phenomena	of	 ‘feeling	pressure’	or	 ‘being	pressured’,	 this	
finding	 does	 however	 offer	 insight	 into	 the	 role	 that	 personal	 choice	 plays	 in	
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decision-making	 and	 highlights	 personal	 choice	 as	 an	 individual	 characteristic	 that	
constrains	 practicing	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 rules.	 It	 is	 therefore	 an	 important	
finding	to	acknowledge	and	‘name	up’.		
The	 finding	 that	 the	 participants	 break	 the	 rules	 about	wearing	 jewellery	 through	
personal	 choice	 as	 opposed	 to	 ‘feeling	 pressure’	 or	 ‘being	 pressured’	 does	 not	
therefore	pertain	 to	 the	conceptual	or	 theoretical	development	of	my	analysis.	As	
such	it	can	be	seen	to	be	an	example	of	the	negative	case.	Negative	cases	‘typically	
refer	to	data	that	demonstrate	sharp	contrasts	with	the	major	pattern	that	accounts	
for	most	of	the	data’	(Charmaz	2014,	p.	198).		
The	connections	and	links	within	and	between	the	concepts	that	emerged	from	the	
data	 will	 now	 be	 expanded	 upon	 and	 presented	 under	 the	 same	 headings	 of	
context,	phenomenon	and	process	used	in	Chapters	5	and	6	and	in	Diagram	1.		
	
Context:	‘Enablers	and	constraints	to	working	in	accordance	with	the	rules’		
The	findings	from	this	research	afford	that	whilst	the	participants	mostly	practiced	in	
accordance	 with	 rules	 and	 standards,	 there	 were	 also	 instances	 where	 they	
practiced	 in	 ways	 other	 than	 following	 rules	 and	 standards.	 Several	 factors	 were	
identified	 that	 enabled	 and	 constrained	 working	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 rules	
including	interruptions	and	distractions;	expectations;	workload;	team	make	up	and	
dynamics;	 experience;	 and	 non-technical	 skills	 of	 individual	 team	 members.	 This	
concurs	with	other	research	suggesting	that	high	workloads,	productivity	pressures,	
resource	 availability,	 deficient	 communication,	 inability	 to	 deliver	 timely	 care,	
unfamiliarity	 with	 technology	 and	 lack	 of	 awareness	 of	 policies	 or	 poor	
understanding	of	content	are	factors	that	impact	on	nursing	actions	(Debono	2013).	
Nursing	is	complex	work	and	this	derives	from	the	changing	condition	of	the	patient;	
the	need	 to	 coordinate	multiple	 activities	 at	 any	 given	 time	and	avoidable	 factors	
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unrelated	 to	 the	 patient	 such	 as	 interruptions,	 supply	 disruptions	 and	 technology	
(Tucker	&	Spear	2006).	The	dynamic	and	unpredictable	nature	of	the	perioperative	
environment	 contributes	 the	 complex	 nature	 of	 perioperative	 nursing	 work.	 This	
complexity	 was	 evident	 in	 my	 research	 where	 I	 frequently	 observed	 participants	
adapting	and	responding	to	rapidly	changing	situations.		
	
This	 is	 the	 context	 within	 which	 perioperative	 nurses	 practice	 and	 this	 context	
creates	an	environment	vulnerable	to	errors	and	violations	and	where	quick	fixes	to	
get	the	job	done	become	tempting	(Reid	2014).	My	research	found	that	constraining	
factors	at	times,	led	to	‘being	pressured’	and	‘feeling	pressured’	to	get	the	job	done	
which	 in	 turn	 constrained	 practicing	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 rules.	 In	 deciding	 to	
work	in	ways	other	than	following	the	rules,	participants	‘reshaped’	their	practice	in	
response	to	pressure	to	get	the	job	done.		
	
This	 research	 found	that	ambiguity/clarity	of	 role;	 responsibility,	 task,	method	and	
expectation	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 enabling	 or	 constraining	 working	 in	
accordance	 with	 the	 rules.	 This	 emerged	 from	 the	 data	 in	 the	 form	 of	
inconsistencies	 in	 the	 application	 and	 implementation	 of	 rules	 and	 standards	
between	perioperative	nurses;	between	categories	of	staff;	between	theatres;	and	
between	specialties.	The	following	exemplar	is	taken	from	a	report	published	by	the	
Victorian	Coroner’s	Office	and	highlights	the	significant	consequences	ambiguity	can	
have	for	patient	safety:		
	 	
 173 
A	patient	was	admitted	for	lower	abdominal	surgery.	The	surgery	and	post-operative	course	
proceeded	according	to	plan,	the	patient	responded	well	to	treatment	and	was	discharged	
home.	Seven	months	later,	the	patient	presented	to	the	emergency	department	with	a	two-
week	 history	 of	 lower	 abdominal	 pain.	 On	 investigation,	 a	 piece	 of	 silicone	 sheet	 was	
identified	wedged	between	the	bowel	and	abdominal	wall	during	a	CT	scan.	The	patient	was	
admitted	for	surgical	removal	of	the	silicone	sheet.	
	
What	were	the	major	contributing	factors?	
	
The	 silicone	 sheet	 introduced	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 procedure	 was	 not	 documented	 on	 the	
count	sheet	and	therefore	was	not	counted	as	part	of	the	surgical	count	process.	
	
The	 tail	 end	 of	 the	 sheet	 was	 not	 externally	 visible	 to	 alert	 staff	 to	 its	 presence	 during	
wound	closure	(Victorian	Government	2014).	
	
	
There	were	many	examples	of	ambiguity	 in	my	observations	of	practice	and	these	
were	 described	 in	 previous	 chapters,	 for	 example	 the	 checking	 of	 tray	 lists;	 the	
count;	the	 implementation	of	the	Team	Time	Out	procedure	and	the	management	
of	warmed	sterile	solutions.	The	role	that	ambiguity	plays	in	constraining	working	in	
accordance	 with	 rules	 will	 now	 be	 discussed	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 theory	 of	 systems	
ambiguity	 developed	 by	 Gurses	 (2008)	 from	 a	 grounded	 theory	 study	 of	 the	
underlying	 causes	 for	 non-compliance	 in	 an	 ICU	 setting.	 The	 theory	 expounds	 the	
role	of	ambiguity	of	task,	responsibility,	method,	expectations	and	exception	in	the	
consistency	with	which	rules	are	applied.		
	
I	 found	 similar	 patterns	 when	 applying	 Gurses’	 theory	 to	 my	 own	 research.	 For	
example,	 with	 the	 practices	 associated	 with	 the	 management	 of	 warmed	 sterile	
solutions	 in	warming	 cabinets,	 there	was	ambiguity	around	 the	nature	of	 the	 task	
(when	 the	solutions	 should	be	dated);	 the	method	 (what	 the	 required	setting	was	
for	 the	cabinet	and	how	 long	the	solutions	can	be	stored	before	use);	expectation	
(what	 the	acceptable	practice	 is);	 and	 responsibility	 for	 the	 task	 (who	should	date	
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and	 rotate	 the	 bottles).	 This	 raises	 the	 question	 of	 what	 supports	 the	 existing	
practice?	 In	 this	 situation,	 it	 is	 an	 informal	 norm	 (this	 is	 just	 the	 way	 we	 do	 it).	
Because	the	rule	is	not	clear	a	necessary	or	system	violation	occurs	because	the.	In	
this	instance	the	rule	violation	can	be	said	to	be	justified;	‘rule	ambiguity	creates	the	
opportunity	 for	organisational	actors	 to	 ignore	 the	 rule’	 (Martin	et	al.	2013	p553).	
Applying	Gurses’	approach	to	inconsistently	performed	practices	by	considering	the	
nature	of	the	task,	who	is	responsible	for	the	task	and	the	expectation	around	the	
task	assists	to	identify	where	the	ambiguity	lies	and	actions	to	address	the	ambiguity	
and	provide	better	clarity.		
	
As	 discussed	 above,	 this	 research	 has	 extended	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	 context	
within	 which	 perioperative	 nurses	 practice	 and	 the	 factors	 that	 influence	 the	
perioperative	nurse	making	decisions	to	work	in	ways	other	than	following	the	rules.	
The	next	section	will	 interpret	and	synthesise	the	finding	that	perioperative	nurses	
reshape	their	practice	in	response	to	‘being	pressured’	and	‘feeling	pressured’	to	get	
the	job	done.	
	
Phenomena:	‘Being	pressured’	and	‘feeling	pressured’	to	get	the	job	done	
Perioperative	nurses	face	daily	challenges	to	get	the	job	done	to	meet	the	needs	of	
the	patients	and	the	demands	of	the	doctors,	the	teams	and	the	organisation.	The	
context	as	described	in	the	previous	section	contributes	to	the	pressure	particularly	
in	the	way	that	it	can	constrain	rather	than	enable	working	in	accordance	with	the	
rules.	 This	 research	 found	 that	 in	 meeting	 these	 demands,	 the	 participants	
experienced	two	different	types	of	pressure.	One	kind	of	pressure	came	from	within,	
created	 by	 the	 expectations	 of	 the	 participants	 to	 do	 the	 job	 effectively	 and	
efficiently.	Dealing	with	the	organisational	conditions	they	faced	such	as	workload;	
availability	 of	 equipment	 and	 supplies;	 supervision	 of	 students	 and	 the	 perceived	
lack	of	time	to	complete	all	necessary	tasks	also	contributed	to	feelings	of	pressure.	
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The	other	pressure	came	from	sources	external	to	the	participants,	these	being	the	
doctors,	 other	 team	members	 and	 team	make	up	 and	 issues	with	 equipment	 and	
supplies.	This	external	pressure	created	or	added	to	the	pressure	felt	from	within.		
	
Of	 significance	 is	 that	 ‘being	 pressured’	 and/or	 ‘feeling	 pressured’	 may	 increase	
vulnerability	to	finding	ways	of	working	that	overcome	perceived	barriers	and	save	
time.	 For	 example,	 not	 checking	 tray	 lists	 for	 familiar	 trays	 and	 completing	
documentation	 ahead	 of	 time	 are	 shortcuts	 that	 improve	 individual,	 team	 and	
organisational	 performance.	 ‘Being	 pressured’	 and/or	 ‘feeling	 pressured’	 may	
directly	 influence	a	decision	to	practice	 in	ways	other	than	following	the	rules.	For	
example,	 the	 perioperative	 nurse	 decides	 not	 to	 recommence	 the	 count	 after	 an	
interruption	 so	 as	 not	 to	 delay	 the	 completion	 of	 the	 procedure	 and	 to	 keep	 the	
doctors	 happy.	 Research	 has	 found	 constant	 pressure	 on	 workers	 to	 increase	
performance	and	productivity	can	lead	to	the	modification	of	work	practices	to	get	
the	job	done	(Amalberti	et	al.	2006).	Debono	(2010)		noted	that	an	expectation	that	
nurses	will	solve	problems	contributed	to	workarounds	persisting.	When	faced	with	
a	problem,	nurses	often	resolve	the	immediate	issue	but	do	not	take	further	steps	to	
prevent	the	problem	recurring.	This	 illustrates	what	Tucker	and	Edmondson	(2003)	
call	 ‘first	 order’	 problem	 solving.	 The	 problem	 is	 only	 resolved	 in	 the	 short	 term	
because	the	underlying	conditions	have	not	changed	and	it	is	likely	the	problem	will	
recur.	 Workarounds	 developed	 by	 individuals	 can	 in	 fact	 be	 better	 than	 existing	
procedures	 and	 are	 therefore	 become	 an	 attractive	 way	 to	 get	 the	 job	 done.	
Improving	safety	requires	perioperative	nurses	to	engage	in	‘second	order’	problem	
solving	 involving	 communicating	 the	 issue	 and	participating	 in	 finding	 solutions	 to	
the	 underlying	 conditions.	 This	 finding	 that	 the	 weight	 of	 expectation	 increases	
feelings	of	pressure	experienced	by	the	participants	supports	this	notion.	 
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Process:	‘Reshaping	practice	in	response	to	being	pressured	and	feeling	pressured	
to	get	the	job	done’		
 
As	 stated	earlier,	 the	process	 influences	 the	actions	of	 the	participants	within	 the	
practice	 setting.	 The	 findings	 from	my	 research	 indicate	 that	 in	 reshaping	practice	
the	participants	use	clinical	 judgment	and	experience	to	make	decisions	to	work	in	
ways	 other	 than	 following	 the	 rules.	 Decision-making,	 experience	 and	 clinical	
judgment	 are	 therefore	 significant	 categories	 that	 connect	 the	 context	 and	 the	
phenomena	with	the	process	of	reshaping	practice.		
 
This	 research	 has	 uncovered	 a	 deeper	 understanding	 of	 the	 way	 the	 participants	
make	decisions	to	work	 in	ways	other	than	following	the	rules.	The	phenomena	of	
‘being	pressured’	and	‘feeling	pressured’	contributes	to	the	decision-making	process	
in	 that	 it	 provides	 on	 many	 occasions	 the	 impetus	 that	 drives	 the	 decision.	 The	
process	of	'reshaping'	practice	incorporates	making	decisions	about	when	rules	and	
standards	 can	be	modified	 to	 respond	 to	 the	pressure	 to	get	 the	 job	done.	 In	 the	
memo	below	I	reflected	on	the	ways	that	participants	reshaped	their	practice.			
	
Memo	(13	July	2016):		
Susan	made	 the	decision	 to	deviate	 from	 the	 standard	 requiring	 the	 trays	 are	 checked	 to	
save	time	and	be	more	efficient.	She	justified	this	practice	by	bringing	it	back	to	the	patient	
in	that	she	was	assuring	the	list	progressed	and	patients	scheduled	later	on	the	list	were	not	
cancelled.		
	
Claire	opened	her	own	supplies	into	a	bowl	before	she	scrubbed	to	save	time	and	eliminate	
the	pressure	 she	would	otherwise	have	 felt	 to	be	 ready	 for	 the	 surgeon.	She	 justified	 the	
practice	by	bringing	it	back	to	the	patient	who	would	otherwise	be	anaesthetised	for	longer	
due	to	the	delay	in	the	scout	being	able	to	open	supplies	for	her.		
	
Sarah	made	the	decision	to	remove	instruments	from	the	theatre	after	the	initial	count	and	
before	the	final	count	in	response	to	the	pressure	of	not	having	the	appropriate	equipment	
ready	for	future	cases.	She	justified	this	practice	by	bringing	it	back	to	the	next	patient	who	
may	be	delayed	or	have	surgery	cancelled	if	the	equipment	is	not	processed	in	time.		
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In	 each	 of	 these	 situations,	 the	 participants	 reshaped	 their	 practice	 in	 response	 to	 the	
situation	hand,	motivated	by	pressure	to	get	the	job	done	but	at	the	same	time	having	the	
patient’s	best	interests	in	mind.	
	
The	examples	of	reshaping	practice	described	in	the	memo	above	will	be	used	as	the	
basis	 for	 discussing	 three	 approaches	 to	 understanding	 rule	 breaking,	 these	 being	
work	as	 imagined	versus	work	as	done;	positive	deviance;	and	the	messy	reality	of	
practice.	
Work	as	imagined	versus	work	as	done	and	the	messy	swamps	of	practice	
This	research	highlights	the	fact	that	the	way	that	nurses	work	is	not	necessarily	the	
same	 as	 the	way	 others	 think	 they	work.	 Employing	 organisations,	 regulators	 and	
professional	bodies	based	on	 their	understanding	of	what	 the	work	 looks	 like	and	
how	that	work	 is	performed,	develop	the	rules,	standards	and	policies	that	govern	
practice.	 However,	 there	 is	 often	 a	 mismatch	 between	 what	 they	 think	 ‘is	 done’	
versus	what	is	actually	done.		
	
Shorrock	et	al.	(2014)	calls	work	that	others	think	you	do	‘work	as	imagined’	and	the	
messy	 work	 people	 actually	 do	 ‘work	 as	 done’	 and	 purports	 a	 number	 of	
assumptions	 that	 underpin	 ‘work	 as	 imagined’.	 Firstly,	 the	 organisation	 is	 like	 a	
complicated	machine,	 secondly	 humans	 are	 a	 hazard	 and	 thirdly	 things	 go	wrong	
and	 things	 go	 right	 for	 different	 reasons.	 These	 assumptions	 lead	 to	 a	 focus	 on	
incidents	 and	 what	 goes	 wrong	 rather	 than	 the	 normal	 routine	 day-to-day	
performance	where	most	 things	 go	 right	 as	well	 as	 exceptional	 performance	 that	
can	be	strived	for.	 In	considering	the	assumptions	Shorrock	et	al.	 (2014)	 	offers	an	
opposing	 view	 that	 is	 firstly,	 the	 organisation	 is	 a	 complex	 organism	 and	 not	 a	
machine.	 If	one	component	of	a	machine	breaks,	a	new	spare	part	 is	 installed	and	
the	whole	machine	works	 again.	 A	 system	 is	more	 complex	with	multifarious	 and	
intricate	 interrelationships	 and	 one	 part	 of	 the	 system	 failing	 can	 have	 significant	
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flow	on	effects	to	the	rest	of	the	system.	For	example,	a	patient	arriving	 late	for	a	
surgical	 admission	 may	 lead	 to	 a	 change	 in	 order	 of	 the	 operating	 list;	 the	 next	
patient	 on	 the	 list	may	 not	 be	 ready;	 the	 correct	 equipment	 and	 supplies	 for	 the	
new	 patient	may	 not	 be	 available;	 the	 radiographer	may	 not	 be	 available;	 delays	
may	 lead	to	the	 last	patient	on	the	 list	being	cancelled;	and	a	change	to	order	will	
increase	the	risk	of	wrong	patient/	wrong	procedure	/wrong	site	surgery.		
	
Secondly,	 Shorrock	 et	 al.	 (2014)	 argues	 that	 humans	 are	 an	 asset	 rather	 than	 a	
hazard;	they	perform	well	the	majority	of	times	and	very	rarely	does	anyone	go	to	
work	 with	 the	 intention	 of	 doing	 harm.	 As	 humans,	 we	 make	 trade-offs	 and	
compromises	to	make	the	system	work	well	and	do	what	makes	sense	to	us	at	the	
time,	 considering	 the	 local	 context	 and	 situation	 at	 hand.	 He	 argues	 further	 that	
safety	 is	 created	by	adjusting,	adapting	and	varying	our	performance	and	 if	we	all	
stuck	 to	 the	 rules	all	of	 the	 time,	 the	system	would	struggle.	My	 findings	describe	
the	 adjusting,	 adapting	 and	 varying	 that	 the	 participants	 engage	 in	 to	 make	 the	
system	work	and	get	the	job	done.	Claire	opens	her	own	sterile	items	into	a	bowl	so	
she	can	be	ready	for	the	surgeon	and	Sarah	sends	 items	out	of	the	theatre	before	
the	 end	 of	 the	 procedure	 so	 that	 they	 are	 ready	 for	 the	 next	 patient.	 These	 are	
trade-offs	that	the	participants	make	in	their	everyday	practice	to	make	the	system	
work	and	get	the	job	done.		
	
The	 third	 assumption	 was	 that	 things	 go	 wrong	 and	 things	 go	 right	 for	 different	
reasons.	Current	 thinking	 is	 that	 things	go	wrong	and	 things	go	 right	 for	 the	same	
basic	 reasons;	 it	 is	 the	ability	of	 the	 system	 to	adjust	 and	adapt	 to	 the	 conditions	
that	leads	to	success	or	failure	(Carthey	2013;	Hollnagel,	Wears	&	Braithwaite	2015;	
Shorrock	et	al.	2014;	Wears,	Hollnagel	&	Braithwaite	2015).	
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The	 notion	 of	 ‘work	 as	 done’	 as	 being	 the	 messy	 reality	 of	 the	 daily	 work	 of	
perioperative	nurses	 is	consistent	with	the	work	of	Schon	(1987)	and	Street	(1992)	
on	the	high	ground	and	swamps	of	practice.		
	
In	 the	 varied	 topography	 of	 professional	 practice,	 there	 is	 a	 high	 hard	 ground	
overlooking	 a	 swamp.	 On	 the	 high	 ground,	 manageable	 problems	 lend	
themselves	 to	 solution	 through	 the	 application	 of	 research-based	 theory	 and	
technique.	 In	 the	 swampy	 lowland,	 messy	 confusing	 problems	 defy	 technical	
solution.	 The	 practitioner	 must	 choose.	 Shall	 he	 remain	 on	 the	 high	 ground	
where	he	can	solve	problems	according	to	prevailing	standards	of	rigor,	or	shall	
he	descend	to	the	swamp	(Schon	1987	p.3).	
	
My	observation	is	that	perioperative	nurses	do	not	deliberately	‘flout’	the	rules	i.e.	it	
is	 not	 rule	 breaking	with	 impunity;	 ‘they	 genuinely	 try	 to	 follow	 the	 rules’.	 In	 the	
messy	 swamps	 of	 practice,	 perioperative	 nurses	 apply	 their	 clinical	 judgment	 and	
common	sense	and	do	what	they	think	needs	to	be	done.	That	this	breaks	rules	does	
not	appear	to	be	an	important	consideration	in	the	decision-making	process.	In	the	
1980’s	academics	were	discussing	how	to	close	the	gap	between	theory	and	practice	
and	 proposed	 a	 new	 pathway	 that	 recognised	 the	 values	 and	 practices	 of	
practitioners	(Street	1990).	It	is	apparent	that	the	path	is	still	unclear	and	there	has	
been	little	study	on	work	as	done	versus	work	as	imagined.		
	
This	research	has	taken	a	step	to	addressing	this	 issue	by	highlighting	that	there	 is	
still	a	gap	between	what	the	standards	and	rules	say	and	how	perioperative	nursing	
is	 practiced.	 This	 understanding	 is	 critical	 in	 determining	 how	 best	 to	 develop	
strategies	to	close	the	evident	gap.	These	findings	indicate	that	a	genuine	desire	to	
do	the	right	thing	underpins	adjusting,	adapting	and	varying	practices	to	make	the	
system	work	and	get	the	job	done.	As	discussed	earlier	the	intention	is	not	to	break	
the	 rules,	 the	 intention	 is	 to	make	 things	better	 for	 the	patient,	 the	 team	and	 the	
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organisation.	 ‘Positive	 deviance’	 and	 ‘local	 rationality’	 are	 terms	 used	 when	
deviating	from	rules	with	the	intention	of	doing	good.	
	
Positive	deviance	and	local	rationality	
In	 the	memo	above,	 I	described	 the	participants	making	decisions	 to	deviate	 from	
rules	 and	 standards	with	 good	 intention,	 that	 is	 to	 save	 time,	 to	 reduce	 time	 the	
patient	 spends	anesthetized,	 to	avoid	delays	and	cancellations	and	keep	 the	 team	
happy.	Deviance	 is	 traditionally	defined	as	a	negative	attribute	and	behaviour	 that	
deviates	 is	 unacceptable.	 Gary	 (2013,	 p.	 27)	 describes	 positive	 deviance	 as	 being	
both	 ‘an	 oxymoron	 and	 a	 viable	 behaviour’	 in	 that	 it	 involves	 deviating	 from	 the	
rules	in	order	to	achieve	a	better	outcome	than	the	norm.		
	
Positive	deviance	is	intentional	and	honourable	behaviour	that	departs	or	differs	
from	 an	 established	 norm;	 contains	 elements	 of	 innovation,	 creativity,	
adaptability	 or	 combination	 thereof;	 and	 involves	 risk	 for	 the	 person	 deviating	
(Gary	2013,	p.	29).	
	
Shorrock	et	al.	(2014,	p.	10)	uses	the	term	‘local	rationality’	to	describe	how	‘people	
do	things	that	make	sense	to	them	given	their	goals,	understanding	of	the	situation	
and	 focus	 of	 attention	 at	 that	 time’.	 Responsible	 subversion	 is	 a	 term	 used	 to	
describe	 the	 behaviour	 of	 nurses	 who	 bend	 rules	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 the	 patient	
(Hutchinson	 1990)	 and	 is	 therefore	 is	 a	 similar	 construct	 to	 positive	 deviance	 and	
local	 rationality.	 The	 next	 section	 will	 discuss	 findings	 from	 this	 research	 in	 the	
context	of	these	concepts.		
	
Gary	(2013)	identified	two	antecedents	to	positive	deviance,	the	first	being	a	sense	
of	 conflict	between	 standards	and	hospital	policies	 that	 limit	 the	nurse’s	ability	 to	
provide	the	care	required	in	different	situations.	Susan	felt	a	sense	of	conflict	when	
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discussing	 her	 observed	 practice	 of	 wrapping	 the	 gown	 tie	 in	 a	 glove	wrapper	 to	
hand	off	to	the	scout	to	turn	her	gown.	
	
Researcher:		Last	thing	probably	today	was	in	relation	to	when	you	were	turning	your	gown.			
Susan:	Yes	(said	with	a	wry	smile)	
	
Researcher:		How	would	you	describe	that	in	your	own	words?	
Susan:	Cheating.		
	
Susan	used	the	term	cheating	to	describe	her	practice.	When	I	pressed	her	further	
on	 what	 she	 meant	 by	 this	 it	 was	 clear	 that	 she	 was	 not	 certain	 of	 the	
appropriateness	 of	 the	 technique	 despite	 being	 able	 to	 rationalise	 and	 justify	 her	
actions.	 The	 term	 ‘cheating’	 was	 therefore	 an	 expression	 of	 the	 conflict	 she	 was	
feeling.	 The	 technique	 itself	 was	 quite	 innovative	 and	 performed	 with	 the	
honourable	intention	of	ensuring	her	back	was	appropriately	covered	when	setting	
up	to	minimise	the	risk	of	contamination.			
	
The	second	antecedent	identified	by	Gary	(2103)	is	that	a	certain	level	of	expertise	is	
required	that	enables	the	nurse	to	recognise	situational	differences.	For	example,	as	
Susan	 reflected,	 she	 chooses	 not	 to	 follow	 the	 standard	 on	 checking	 of	 trays	 for	
certain	 procedures	 because	 of	 her	 experience	 but	 she	 recognises	 that	 an	
inexperienced	nurse	may	not	know	when	it	is	appropriate	or	not	to	check	a	tray	list	
so	when	working	with	an	inexperienced	team	member	Susan	will	always	check	the	
tray	 against	 the	 list	 so	 the	 inexperienced	 nurse	 can	 learn	 the	 rules.	 The	 role	 of	
experience	 is	 therefore	 central	 to	 making	 the	 decision	 to	 deviate	 from	 rules	 and	
standards.			
	
Research	by	Traynor	et	al.	 (2010,	p.	1588)	 found	 that	whilst	nurses	acknowledged	
guidelines	 and	 protocols	 as	 ‘instruments	 they	 had	 to	 adhere	 to	 and	 act	 in	
accordance	with’,	they	were	also	considered	them	to	be	‘too	theoretical	and	of	little	
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practical	use’	and	introduced	personal	experience	as	a	rational	way	of	utilizing	them	
in	 everyday	 practice.	 The	 concept	 coined	 by	 Traynor	 (2010)	 to	 describe	 this	
phenomenon	is	‘negotiating	technicality’.	The	findings	in	my	research	are	consistent	
with	those	of	Traynor	(2010)	in	that	the	participants	emphasised	their	experience	as	
being	central	to	the	way	they	worked.	The	next	segment	will	explore	this	finding	in	
more	 detail	 against	 the	 background	 of	 work	 by	 Dreyfus	 and	 Dreyfus	 (1980)	 and	
Benner	(1984).			
	
The	role	of	experience	in	reshaping	practice	
Participants,	in	describing	how	and	why	they	made	certain	decisions	frequently	used	
the	terms	experience,	clinical	 judgment	and	common	sense.	The	concept	 ‘knowing	
how/not	 knowing	how’	expresses	 these	 categories.	 This	 concept	encompasses	 the	
finding	 that	 ‘knowing	 how’	or	 ‘not	 knowing	 how’	 can	 have	 a	 negative	or	 positive	
influence	 on	 individual,	 team	 and	 organisational	 performance;	 can	 constrain	 or	
enable	 working	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 rules	 and	 can	 increase	 or	 decrease	 the	
pressure	 felt	 by	 participants.	 The	 following	memo	describes	my	 theorising	 on	 this	
finding:	
	
Memo	 (10	 Jan	 2016):	Whilst	 exploring	 and	 considering	 my	 codes	 and	 categories	 I	 was	
thinking	about	firstly	what	experience	means	to	the	participants	and	secondly	the	nature	of	
the	 relationship	between	experience	and	decision-making.	Experience	 in	 the	context	used	
by	 the	participants	 is	both	 related	 to	 time	 in	 the	 job	and	 the	 level	of	 skill	 and	knowledge	
gained	from	that	 longevity.	However,	 longevity	alone	does	not	necessarily	confer	the	type	
of	experience	that	the	participants	value	in	a	team	member.	In	describing	what	experience	
means	to	the	participants	they	are	also	describing	their	expertise,	which	is	the	composite	of	
the	skills	and	knowledge	gained	 from	experience	 in	 the	 job.	There	also	seems	to	be	a	 link	
between	a	decision	to	either	break	or	follow	rules	with	experience.		
	
Susan	 is	much	more	 likely	 to	break	 rules	when	working	with	an	experienced	 team	and	 to	
follow	them	when	she	is	with	an	inexperienced	staff	member,	an	unfamiliar	situation	where	
she	assesses	the	risk	to	be	high.	She	adapts	her	behaviour	to	the	situation	and	works	 in	a	
way	 that	 does	 not	 follow	 recommended	 practice	 when	 she	 feels	 it	 is	 safe	 to	 do	 so.	 She	
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applies	clinical	 judgement	to	the	situation	as	part	of	the	decision-making	process.	Another	
aspect	was	the	role	that	having	people	in	the	team	has	on	the	amount	of	pressure	that	the	
participants	 felt	 and	 its	 contribution	 to	 ‘having	 a	 good	 day’.	 The	 concepts	 of	 decision	
making,	 experience,	 expertise	 and	 clinical	 judgment	 therefore	 appear	 to	 be	 inextricably	
linked.	
	
This	theorising	 led	me	to	visit	the	 literature	on	experience	and	expertise	to	 inform	
and	situate	my	findings	in	relation	to	the	extant	literature	and	theories	on	this	topic.	
The	work	of	Benner	 (1984)	and	Dreyfus	and	Dreyfus	 (1980)	was	 the	starting	point	
for	exploring	the	finding	that	the	experience	the	participants	spoke	of	i.e.	‘knowing	
how/not	knowing	how’	was	a	significant	factor	in	the	amount	of	pressure	they	felt	
and	its	influence	on	constraining	or	enabling	working	in	accordance	with	the	rules.		
	
The	 participants	 identified	 that	 ‘experience’	 in	 their	 eyes	was	 not	 related	 to	 how	
long	 someone	 had	 been	 a	 perioperative	 nurse,	 rather	 it	 is	 the	 specific	 type	 of	
experience	and	non-technical	 skills	 that	each	member	brings	 to	 the	 team.	Dreyfus	
and	Dreyfus	(1980)	speak	of	two	forms	of	knowing;	 ‘knowing	that’	which	is	guided	
by	 rules	 and	 ‘knowing	 how’	 which	 is	 experienced	 based.	 The	 ‘knowing’	 that	 the	
participants	 speak	 of	 is	 ‘knowing	 how’.	 ‘Knowing	 how’	 reflects	 the	 constant	
interaction	between	knowledge,	skills	and	experience.	The	combination	of	past	and	
new	 experience	 becomes	 ‘skilled	 know	 how’,	 one	 of	 the	 six	 aspects	 of	 intuitive	
judgment	 developed	 by	 Dreyfus	 and	 Dreyfus	 (1980)	 -	 the	 others	 being	 pattern	
recognition,	 similarity	 recognition,	 sense	 of	 salience,	 deliberate	 rationality	 and	
common	sense.		
	
Experience	is	however	more	than	just	knowing	more	or	gaining	skills,	it	is	also	about	
perceiving	 the	 world	 and	 approaching	 problem	 solving	 in	 a	 different	 way	 and	
developing	 new	 mental	 models	 (Hunt	 2008).	 The	 experience	 of	 which	 the	
participants	speak	is	expertise;	the	special	skills	and	knowledge	developed	because	
of	 experience.	 It	 is	 the	 expertise	 that	 is	 highly	 valued	 as	with	 it	 comes	 a	 level	 of	
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knowledge	and	skills	that	enhance	the	work	of	the	team,	instils	confidence	and	trust	
within	the	whole	team,	reduces	pressure	and	facilitates	the	delivery	of	safe	patient	
care.		
	
Whilst	 some	 disagree	 with	 Benner’s	 developmental	 competence	 model	 (Rischel,	
Larsen	&	Jackson	2008)	or	are	critical	of	the	lack	of	definition	(Lyneham,	Parkinson	&	
Denholm	 2008)	many	 authors	 continue	 to	 explore	 the	 concept	 of	 expert	 practice	
from	a	 range	 of	 nursing	 perspectives	 including	 surgical	 and	 intensive	 care	 nursing	
(King	&	Clark	2002)	district	nursing	(Burke	2014)	and	emergency	nursing	(Lyneham,	
Parkinson	&	Denholm	2008).	Whilst	 application	of	 this	model	 in	 the	perioperative	
setting	has	not	yet	been	researched,	my	research	has	extended	our	understanding	
of	 the	 role	 that	experience	plays	 in	 influencing	decisions	 to	practice	 in	ways	other	
than	following	the	rules.		
	
The	finding	that	non-technical	skills	can	enable	or	constrain	working	 in	accordance	
with	the	rules	will	now	be	discussed.		
	
Having	non	-	technical	skills	
Non-technical	 skills	 are	 composed	 of	 a	 range	 of	 attributes	 that	 include	
communication,	situation	awareness,	decision-making	skills,	teamwork,	 leaderships	
and	culture	(Flin	2014;	Yule	et	al.	2006).	These	skills	have	been	the	focus	of	attention	
in	 training	 programs	 for	 crews	 in	 a	 range	 of	 industries	 such	 as	 aviation,	 nuclear	
power	and	oil	drilling	but	there	has	been	little	emphasis	in	surgery	(Yule	et	al.	2006)	
and	 in	 nursing.	 In	 perioperative	 nursing,	 the	 development	 of	 these	 skills	 has	 very	
much	 been	 left	 to	 chance	 and	 the	 relationship	 between	 non-technical	 skills	 and	
patient	 safety	 remains	 largely	 unexplored.	 Whilst	 there	 is	 little	 research	 on	 the	
influence	of	 expertise	 on	 task	 performance,	 Koh	 et	 al.	 (2014)	 found	non-technical	
 185 
nursing	 skills	 to	 be	 advantageous	 in	 a	 scrub	 nurse.	 Experienced	 scrub	 nurses	 did	
better	 in	 assessments	 of	 non-technical	 skills	 than	 novice	 practitioners.	 This	
supporting	 their	argument	 that	some	of	 the	expertise	related	differences	could	be	
associated	 with	 superior	 non-technical	 skills	 (Koh,	 Park	 &	 Wickens	 2014).	 Where	
these	skills	are	lacking	or	absent	patient	outcomes	can	be	impacted	with	a	reported	
number	of	errors	arising	from	instances	where	there	was	an	observed	deficit	in	non-
technical	skills	(Yule	et	al.	2006).	What	is	emerging	from	the	data	in	this	research	is	
the	 importance	 of	 the	 perioperative	 nurse	 having	 well-developed	 non-technical	
skills	in	terms	of	the	‘value’	the	nurse	brings	to	the	team.	
	
Mindfulness	is	a	similar	concept	to	situational	awareness	being	defined	as	‘a	set	of	
cognitive	processes	 that	 allows	 individuals	 to	be	highly	 attuned	 to	 the	many	ways	
things	 can	 go	 wrong	 in	 unkind	 environments	 and	 ways	 to	 recover	 from	 them’	
(Henriksen	et	al.	2008,	p.	I	81).	Being	mindful	is	seen	as	an	important	characteristic	
in	high	reliability	organisations	(Henriksen	et	al.	2008)		as	it	increases	awareness	of	
safety	 (Emanuel	 et	 al.	 2005).	 Sarah	 relating	 how	 she	 is	 always	 looking	 around	 to	
make	sure	everything	is	ok	and	observing	the	patient	within	that	context	describes	
mindfulness	in	action.	As	Sarah	states	‘it	all	comes	back	to	the	patient’.	
	
The	 findings	 demonstrate	 the	 need	 to	 manage	 multiple	 tasks	 in	 sequence,	
concurrently	or	holding	information	for	future	action.	A	term	given	to	the	process	of	
holding	 and	 storing	 information	 is	 cognitive	 stacking	 (Potter	 et	 al.	 2005)	 and	 this	
presents	 challenges	 for	 the	 perioperative	 nurse	 in	 remembering	 activities	 and	
priorities,	 particularly	 as	 tasks	 accumulate.	 Research	 by	 Potter	 et	 al.	 (2005)	 found	
that	 RNs	 stack	 a	 large	 number	 of	 tasks	 and	 that	 cognitive	 shifts	 occur	 frequently	
throughout	 a	 shift.	 The	 high	 number	 of	 stacked	 tasks	 achieved	 by	 the	 RNs	 she	
observed	 in	her	study	was	of	concern	because	 it	could	affect	 the	nurse’s	ability	 to	
maintain	information	in	a	quickly	retrievable	way	and	attend	to	priorities.	This	may	
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lead	 to	 errors	 or	 omissions,	 particularly	 when	 further	 complicated	 by	 a	 high	
frequency	 of	 cognitive	 shifts	 and	 interruptions	 (Potter	 et	 al.	 2005).	 This	 research	
supports	 findings	 from	 other	 studies	 that	 interruptions	 and	 distractions	 affect	
workload	and	task	prioritisation.		
Resources	 such	as	 staffing,	 availability	of	equipment	and	 supplies	 and	 information	
can	affect	 the	ability	of	 the	perioperative	to	practice	 in	accordance	with	the	rules.	
Constraints	 on	 resources	 can	 increase	mental	 load,	 task	 load,	 time	 pressures	 and	
fatigue	 and	 as	 such	 are	 threats	 to	 situational	 awareness	 (Fore	 and	 Sculli	 2013).	
System	 factors	 impact	 on	 the	 individual	 and	 team	 performance,	 which	 can	 then	
affect	patient	outcomes.		
	
Whilst	there	is	a	dearth	of	research	on	experience	and	expertise	in	the	perioperative	
field	 research	 in	 other	 areas	 provides	 insight	 into	 how	 this	 might	 impact	 in	 the	
perioperative	setting.	For	example:	 research	 in	expertise	 in	 ICU	(Hill,	W	2010);	 ICU	
and	 surgical	 wards	 (King	 &	 Clark	 2002);	 palliative	 care	 (Bergdahl,	 Wikstrom	 &	
Andershed	 2007);	 district	 nursing	 (Burke	 2014);	 and	 the	 relationship	 between	
experience	 and	performance	of	 perioperative	 nurses	 (Koh,	 Park	&	Wickens	 2014).	
This	 research	 findings	 indicate	 that	 participants	 make	 deliberate	 and	 rational	
decisions	 based	 on	 their	 skills,	 knowledge	 and	 experience	 and	 these	 findings	 are	
grounded	in	the	data.	Scholes	et	al.	(2006)	argue	that	clinical	experts	have	to	act	as	
‘mavericks’	to	bring	about	change	and	they	need	courage	and	fortitude	to	succeed	
in	this	this.	The	notion	of	being	a	maverick	is	similar	to	being	a	positive	deviant.	This	
has	 extended	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 role	 that	 experience	 plays	 in	 making	
decisions	to	work	in	ways	that	are	not	in	accordance	with	the	rules.	
	
Whilst	there	is	a	need	to	be	wary	about	intuition,	in	that	experts	can	be	fallible	and	
intuition	can	be	wrong,	 there	 is	also	a	need	to	 ‘	habitually	narrate	what	we	do,	 to	
others	 and	 question	 their	 understanding	 of	 the	 experience’	 (Scholes,	 Albarran	 &	
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Williams	2006,	p.	9).	Sharing	this	with	other	staff	not	only	helps	in	the	development	
of	clinical	decision	making	skills,	 it	also	makes	 transparent	what	 is	being	done	and	
why.	This	is	particularly	important	where	rules	are	being	broken	so	that	junior	staff	
do	not	blindly	 follow	their	 role	models	and	 to	promote	professional	 conversations	
about	deviations	from	standards.	
	
The	preceding	section	has	discussed	the	role	of	decision-making	and	experience	 in	
the	process	of	reshaping	practice.	The	reshaping	of	practice	 is	a	human	act	and	to	
fully	 understand	 the	 implications	 the	 next	 section	will	 discuss	 this	 in	 the	 broader	
context	of	human	factors.		
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Human	factors	
The	findings	from	this	research	 indicate	that	perioperative	nurses	at	times	work	 in	
ways	contrary	to	rules	and	standards.	The	choices	we	make	to	behave/act/practice	
in	 a	 certain	 way	 can	 have	 positive	 or	 negative	 consequences	 and	 at	 times,	 the	
consequences	 are	 unintended.	 In	 healthcare,	 an	 unintended	 consequence	may	 be	
that	 a	 patient	 suffers	 an	 adverse	 event	 and	 this	 is	 obviously	 a	 negative	 outcome.	
Conversely,	a	positive	consequence	could	be	that	a	new,	more	efficient	and	just	as	
safe	way	of	doing	something	is	developed.	There	are	opportunities	for	innovation	on	
the	 one	 hand	 and	 potential	 for	 patient	 harm	 on	 the	 other	 and	 this	 creates	 the	
paradox	of	how	to	make	perioperative	patient	care	safer	and	 innovate	to	progress	
the	profession.		
	
The	organisation	or	health	care	system	also	has	a	role	in	adverse	events	in	that	it	can	
create	the	latent	factors	which	may	lie	dormant	for	a	long	time	and	when	combined	
with	 active	 failures	 can	 lead	 to	 an	 adverse	 event	 occurring	 (Reason	 2004).	 I	 have	
discussed	organisational	conditions	previously.	What	has	arisen	from	this	research	is	
a	 connection	 between	 some	 organisational	 conditions	 and	 feelings	 of	 pressure	
experienced	by	participants	to	get	the	job	done.	This	connection	is	the	point	where	
the	 individual	 intersects	 with	 the	 organisation.	 The	 discipline	 that	 studies	 the	
relationship	 between	 humans	 and	 the	 systems	 in	 which	 individuals	 work	 and	
interact	is	Human	Factors	and	this	provides	a	useful	framework	for	interpreting	and	
discussing	the	findings	from	my	research.		
	
The	 Human	 Factors	 discipline	 has	 a	 lot	 to	 offer	 in	 terms	 of	 understanding	 the	
interactions	between	and	among	humans	and	other	elements	of	a	system	and	offers	
useful	 insights	 into	 developing	 ways	 to	 optimise	 human	 behaviour	 and	 the	
performance	 of	 the	 system	 within	 which	 we	 work.	 In	 practicing	 perioperative	
nursing	and	delivering	patient	care,	perioperative	nurses	are	continually	interacting	
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with	 the	 patient;	 the	 team;	 technology;	 equipment;	 information	 systems;	 other	
departments	 and	 the	 environment.	 These	 are	 the	 organisational	 conditions	 that	
influence	the	ways	that	perioperative	nurses	work	and	as	my	research	and	studies	
by	others	have	shown,	this	can	enable	or	constrain	working	in	accordance	with	the	
rules.	 Human	 Factors	 research	 assists	 interpreting	 the	 findings	 from	 this	 research	
and	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 nature,	 implications	 and	 consequences	 of	 the	
interactions	 between	 the	 participants	 and	 the	 system	 that	 take	 place	 in	 the	
perioperative	setting.		
	
Systems	change	and	evolve	over	time.	Perioperative	nurses,	along	with	other	health	
professionals	 adapt	 and	 modify	 their	 behaviour	 in	 response	 to	 these	 changes.	
Challenges	exist	in	maintaining	patient	safety	in	the	complex,	adaptive	environment	
that	characterizes	the	perioperative	setting.	Carthey	(2013)	argues	that	the	‘positive	
and	negative	effects	of	system	evolution	need	to	be	anticipated	and	understood	to	
manage	safety	effectively’.	This	presents	opportunities	 for	 research	 into	how	ways	
of	working	other	than	following	the	rules	contributes	to	the	enhancement	or	erosion	
patient	safety	in	the	perioperative	setting.	
	
The	 next	 section	 will	 situate	 my	 findings	 within	 the	 broader	 Human	 Factors	
literature	focussing	on	the	concepts	of	rule	violations;	normalizing	of	deviance;	and	
intentionality	 and	 to	 position	 the	 theoretical	 understandings	 emerging	 from	 this	
research	in	relation	to	existing	literature	and	theories.	
Rule	violations	
Rules	 and	 standards	 play	 a	 key	 role	 regulating	 and	 controlling	 the	 work	 of	
perioperative	 nurses,	 prescribing	 what	 and	 how	 work	 should	 be	 done	 (Reason	
1997).	 There	 are	 also	 internal	 controls	 that	 represent	 the	 knowledge,	 skills	 and	
experience	of	the	 individual	and	together	these	controls	 limit	the	use	of	discretion	
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and	 the	 variability	 of	 human	 behaviour	 thereby	 ensuring	 safer	 ways	 of	 working	
(Reason	1997).	The	findings	 indicate	that	the	 internal	controls	of	the	perioperative	
nurse	 can	 take	precedence	over	 the	external	 controls	when	 ‘being	pressured’	 and	
‘feeling	pressured’.	This	can	then	 lead	to	working	 in	ways	other	than	following	the	
rules.	
	
The	definition	of	reshaping	practice	provided	in	the	previous	chapter	is	‘to	perform	
an	 existing	 practice	 differently	 to	 the	 established	 norm,	 standard	 or	 rule’.	 In	
deviating	 from	 the	 established	 norm,	 standard,	 or	 rule,	 the	 participants	 are	 in	
essence	breaking	the	rules.	These	findings	align	with	the	results	 from	a	number	of	
studies	that	show	that	nurses	adopt	ways	other	than	following	the	rules	to	get	the	
job	 done	 (Debono	 et	 al.	 2013;	 Halbesleben	 et	 al.	 2008).	 Rule	 breaking,	 taking	
shortcuts,	cutting	corners,	 rule	bending	and	workarounds	are	examples	of	ways	of	
working	that	do	not	strictly	follow	a	rule	or	a	prescribed	set	of	steps.	Reason	(2005a,	
p.	 82)	 uses	 the	 term	 violation	 -	 ‘	 a	 deviation	 from	 safe	 operating	 practices,	
procedures,	standards	or	rules’,	to	encompass	all	these	terms.	Given	that	evidence	
based	standards	and	protocols	(rules)	are	safety	tools	to	guide	practice	and	deliver	
safe	care,	these	alternative	ways	of	working	are	examples	of	where	a	safety	system	
can	be	breached,	leading	to	the	potential	for	patient	harm	and	migration	of	practice	
to	 the	 boundaries	 of	 safety	 (Amalberti	 et	 al.	 2006).	Ways	 of	working	 that	 deviate	
from	procedures,	standards	or	rules,	may	potentially	increase	the	risk	of	harm	to	the	
patient	(Collins	2012;	Debono	et	al.	2013;	Halbesleben	et	al.		2008).	
	
Reason	 (1997)	argues	 that	where	rules,	policies	and	procedures	are	unavailable	or	
deemed	 to	 be	 unworkable	 for	 the	 situation	 at	 hand,	 ways	 of	 working	 other	 than	
following	 the	 rules	 can	 be	 perceived	 as	 necessary	 to	 get	 the	 job	 done.	 These	
‘necessary	violations’	are	the	responsibility	of	the	system	rather	than	the	individual.	
Under	these	circumstances	such	actions	can	be	viewed	as	system	violations	where	
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the	individual	knowingly	violates	procedures	because	procedures	are	not	available,	
unworkable	 or	 incorrect	 and	 these	 constitute	 up	 to	 90%	 of	 all	 violations	 (Reason	
1997).	 Necessary	 or	 system	 violations	 can	 also	 occur	 when	 the	 rule	 is	 not	 clear	
(Gurses	 et	 al.	 2008)	 highlighting	 the	 relationship	 between	 ambiguity	 and	 rule	
breaking.		
	
There	 are	 several	 examples	 of	 necessary	 or	 system	 violations	 observed	 in	 this	
research.	Due	to	the	speed	of	the	surgeon	and	only	having	one	nurse	scouting	Claire	
cannot	 physically	 complete	 all	 the	 tasks	 required	 at	 the	 time	 they	 should	 be	
completed	 and	 this	 puts	 her	 under	 pressure.	 She	 prioritises	 keeping	 the	 surgeon	
happy	and	the	list	moving	along	over	the	paper	work	even	though	she	is	cognisant	
she	 is	not	 following	 the	rules	around	accurate	and	timely	documentation	and	that	
there	may	be	inaccuracies,	for	example	where	the	diathermy	pad	was	placed,	how	
much	local	was	injected	and	the	count.		
	
The	failure	of	the	organisation	to	provide	adequate	resources	to	meet	the	standards	
puts	the	participant	in	the	position	of	having	to	trade	off	one	priority	over	another.	
If	an	item	is	not	recorded	this	has	potential	consequences	for	patient	safety	because	
there	is	no	way	of	knowing	whether	it	has	been	inadvertently	retained.	The	vignette	
from	 Riskwatch	 (Victorian	 Government	 2014)	 presented	 earlier	 in	 this	 chapter	
demonstrates	 the	 consequences	 to	 patient	 safety	 of	 items	 being	 used	 during	 a	
procedure	but	not	being	recorded.			
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I	 documented	 my	 reflections	 on	 time	 availability	 or	 limitation	 in	 the	 following	
memo:	
	
Memo	(3	Nov	2015):	The	issue	of	‘time’	came	up	frequently	during	interviews	and	this	 led	
me	to	look	for	some	articles	around	the	concept	of	time.	This	reading	made	me	realise	how	
much	I	thought	of	time	as	clock	time	and	how	little	I	had	considered	its	subjective	nature.	I	
had	 no	 understanding	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 temporality	 and	 the	 work	 of	 Orlikowski	 (2002)	
enlightened	 me	 about	 temporal	 structures	 and	 how	 the	 work	 of	 a	 team	 within	 an	
organisation	 is	 influenced	by	shared	 temporal	 structures.	This	 then	got	me	 thinking	about	
what	 time	means	 in	 a	 perioperative	 setting	 where	 clock	 time	 is	 the	 dominant	 paradigm,	
what	and	how	 temporal	 structures	are	 shared	and	 the	 impact	of	perceived	 time	pressure	
and	whether	this	influenced	behaviour	(rule	breaking).	Then	an	article	by	Hendry	(2004)	on	
how	nurses	ration	time	when	allocated	time	is	not	sufficient	to	deliver	the	care	required,	led	
me	thinking	to	how	perioperative	nurses	prioritise.	 It	 is	evident	that	time	or	the	perceived	
lack	 of	 time	 is	 important	 to	 perioperative	 nurses	 as	 this	 is	 alluded	 to	 frequently	 in	 the	
context	of	getting	the	job	done.	
	
	
During	 this	 research,	 I	 observed	 that	 several	 rules	 and	 standards	 were	 regularly	
breached.	For	example,	trays	were	not	always	checked	with	the	scout	nurse;	items	
were	 removed	 before	 the	 final	 count;	 inappropriate	 jewellery	 was	 worn;	 stickers	
were	placed	on	 arms	 and	on	uniforms	 rather	 than	on	 the	 form;	 the	 count	wasn’t	
restarted	 following	 an	 interruption;	 packs	 were	 not	 counted	 for	 burns	 cases.	 The	
regular	 breaching	 of	 the	 rules	 that	 underpin	 practices	 such	 as	 the	 count,	 theatre	
attire	 and	 tracking	 procedures	 points	 to	 the	 ‘reshaped’	 practices	 becoming	 the	
norm.	 I	 will	 now	 position	 this	 finding	 within	 research	 on	 normalizing	 of	 deviance	
(discussed	 in	 Chapter	 2)	 emphasising	 the	 implications	 this	 may	 have	 for	 patient	
safety	and	practice.	
	
The	‘reshaped’	practices	point	to	evidence	of	borderline	tolerated	conditions	of	use	
(BCTU’s)	 being	 present	 indicative	 of	 the	 system	 being	 in	 phase	 2	 of	 migration	
(Amalberti	et	al.	2006).	Rule	breaking	has	already	become	so	routine	and	common	
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that	it	is	invisible.	In	this	phase	‘migration	toward	the	boundaries	of	safe	operations	
develops	through	a	combination	of	organisational	demands	for	greater	performance	
and	the	pressure	that	 this	generates,	combined	with	the	perceived	advantages	 for	
individuals	 in	 getting	 things	 done’	 (Reid	 2014,	 p.	 4).	 As	 previously	 described	 the	
participants	at	times	deviated	from	the	rules	to	improve	performance	of	the	system	
and	 viewed	 this	 as	 beneficial	 and	 honourable.	 On	 several	 occasions	 participants	
were	 unaware	 their	 practices	 breached	 the	 rules	 until	 this	 was	 raised	 into	 their	
consciousness	through	interview.		
	
There	 is	 an	 irony	 present	 that	 many	 violations	 support	 service	 efficiencies	 and	
productivity	in	the	short	term	and	staff	can	be	praised	for	flexibility	and	getting	the	
job	 done	 (Amalberti	 et	 al.	 2006;	 Reid	 2014;	 Vats,	 Nagpal	 &	 Moorthy	 2009).	 The	
problem	 is	 that	 perioperative	 nurses	 may	 become	 blinded	 to	 the	 potential	
consequences	and	risks	inherent	in	such	behaviours.	Because	they	help	us	get	things	
done,	 rule	breaking	becomes	 increasingly	appealing.	However	where	rule	breaking	
becomes	the	norm	coupled	with	a	lack	of	regard	or	understanding	of	the	potential	
consequences	of	normalizing	deviant	acts,	 the	organisation	begins	to	drift	 towards	
the	boundaries	of	safety	where	further	rule	breaking	may	breach	safety	systems	and	
lead	to	patient	harm	(Reid	2014).	
 
Intentionality	
The	concept	of	intentionality	has	its	philosophical	roots	in	the	work	of	Franz	Bertano	
and	Edmund	Hurserl.	Hurserl	 cited	 in	McIntyre	 and	 Smith	 (1989	p.	 147)	 considers	
intentionality	 to	 be	 the	 ‘fundamental	 property	 of	 consciousness’	 and	 ‘a	
characteristic	 feature	 of	 our	 mental	 state	 and	 experiences,	 especially	 evident	 in	
what	 we	 commonly	 call	 being	 ‘conscious’	 or	 ‘aware’	 ’.	 Intentionality	 directs	 an	
action	towards	something;	that	is	an	action	is	intentional	when	it	is	performed	with	
a	certain	intention	(McIntyre	&	Smith	1989).	Understanding	intentionality	assists	in	
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understanding	the	degree	of	individual	responsibility	for	actions	and	Reason	(2000a)	
has	 built	 on	 these	 ideas	 in	 his	 work	 on	 violations.	 Reason	 (2005)	 differentiates	
between	erroneous	(unintentional)	or	deliberate	(intentional)	actions.	For	example,	
if	you	unknowingly	park	your	car	in	a	restricted	zone,	this	is	an	erroneous	violation.	
You	may	not	have	intended	to	deliberately	break	council	by-laws,	but	you	have	still	
deviated	 from	 the	 rules.	 Reason	 (Reason	 1997)	 proposes	 a	 model	 of	 diminishing	
culpability	 based	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 3	 elements	 of	 human	 acts,	
actions,	intention	and	consequence.	The	key	aspects	of	this	model	are	summarized	
as	follows:	
1. Where	actions	are	unintended	such	as	slips	and	lapses	(errors),	the	level	
of	culpability	is	low.		
2. Where	actions	are	intended	but	the	possible	bad	consequences	are	not,	
covers	mistakes	and	violations.		
3. Where	 actions	 and	 the	 consequences	 are	 intended,	 this	 is	 likely	 to	 be	
deemed	criminal	behavior	(Reason	1997).	
	
Instances	of	 taking	 shortcuts,	 cutting	 corners,	 bending	 and	breaking	 the	 rules	 and	
workarounds	 were	 observed	 during	 my	 research	 and	 these	 were	 justified	 by	 the	
participants	 because	 they	 saved	 time,	 avoided	 delays,	 kept	 the	 doctors	 and	 team	
happy	and	met	organisational	needs.	In	acknowledging	and	articulating	the	reasons	
for	rule	breaking	the	participants	are	also	acknowledging	an	intention	to	practice	in	
a	 certain	 way	 but	 they	 do	 not	 necessarily	 perceive	 this	 to	 be	 rule	 breaking	 as	
described	by	Susan	in	the	following	exemplar:		
	
Susan:	Well	 I	wouldn’t	 consciously	 think	 I’m	breaking	 the	 rules.	 I	 know	 I	am	not	 following	
the	 recommended	procedure	but	 I	 guess	 I	 use	my	experience	 to	 judge	 in	what	 instance	 I	
would	do	that.	
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Whilst	 the	 actions	 being	 taken	 are	 deliberate,	 for	 example	 not	 checking	 the	 tray	
contents	 with	 the	 scout	 nurse	 against	 the	 tray	 list,	 there	 is	 not	 necessarily	 an	
awareness	or	 consciousness	of	 this	 being	 rule	breaking	behaviour	 as	 described	by	
Susan	 above.	 From	 a	 philosophical	 perspective	 then	 intentionality	 is	 not	 present,	
because	 whilst	 the	 action	 is	 intentional	 the	 action	 is	 not	 performed	 with	 the	
intention	to	break	the	rules.	The	action	is	performed	for	another	purpose,	which	is	
to	 prevent	 delays	 or	 cancellations,	 keep	 the	 team	 happy	 or	 meet	 organisational	
needs.	 Busby	 and	 Izzat-White	 (2016	 p.49)	 argue	 that	 one	 of	 the	 issues	 with	 rule	
breaking	 behaviour	 is	 that	 it	 has	 commonly	 been	 judged	 in	 the	 third	 person	 i.e.	
through	 the	eyes	of	 the	organisation,	 rather	 than	 ‘exploring	 the	 judgments	of	 the	
people	 who	 have	 to	 explain	 rule	 violation	within	 the	 system	 in	 which	 it	 is	 taking	
place’.	 This	 is	 in	 line	with	 the	work	of	 Shorrock	 (2014,	p.	 10)	who	argues	 strongly	
that	 ‘work	needs	 to	be	understood	 from	the	 local	perspectives	of	 those	doing	 the	
work’.	
	
The	intention	behind	the	rule	breaking	observed	in	my	research	is	more	about	doing	
the	right	thing	by	the	patient,	team	or	organisation	rather	than	an	intention	to	break	
the	 rules.	 This	 finding	 aligns	with	 those	of	 a	 study	of	 environmental	 and	personal	
drivers	for	rule	bending	within	the	context	of	defending	nurses	whose	 license	may	
be	 suspended	 due	 to	 their	 actions,	which	 found	 that	 nurses	 sometimes	 bend	 the	
rules	with	good	intentions	(Collins	2012).		
	
The	 implications	 of	 the	 findings	 for	 patient	 safety	 and	 nursing	 practice	 will	 be	
discussed	the	following	sections.	
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Implications	for	patient	safety		
The	 research	 question	 asked	 what	 ‘What	 are	 the	 ways	 of	 working	 and	 the	
implications	for	patient	safety	and	nursing	practice?’	 In	previous	sections	the	ways	
that	 the	 participants	 worked	 were	 explored	 with	 the	 finding	 that	 in	 certain	
circumstances,	the	participants	worked	in	ways	other	than	following	the	rules.	The	
most	significant	potential	outcome	for	a	patient	from	perioperative	nurses	deviating	
from	standards	and	 rules	 is	unnecessary	harm.	The	next	exemplars	describe	 three	
adverse	events/	near	misses	the	participants	were	aware	of	or	involved	in	and	they	
are	presented	here	 to	paint	 a	picture	of	 the	possible	 consequences	 that	 can	arise	
where	 rules	 and	 standards	 are	 not	 followed	 i.e.	 incorrect	 diagnosis,	 retention	 of	
pack	and	incorrect	site	surgery:	
	
Susan:	 The	 example	 of	 the	 specimen	 that	 was	 put	 in	 the	 same	 jar	 as	 somebody	 else's	
specimen.	That's	happened	on	several	occasions,	so	that's	why	we're	supposed	to	check	the	
label	for	patient	name	and	the	name	of	the	specimen	before	you	put	it	in	the	pot.		
	
Joanne:	They	did	a	count	and	one	pack	had	fallen	on	the	floor.	And	then	they	did	the	closing	
count	and	meanwhile	the	surgeon	had	taken	a	pack	and	used	it	as	a	dish	and	somebody	had	
picked	 the	 fallen	 pack	 up	 and	put	 it	 somewhere.	And	when	 they	did	 the	 final	 count	 they	
counted	one	pack	twice.	So,	there	was	a	pack	left	and	so	because	of	that,	we	changed	what	
we	did	as	our	practice	to	say	that	all	items	must	be	visualised	for	the	final	count.	
	
Claire:	We	have	had	a	couple	of	 incidents	where	pretty	serious	things	have	happened	and	
they	have	then	even	modified	the	time-out.	There	were	several	lesions	being	removed	and	
the	wrong	lesion	was	taken	off	someone	and	there	was	a	wrong	toe	was	taken	off	because	
there	were	multiple	toes	being	removed	and	the	wrong	toe	was	removed.		
	
	
Whilst	 these	 exemplars	 describe	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 adverse	 events	 what	 is	 less	
evident	are	the	factors	that	influenced	standard	practices	not	being	followed	and	it	
is	 these	 factors	 that	my	 research	has	 explored.	 In	 the	next	 exemplar,	 the	 adverse	
event	described	can	be	directly	 linked	to	organisational	conditions	that	created	an	
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environment	 vulnerable	 to	 rule	 breaking.	 Here	 the	 participant	 knows	 the	 risks	
associated	 with	 positioning	 bariatric	 patients	 for	 laparoscopic	 surgery	 and	 the	
strategies	that	would	minimise	this	risk	i.e.	application	of	thigh	straps.	However,	the	
organisational	 conditions	of	 inadequate	 staffing	 and	 ‘being	busy’	 created	pressure	
that	 led	her	to	overlook	checking	that	straps	were	placed	over	the	 legs	to	prevent	
the	patient	slipping	down	the	table	and	into	the	anaesthetist’s	lap:	
	
Susan	-	One	area	of	patient	safety	that	has	been	a	recent	issue	is	the	use	of	yellow	fins	with	
bariatric	patients.	We've	had	a	few	near	misses	where	the	patient	has	been	put	into	stirrups	
and	then	when	we've	tipped	the	bed	intra-operatively	they’ve	slid	down.	I	was	involved	in	
one	recently	and	 luckily	 there	was	no	 injury	to	the	patient.	 I	 strained	my	back	 for	 the	day	
catching	the	patient	in	a	hurry.	Looking	back	to	that	day	and	I	remember	thinking	about	it,	
we	were	short	 staffed	 that	day	and	busy	 running	around	 in	 the	morning,	did	all	 the	usual	
positioning	 I	did	but	wasn't	 thinking	bariatric	straps	and	 ironically	all	 through	the	case	the	
surgeon	was	saying	I	hope	the	patient	doesn’t	slide	off	as	we've	had	this	happen	before	and	
sure	as	eggs.	
	
	
In	 theorising	 about	 the	 influence	 of	 organisational	 conditions	 on	ways	 of	working	
and	 through	 further	 reading	 of	 the	 literature,	 I	 became	 aware	 of	 a	 framework	
developed	 by	 Charles	 Vincent	 (2012)	 that	 helps	make	 sense	 of	 and	 situate	 these	
findings.	
	
Seven	Levels	of	Safety	framework		
Vincent	(2012),	drawing	on	the	work	of	Reason	(1997)	and	adapting	it	to	the	health	
care	setting,	 identified	several	 contributory	 factors	 that	can	ultimately	 result	 in	an	
adverse	event	by	creating	an	environment	vulnerable	to	unsafe	acts,	violations	and	
errors.	 The	 ‘Seven	 Levels	 of	 Safety’	 framework	 (Vincent	 2012)	 describes	 these	
factors	 under	 the	 headings	 of	 task	 factors,	 individual	 factors,	 team	 factors,	 work	
environment,	organisational	conditions,	institutional	context	and	patient	factors.		
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For	 the	 purposes	 of	 comparison	 and	 discussion	 the	 factors	 evident	 from	 this	
research	will	be	discussed	under	each	of	these	headings.	
	
	
Task	factors	
Vincent	(2012	p.	25)	notes	that	‘the	design	of	the	task,	the	availability	and	utility	of	
protocols	and	test	 results	may	 influence	 the	care	process	and	affect	 the	quality	of	
care’.	 This	 research	 found	 that	 ambiguity	 or	 clarity	 of	 a	 task,	 rule,	 standard	 also	
influenced	the	care	process	by	acting	to	enable	or	constrain	practicing	in	accordance	
with	the	rules.	Examples	of	ambiguity	were	found	in	Team	Time	Out	procedures	and	
practices	 related	 to	 storage	 of	 sterile	 solutions	 in	 warming	 cabinets	 leading	 to	
inconsistencies	in	practices	within	the	team	and	between	theatres	and	specialities.		
	
Individual	factors		
Vincent	 (2012	 p.25)	 argues	 that	 individual	 staff	 factors	 including	 ‘the	 knowledge,	
skills	 and	 experience	 of	 each	member	 of	 staff…	will	 obviously	 affect	 their	 clinical	
practice’.	 The	 findings	 from	 my	 research	 support	 this	 assertion	 and	 found	 that	
experience,	personal	choice	and	non-technical	skills	influenced	decisions	to	work	in	
ways	other	 than	 following	 the	 rules.	 Emerging	 as	 a	 key	 finding	 from	 this	 research	
and	 thus	 extending	 our	 knowledge	 in	 this	 area	 is	 that	 the	 phenomena	 of	 being	
pressured	and	feeling	pressured	also	influences	decisions	to	work	in	ways	other	than	
following	the	rules.		
Team	factors	
Vincent	 (2012	p.25)	purports	 that	 ‘each	staff	member	 is	part	of	a	 team	within	 the	
inpatient	or	community	unit.	The	way	an	individual	nurse	practices	and	their	impact	
on	 the	 patient,	 is	 influenced	 by	 other	 members	 of	 the	 team	 and	 the	 way	 they	
communicate	and	support	each	other’.	This	research	found	that	team	dynamics	and	
team	make-up	 can	 enhance	 or	 detract	 from	 individual	 or	 team	 performance	 and	
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highlighted	 the	 influence	 of	 group	 norms	 on	 behaviour	 and	 the	 importance	 of	
having	shared	goals.		
Working	conditions	
Vincent	 (2012	 p.25)	 described	 these	 conditions	 as	 including	 ‘the	 physical	
environment,	 availability	 of	 equipment	 and	 supplies	 and	 the	 light,	 heat,	
interruptions	and	distractions	that	staff	endure’.	 In	this	research,	 interruptions	and	
distractions	and	the	availability/accessibility	of	equipment	and	supplies	were	found	
to	 constrain	 working	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 rules.	 Furthermore	 ‘being	 busy’	 and	
limitations	 on	 time	were	 also	 found	 to	 influence	 decisions	 to	work	 in	ways	 other	
than	following	the	rules.		
	
Organisational	factors	
Vincent	 (2012	 p.25)	 states	 that	 ‘the	 team	 is	 influenced	 in	 turn	 by	 management	
actions	and	by	decisions	made	at	a	higher	 level	 in	 the	organisation.	These	 include	
policies	 for	 the	 use	 of	 locum	 or	 agency	 staff,	 continuing	 education,	 training	 and	
supervision	 and	 the	 availability	 of	 equipment	 and	 supplies’.	 Availability	 of	
equipment	 and	 supplies	 was	 also	 constraining	 factor	 for	 the	 participants	 in	 my	
research	 along	 with	 the	 expectation	 that	 already	 busy	 perioperative	 nurses	
supervise	 junior	 staff.	 Other	 organisational	 conditions	 highlighted	 in	 my	 research	
were	 the	 role	 that	 communication	 plays	 in	 minimising	 risk	 to	 patients	 and	 the	
impact	 of	 workload	 and	 expectations	 of	 team	 members	 on	 the	 participant’s	
performance.		
	
	
Institutional	context	
Vincent	 (2012	 p.25)	 proposes	 that	 ‘the	 organisation	 itself	 is	 affected	 by	 the	
institutional	context,	 including	 financial	constraints,	external	 regulatory	bodies	and	
the	 broader	 economic	 and	 political	 climate’.	 Whilst	 these	 factors	 were	 not	
specifically	 canvassed	 in	my	 research,	my	 research	 did	 find	 instances	where	 team	
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members	were	 required	 to	 comply	with	 rules	 and	 standards	 imposed	 by	 external	
regulatory	 bodies,	 for	 example	 the	WHO	 Surgical	 Safety	 Checklist	 but	 compliance	
was	problematic	due	to	ambiguity	of	the	procedures.		
Patient	factors	
Vincent	(2012	p.25)	states	that	‘the	patient’s	condition	has	the	most	direct	influence	
on	 practice	 and	 outcome’	 and	 ‘other	 factors	 such	 as	 personality,	 language	 and	
psychological	problems	may	also	be	important	as	they	can	influence	communication	
with	staff’.	Even	where	there	are	no	obvious	problems	patients	can	play	a	role	in	the	
error	trajectory	as	highlighted	by	Claire	in	describing	a	situation	where	the	‘wrong’	
Beverley	stood	up	when	called	by	the	surgeon	for	a	pre-operative	assessment.	The	
surgeon	went	to	the	Day	Unit	and	called	for	Beverley	(surname)	and	a	lady	stood	up	
in	 response	and	 followed	the	doctor	 into	a	consult	 room.	As	 that	 lady	was	 leaving	
the	room	a	nurse	came	up	to	her	asking	if	she	was	Beverley	(different	surname)	to	
which	 she	 responded	 yes.	When	 she	 had	 heard	 the	 doctor	 call	 Beverley	 she	 had	
automatically	 stood	up	 having	 not	 registered	 that	 the	 surname	was	 not	 hers.	 She	
was	 having	 a	 breast	 procedure	 and	 despite	 the	 doctor	 looking	 at	 her	 hand	 and	
telling	 her	 about	 hand	 surgery	 she	 still	 did	 not	 say	 anything.	 The	 doctor	was	 not	
aware	he	was	examining	the	wrong	patient	until	the	nurse	told	him	it	was	the	wrong	
patient.	 This	 incident	 highlights	 how	 trusting	patients	 are	 that	 doctors	 and	nurses	
know	what	they	are	doing	and	must	be	right	and	their	reluctance	to	question	even	if	
things	 appear	 amiss.	 This	 incident	 demonstrates	 how	 easily	 poor	 communication	
and	making	assumptions	can	potentially	contribute	to	adverse	outcomes.		
	
In	 summary,	 the	 ‘Seven	 Levels	 of	 Safety’	 framework	 developed	 by	 Vincent	 (2012)	
provides	a	useful	tool	for	assessing	the	factors	that	contribute	to	adverse	events	and	
the	risks	they	pose	to	patient	safety.	Findings	from	this	research	have	consolidated	
our	 knowledge	 on	 the	 factors	 contributing	 to	 adverse	 events	 and	 have	 also	
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extended	 our	 understanding	 of	 this	 topic	 in	 the	 context	 of	 perioperative	 nursing	
practice.	
	
Implications	for	nursing	practice	
The	 findings	 emerging	 from	 this	 research	 indicate	 that	what	 is	 practiced	 (work	 as	
done	that	does	not	necessarily	follow	the	rules)	is	neither	documented	at	the	time	it	
occurs	 nor	 discussed	 at	 unit,	 department	 or	 organisational	 level	 or	 in	 the	
professional	 arena.	 It	 was	 also	 found	 that	 the	 ability	 to	 improve	 the	 system	 is	
compromised	 by	 unrealistic	 expectations	 and	 limitations	 on	 the	 time	 of	 the	
individuals	who	are	best	placed	to	make	them.	Interpretation	of	these	findings	will	
now	be	discussed	and	positioned	in	relation	to	the	literature,	dialogues	and	theories	
and	demonstrate	where	knowledge	and	understanding	has	been	extended.	
	
The	 implication	of	 failing	 to	 recognise	and	 respond	 to	 ‘work	as	done’	 is	 threefold.	
Firstly,	 positive	 outcomes	 or	 learning’s	 from	 deviance	 are	 lost;	 secondly	 existing	
inefficient,	ineffective,	unusable	or	unnecessary	rules	continue	in	place;	and	thirdly	
rules	that	should	not	be	broken	continue	to	be	broken	with	the	concomitant	risks.	
Underpinning	this	is	a	reluctance	to	speak	out	on	these	issues,	write	about	them	and	
communicate	them	within	the	workplace	and	with	professional	bodies.	‘If	nurses	are	
to	learn	from	nursing	practice	they	need	to	take	the	risk	of	writing	about	practice	as	
it	 is	 and	not	as	 they	believe	 it	 should	be’	 (Street	1990,	p.	2).	Perioperative	nurses	
need	 to	speak	out	 to	expose	and	uncover	 the	constraints	within	which	 they	work,	
challenge	 assumptions	 and	 acknowledge	 the	 potential	 consequences	 of	 their	
actions.	 They	 are	 a	 rich	 source	 of	 tacit	 knowledge	 and	 it	 is	 beholden	 on	 the	
profession	 to	 capture	 this	 and	use	 it	 to	 inform	practice	 and	 standards.	 A	 rigorous	
and	systematic	examination	of	practices	that	do	not	follow	established	norms	might	
identify	creative	and	innovative	practices.	These	practices,	whilst	breaching	existing	
rules	and	standards,	may	 in	 fact	 improve	productivity	and	performance	and	at	 the	
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same	 time	 assure	 patient	 safety.	 This	 offers	 multiple	 opportunities	 for	 further	
research.		
	
These	 findings	 indicate	 that	 in	 responding	 to	 pressures	 to	 get	 the	 job	 done,	 the	
participants	prioritised	their	tasks	in	such	a	way	that	improvements	to	processes	and	
reporting	of	incidents	were	often	placed	last	and	were	at	times	not	done.	The	ability	
to	 make	 improvements	 to	 processes,	 to	 reporting	 incidents	 and	 issues	 with	
equipment	and	IT	is	severely	compromised	by	organisational	conditions	such	as	time	
availability,	staffing	and	workload	and	pressure	to	get	the	job	done.		
	
The	 preceding	 discussion	 and	 interpretation	 of	 findings	 has	 highlighted	 the	
multifactorial	nature	of	perioperative	patient	safety	and	nursing	practice.	To	better	
understand	 patient	 safety	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 consider	 it	 ‘in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 overall	
system,	not	isolated	individuals,	parts,	events	and	outcomes’	(Shorrock	et	al.	2014,	
p.	4).	Viewing	patient	safety	as	a	system	rather	than	part	of	a	system	or	an	outcome	
of	the	system	changes	the	perspective	on	how	to	make	surgery	safer.	Approaching	
safety	 in	 this	 way	 brings	 together	 the	 multifactorial	 aspects	 discussed	 in	 the	
previous	chapter	into	a	coherent	whole.	In	so	doing,	it	offers	a	way	forward	in	terms	
of	strategies	to	make	the	delivery	of	perioperative	nursing	care	safer.		
	
Systems	thinking	for	safety	
Systems	 thinking	 for	 safety	 facilitates	 the	 bringing	 together	 of	 the	 concepts	
emerging	 from	 this	 research,	 how	 they	 are	 connected	 and	 interrelated	 and	 in	 so	
doing	 builds	 upon	 the	 conceptual	 framework	 described	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 this	
chapter.	The	ten	principles	for	safer	systems	(Shorrock	et	al.	2014,	p.	4)	encourage	
and	 promote	 a	 systems	 thinking	 approach	 to	 organisational	 safety.	 Whilst	 these	
principles	 have	 been	 formulated	 primarily	 for	 the	 air	 safety	 industry,	 they	 are	
applicable	 for	use	 in	any	system	 including	health	care.	Based	on	 the	 findings	 from	
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this	 research	 these	 principles	 are	 of	 particular	 relevance	 to	 the	 provision	 of	 safe	
perioperative	 nursing	 care	 and	 are	 outlined	 below	 along	with	 examples	 from	 this	
research.	
	
Principle	1.	Involvement	of	Field	Experts	
Shorrock	 (2014)	 advises	 that	 the	 involvement	 of	 the	 people	 who	 are	 part	 of	 the	
system	 is	 fundamental	 to	 understanding	 the	 system.	 To	 understand	 how	 work	 is	
done,	 the	 people	 doing	 the	 work	 need	 to	 be	 partners	 in	 improving	 the	 system.	
Within	 the	 perioperative	 setting,	 perioperative	 nurses	 are	 the	 experts	 in	
perioperative	nursing	practice	and	their	 involvement	 in	any	changes	to	the	system	
e.g.	introduction	of	a	new	process,	is	vital	to	ensure	success.	
	
	
Principle	2.	Local	Rationality	
	
Shorrock	(2014,	p.	10)	argues	that	‘people	do	things	that	make	sense	to	them	given	
their	goals,	understanding	of	the	situation	and	focus	of	attention	at	the	time’.	This	is	
quite	evident	in	this	research	findings	where	the	participants	made	decisions	based	
on	the	circumstances	at	the	time	for	example,	Claire	flipping	her	sterile	items	into	a	
bowl	 so	 she	could	go	and	scrub	 to	be	 ready	 for	 the	 surgeon.	The	concept	of	 local	
rationality	accepts	that	there	are	multiple	perspectives	on	any	individual	event	and	
that	making	sense	of	system	performance	relies	on	seeing	all	these	perspectives.		
	
Exploring	 multiple	 and	 differential	 views	 on	 past	 events	 and	 current	 system	
issues	 brings	 different	 aspects	 of	 the	 system	 to	 light,	 including	 the	 demands,	
pressure,	 resources	 and	 that	 affect	 performance.	 We	 begin	 to	 see	 trade-offs,	
adjustments	and	adaptations	through	the	eyes	of	those	doing	the	work.	This	will	
help	 to	 reveal	 the	 aspects	 of	 the	 system	 that	 should	 be	 the	 focus	 of	 further	
investigation	and	learning	(Shorrock	et	al.	2014,	p.	10).	
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Principle	3.	Just	Culture	
This	principle	is	underpinned	by	the	assertion	that	when	things	go	wrong	there	is	a	
natural	 tendency	 to	 compare	 the	 performance	 of	 an	 individual	 against	 ‘work	 as	
imagined’	and	to	apportion	blame	despite	the	fact	that	people	usually	set	out	to	do	
their	best	and	achieve	a	good	outcome	(Shorrock	et	al.	2014).	There	was	of	evidence	
in	my	research	of	perioperative	nurses	feeling	blamed	for	incidents	that	occurred	for	
example	when	 Joanne	omitted	 to	 remove	 the	 IV	 from	 the	previous	 case.	 To	 learn	
from	near	misses,	errors	and	adverse	events,	an	environment	of	openness,	trust	and	
fairness	 is	 an	 essential	 condition.	 Only	 then	 can	 conversations	 about	 how	 things	
work	and	why	they	work	that	way,	be	had.		
	
Principle	4.	Demand	and	Pressure	
Shorrock	 (2014)	 proposes	 that	 people	 adjust	 and	 adapt	 in	 response	 to	 varying	
demands.	Availability	of	resources,	constraints	or	the	design	of	the	work	can	lead	to	
pressure	resulting	in	the	individual	having	to	make	trade-offs	to	meet	the	demands	
of	 the	 job.	 There	 are	 multiple	 examples	 in	 this	 research	 of	 perioperative	 nurses	
adapting	and	adjusting	their	behaviours	and	making	trade-offs	to	get	the	 job	done	
for	 example	 Susan	deciding	not	 to	 check	 tray	 lists	 for	 trays	 she	 is	 familiar	with	 to	
save	time	and	Claire	not	restarting	the	count	following	an	interruption	so	as	not	to	
delay	the	surgeon.	The	feelings	of	pressure	created	by	meeting	demands	were	also	
observed	 in	 this	 research	 with	 ‘being	 pressured’	 and	 ‘feeling	 pressured’	 being	
uncovered	as	a	constraint	to	working	in	accordance	with	rules	and	standards.		
	
Principle	5.	Resources	and	Constraints	
This	 principle	 acknowledges	 system	 conditions	 that	 help	 or	 hinder	 work	 and	
highlights	 the	 impact	 of	 inadequate	 resources	 on	 system	 performance.	 Shorrock	
(2014)	 finds	 that	whilst	 constraints	 keep	 variability	within	 certain	 boundaries	 and	
are	necessary	for	system	stability,	they	can	also	supress	flexibility.	‘If	constraints	‘run	
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counter	to	the	purpose	and	flow	of	the	work,	they	become	problematic	and	people	
work	 around	 them’	 (Shorrock	 et	 al.	 2014,	 p.	 16).	 An	 example	 of	 this	 from	 this	
research	is	the	participants	finding	a	way	around	placing	the	stickers	on	a	form	that	
is	located	on	the	other	side	of	the	theatre	by	placing	the	stickers	on	themselves	first	
and	transferring	them	across	later.		
	
Principle	6.	Interactions	and	Flows	
Here	Shorrock	(2014)	discusses	the	nature,	demand,	flow	and	interactions	that	take	
place	 within	 a	 system.	 He	 argues	 that	 if	 aspects	 of	 the	 system	 are	 managed	 as	
individual	 entities,	 goals	 may	 be	 introduced	 that	 conflict	 with	 the	 goals	 of	 other	
entities.	 An	 example	 of	 this	 in	 this	 research	 is	 the	 conflict	 created	 by	 the	
organisation	 implementing	a	process	 to	 track	sterile	 items	 (the	goal	being	 to	 track	
which	items	are	used	on	which	patients)	without	having	tested	how	this	process	can	
be	implemented	in	the	messy	reality	of	practice.	The	results	being	that	perioperative	
nurses	(whose	goal	is	to	open	all	the	sterile	items	quickly	to	get	the	case	under	way)	
have	developed	 a	workaround.	 The	 Team	Time	Out	procedure	 is	 an	 example	of	 a	
need	 to	 cut	 across	 organisational	 boundaries,	 which	 hinders	 flow	 and	 creates	
conflicts	within	the	system.	Such	conflict	builds	up	pressure	for	perioperative	nurses	
who	must	manage	the	competing	goals.	To	avoid	such	conflicts	occurring	the	work	
should	 be	 viewed	 from	 end	 to	 end	 throughout	 the	 system	 and	 involve	 the	 field	
experts	in	development	of	processes.		
	
	
Principle	7.	Trade-offs	
This	principle	poses	that	work	in	complex	systems	does	not	always	follow	a	routine	
path	 and	 the	 impact	 of	 demand,	 resources	 and	 constraints	 results	 in	 trade-offs	
having	 to	be	made	 (Shorrock	et	al.	2014).	Trade-offs	were	evident	 in	 this	 research	
when	for	example	Sarah	made	the	decision	to	send	instruments	to	CSD	before	the	
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count	 was	 completed	 (in	 breach	 of	 the	 standard)	 to	 ensure	 the	 items	 would	 be	
ready	for	the	next	patient	thereby	avoiding	delays	and	cancellations.		
	
Principle	8.	Performance	Variability	
Shorrock	 (2014)	 asserts	 that	 the	 unpredictable	 nature	 of	 demand,	 resources	 and	
constraints	 results	 in	 variability	 in	 performance	 and	 individuals	 make	 continuous	
adjustments	to	adapt	to	system	changes.	 In	this	research	Susan	acknowledged	her	
performance	varied	depending	on	whether	there	was	a	student	present	and	Joanne	
and	Claire	admitted	 they	cut	corners	when	the	surgeon	was	very	 fast.	 ‘People	will	
find	 ways	 to	 fill	 gaps	 in	 the	 system,	 with	 various	 adjustments	 to	 balance	 various	
goals’	 (Shorrock	 et	 al.	 2014,	 p.	 22).	 Whilst	 variability	 is	 normal	 and	 necessary,	 it	
needs	to	be	kept	within	acceptable	 limits	to	avoid	drifting	to	the	margins	of	safety	
and	where	 unwanted	 variability	 is	 identified,	 Shorrock	 argues	 (2014)	 that	 it	 is	 the	
system	that	needs	to	be	acted	upon,	not	the	individual.		
	
Principle	9.	Emergence	
This	principle	identifies	outcomes	from	complex	systems	as	being	emergent	and	as	
such	they	may	not	be	the	outcomes	that	were	expected	(Shorrock	et	al.	2014).	This	
emergence	 arises	 from	 variability,	 adaptation	 and	 the	 interaction	 of	 different	
elements	of	the	system.	This	principle	recognises	that	‘small	changes	and	variations	
in	conditions	can	have	disproportionally	 large	effects’	 (Shorrock	et	al.	2014,	p.	24).		
An	 example	 from	 this	 research	 was	 the	 infection	 risk	 posed	 to	 a	 patient	 when	
changes	 in	 conditions	 (having	 a	 student	 present	 and	 normal	 routine	 being	
interrupted)	led	to	Joanne	omitting	to	remove	the	used	IV.	This	highlights	the	need	
to	 be	 cognisant	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 interactions	 and	 flows	 and	 to	 develop	 skills	 to	
anticipate	emergent	properties	of	the	system	within	which	we	work.			
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Principle	10.	Equivalence	
In	 this	 final	 principle	 Shorrock	 (2014)	 highlights	 the	 tendency	 to	 look	 to	 the	
individual	when	something	goes	wrong	and	add	another	constraint	and	to	pay	little	
attention	when	things	go	right,	as	they	do	most	of	the	time.	The	participants	in	this	
research	observed	that	the	organisation	was	quick	to	apportion	blame	when	things	
went	wrong.	The	focus	of	attention	was	on	investigating	incidents	and	near	misses	
and	changing	practices	to	remedy	the	problem.	For	example,	Claire	reported	that	in	
response	to	a	wrong	site	surgery	where	there	were	multiple	toes	to	be	removed	but	
the	wrong	one	was	excised,	 the	organisation	sent	out	a	directive	to	stop	and	do	a	
TTO	 between	 each	 toe	 (or	 lesion,	 or	 tooth	 removal).	 As	 the	 Safety	 II	 approach	
(Hollnagel,	Wears	&	Braithwaite	2015)	demonstrates,	success	and	failure	come	from	
the	 same	 source	 and	 it	 is	 therefore	 just	 as	 important	 to	 focus	 attention	 on	what	
goes	 right.	 Strategies	 such	 as	 working	 on	 demand,	 providing	 better	 resources,	
adjusting	 interactions,	 improving	 flow,	 increasing	 flexibility	 and	 responsiveness	 by	
removing	unnecessary	constraints	will	act	to	improve	the	number	of	things	that	go	
right	and	hence	improve	patient	safety	(Shorrock	et	al.	2014).		
	
In	 summary	 the	 ‘Systems	 Thinking	 for	 Safety’	 principles	 developed	 by	 Shorrock	
(2014)	 offers	 a	way	of	 viewing	perioperative	 nursing	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 system	
within	which	it	is	practiced.	We	need	to	consider	the	system	as	a	whole	rather	than	
a	collection	of	parts	and	recognise	the	importance	of	involving	perioperative	nurses	
as	 field	 experts	 in	 the	 design	 of	 and	 changes	 to	 the	 system.	 It	 presents	 an	
opportunity	for	further	study	on	embedding	these	principles	within	the	workplace.		
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Summary	
This	 research	 has	 addressed	 the	 question	 of	 the	 ways	 that	 perioperative	 nurses	
work	and	the	implications	for	patient	safety	and	nursing	practice.	It	has	uncovered	
that	at	times	perioperative	nurses	break	the	rules	when	they	encounter	barriers	or	
challenges	that	compromise	or	limit	their	ability	to	get	the	job	done.	The	data	shows	
that	 decisions	 to	 work	 in	 ways	 other	 than	 following	 the	 rules	 are	 influenced	 by	
several	 factors	 including	 organisational	 conditions,	 ambiguity	 of	 rule,	 task	 and	
responsibility,	team	characteristics	and	individual	characteristics.	These	factors	craft	
the	context	within	which	perioperative	nurses	practice	and	create	the	phenomena	
of	 ‘being	 pressured’	 and	 ‘feeling	 pressured’.	 The	 participants	 respond	 to	 this	
pressure	 by	 engaging	 in	 a	 process	 of	 reshaping	 their	 behaviour.	 Together	 these	
concepts	 form	 the	 substantive	 theory	 that	 perioperative	 nurses	 ‘reshape	 their	
practice	 in	 response	to	being	pressured	and	 feeling	pressured	to	get	 the	 job	done’.	
Rule	 breaking	 or	 violations	 in	 perioperative	 nursing	 are	 not	 well	 understood	 and	
there	 has	 been	 little	 research	 on	 this	 topic.	 This	 research	 has	 contributed	 to,	 and	
extended	 our	 understanding	 of	 why	 perioperative	 nurses	 deviate	 from	 rules	 and	
standards.	 The	 phenomenon	 of	 being	 pressured	 and	 feeling	 pressured	 is	 another	
factor	 that	 impacts	on	knowingly	deviating	 from	rules	and	standards	giving	 rise	 to	
the	basic	social	process	of	reshaping	practice	in	response	to	pressure.	 	
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Chapter	7:	Conclusions	and	recommendations	
This	 thesis	 presents	 the	 substantive	 constructivist	 grounded	 theory	 that	
perioperative	nurses	reshape	their	practice	 in	response	to	pressures	to	get	the	 job	
done.	The	research	provides	insight	into	the	ways	that	perioperative	nurses	work	as	
they	 deliver	 care	 in	 a	 complex	 and	 challenging	 environment	 where	 there	 are	
competing	demands	on	their	time.	The	substantive	theory	generated	from	this	study	
is	 a	 co-construction	 of	 the	 respective	 experiences	 and	 realities	 of	 the	 participants	
and	of	the	researcher	who	brings	an	emic	perspective	to	the	research.	
	
This	final	chapter	will	present	the	key	findings	from	this	study,	their	relevance	to	the	
research	question	and	propose	recommendations	that	address	the	key	findings	and	
offer	ways	 to	enhance	perioperative	patient	 safety.	 The	contribution	 this	 research	
has	made	 to	 the	 discipline	 of	 perioperative	 nursing	 and	 opportunities	 for	 further	
research	and	enquiry	will	also	be	expounded.	The	research	will	be	evaluated	against	
several	criteria	posed	by	Charmaz	(2014)	
	
The	Research	question	
The	aim	of	this	research	was	to	explore	the	ways	that	perioperative	nurses	work	in	a	
complex	and	demanding	environment	where	there	are	competing	pressures	to	get	
the	 job	done	and	 this	 aim	has	been	achieved.	 The	primary	 research	question	was	
‘what	 are	 the	 ways	 of	 working	 in	 perioperative	 nursing	 and	 the	 implications	 for	
patient	 safety	 and	 nursing	 practice?	 The	 following	 questions	 supplemented	 the	
primary	question:	
	
• What	are	the	different	ways	of	working	in	perioperative	nursing?	
• What	are	the	conditions	that	underlie	the	different	ways	of	working?	
• What	influences	the	nurse	engaging	in	different	ways	of	working?	
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• Are	perioperative	nurses	mindful	of	working	in	different	ways?	
• What	are	the	implications	for	practice	and	patient?	
		
The	answers	to	these	questions	have	emerged	from	and	are	grounded	in	the	data.	
The	 key	 findings	 from	 this	 research	 have	 been	 detailed	 and	 discussed	 in	 the	
preceding	chapters	and	are	briefly	summarised	as	follows.	
	
Key	findings	
The	 context	 within	 which	 perioperative	 nurses	 practice	 was	 found	 to	 enable	 or	
constrain	 practicing	 in	 accordance	 with	 standards	 and	 rules.	 These	 enablers	 and	
constraints	may	act	 to	enhance	performance	and	compliance	or	 conversely	 create	
pressure	and	an	environment	vulnerable	to	perioperative	nurses	making	trade-offs	
between	 rule	 following	 or	 rule	 breaking	 to	 get	 the	 job	 done.	 The	 enablers	 or	
constraints	 to	 practicing	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 rules	 were	 categorised	 under	
headings	 of	 organisational	 conditions;	 ambiguity/clarity	 of	 rules,	 standards	 and	
tasks;	team	characteristics	and	individual	characteristics.			
	
Organisational	 conditions	 that	 enabled	or	 constrained	working	 in	 accordance	with	
the	rules	were	found	to	be	‘being	busy’;	‘needing	more	time’;	‘being	interrupted	and	
distracted’;	 and	 ‘having	 a	 good	 team’.	 Team	 characteristics	 were	 ‘having	 a	 good	
day’;	 teamwork	and	dynamics;	and	 ‘having	 shared	goals’.	 Individual	 characteristics	
were	found	to	be	‘making	decisions’;	 ‘knowing	how’;	gaps	in	knowledge;	‘making	a	
personal	choice’	and	‘having	non-technical	skills’.			
	
The	phenomena	 of	 ‘feeling	 pressured’	 and	 ‘being	 pressured’	 to	 get	 the	 job	 done	
emerged	from	the	data.	This	research	found	that	in	meeting	the	demands	of	the	job,	
the	 participants	 experienced	 feelings	 of	 pressure	 arising	 from	 the	 organisational	
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conditions	 they	 faced	 such	 as	 workload;	 availability	 of	 equipment	 and	 supplies;	
supervision	of	students,	 the	perceived	 lack	of	 time	to	complete	all	necessary	tasks	
and	their	own	desire	to	do	the	job	well.	Other	pressure	came	from	sources	external	
to	 the	 participants,	 these	 being	 the	 doctors,	 other	 team	 members,	 skill	 mix	 and	
issues	with	equipment	and	supplies.		This	external	pressure	created	or	added	to	the	
pressure	 being	 felt	 from	 within.	 Of	 significance	 is	 that	 ‘being	 pressured’	 and/or	
‘feeling	 pressured’	 may	 increase	 vulnerability	 to	 finding	 ways	 of	 working	 that	
overcome	perceived	barriers	and	save	time.		
	
The	 final	 finding	was	 that	 in	 responding	 to	 the	 pressures	 to	 get	 the	 job	 done	 the	
participants	 engaged	 in	 a	 process	 of	 ‘reshaping	 practice’,	 highlighting	 what	
perioperative	 nurses	 actually	 do	 when	 they	 encounter	 barriers	 or	 pressures	 that	
compromise	 or	 limit	 their	 ability	 to	 get	 the	 job	 done.	 The	 findings	 indicate	 that	
perioperative	nurses	respond	to	pressure	to	get	the	job	done	by	working	in	several	
different	ways.	Ways	of	working	were	found	to	be:	complying	with	the	rules;	toeing	
the	 line;	 making	 errors;	 and	 breaking	 the	 rules.	 Whilst	 on	 most	 occasions	
participants	 practiced	 in	 accordance	with	 rules	 and	 standards,	 there	were	 several	
instances	 where	 they	 practiced	 in	 ways	 other	 than	 following	 the	 rules.	 The	
phenomena	of	‘feeling	pressured’	and	‘being	pressured’	were	present	during	many	
instances	of	rule	breaking.			
	
The	study	uncovers	the	role	that	being	pressured	and	feeling	pressured	plays	in	the	
participant’s	 decisions	 to	 reshape	 practice	 and	work	 in	ways	 other	 than	 following	
the	 rules.	 These	phenomena	have	not	been	explored	 in	other	 studies	and	as	 such	
this	 finding	 adds	 to	 our	 body	 of	 knowledge	 on	 the	 factors	 that	 impact	 on	 rule	
breaking.	
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Evaluation	of	the	study	
Evaluation	 of	 a	 study	 affords	 the	 opportunity	 to	 reflect	 on	 the	 research	 journey,	
consider	what	the	study	offers	to	the	audience	and	facilitate	clarification	of	both	the	
research	processes	and	 findings.	Evaluating	 the	 research	against	a	pre-determined	
set	of	 criteria	ensures	 that	 the	expectations	 for	a	grounded	 theory	 study	are	met.	
For	 this	 constructivist	 grounded	 theory	 study,	 the	criteria	of	 credibility,	originality,	
resonance	and	usefulness	proposed	by	Charmaz	(2014)	will	be	utilised.	
	
Credibility		
This	 study	 was	 designed	 using	 a	 constructivist	 grounded	 theory	 approach	 that	
recognises	 the	 intimate	 and	 reciprocal	 nature	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	
researcher	and	the	participants.	Issues	of	power	imbalance	and	the	professional	self	
and	 their	 potential	 impact	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 researcher	 and	 the	
participants	 were	 considered	 prior	 to	 entering	 the	 field.	 The	 writing	 of	 memos	
engaged	the	researcher	in	critical	reflexivity	that	in	turn	raised	self-awareness	of	the	
place	 of	 the	 researcher	 in	 the	 research	 process.	 The	 rigorous	 attention	 to	 the	
research	 design	 in	 terms	 of	 number	 of	 participants	 recruited	 and	 time	 spent	 in	
observing	and	 in-depth	 interviewing	 lends	weight	 to	 the	credibility	of	 the	 findings.	
The	 detailed	 field	 notes	 taken	 during	 observation	 coupled	with	 the	 recording	 and	
transcribing	of	interviews	ensured	the	sufficiency	of	data	to	support	the	claims	being	
made	and	to	enable	the	reader	to	form	an	independent	assessment	of	the	findings.		
	
Systematic	 comparisons	 were	 made	 between	 codes	 and	 codes,	 codes	 and	
categories,	categories	and	categories	and	significant	categories	were	then	elevated	
into	 the	 concepts	 that	 underpin	 the	 nascent	 substantive	 theory.	 This	 process	 is	
clearly	 articulated	 and	 documented	 within	 this	 thesis.	 The	 theory	 generated	 is	
culmination	 of	 the	 emergent	 concepts	 and	 the	 links	 and	 connections	 within	 and	
 213 
between	them.	The	theory	portrays	the	logical	links	between	the	gathered	data	and	
the	 analysis	 and	 arguments	 that	 ensued.	 The	 exemplars	 provided	 throughout	 the	
thesis	 provide	 abundant	 evidence	 to	 the	 reader	 to	 support	 the	 analysis,	 synthesis	
and	interpretation	of	the	findings.	My	experience	as	a	perioperative	nurse	enhances	
the	credibility	of	the	study	in	that	it	enabled	me	to	quickly	become	embedded	in	the	
setting;	 to	 observe	 and	 understand	 practices	 from	 a	 position	 of	 having	 relevant	
knowledge	and	skills;	to	accurately	record	observations	and	write	about	professional	
standards;	 to	 engage	 in	 discussion	 with	 participants	 about	 practices;	 and	 to	
accurately	interpretation	the	views	of	the	participants.	
	
Originality	
The	codes	developed	were	derived	from	the	data	and	in-vivo	codes	used	wherever	
possible	 as	 these	 represented	 telling	 statements	 made	 by	 the	 participants	 using	
their	 everyday	 language.	 For	 example,	 the	 codes	 ‘push,	 push,	 push’	 and	 ‘working	
with	 haste’	 that	 were	 later	 elevated	 to	 categories	 offered	 new	 insights	 to	 the	
experiences	of	the	participants	as	they	went	about	their	daily	activities,	in	particular	
the	feelings	of	pressure	to	get	the	 job	done.	The	rendering	of	the	data	 led	to	new	
insights	about	 factors	 that	enabled	or	constrained	working	 in	accordance	with	 the	
rules	 and	 the	 connection	 between	 ‘being	 pressured’	 and	 ‘feeling	 pressured’	 and	
reshaping	practice	 i.e.	deviating	 from	rules	and	standards.	This	work	 supports	and	
extends	 research	on	contributory	 factors	 to	adverse	events.	 It	aligns	with	work	by	
others	 on	 rule	 breaking,	 normalising	 of	 deviance,	 systems	 ambiguity	 and	 safer	
systems	 and	 extends	 this	 understanding	 further	 into	 the	 field	 of	 perioperative	
nursing	practice.	
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Resonance	
The	 developed	 categories	 and	 concepts	 (illustrated	 in	 diagram	 1	 in	 the	 previous	
chapter)	 portray	 the	 data	 in	 a	 meaningful	 way	 that	 is	 evocative	 of	 the	 lived	
experience	 of	 the	 participants.	 The	 names	 of	 the	 categories	 and	 concepts	 make	
sense	 of	 the	 data	 and	 render	 it	 in	 a	 way	 that	 facilitates	 the	 articulation	 of	 the	
substantive	theory.	The	substantive	theory	is	therefore	grounded	in	the	data.			
	
Throughout	 interviewing	 the	 participants	 shared	 their	 experiences	 and	 through	 a	
reciprocal	 process	 could	 make	 sense	 of	 practices	 that	 they	 had	 not	 necessarily	
considered	 previously.	 Many	 taken-for-granted	 aspects	 of	 their	 work	 were	 thus	
raised	 into	their	consciousness	and	this	process	engaged	them	in	critical	reflexivity	
and	helped	 them	make	 sense	of	 their	world.	This	 increasing	 self-awareness	of	 the	
participants	has	been	incorporated	into	this	thesis.	Some	of	my	writings	were	shared	
with	 the	 participants	 to	 seek	 clarification	 from	 them	 of	 observations	 made	 and	
responses	 they	 had	 given	 at	 previous	 interviews.	 This	 process	 of	 theoretical	
sampling	 helped	 to	 refine	 categories	 and	make	 sense	 of	 the	 data	 and	 offer	 them	
deeper	insights	into	their	world.	For	example,	when	discussing	with	the	participants	
those	 practices	 that	 did	 not	 comply	with	 the	 standards,	 they	 became	 aware	 of	 a	
hitherto	unknown	conflict	between	what	they	were	doing	versus	what	the	standards	
prescribed.	The	normalising	of	practices	that	were	not	in	accordance	with	rules	and	
standards	 render	 non-compliant	 practices	 invisible	 and	 it	 was	 the	 conversation	
between	 us	 at	 interview	 that	 uncovered	 this	 dissonance	 and	 led	 to	 new	
understanding	of	their	practice.		
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Usefulness	
The	analysis	of	the	data	is	presented	in	a	form	that	renders	the	findings	meaningful,	
readable	and	accessible.	This	thesis	brings	together	the	findings	into	a	coherent	and	
logical	whole	and	can	be	utilised	by	perioperative	nurses,	managers,	organisations	
and	 professional	 bodies	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 world	 of	 perioperative	 nursing,	
provide	 insight	 into	 the	 factors	 that	 fall	within	 their	 respective	 spheres	 of	 control	
and	to	inform	decisions	at	all	levels	on	how	to	make	surgery	safer.	The	research	was	
conducted	at	a	public	and	a	private	hospital	in	Tasmania	and	the	findings	articulated	
in	this	thesis	are	equally	attributable	to	both	settings.	 It	 is	highly	 likely	that	similar	
findings	 would	 be	 generated	 at	 other	 hospitals	 in	 other	 states	 of	 Australia	 and	
therefore	the	substantive	theory	has	general	applicability.		
	
The	 analysis	 has	 also	 raised	 areas	 that	 offer	 opportunity	 for	 further	 research	 into	
addressing	 systems	 ambiguity	 and	 better	 aligning	work	 as	 imagined	with	work	 as	
done.	 Exploring	 strategies	 that	 enhance	 coping	 strategies	 and	 resilience	 of	
perioperative	nurses	would	also	be	of	benefit	 to	 the	profession.	This	 research	has	
been	 situated	within	 the	extant	 literature	on	patient	 safety	and	 rule	breaking	and	
contributes	 to	 and	 extends	 our	 understanding	 of	 this	 topic.	 The	 benefits	 of	 this	
research	 are	 threefold.	 Firstly,	 it	 shines	 a	 light	 on	 the	 lived	 experiences	 of	
perioperative	 nurses	 and	makes	 visible	 the	 difficulties	 and	 challenges	 they	 face	 in	
delivering	 safe	 care	 in	 the	messy	 reality	 of	 practice.	 Secondly	 it	 offers	 a	 practical,	
principle-based	 approach	 to	 addressing	 patient	 safety	 through	 a	whole	 of	 system	
approach.	 Thirdly	 recommendations	 if	 implemented	 will	 contribute	 to	 enhancing	
system	and	patient	safety	thereby	minimising	the	risk	of	patient	harm.		
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Limitations	of	the	study	
All	 research	 approaches	 have	 limitations	 and	 it	 is	 important	 to	 choose	 the	 right	
methodology	 and	 research	 design	 for	 the	 research	 questions	 posed.	 Qualitative	
research	 is	 concerned	 with	 how	 social	 experience	 is	 created	 and	 given	 meaning	
(Charmaz	 2014)	 and	 the	 constructivist	 grounded	 theory	 approach	 used	 in	 this	
research	brought	to	life	the	experiences	of	the	perioperative	nurse	participants	and	
laid	bare	 the	messy	reality	of	 their	practice	world.	Ultimately	 the	credibility	of	 the	
research	lies	in	the	sufficiency	and	richness	of	the	data	and	its	conceptual	rendering	
by	the	researcher	into	a	substantive	theory	that	is	representative	of	the	world	of	the	
participants.	
Qualitative	 research	 is	 by	 its	 very	 nature,	 subjective	 and	 relies	 on	 the	 researcher	
who	 conducts	 it	 to	 interpret	 and	 represent	 the	 experiences	 of	 the	 participants.	
Readers	may	perceive	this	as	a	being	a	limitation.	A	constructivist	grounded	theory	
approach	 acknowledges	 that	 the	 researcher	 is	 ‘not	 neutral’	 and	 is	 ‘not	 just	 an	
observer’	 but	 is	 a	 participant	 in	 the	 research	 bringing	 his/her	 own	 knowledge,	
experiences,	values	and	assumptions	to	the	research	(Denzin	&	Lincoln	2005,	p.	27).	
The	 obligation	 is	 on	 the	 researcher	 to	 ‘be	 reflexive	 about	 what	 we	 bring	 to	 the	
scene,	what	we	see	and	how	we	see	 it’	 (Charmaz	2014)	and	by	engaging	 in	critical	
reflexivity	and	through	the	processes	of	memo	writing	and	theoretical	sampling	the	
researcher	 makes	 transparent	 how	 the	 codes,	 categories	 and	 concepts	 and	
ultimately	the	substantive	theory	are	arrived	at.		
	
The	 findings	 from	 this	 research	 emerged	 from	 observing	 and	 interviewing	 six	
participant	perioperative	nurses	in	one	public	and	one	private	hospital	in	Tasmania.	
The	 small	 number	 of	 participants	 may	 be	 considered	 a	 limitation	 but	 this	 is	 in	
keeping	with	other	qualitative	studies	 that	 seek	 to	explore	 the	 lived	experience	of	
participants.	 Notwithstanding	 the	 small	 number	 of	 participants,	 the	 findings	were	
 217 
common	 to	 both	 sites	 indicating	 that	 perioperative	 nurses	 working	 in	 both	 the	
public	 and	 private	 sector	 faced	 similar	 challenges	 and	 competing	 demands	 and	
responded	 in	 similar	 ways.	 Whilst	 the	 findings	 are	 not	 necessarily	 applicable	 to	
perioperative	nurses	working	in	different	facilities	across	Australia	or	in	other	parts	
of	 the	world,	 it	 is	 highly	 likely	 that	 some	 if	 not	 all	 the	 findings	will	 resonate	with	
many	perioperative	nurses.		
A	 further	 limitation	 is	 the	 potential	 for	 bias	 and	 issues	 of	 power	 from	 the	
background	of	the	researcher	and	many	of	the	participants	knowing	or	knowing	of	
the	researcher.	I	acknowledged	issues	relating	to	power	and	the	professional	self	on	
commencement	 of	 the	 study	 with	 the	 process	 of	 memo	 writing	 and	 engaging	 in	
critical	reflexivity	built	into	the	research	design	to	address	these	concerns.		
Recommendations	
This	 research	has	 identified	a	 range	of	 factors	 that	 constrain	or	enable	working	 in	
accordance	with	rules	and	standards.	These	factors	can	lead	to	the	phenomenon	of	
‘being	 pressured’	 and	 ‘feeling	 pressured’	 and	 this	 pressure	 in	 turn	 becomes	 a	
constraining	factor.	No	single	strategy	will	offer	a	resolution	to	the	pressure	felt	by	
perioperative	 nurses	 whereas	 a	 multipronged	 approach	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 be	
effective.	 It	 is	 paramount	 that	 any	 approach	 to	 addressing	 the	 findings	 from	 this	
research	includes	the	employing	organisation,	the	profession,	the	nursing	education	
sector	and	individual	perioperative	nurses.	The	recommendations	that	follow	reflect	
the	need	to	implement	strategies	across	several	areas.		
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The	organisation	
1. Adopt	the	Safety	II	approach	of	thinking	about	how	work	is	actually	done	and	
how	to	ensure	things	go	right,	to	shift	the	organisation’s	focus	to	effectively	
achieving	 the	goal	of	delivering	 safe	care	 rather	 than	on	ways	 to	avoid	 the	
anti-goal	of	avoiding	incidents.		
2. Harness	 the	knowledge	and	experience	of	perioperative	nurses	and	engage	
them	 in	 discussions	 about	 ‘work	 as	 done’,	 exploring	multiple	 and	 different	
views	on	safety	events	and	current	 system	 issues	 to	better	understand	 the	
demands,	pressure,	resources	and	constraints	that	affect	performance.	This	
will	highlight	 the	 trade-offs,	adjustments	and	adaptations	 through	 the	eyes	
of	those	doing	the	work	and	reveal	the	aspects	of	the	system	that	should	be	
the	focus	of	further	investigation	and	learning.		
3. Discuss	openly	with	clinicians	about	ways	of	working	other	than	following	the	
rules	 to	 bring	 violations	 to	 the	 fore	 leading	 to	 improvement	 in	 safety	
systems.	 Engaging	 staff	 in	 dialogue	 about	 practices	 vulnerable	 to	
workarounds	could	also	prove	fruitful.		
4. Clearly	communicate	those	violations	that	will	not	be	tolerated	and	manage	
individual	 performance	 appropriately	 where	 ongoing	 violations	 may	
potentially	lead	to	patient	harm.	
5. Recognise	 the	 value	 of	 teamwork	 in	 patient	 safety	 and	 work	 to	 establish	
teams	based	on	skill	mix	and	familiarity	of	team	members	with	each	other,	
the	surgeon	and	the	speciality.		
6. Reduce	the	volume	and	complexity	of	rules	that	health	care	professionals	are	
expected	 to	 follow	and	embrace	strategies	such	as	adopting	 the	standards,	
guidelines	and	protocols	promulgated	by	professional	bodies	only	publishing	
local	 policies	 where	 there	 are	 variations.	 In	 addition,	 limiting	 length,	
improving	readability	and	removing	out	of	date,	 irrelevant	or	trivial	policies	
will	also	prove	beneficial.		
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7. Focus	on	key	standards	that	have	biggest	impact	on	safety	and	ensure	100%	
compliance	with	these.	
8. Ensure	 an	 accessible,	 simple,	 easy	 to	 use	 system	 for	 reporting	 problems,	
underpinned	by	a	culture	that	promotes	problem	sharing	and	solving	rather	
than	finger	pointing	and	blame	to	more	effectively	manage	violations.		
The	profession	
1. Develop	 strategies	 to	 engage	 perioperative	 nurses	 to	 use	 the	 standards	 as	
the	benchmark	for	best	and	safest	practice.	
2. Establish	forums	for	perioperative	nurses	to	provide	feedback	and	discussion	
on	‘work	as	done’	and	use	these	to	inform	development	and	amendment	of	
standards.	
3. Move	towards	principle	based	rather	prescriptive	standards	to	facilitate	the	
use	of	a	range	of	techniques	that	may	achieve	the	same	outcome.	
	
The	nursing	education	sector	
1. Adopt	a	non-technical	skills	framework	such	as	the	Scrub	Practitioners	List	of	
Intraoperative	 Non-Technical	 Skills	 (SPLINTS),	 to	 enhance	 the	 development	
non-technical	skills	in	post-graduate	perioperative	nursing	programs.	
2. Enhance	the	resiliency	of	nurses	 to	better	manage	the	pressure	 inherent	 in	
the	clinical	setting.	
The	individual	perioperative	nurse	
1. Articulate	the	knowledge	embedded	 in	the	practice	of	perioperative	nursing	
to	bring	to	life	everyday	practices	and	offer	them	up	for	scrutiny	and	testing	
to	ensure	they	are	safe.	
2. Communicate	 with	 the	 organisation	 and	 professional	 body	 those	
circumstances	 and	 situations	 where	 standards	 and	 rules	 are	 seen	 to	 be	
unnecessary,	 out	 of	 date,	 inaccessible,	 unreadable,	 unworkable	 and/or	
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unable	to	be	complied	with	or	where	there	is	a	more	effective	or	efficient	way	
of	working	to	achieve	the	same	or	a	similar	outcome.	
3. Find	 your	 voice	 and	 speak	 up	 where	 practices	 of	 others	 are	 contrary	 to	
standards	 or	 breach	 policies	 and	 report	 where	 behaviour	 of	 colleagues	
becomes	reckless.	
4. Engage	 with	 the	 professional	 body	 that	 represents	 the	 speciality	 and	
participate	 in	 education	 to	 keep	 up-to-date	 with	 amended	 standards,	 new	
research	and	evidence-based	practices	
5. Use	the	ACORN	standards	as	the	benchmark	for	best	and	safest	practice	for	
self	and	colleagues	and	the	patients.	
Opportunities	for	further	research	
1. The	substantive	theory	emerging	from	this	research	can	be	further	
developed	through	operationalising	the	concepts	as	constructs	that	can	be	
measured	to	empirically	test	relationships	between	the	concepts	identified.		
	
Ethical	issues	
There	 are	 ethical	 issues	 posed	 by	 rule	 breaking.	 Perioperative	 nurses,	 in	 common	
with	other	nurses,	are	 frequently	 faced	with	ethical	dilemmas	 in	delivering	patient	
care.	They	face	daily	conflicts	between	doing	the	right	thing	(following	rules),	acting	
as	patient	advocate,	maintaining	collegial	 relationships	with	other	members	of	 the	
team	and	meeting	the	demands	placed	on	the	individual	by	the	organisation.	Putting	
patients	 first	 and	 doing	 no	 harm	 is	 the	 ethical	 commitment	 of	 every	 professional	
because	 patients	 rely	 not	 only	 on	 the	 skills	 and	 knowledge	 of	 nurses	 but	 also	 on	
their	 integrity	 (Hill,	 J	2012).	Having	 integrity	means	following	your	moral	or	ethical	
convictions	and	doing	the	right	thing	in	all	circumstances,	even	if	no	one	is	watching	
you.	This	can	be	a	dilemma	when	faced	with	the	competing	demands	present	in	the	
operating	theatre	at	any	given	time	and	has	important	implications	for	perioperative	
nurses	in	terms	of	the	choices	they	make	and	the	priorities	they	set.	
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Summary	
Whilst	 there	 is	 debate	 on	 the	 accuracy	 of	 adverse	 event	 rates	 quoted	 in	
international	 and	 national	 studies,	 patients	 undergoing	 surgery	 continue	 to	 suffer	
preventable	 adverse	 events	 and	 the	 consequences	 can	 be	 severe	 for	 the	 patient.	
The	 operating	 theatre	 is	 a	 complex	 and	 dynamic	 environment	 characterised	 by	 a	
high	level	of	task	performance	and	low	tolerance	for	error	and	perioperative	nurses	
have	 a	 key	 role	 in	 the	 detection	 and	 prevention	 of	 errors	 and	 adverse	 events.	
Workplace	 culture,	 communication	 and	 teamwork,	 the	 level	 of	 distractions	 and	
interruptions	 and	 personal	 and	 psychological	 factors	 create	 an	 environment	
vulnerable	to	the	occurrence	of	errors	and	adverse	events.			
	
The	reasons	that	adverse	events	occur	are	complex	and	multifactorial	with	more	
recent	studies	acknowledging	organisational	deficiencies	and	latent	failures	but	also	
recognising	the	abilities	of	the	individual	practitioners	to	adapt	and	respond	to	
system	changes.	In	adapting	and	responding	to	changes,	perioperative	nurses	adopt	
ways	of	working	to	meet	the	demands	of	their	work.		
	
As	previously	described	 the	data	 shows	 that	decisions	 to	work	 in	ways	other	 than	
following	 the	 rules	 are	 influenced	 by	 several	 factors	 including	 organisational	
conditions,	 ambiguity	 of	 rule,	 task	 and	 responsibility,	 team	 characteristics	 and	
individual	 characteristics.	 These	 factors	 construct	 the	 context	 within	 which	
perioperative	nurses	practice	and	create	 the	phenomena	 of	 ‘being	pressured’	and	
‘feeling	 pressured’.	 The	 participants	 respond	 to	 this	 pressure	 by	 engaging	 in	 a	
process	of	reshaping	their	behaviour.	Together	these	concepts	form	the	substantive	
theory	 that	 perioperative	 nurses	 ‘reshape	 their	 practice	 in	 response	 to	 being	
pressured	and	feeling	pressured	to	get	the	job	done’. 
	
Without	deviation	from	the	norm,	progress	is	not	possible	(Frank	Zappa)	
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Appendix	2:	Participant	consent	form	
	
Name	of	Researcher:	Sharon	Bingham	PhD	Candidate	
Study	 Title:	 Getting	 the	 job	 done	 -	 ways	 of	 working	 in	 Perioperative	 Nursing	 and	
implications	for	practice	and	patient	safety.	
	
This	consent	form	is	for	all	participants	in	the	abovementioned	study.	
1. I	agree	to	take	part	in	the	research	study	named	above.	
2. I	have	read	and	understood	the	Information	Sheet	for	this	study.	
3. The	nature	of	the	study	has	been	explained	to	me.	
4. I	understand	that	my	participation	in	this	study	will	be	by:	
i. Observation	of	practice	and	follow	up	interview	or	
ii. Interview	or	
iii. Group	interview	
5. I	also	understand	that	the	interviews	and	focus	group	meetings	will	be	recorded.	
6. I	understand	that	there	are	no	foreseeable	risks	associated	with	participation	in	
this	study.		
7. I	understand	that	all	research	data	will	be	securely	stored	on	the	University	of				
Tasmania’s	premises	for	five	(5)	years	from	date	of	publication	of	the	study	results	
and	will	then	be	destroyed.		
8. Any	questions	I	have	asked	have	been	answered	to	my	satisfaction.	
9. I	understand	the	researcher	will	maintain	confidentiality	and	that	any	information	
I	supply	to	the	researcher	will	be	used	only	for	the	purposes	of	the	research.	I	also	
understand	that	if	participating	in	a	group	interview	all	participants	will	be	
requested	to	keep	discussions	confidential,	but	this	cannot	be	guaranteed.	
10. I	understand	that	the	results	of	the	study	will	be	published	so	that	I	cannot	be	
identified	as	a	participant.		
11. I	understand	that	my	participation	is	voluntary	and	that	I	may	withdraw	at	any	
time	without	any	effect.	I	understand	that	I	will	not	be	able	to	withdraw	my	data	
after	data	analysis	has	commenced.	
	
Participants	name:	
	
Participant’s	signature:	 Date:	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Statement	by	Investigator	
I	have	explained	the	project	and	the	implications	of	participation	in	it	to	this	volunteer	and	
I	 believe	 that	 the	 consent	 is	 informed	 and	 that	 he/she	 understands	 the	 implications	 of	
participation.	
	
Investigator’s	name:	
	
Investigator’s	signature:	 Date:	
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Participant	information	sheet			
	
Study	 Title:	 Getting	 the	 job	 done	 -	 ways	 of	 working	 in	 Perioperative	 Nursing	 –	
implications	for	practice	and	patient	safety.	
This	information	sheet	is	for	all	participants	in	the	study	named	above.	
	
Invitation	
You	have	been	invited	to	participate	in	this	study	conducted	by	Sharon	Bingham	in	partial	
fulfilment	of	a	PhD,	under	the	supervision	of	Professor	Kenneth	Walsh	and	Dr	Karen	Ford.	
	
What	is	the	purpose	of	this	study?	
The	aim	of	this	research	is	to	better	understand	the	relationship	between	the	ways	that	
perioperative	nurses	work	and	patient	safety	so	that	perioperative	nurses	can	minimise	
the	risk	of	harm	to	 their	patients	and	patients	can	remain	 free	 from	 injury	during	 their	
surgery.		
	
Why	have	I	been	invited	to	participate?	
You	 have	 been	 invited	 to	 participate	 in	 this	 study	 because	 you	 are	 a	 practicing	
perioperative	nurse.	
Your	involvement	in	this	study	is	purely	voluntary	and	there	are	no	consequences	should	
you	decide	not	to	participate	or	to	withdraw	from	the	study.	
	
What	will	I	be	asked	to	do?	
Your	participation	may	be	in	the	form	of:	
1. Observation	of	practice	and	follow	up	interview	or	
2. Interview	or	
3. Group	interview	
Interviews	will	be	recorded	to	enable	the	researcher	more	time	to	participate	and	these	
recordings	will	be	transcribed	and	analysed	following	the	interview.		
Participants	will	have	the	opportunity	to	review	and	correct	a	transcript.	
All	data	will	be	treated	confidentially.	If	participating	in	a	group	interview,	all	participants	
will	be	requested	to	keep	discussions	confidential,	but	this	cannot	be	guaranteed.	
	
Are	there	any	possible	benefits	from	participation	in	this	study?	
Your	 participation	 in	 this	 study	 will	 benefit	 the	 profession	 of	 perioperative	 nursing	 by	
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improving	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 different	 the	ways	 perioperative	 nurses	work	 and	
why	they	are	adopted.	A	clearer	understanding	will	contribute	to	discussion	and	debate	
about	the	role	of	the	perioperative	nurse	in	patient	safety	and	inform	decision	making	in	
relation	to	steps	that	may	need	to	be	taken	to	address	those	ways	of	working	that	may	
be	have	unintended	consequences	for	patients.		
	
Are	there	any	possible	risks	from	participation	in	this	study?	
There	are	no	foreseeable	risks	with	the	study	
	
What	if	I	change	my	mind	during	or	after	the	study?	
Participants	 are	 free	 to	withdraw	 at	 any	 time	 during	 the	 study	 and	 can	 do	 so	without	
providing	an	explanation.	It	may	not	however	be	possible	to	remove	your	data	from	the	
study	once	data	analysis	has	commenced.		
	
What	will	happen	to	the	information	when	this	study	is	over?	
The	raw	data	will	be	kept	for	5	years	from	date	of	first	publication	of	the	thesis.	The	data	
will	be	stored	on	University	of	Tasmania	premises	and	will	then	be	destroyed.		
	
How	will	the	results	of	the	study	be	published?	
The	results	from	the	study	will	be	published	as	a	thesis	in	2017.	The	thesis	will	be	made	
available	 via	 the	 University	 of	 Tasmania	 library	 website	 and	 to	 individuals	 on	 request.	
Results	may	also	be	published	 in	academic	 journals.	 	 Individual	participants	will	 not	be	
identifiable	in	the	publication	of	the	results.	
	
What	if	I	have	questions	about	this	study?	
If	you	have	any	questions	I	can	be	contacted	by	email	on	Sharon.bingham@utas.edu.au	
or	by	mobile	on	0447	206	095.	
My	supervisors	can	be	contacted	as	follows:	
Professor	Kenneth	Walsh,	Professor	of	Translational	Research	Nursing	and	Midwifery,	
Conjoint	University	of	Tasmania	and	THO-South.	Email	Kenneth.walsh@utas.edu.au		or	
phone	03	6226	7375.	
Dr	Karen	Ford,	ADON	Research	and	Practice	Development,	Nursing	and	Midwifery,	THO-
South	and	Senior	Clinical	Lecturer,	School	of	Health	Sciences,	University	of	Tasmania.	
Email	Karen.ford@dhhs.tas.gov.au	or	phone	03	62228530.	
	
This	study	has	been	approved	by	the	Health	and	Medical	Research	Ethics	Committee.	 If	
you	have	any	concerns	or	complaints	about	the	conduct	of	this	study,	please	contact	the	
Executive	 officer	 of	 the	 HREC	 (Tasmania)	 Network	 on	 03	 62266254	 or	 email	
human.ethics@utas.edu.au	 The	 Executive	 Officer	 is	 the	 person	 nominated	 to	 receive	
complaints	 from	 research	 participants.	 Please	 quote	 ethics	 reference	 number	
H0014736.	 This	 information	 sheet	 is	 for	 you	 to	 keep.	 You	will	 be	 requested	 to	 sign	 a	
consent	form	confirming	your	agreement	to	participate	in	this	study.		
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Guidelines	for	conducting	intensive	interviewing	(Charmaz,	2014)	
	
Do	
1. Listen,	listen	and	listen	some	more	
2. Try	to	understand	the	described	events,	beliefs	and	feelings	from	your	research	
participant’s	point	of	view,	not	your	own	
3. Aim	to	be	empathetic	and	supportive	
4. Build	trust	
5. Encourage	your	research	participant	to	state	things	in	his	or	her	own	terms	
6. Let	the	participants	explore	a	question	before	you	ask	any	specific	probes	
7. Ask	the	participant	to	elaborate,	clarify	or	give	examples	of	his	or	her	views	
8. Be	sensitive	to	the	participant’s	non-verbal	responses	to	you	and	your	questions	
9. Revise	a	question	that	doesn’t	work	
10. Be	willing	to	take	time	for	unanticipated	issues	that	might	come	up	
11. Leave	your	participant	feeling	positive	about	the	interview	experience	and	about	
self	
12. Express	your	appreciation	for	the	opportunity	to	talk	with	him	her.		
	
Don’t	
1. Interrupt	
2. Correct	the	research	participant	about	his	or	her	own	views,	experiences	or	
feelings	
3. Interrogate	or	confront	
4. Rely	on	‘do	you’	or	‘did	you’	probes	(these	elicit	‘yes’	or	‘no’	responses,	rather	
than	information	and	reflections)	
5. Ask	‘why’	questions	(‘Why’	questions	are	generally	taken	as	hostile	challenges	in	
numerous	cultures.	Instead	phrase	questions	in	these	ways	‘Tell	me	about…,’	
Could	you	tell	me	more	about….,’	How	did….,’	What	was….,’)	
6. Ask	loaded	questions	
7. Expect	you	research	participants	to	answer	questions	that	you	would	be	
unwilling	to	answer	
8. Take	an	authoritarian	stance	in	the	interview	(It	is	a	privilege	to	share	someone’s	
private	views	and	personal	experience	–	establish	equality,	not	authority)	
9. Ignore	or	gloss	over	what	the	participant	wants	to	talk	about.	Be	willing	to	take	
more	time	if	need	be	
10. Forget	to	follow	up	and	thus	overlook	clarifying	points	and/or	asking	for	further	
thoughts	and	information	
11. Truncate	the	interview	to	get	it	over	in	time	
12. Leave	when	the	participant	seems	distressed	
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Appendix	5:	Sample	interview	questions	
	
Opening	statement	
	
Thank	you	for	allowing	me	to	observe	you	as	you	practiced.	I	am	interested	in	
understanding	what	was	happening	and	what	you	were	thinking	and	feeling	during	
that	episode	of	practice	and	would	like	to	ask	you	some	questions	relating	to	that.		
	
Initial	open-ended	questions	
	
1. Could	you	run	through	what	you	were	doing	when	you	were	…….?		
2. What	was	happening?	
3. What	happened	next?	
4. Is	that	what	normally	happens?	
5. What	do	you	do	if	you	get	stuck?	
6. What	things	do	you	find	helpful	in	dealing	with….?	
	
Intermediate	questions	
	
7. Was	there	anything	happening	that	was	influencing	you	in	any	way?	
8. Was	there	anything	getting	in	the	way	of	what	you	were	doing?	
9. Do	those	things	normally	get	in	the	way?	
10. How	do	you	normally	deal	with	those	situations?	
11. Have	you	had	previous	experiences	with	this	type	of	situation?	
12. 	Did	this	affect	how	you	handled	this	situation?	
13. Can	you	tell	me	what	you	thought	the	outcome	was	for	the	patient?		
14. As	you	reflect	on	this	episode	do	you	think	you	would	do	anything	
differently	next	time?	
	
Ending	questions	
15. Is	there	something	else	you	think	I	should	know	to	help	me	better	
understand	your	experience?	
16. Do	you	have	any	questions	for	me?	
	
 
